In this session we examined challenges that face the US and its European allies as they struggle to organize and equip in a way that allows them to work together in the demanding expeditionary operations that face us today. This issue will be more critical if, as expected at the Prague NATO summit, our European allies commit to developing a reaction force trained, organized and equipped to operate alongside US forces.

The creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) provides a conduit through which the United States can help NATO transform and more importantly, become interoperable through joint training and equipment of forces.

Dr. Richard Kugler, Distinguished Research Professor of the Center and one of those who developed the concept of the NRF, explained the theory behind the NRF and how it will take shape. NATO currently has 2.4 million active troops, but the problem is that they are not strategically mobile and cannot project power. However, 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom crystallized a need for a better European capability, especially in the areas of being able to carry out swift, decisive strikes and joint expeditionary operations. In response, the NRF will be a flexible, adaptable spearhead force capable of serious warfighting and able to fight alongside the US or join coalition forces.

Dr. Vitali Garber, Director of Systems Integration, OSD spoke about the reality facing interoperability issues. While the US realizes the importance of interoperability with NATO, it must first focus on interoperability within the Services. There are currently two obstacles to effective interoperability within U.S. forces. The first is the lack of an effective joint requirements process. The second is the sheer size of U.S. forces. The US military is so large that it is difficult to have common standards and ensure they are universally observed.

The SECDEF has stated that doctrine and "mission capability areas" are at the heart of transformation. Accordingly, Dr. Garber's office has begun to look at the implementation of a more integrated and collaborative requirements and acquisition process that will link different mission areas. Rather than forcing interoperability from above by imposing arbitrary standards, OSD will stress and support the development of a "joint integrated architecture" that draws on existing service capabilities. The development of this architecture will reveal gaps that reduce the level of interoperability necessary to perform missions successfully. Garber's office is currently working with the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and other OSD offices to define this "joint integrated architecture."

The Services must move away from developing systems in isolation. The Joint Staff will help by developing comprehensive "mission areas" and "mission capability" concepts and metrics. USD (AT&L) will help by promoting "spiral requirements" as a complement to "spiral development." The milestone reviews for major programs should cover capability areas, like "precision engagement," instead of performance characteristics that deal only with the mission needs of one service.

Dr. Garber defined "precision engagement" as "detection to assessment in less than 10 minutes." He then argued that the Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures (FIOP), a horizontal and vertical system interoperability across Service lines and between echelons, was essential to achieving "precision engagement." Another top concern for Garber and his staff is Combat Identification (CID), which, combined with improved situational awareness, should lead to fratricide reduction and increased combat effectiveness. He noted out the importance of getting a consensus among the services about these concepts. He also noted that efforts to achieve CID are especially important in terms of cooperation with Allies and coalition partners. The USAF is the executive agent for improvements in precision engagement, and is charged with making sure that legacy Battle Management and Command and Control systems are interoperable by 2008.

For this to happen, however, the Services must develop the FIOP. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) will lead conceptual work on the FIOP, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) will review the specific requirements that the FIOP developers will work toward. OSD has made the USAF the executive agent so that developing the FIOP will have a place in a service POM.

JFCOM's role is central to the success of this effort because it's important to guarantee that the FIOP is both interoperable and able to meet separate service needs. JFCOM is the only organization that can, through simulations and exercises, show how existing systems can be made compatible with standards for new, cross-service systems. Finally, the JROC will oversee the USAF's development of the specific requirements for both the upgrades to the legacy systems and the creation of new systems.

Garber's final point was that commercial information technology (IT) can and must be the driver for these interoperability initiatives. By adopting international IT standards, the Defense Department will avoid disputes with allied nations and facilitate the procurement of new equipment by those countries. In adopting commercial systems and engineering practices, JFCOM will be able to work easily with its alliance partners and also have greater leverage within DOD.

However, the creation of the NRF puts pressure on the Department of Defense to achieve its interoperability goals faster. The NATO Response Force needs to be ready by 2004-05, not by 2008. Advancing the deadline for the creation of the NRF must force the US and Europeans to use commercial IT systems and standards. According to Dr. Garber, the Joint Forces Command will need input from NATO soon. Even with that input, however, the Defense Department will need to adopt a strategy of spiral development in order to field a workable interoperable battle management system by the time that the NRF is supposed to be ready for operations.

Dr. Garber stressed that it was important for NATO and the US to move together and define interoperability as more than just the ability to communicate. He also repeated his point about commercial IT-that it was the only solution to standardization among the U.S. services and therefore the solution to the interoperability problems among the NATO nations. The use of commercial IT models and standards - hardware, software, and middleware - is the future of C2 systems in DOD.

Representatives from the EU community echoed their support of the NRF but were concerned about how it will work with EU initiatives (especially since not all of EU are in NATO) and how it will interact with the European Rapid Reaction force. The newest NATO members see the NRF as an opportunity for the US to help their own countries' military transformation, specifically in terms of training and integration with the US and EU, while non-NATO members wanted to know about possibilities for future participation. Conceptually, the NRF was designed to complement the European Force, which is larger and mostly a ground force with different functions from the NRF.