INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE
TRANSFORMATIONAL CONCEPTS, PAST AND PRESENT
APPROACHES & STRATEGIES FOR TRANSFORMATION

Introduction

Welcome to the NDU elective “US Military in Transformation.” I look forward to our first seminar on Tuesday, September 18, and to meeting you. We’ll meet from 1535 to 1730, room to be determined soon. My purpose in writing this letter is to share my thoughts about the overview of the course and the goals for the first class. You are a diverse group, and the course design reflects both your background and inputs. The objectives, issues for discussion, and reading assignments are at the end of the letter.

The lesson begins with an overview of the course.

• In the first two lessons we will address the characteristics of military revolutions, approaches to US military transformation over the past decade or so, and the debate over US transformation efforts. At the end of lesson 2, students will begin discussing the topics they will present during the last class.
• Lessons 3 to 5 will focus on the preconditions for change in scientific, military and other environments, examples of successful and unsuccessful military transformations, and the changing nature of warfare. This section also will address criticisms that military innovation is best addressed by focusing on specific operational problems and concepts. It will set the stage for later discussions about leading organizational change.
• In lesson 6, Dr. Binnendijk will discuss the potential need for multiple transformations to address diverse challenges like: future peer competitors, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and possibly homeland defense. The differing, and often conflicting, implications of each of these situations should make this a lively session. Student presentation topics should be chosen by the end of this class.
• Outside experts will come in to talk with us about Air, Naval and Ground Force transformations in Lessons 7-9.
• In lesson 10 we’ll move farther afield to discuss changes that will be needed to effect transformations in inter-agency activities within the US government, and in relations with allies and coalition partners, as well as within the Department of Defense (DoD). This includes the operational innovations and organizational adaptions that must accompany technological change and systems development to achieve either transformation or genuine innovation, and the leadership challenges they create at all levels. In lesson 11 we’ll extend this to look at the future of national security transformation itself in an uncertain world of complex contingencies with a wide variety of partners, including non-state actors.
• Lesson 12 will be devoted to student presentations and the course wrap-up.
• At the end of the semester there will be a “bonus lesson” to provide materials that examine lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and elsewhere, and how they may apply to the “long war.” The intent is to provide students with access to online and other references that are being continuously updated and that you can use even after the course is over.

After the course summary, we’ll introduce several concepts which will be expanded in subsequent weeks. We’ll start by examining the ten military revolutions since the fourteenth century, and the seven historical lessons from them, that Andy Krepenevich describes in his article: “Cavalry to Computer, the Pattern of Military Revolutions.”

With this as background, we’ll begin to look at transformation as it has been emphasized within DoD for nearly a decade. Transformation is defined as a wide-ranging process of major changes in which the military is restructuring and acquiring new capabilities to be able to adapt rapidly to emerging threats. It responds to several dynamics: new U.S. defense (and national security) goals to meet a changing security environment, new forms of warfare and combat, and rapidly advancing technology (especially information technology). However, some question whether transformation still is a priority for the Department’s leadership after VADM Cebrowski’s death and Secretary Rumsfeld’s departure, and it’s important to address this issue.

In point of fact, the world is changing, the threat is changing, the national security environment is changing and the capabilities of the US military will have to change also, whoever is in charge. In June 2007, Secretary Gates met with senior Defense leaders and confirmed many of the existing transformational goals as priorities for the remainder of this administration. Deputy Secretary England’s memo of August 9, 2007 reinforces this. But it is interesting that many of the memo’s priorities broaden the focus of “forces transformation” to address management processes, personnel questions and inter-agency questions. Energy issues also are on the list. Some priorities doubtless will change after 2008, but it’s unlikely that future leaders will call for the military to remain static.

Improved battlespace awareness and precision strike weapons had significant impacts on the battlefield during Operation Desert Storm. In the mid-1990s, an underlying premise of Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 was that the military would be able to use an information-driven “system of systems” to concentrate long-range firepower, instead of massing battle platforms against enemy strength. Key concepts moved beyond mobilization and mass to emphasize speed, information, precision and lethality. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 created new goals for transformation: to protect the homeland and our information networks; to project and sustain power in distant theaters and deny our enemies sanctuary there; and to leverage information and space technology. Meanwhile, each of the Services developed new operational concepts to implement Joint Vision 2020. These, in turn, have been affected by lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). QDR 2006 continued in this vein, focusing on the need for speed, flexibility, and agility to fight the “long war” and meet a wide range of future challenges. The excerpts from Hans Binnendijk and Dick Kugler’s book Seeing the Elephant analyze seven important contributions to the literature on US defense strategy, including the 2006 QDR.

Similar to transformations of the past, today’s effort is a fluid process. It responds to diverse imperatives, follows the course of experiment and discovery as new technologies and concepts emerge, and is animated by vigorous debate and dialogue. One part of the debate involves choosing a transformation strategy. Some advocate a “steady as you go” evolution, while others favor a “leap ahead” strategy, and a third group seeks a balanced, measured transformation. Whichever strategy the Pentagon adopts, however, must balance near-term readiness, mid-term modernization, and the long-term pursuit of “breakthrough” technologies and warfighting concepts to stay ahead of impending challenges and provide agility in the face of an increasingly uncertain security environment.

Within this debate, however, some challenge the concept of transformation itself. They argue that a military cannot be “directed” to transform, and that true innovation is more likely to stem from responses to specific military problems than from “top-down,” overarching approaches. Still others note that leaders need to be developed and mechanisms put in place to sustain the innovations and transformations that occur. Others ask if there should be multiple transformations--to address threats from major peer competitors while meeting the future needs of stabilization and reconstruction, and asymmetric or irregular challenges in homeland defense.

Understanding this debate will be an important element of this class. In fact, finding a balance among these diverse views is essential. Transformation detached from actual military problems will not be effective and, worse, will divert energy and resources from real issues that put people’s lives at risk. At the same time, the information revolution is changing the way we live, the way we do business, and the way our children think. Parallel revolutions in biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics, energy and cognitive sciences also will have enormous, inter-related impacts that are poorly understood. To wait until the military instantiations of these trends are recognized would seem to condemn us to keep shooting behind the rabbit. In any case, it is clear that technology is not enough---people, processes and technologies must be co-evolved together and, in some cases, radical changes in institutions and governance processes are warranted. Eliot Cohen addresses these multi-faceted issues in his article "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs."

Moreover, DoD’s mission also may be changing. National Security is being defined more and more broadly—the Department is being involved in activities that extend well beyond its traditional role of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Assignments range from building the capacity of partner nations overseas, to supporting stabilization and reconstruction operations, to providing increased support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, both abroad and at home, as well as to combat. Many are concerned that the military is being asked to take on roles for which it is neither resourced nor well-suited. Areas such as battlefield medicine and strategic communication also are changing in fundamental ways. All this is complicated by the fact that these transformations are taking place in the middle of a war, and with projections of an increasingly austere fiscal environment. Together, these will challenge leaders at all levels—not just very senior decision-makers. The true test of transformation is whether it lets people focus on the right vision and goals, and then helps them decide and implement quickly to achieve effective results.

The transformation of the U.S. military is thus a complex and demanding endeavor whose success is not guaranteed. Coherent strategies are needed to achieve core transformation objectives, but entrepreneurial approaches at the “edges” of the organization also need to be encouraged to respond rapidly to changing conditions. Throughout the transformation process the military must be able to accomplish the missions it is assigned, while considering the effects of transformation on the rest of the US government, allies and coalition partners, and others.

A final thought. John Gaddis, the distinguished professor of military and naval history at Yale, observed “…to teach without being talked back to is, I think, not to teach at all.” Lt. Gen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (ret) once hoped that his class would be an “intellectual gun fight.” I very much feel the same and look forward to an exciting and stimulating course.

Objectives

1. Begin to understand the origins, dynamics, and lasting significance of previous revolutions in military affairs, as well as past U.S. transformation efforts, their successes, shortcomings, and enduring influences.
2. Understand the origins and nature of today’s transformation, especially how the information revolution and the evolving national security environment is shaping the U.S. military’s approach to transformation.
3. Introduce recent literature on US national security strategy, including the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Examine its implications for transformation.
4. Begin to considered how new threats, missions, and requirements, along with changes in the nature and conduct of war, will influence DoD’s strategic framework for evaluating and developing new technologies, organizational structures, operational concepts, training, and doctrine for transformation.
5. Introduce some of the constraints or impediments that DoD faces in pursuing transformation, such as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system, Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and acquisition processes, Service cultures, Congressional issues, and technological barriers.
   

Issues for Discussion

1. What is transformation? How influential is it? How does it apply in a range of environments, from the back streets of Third World towns to threats in the future from a peer competitor?
2. What were the origins and effects of previous RMAs? What lessons can be applied to today’s transformation? Does the historical record reveal a pattern of “best” practices regarding how transformation is best pursued?
3. What kind of capabilities will the new U.S. defense strategy and global geostrategic environment need in the future? Is transformation likely to produce such forces and capabilities by virtue of its own dynamic, or will high-level strategic direction be needed in order to foster this outcome?
4. What is at the heart of transformation: technology, operational concepts, organizational structures, education, training? How do you prioritize them?
5. How can transformation best be pursued? Is transformation best achieved by embracing a single strategic design imposed from above or by blending together multiple designs that are pursued through a pluralistic process of activity in many quarters?
6. How should DoD balance modernization and recapitalization with the pursuit of revolutionary technologies, platforms, and weapon systems?

Required Reading
Krepinevich, Andrew F. "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions." The National Interest. Fall 1994. pp. 30-42. The article outlines 10 military revolutions. (handout or LexisNexis)

Binnendijk, Hans and Richard L. Kugler. Seeing the Elephant. National Defense University Press and Potomac Books, 2006. Chapter 1, Introduction (pp. 1-13), and the latter part of Chapter 6 (pp. 236-275). The book summarizes debates over US national security policy through reviews of a wide range of articles. [Book to be handed out]

Deputy Secretary of Defense memo of August 9, 2007, "DoD Transformation Priorities." The memo outines 25 initiatives to be taken during the rest of this adminstration to "prevail in the GWOT, strengthen joint warfighting capabilities, focus on people, and transform enterprise management."

Cohen, Eliot A. "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs." Journal of Strategic Studies, September, 2004. The article addresses four general problems associated with RMAs and Transformation: (1) abstraction of RMA theorizing from the world of geopolitics; (2) a focus on technology at the expense of organization, doctrine, and manpower; (3) a tendency to depict transformation as something that happens top-down, rather than bottom-up; and (4) a failure to look at the response to RMA-type capabilities on the part of weaker opponents. Prof Cohen concludes that it is only by looking at these four aspects of military affairs in our time that we can truly estimate the possibilities of military transformation. He also notes that there is reason to think that a major change in the character of warfare itself has occurred. (PROQUEST)

Supplemental Reading

Statement of VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), Director of the Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee. April 9, 2002. (7 pp) Summarizes the rationale for transformation and the importance of anticipating change.

Binnendijk, Hans and Richard L. Kugler."Choosing a Strategy." Transforming America's Military. ed. Hans Binnendijk. National Defense University Press. 2002. pp. 57-97. (Book to be handed out)

Rumsfeld, Donald H. "Transforming the Military." Foreign Affairs. May-June 2002. pp. 20-32. Lays out the rationale for transformation from the Secretary’s perspective. (PROQUEST)

Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR). February 6, 2006. (especially pp. v-ix). The 2006 QDR tested the conclusions of the 2001 QDR; applied lessons learned since 9/11, and tested assumptions about the continuously changing nature of the world.

Joint Vision 2020, June 2000. “ (especially Section 3, pp. 8-16) Articulates the Chairman’s vision for “full spectrum dominance.”

Barnett, Thomas P.M. “The Pentagon’s New Map.” Esquire. March 2003. The first part of the article introduces Barnett’s basic concepts about the “Core” vs. the “Gap.” He has expanded on this theme in subsequent books. His blog is one of the most prolific on National Security subjects.

Hone Thomas. “Understanding Transformation.” Transformation Trends. January 2004. Hone summarizes Frederick Kagan’s critique that transformation efforts are two airpower-focused, and provides counter-arguments.

Krause, Merrick E. "Decision Dominance: Exploiting Transformational Asymmetries." Defense Horizons. National Defense University Press. February 2003. Introduces “decision dominance” as an operating concept to unify various transformational themes.

Davis, Paul K., David C. Gompert, R.J. Hillstad, Stuart E. Johnson. Transforming the Force: Suggestions for Defense Strategy. RAND Issue Paper, 1998. Recommend read down to “SecDef Rude Questions” and the “Conclusions” section at the end.