| In this session we examined
how the labs have been performing in the post Cold-War era as Government-owned-Government-operated
(GOGO) organizations and discussed alternative governance models
that might enhance their effectiveness.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States maintained an edge over
its adversaries by fielding technologically superior warfighting
systems. This strategy depended on a strong research and development
(R&D) effort in both the public and private sectors. The community
of Military labs in the Department of Defense (DoD) played an essential
role in the overall effort. Because of their importance during the
Cold War, defense planners focused on ways to improve and strengthen
these labs.
The end of the Cold War, however, shifted the focus away from laboratory
improvement toward consolidation, closure, realignment, and personnel
downsizing. Scrutiny of the labs greatly increased as a stream of
Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) and other cost-reduction efforts
sought to decrease their roles and size. Because these actions focused
almost exclusively on "efficiency," little attention was
paid to improving the "effectiveness" of the labs-their
ability to carry out their assigned missions. Most activity directed
at improving lab operation has dealt with incremental modifications
of the current governance model (Government-owned-Government-operated
(GOGO) organizations). Many studies point out that this governance
model puts these labs at a great disadvantage and complicates their
ability to accomplish their assigned missions. This seminar discussed
several potential alternative governance models for the labs with
emphasis on the Federated Center Laboratory (or Multi-Centered Model),
the Government-owned Contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratory and Government
Corporation laboratory models.
We are very fortunate to have had Dr.
Tim Coffey, former Director of the Naval Research Laboratory
and Dr. John Lyons, former Director
of the Army Research Laboratory and the National Bureau of Standards
to frame the issue for us and lead the discussion.
Dr. Tim Coffey spoke about the necessity for attracting and retaining
a technically competent Federal workforce in relation to the issue
of governance within the DOD Labs.
Although the official government organizational flow-charts are
relatively simple, in reality the bureaucracy is an overly complex
system of regulatory organizations. As a result, a large amount
is spent on human capital to meet the requirements of this highly
regulatory environment. To address this issue, three alternatives
might be considered: implementing incremental modifications to the
status quo; shifting towards Government Owned Contractor Operated
(GOCO); or transforming to a “Government Corporation”
model.
Maintaining the status quo seems to be viable only if DOD Labs
can be shielded from encroaching bureaucracy. However, history indicates
this is not likely after several years of few results and great
resistance under programs such as LDP, LQIP, and the Reinvention
initiative. Furthermore, the personnel demonstration pilot program
has become watered down and is in jeopardy. It seems that attacking
problems independently under this paradigm is too difficult and
marginal changes don’t tend to maintain the desired level
of personnel quality.
Another option might be to convert operations to GOCO where Lab
employees are now contractors. A few successful examples already
exist such as SANDIA, Los Alamos, and Livermore. However, to go
this route will require a waiver of the Government’s cost-benefit
analysis provision (in 10 USC 2461), as well as legislation to waive
payment of severance pay. Although more flexibility could potentially
be achieved, and subsequently higher retention of quality personnel,
the cost in the long run may be higher and the Labs could lose their
unique position in the service. This avenue may also open the door
to more political influence over the Labs.
A third option might be to redesign the Labs as a “Government
Corporation.” This option would enable the Government to retain
Federal employees under the Excepted Service, yet still offer much
of the flexibility of the GOCO approach. Many of the Governments
important activities are operated under “Government Corporations,”
and transitioning to this structure would likely be cheaper and
less disruptive than the GOCO alternative. Legislation would be
required to make this happen, but the transition process should
be more rapid than the GOCO as well.
If the latter path is chosen, the objective should be to maintain
a more autonomous and flexible environment for the Labs. The initiative
should seek to implement clearer lines of authority, a better personnel
system, greater flexibility in facility renewal, and management
practices from the private sector to gain efficiencies and economies.
This scenario is somewhat analogous to a State University system
whereby an autonomous Board of Regents appointed by the State is
able to achieve research and public service objectives by tailoring
the regulatory environment to the mission of their organization,
in effect freeing up the Labs to focus on Science and Technology
development with greater efficiency.
Any option chosen should be carefully considered, and the bottom-line
result should be a system that attracts and retains high quality
personnel in order to maintain superiority in technology.
Dr. Lyons discussed the Army Laboratories and several alternatives
for governance. After 40 years of outside studies conducted on the
effectiveness of the labs, most have concluded that the labs are
relevant with significant accomplishments. However, the reports
also say the labs still have problems with personnel policies, centralized
administration of local procurement, facilities management, and
other business functions, and lack of empowerment for lab management.
Little evidence has been offered to justify these criticisms and
most of the recommendations from these studies have not been implemented.
NDU’s recent report on the future relevance of the DOD labs
(Se. 913 NDAA FY 2000), found that the lab’s work is relevant
to future needs, however some work is too short- term in scope.
Generally the customers of the Lab are satisfied, however there
are some personnel problems and labs are losing authority and flexibility,
and incentives are needed to perform work on joint requirements.
In sum, there is a continuing need to maintain strong in-house lab
competence so that they can help the Army be a “smart buyer.”
In order to have a quality lab, it is imperative to have highly
competent staff. Managerial problems and bureaucracy can hinder
this goal under the current system. A good laboratory needs to have
inspired, empowered, highly qualified leadership, flexibility, effective
two-way relationships with warfighters, and strong linkage to other
labs.
Several options exist for the governance of labs including Government
Owned and Operated (GOGO), Government Owned Contractor Operated
(GOCO), Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC),
or Government Corporations. One of the more interesting options
is a multi-center approach under the GOGO model, where the Army
assesses its strengths and weaknesses with comparison to private
industry and academe, and subsequently funds centers of excellence
in the private sector where the expertise lies. The ideal is to
make the collaboration of work in-house and at the centers into
a single, integrated program with an Army staffer in management
control. This is possible under the terms of cooperative agreements,
a relatively new contractual device.
Keeping in mind the need for quality leadership, staff, and innovation,
several recommendations are possible such as the further exploration
of the current GOGO model with multi-centers. Also, an Army-wide
stakeholders committee should be created to review and evaluate
the Lab policy and strategy, and to better represent warfighter
perspectives. Further study should also be done on the impact of
using Lead System Integrators on the Labs and their role vis-à-vis
the “smart buyer” concept.
Some of the issues and opinions discussed during the Q&A
session:
If you want to combine functions under one agency, wouldn’t
it make sense to do so at the same time? Combining functions such
as acquisitions under OSD may be easier than the challenge of maintaining
them in the services.
NRL by construct is a multi-disciplinary center.
Joint Forces Command doesn’t have acquisition authority and
this presents a challenge. It is difficult to discuss government
agencies without linking to the specific missions. The issue goes
beyond just acquisition to involve the entire structure, and the
way that services and processes impact priorities and operations.
--
Going down the track of reorganization is cause for concern because
despite potential long-term benefit, the short-term cost is often
painful. Having gone through reorganizations, it’s hard to
tell if it’s worth the pain. This depends on the motivation
of the reorganization, and the timeframe and money involved. The
over 100 studies already done indicate that we probably have things
about as optimized as they will be. Reorganization is a massive
challenge, but if something in a joint role would fulfill something
we’re not already doing, then let’s go there. Models
already exist to move us towards greater jointness. Despite criticizing
ourselves, we have a pretty good system in place.
--
We are in a wartime need for responsiveness and efficiency, and
this is not a time to do reorganization. There are a few areas where
we need to do a better job, and will enable us to truly integrate
and create true joint force capability. From experience over the
years, it seems we are fairly efficient when it comes to investing
in areas relative to the services.
--
In Government model, Herzberg’s theory of motivators and
hygiene factors (based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs) were
discussed in relation to attracting and retaining employees, but
how do we address the larger structural issues? Where are we leaders?
Where are we fast followers?, etc. How do you direct and fund that
set of decisions in order to do a good job?
--
The underlying concern should be to assure the government has the
technical competence to do its job. The government has shown no
evidence that it’s designed to do this. There are serious
issues warranting serious thought, and therefore we need to keep
plugging away to ensure this happens. However, no one should go
for major transformation without serious consideration of what will
be the desired and actual outcomes.
--
There is an extreme tendency to micromanage in the government labs.
In looking at models of innovation and effectiveness, Bell labs
used to go for the best staff, tell them the mission, and cut them
loose. The government is running too many budgets and micromanaging.
NIST should be considered as a model because of its independence.
--
Management textbooks say the first response of managers facing
a reorganization is “we’re doing the best possible job
already…there’s no reason to change.”
--
DARPA is an organization without a customer. For a certain kind
of work, it’s a good model. However, alignment with the customer
is hard to achieve. Disconnect is still a problem—it’s
not connected back into the services. DARPA doesn’t have a
lab, thus needs outside infrastructure to support it.
--
In Air Force saw three Chiefs of Staff come in and go three different
directions. The Air Force has stood still for nearly eight years
because these changes have failed to institutionalize. Change for
the sake of change is not necessarily good. One needs to clearly
know the desired end result and motivation for going there.
--
DOE weapons labs were successful maintaining quality despite changes
is due to GOCO model and independence? Congress passed a law for
opening competition in the case of Los Alamos and the result was
flexibility and autonomy.
Flexibility and autonomy are partly responsible for maintaining
the workforce in DOE. DOE has historically taken care of their labs
first. DOD labs have been funded at a much lower level, thus they
need to work harder to pick the right kinds of activities. DOE technical
staff in general is higher quality when compared with DOD (with
some exceptions). This might also have to do with the GOCO model.
There is a concern with disconnection in models where too much
work is moved outside of the government—this may be harmful.
Post WWII, the DOD had the highest quality scientists. Defense
doesn’t have the luxury to keep the first rate scientists
anymore. People stayed at NRL, for example, for one reason—it’s
a place they can get serious work done. It would be ideal to see
Defense organizations in the S&T arena maintain their objective
of holding a superior technological advantage and keep people in
government who can go toe to toe with their peers outside of government.
The following documents were prepared by the speakers as their
presentations for this luncheon. The views expressed are those of
the authors and do not reflect the official policy of the United
States Government.
Dr. Coffey's Presentation
(PDF, 289 KB)
Dr. Lyons'
Presentation (PDF, 242 KB)
|
