

Issues in Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations

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Abstract

This paper provides an overview of some of the issues present in conducting stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations in today's operational environment. Several key directives, reports, and definitions are reviewed. A number of potential problem areas are discussed as are areas for future research.

I. Background

"In the dim background of mind we know what we ought to be doing but somehow we cannot start." William James

Key among the needs in nation building is security, a fair justice system, respect for the rule of law, and a functional government accepted by the populace. The basic structure of a country may or may not remain; its political, economic, and judicial systems, cultural, educational, medical, and military institutions, and critical infrastructure all vitally contribute to the overall progression of stability and prosperity. Understanding the significance of the dynamic relationships between the forces in play during stability and reconstruction operations is paramount to establishing a viable peace (Robbins, 2005, p. iv).

DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, issued November 28, 2005 outlines the basis for the Department of Defense's roles and responsibilities in Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO). It offers the following definitions:

Stability Operations: Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

Military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR): Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. (DODD 3005.5, p.2)

DODD 3005.5 was followed on December 7, 2005 by National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 with the subject line of *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. Its stated purpose “is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.” (NSPD-44, p. 1)

This directive notes that:

To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation. (NSPD-44, p. 2)

The NSPD further states that:

The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed. (NSPD-44, p. 2)

NSPD-44 goes on to outline key tasks and responsibilities including specific mention of coordination between DoS and DoD:

The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant

and appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.

Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be re-designated as transitions are required. (NSPD-44, p. 5)

While there have been a number of meetings, conferences and discussions on SSTRO since the issuing of these two directives, they remain, in general, the overarching documents for SSTRO.

A few key studies are reviewed in the remainder of this section.

The Defense Science Board's 2004 Summer Study on *Transition to and from Hostilities* called for the military to extend their outstanding capabilities to stabilization, reconstruction, and intelligence across the government. The report suggested the formation of a Presidential or NSC level Contingency Planning Task Forces which would be permanently staffed across agencies with the necessary country and functional expertise to carry out the transitions. (DSB, 2004, p. v) The report further suggests that regional combatant commanders "maintain and develop a portfolio of contingency operational campaign plans" covering peacetime, war, and reconstruction supported by complimenting intelligence plans. (DSB, 2004, p.vi) The report notes:

Agencies other than DOD seldom plan with this discipline—they instead focus more on policy issues and day-to-day program execution

- They lack the capability and experience to do operational-level planning
- They also lack the resources to do such planning
- **As a result, the disciplined planning process for military operations has not been applied to**
 - Planning in peacetime to achieve U.S. objectives without major combat, using the many tools of the U.S. government
 - Planning for stabilization and reconstruction after active combat ends

- Planning for intelligence to support the above
(DSB, 2004, p.36)

The report goes on to suggest:

Create an integrated Foreign Service Institute/National Defense University program to teach officials at all levels integrated planning skills

• Export DOD’s competencies in crisis and deliberate planning

- Assign a staff of ten experienced DOD planners (led by flag level senior) to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in DOS
- Provide models, training, education, red teaming, worst case analyses, war gaming

• NGOs, coalition partners, and international organizations should participate—as appropriate—with Regional Combatant Commanders in drafting contingency plans

• Use the existing DOD Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance to engage NGOs and to participate, as appropriate, in Regional Combatant Commander contingency planning

(DSB, 2004, p.36)

As a second major thrust set, the DSB felt that various capabilities were lacking in both DoD and DoS. They summarized these potential deficiencies in Table 1:

Table 1
Criteria for an Effective Stabilization Capacity

	Finding	
	DOD	DOS
<i>Effective Partnership requires Improvements on Both Sides</i>		
Actively train, practice, exercise, rehearse	Some Capacity Exists but Needs to be Improved	Inadequate Capacity
Evaluate Readiness and validate plans	Some Capacity Exists but Needs to be Improved	Inadequate Capacity
Available on short notice	Adequate Capacity	Some Capacity Exists but Needs to be Improved
Continuity in theater	Inadequate Capacity	Inadequate Capacity
Large enough to support multiple concurrent cumulative stabilization operations	Some Capacity Exists but Needs to be Improved	Inadequate Capacity
Prepared for a range of cultures, languages	Inadequate Capacity	Some Capacity Exists but Needs to be Improved
Elasticity to respond and adjust to an adaptive enemy	Some Capacity Exists but Needs to be Improved	Some Capacity Exists but Needs to be Improved
Active experimentation program	Some Capacity Exists but Needs to be Improved	Inadequate Capacity

Recommendations

- DOD and DOS use these criteria to develop metrics to measure progress in S&R readiness

- DOD include S&R readiness in the Joint Military Readiness Reporting System
Adapted from DSB, 2004 Summer Study *Transition to and from Hostilities* p. 40

The study further suggests the following critical capabilities for DoD stability success:

- **Security**
 - Robust ISR, including capability to manage HUMINT operations
 - Adequate security forces to ensure stability and safety
 - Military police trained to maintain order and ensure security
 - Ability to train constabulary forces and indigenous police
 - **Communication**
 - Strategic communication
 - Robust IO capability
 - **Humanitarian**
 - Civil affairs capability
 - Robust engineer capability, including civil engineers
 - Humanitarian assistance
 - Authority and capability to disburse funds
 - **Area Expertise**
 - Language capability
 - Cultural awareness adequate to deal with indigenous population
- (DSB, 2004, p.43)

The report stresses that these capabilities must incorporate knowledge, understanding, and intelligence for the 21st century. This must be coupled with the ability to identify, locate and track in an asymmetric warfare.

In August of 2006, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy of the Department of Defense issued *Interim Progress Report on DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. The report pointed out that the nation needed to “integrate military and civilian operations to meet irregular and traditional challenges” and will need “to conduct operations in the midst of civilian populations” (Interim, 2006, p.3). The report points out that three (Enable Partners to Combat the Enemy, Deter Tact and Active Support, Erode Support for Ideologies) of the five main lines of operations in the GWOT plan are non-kinetic with the other two lines being kinetic (Disrupt

Violent Extremist Networks, Deny Access and Use of WMD/E) (Interim, 2006, pp. 4-5) . It further notes that:

Without successful implementation of the tasks set out in DoD Directive 3000.05, U.S. forces will not be prepared to conduct the non-kinetic lines of operations in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) or future major combat operations effectively. Success in the Long War requires the integration of combat operations to kill or capture enemy forces with military and civilian stability operations focused on civilian populations. (Interim, 2006, p. 6)

The Interim Progress Report on DoD Directive 3000.05 goes on to review the progress on implementing the Directive. While the report identifies some successes and identifies some works in progress, it also finds some shortfalls in a number of areas.

The National Science and Technology Council's Committee on Homeland and National Security established the Regional Stability Interagency Working Group (RSIWG) to identify research and development areas that need to be addressed to increase our nation's operational capabilities. In a report issued February, 2008 entitled *Research & Development Challenges for Regional Stability and Capacity Building* the group points out that "new or emerging tools from the social, political and behavioral sciences have not been effectively leveraged, targeted, or developed to significantly contribute to the rebuilding of conflict-torn societies or stabilization of pre-conflict environments." (RSIWG, 2008, p.7) The report identifies five R &D operational goals. These goals are summarized as:

- Seamless integrated interagency operations with multi-level collaboration and planning systems, requiring multiple degrees of security;
- New and improved socio-cultural knowledge on how specific societies function—culturally, politically, socially and economically—in local, regional and global contexts and operational access to that knowledge;

- Mission feedback, assessment, and anticipation/prediction using valid indicators/metrics of regional status and national stability;
- Analytic tools to create, explore and assess regional and national plans and operational capabilities for improving regional stability; and
- Strategic communication methodologies and techniques that effectively respond to public perceptions and prioritize USG policies to target audiences.
(RSIWG, 2008, p.9)

The document goes on to outline specific needs to implement these points, many of which are re-occurring points from the previous documents and studies. Key repeated issues are adequate planning, coordination and funding. The study identifies five core research areas:

1. Interagency Collaboration
 2. Cultural Understanding
 3. Assessment and Foresight
 4. Intervention and Prevention Operations
 5. Strategic Communication
- (RSIWG, 2008, pp.9-17)

Each of the five core research areas gives specific details. To highlight Human, Social, Cultural, and Behavior issues, the Cultural Understanding section of the report is reviewed here as an example of the depth of the recommendations. The RSIWG point out that to be successful, there will need to be cultural, political, social, and economic understanding at the local, regional, and global levels. In addition, dynamic assessments and evaluations, with an understanding of the key individuals, societal groups, and culture are required across agencies and regions. (RSIWG, 2008, p.10) Tools and methods are needed to carry out these functions. In the area of Cultural Understanding, the report calls out the following key points:

With regard to cultural understanding the R&D community needs to:

- develop methodologies, systems and metrics for accurately characterizing and measuring underlying political, economic, and social conditions/ dynamics;

- understand the role of religion and other broadly accepted beliefs in power structures, social norms, legal imperatives and economic realities;
- create effective information-collection and distribution techniques;
- develop theories, models and methodologies that build on regional historical frameworks and experiences and reflect regional dynamics;
- develop effective language translation tools;
- understand and create methodologies for sustainable private sector venture opportunities that allow for the creation of incentive based solutions to meet local needs;
- develop techniques for integrating local mores and legitimate legal/extralegal systems into a(n) nationally/internationally rule of law construct;
- find timely methods for training/educating operatives to be culturally aware and effective in foreign environments (e.g. the rapid development of cultural training support packages relevant to the area of operations);
- develop programs to sponsor pre-conflict, open source historical and ethnographic research of partner nation societies.

Successful research on these topics will benefit future operations by enabling culturally informed, sustainable solutions that are embraced by local and regional populations. Methodologies and tools that inform USG activities should also assist in the development of partner nation capabilities and regional populations. Methodologies and tools that inform USG activities should also assist in the development of partner nation capabilities.

(RSIWG, 2008, p.11)

In each section, a similar overview is presented on general and specific needs. While they do vary somewhat, classic operations research modeling concepts can be found in each area. There is a need for generic tools, methodologies and approaches for interagency planning and assessment that can be modified for a specific country or region in virtually all the critical research areas. To support these modeling efforts, there must be scientifically sound measures and metrics. Tools are needed to integrate planning and operations across diverse functional

disciplines that have not always been well integrated. These models, methods and tools must also be able to deal with dynamic, changing foreign environments.

Again, while varying detail exists in each core research area, the bottom line is we need to know what we want to do; who has the capability and expertise to do it, or who should develop it; how do we measure and assess how we are doing; and how will we know when we are done. All of this needs to be done in a potentially hostile, dynamic, foreign environment with interagency, coalition, host nation, and non-governmental organization cooperation.

There is a plethora of other documents which apply to background for stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations. Key documents include the joint and individual service doctrines which deal with these areas. They have not been summarized here but are essential to any SSTRO effort. What should be noted is that many of the problems identified in 2004 and 2005 still exist in 2008. Certainly, progress has been made, but a number of the problems still exist. (This progress is evidenced by the number of recent changes in joint and service doctrines as well as efforts such as the Human Terrain Teams, interest in Human Networks, COIN on line groups, and so forth.) Change, however, can be difficult and slow in taking hold. President Eisenhower encouraged a joint force in 1958, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 legislated aspects of “jointness” in the DoD. While strides have been made, service differences still exist. (Kimbrough, 2008, p. 2)

II. The Journey and the Destination

If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there. Lewis Carroll

von Clausewitz has characterized military operations as dynamic and unpredictable (von Clausewitz, 1976, p. 119). Bullock, referring to military operations, points out:

In this complex arena, one would like to measure the outcome of deliberate actions and specifically be able to measure them relative to a desired end-state. (Bullock, 2006, p.1)

Clearly, SSTRO are equally dynamic and potentially unpredictable, particularly when one considers second, third, and lower order effects. Equally clearly, to plan, coordinate, measure, assess, and dynamically adjust, one needs an end-state. While it is an oft heard bromide that “The OPLAN lasts to the moment of contact”, a plan is still needed to marshal and deploy material and personnel as well as gauge progress. The need for interagency planning is a key point brought up in the documents reviewed in the previous section. The days when the DoS could operate by “hiring a bunch of smart Ivy Leaguers and wait for the phone to ring” are long gone, if they ever actually existed. Unfortunately, another popular characterization that “there are fewer planners in the Department of State than members of a good military band” may be closer to the truth than anyone wants to admit; this, despite the fact that NPD-44 gives State the lead overseeing SSTRO. That is precisely why the need for the military’s managerial and planning skills, tempered with cultural knowledge and interagency support, is required.

Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* begins the chapter on joint operational planning with the following quote from von Clausewitz:

“War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war or rather, no one ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832
(JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-1)

Plans require “a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled”. To effectively conduct SSTRO, to develop interagency, coalition, and host nation planning and

execution, an ultimate objective must be defined. This begs the question of what is the ultimate objective of an SSTRO.

In *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, edited by Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, a viable peace is defined as the point where the local authority is just as able as the intervening, outside forces to deal with the drivers of the conflict, as shown in Figure 1. More specifically:

Viable Peace: In the wake of state collapse or internal war, a domestic balance of power must be restored in favor of legitimate institutions of government. Violence-prone power structures must be dislodged. To accomplish this, the motivations and means for continuing violent conflict must diminish. Peace becomes viable when the capacity of domestic institutions to resolve conflict peacefully prevails over the power of obstructionist forces. As portrayed here, viable peace is the decisive turning point in the transformation of conflict from imposed stability to self-sustaining peace.




Figure 1: Viable Peace: The Turning Point in Conflict Transformation
Dziedzic and Hawley, Chapter 1, p.15 in Covey *et. al.*

Wehr points out that "Stable peace is a developmental process, not merely the absence of visible violence." (Wehr, 1979, p.16) Sambanis, in a recent article, noted that "For peace to be self-sustaining, countries must develop institutions and policies that generate economic growth. UN peacebuilding lacks a strategy for fostering self-sustaining economic growth that could connect increased participation with sustainable peace." (Sambanis, 2008, p. 1) Clearly, these needs fall to the international community to provide.

Dziedzic and Hawley suggest stages and strategies of conflict transformation in Table 2.

Table 2
Stages and Strategies of Conflict Transformation
From Dziedzic and Hawley, Chapter 1, p.15 in Convy *et. al.*

Strategies of Conflict Transformation				
Stages of Conflict Transformation	Moderating Political Conflict	Defeating Militant Extremists	Institutionalizing the Rule of Law	Developing a Legitimate Political Economy
Internal Conflict	Political discourse completely breaks down	Fractional Hostilities Rage	Lawlessness rules; the legal system is an instrument of repression	The political economy is criminalized
Imposed Stability	Peace is a continuation of conflict by other means	Armed groups and informal power structures are predominant	The local system is unable to administer justice; the environment is hostile to the rule of law	Obstructionists derive means and motives from the informal economy
Viable Peace	Conflict is managed with international safeguards.	Armed groups are reintegrated or have lost popular support	Local institutions are able to protect minority rights and confront impunity with the aid of international safeguards	Peace pays; the state is financially viable; the formal economy offers alternatives
Self-Sustaining Peace	Conflict is resolved peacefully by domestic political process	The security sector is reformed and subordinated to political authority	Local institutions maintain order, law, and justice with domestic safeguards	The formal economy outperforms gray and black market

The entries in Table 2 provide a generic outline of potential end states and transitional phases. The Covey, Dziedzic and Hawley text, based primarily on their experiences in Kosovo, goes on to detail various strategies, linkages and approaches. Thus, the goal of SSTRO is to reach a sustainable peace with a way point for the intervening international forces of a viable peace

where more effort can be passed from the military to the appropriate local authorities and the interagency development authorities.

The peace building literature is replete with discussions on potential objectives. Ultimately, however, if joint plans, models and tools are to be established, either generically or for specific settings, a workable definition of the desired end state must be established. This may also require a time frame. It is not possible to guarantee a nation will remain at peace forever. If the point of a viable peace can be reached and the situation stabilized such that the probability of outside intervention or collapse is not likely (not guaranteed, just believed to be not likely) occur for some acceptable period after the drawdown of forces (say, five or ten years, for example) and phased hand over of security to the host population, this might be a viable goal for a viable, sustainable peace as the result of SSTRO. “Peace with Honor” followed by a total collapse in a few months or years, would not be a desired end state.

As we support the building of democracies throughout the world, we need to recognize that our own democracy did not evolve to its present state in a matter of years or decades, but rather centuries. Born out of an insurgency that was among our longest conflicts, a number of Tories were driven out of the new nation because of their support of Britain. Shays’ Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion confronted the Founding Fathers with potentially critical insurrections in the nation’s nascent period. The first half of the 1800s was dominated with issues of states’ rights and slavery, resulting in a civil war that to this day goes by various names depending on the region of the nation (Civil War, War Between the States, War of the Rebellion, The Lost Cause, War for Southern Independence, War of Northern Aggression, and others). This war was followed by Reconstruction, which one part of the nation believed was a justified effort to establish security and stability while the other felt it was a punitive occupation. The Indian

Wars and the series of abrogated treaties that mark that period, from admittedly a 21st century viewpoint, was not one of our finest moments. It is likely that a commander today who made a statement like General Sheridan did in 1869 would be facing charges of crimes against humanity if he or she acted on such a statement or would be dismissed from service even if they did not act. The 20th Century finally saw woman receive the vote throughout the nation and later in the century the Women's Movement gained more equity for women. (The UN maintains that respect for woman's rights is a cornerstone to a sustained peace.) The first part of the last century also saw the Alien and Sedition Act and the internment of citizens and aliens of Japanese descent. The latter half of the last century will be remembered, in part, for the gains the Civil Rights movement made, the Anti War Movement, the Sixties in general, and political assassinations.

This litany of unrest in our own history is not meant as a criticism of the nation, but rather a caution that nation building does not happen overnight and any plans will need to be flexible. Our own history shows it would be foolish to expect to create full blown democracies similar (or congruent) to ours or other Coalition partners in a politically short span of time and in cultures that may have different fundamental mores and norms. It also demonstrates, however, that a flexible dynamic democracy can be established and maintained despite setbacks. As we assist host nations with SSTRO, we will need to help develop the form of viable, just government that *they* pick to match *their* cultures and customs while building to a self sustaining peace. Like other "late adapters", the nations in which we conduct SSTRO hopefully will be able to gain from the hard lessons learned by the revolutionary first adapters of modern republic based democracy.

A number of the reports reviewed brought up the importance of *strategic communication*.

The *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, issued in September of 2004 indicates that:

...strategic communication describes a variety of instruments used by governments for generations to *understand* global attitudes and cultures, *engage* in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, *advise* policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion implications of policy choices, and *influence* attitudes and behavior through communications strategies.

Strategic communication can help to shape context and build relationships that enhance the achievement of political, economic, and military objectives. It can be used to mobilize publics in support of major policy initiatives – and to support objectives before, during, and after a conflict. To be effective, strategic communicators must understand attitudes and cultures, respect the importance of ideas, adopt advanced information technologies, and employ sophisticated communication skills and strategies. To be persuasive, they must be credible.

Policies, diplomacy, military operations, and strategic communication should not be managed separately. Good strategic communication cannot build support for policies viewed unfavorably by large populations. Nor can the most carefully crafted messages, themes, and words persuade when the messenger lacks credibility and underlying message authority. (DSBTF, 2004, p.11)

The follow excerpt from a *Parameters* article published in 2007 by Richard Halloran give perspective on the importance of strategic communication:

... in the airport, he got into a conversation with a North Vietnamese colonel named Tu who spoke some English and, as soldiers do, they began to talk shop. After a while, Colonel Summers said: “You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield.” Colonel Tu thought about that for a minute, then replied: “That may be so. But it is also irrelevant.”

If that conversation were to be held in today’s vocabulary, it would go something like this. Colonel Summers: “You know, you never defeated us in a kinetic engagement on the battlefield.” Colonel Tu: “That may be so. It is also irrelevant because we won the battle of strategic communication—and therefore the war.”

On a contemporary note, a US officer returning from Iraq said privately: “We plan kinetic campaigns and maybe consider adding a public affairs annex. Our

adversaries plan information campaigns that exploit kinetic events, especially spectacular attacks and martyrdom operations. We aren't even on the playing field, but al Qaeda seeks to dominate it because they know their war will be won by ideas."

For five years, Americans have been struggling to comprehend strategic communication as they have seen the standing of the nation plummet around the world and political support at home evaporate for the war in Iraq. They have lamented the seeming failure of their government to persuade the Islamic world of America's good intentions while Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda operate in the best fashion of Madison Avenue. A perceptive Singaporean diplomat and scholar, Kishore Mahbubani, was asked two years ago what puzzled him about America's competition with Osama bin Laden. Mahbubani replied: "How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world's greatest communication society?" (Halloran, 2007, pp. 4-5)

How indeed? Halloran goes on to point out:

There should be no great mystery about what strategic communication is nor an unnecessarily complicated definition of it. In short, strategic communication is a way of persuading other people to accept one's ideas, policies, or courses of action. In that old saw, it means "letting you have my way." Strategic communication means persuading allies and friends to stand with you. It means persuading neutrals to come over to your side or at least stay neutral. In the best of all worlds, it means persuading adversaries that you have the power and the will to prevail over them. Vitally important, strategic communication means persuading the nation's citizens to support the policies of their leaders so that a national will is forged to accomplish national objectives. In this context, strategic communication is an essential element of national leadership. As a former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. "Shy" Meyer, once said, "Armies don't fight wars, nations fight wars." (Halloran, 2007, pp. 5-6)

Note should be taken of the last point. It is vitally important that the nation's citizens are persuaded to support the policies of their nation. Artelli has shown that national support for the 'Long War' has been decreasing at a rate statistically similar to Vietnam. (Artelli, 2007 and Artelli *et al.*, 2007) Long term loss of public support does not bode well for combat or stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations. Any SSTRO must consider information dissemination and strategic communication both at home and abroad. Burns and Novick's recent PBS series *The War*, with its discussions about the efforts on the home front, underscores a

national feeling of support for the World War II. The sacrifices people made on the home front made them feel part of the war effort and that they were supporting the troops. The mindset displayed in the series on the home front would appear to be a far cry from statements heard today like “I support the troops but not the war” or “It’s a voluntary service so they wanted to go.” True, it is a vast improvement over the Vietnam era, but do the citizens of our nation truly feel that we are a nation at war? What efforts are being made to build the national will in this war of wills? Finally, whose responsibility is it to do so? Halloran’s article goes on to review a number of key principles, including reasons strategic communications have succeeded and have failed.

The DoD defines Irregular Warfare (IW) as:

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, through it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (IW JOC, 2007:6).

Unlike previous insurgencies or counterinsurgency, in a global insurgency, capturing territory or denying sanctuary to an insurgent may not be a primary course of action. A global insurgent is focused on the support of a segment of the global population that consists of those who are similar to the terrorists in their culture, beliefs, perceived oppression and, possibly, religion; they believe they are disfranchised from their governments or society in general (Hetherington, 2005, p. 2-8). It is this transnational population that the global terrorist in the GWOT is attempting to influence, recruit, draw financial and material support from and ultimately gain dominion over (or freedom for, depending on your point of view). The terrorists’ ability to reach their target population, as well as reach the population of the intervening nations, has been fundamentally

altered by advances in communication, the use of the internet, and the increasingly interconnected world. They must be countered in all these realms.

The communications concepts, will, and morale are familiar concepts both historically and in the modern context of information operations in conflict and in maintaining peace. Any effective SSTRO will have to develop the support of the population or populations it is assisting and of the nations of the world. Any effective strategic communication/ information operations campaign will require a great deal of human, social, cultural, and behavioral knowledge. This knowledge is not just restricted to areas of conflict, but must span across the global population.

III. Some Thoughts on Research Issues

“There is nothing like looking, if you want to find something. You certainly usually find something, if you look, but it is not always quite the something you were after.”

J.R.R. Tolkien

The February 2008 report *Research & Development Challenges for Regional Stability and Capacity Building* provides an excellent review of the tools, models and methods need for SSTRO. The five R &D operational goals identified in the report (RSIWG, 2008, p.9) (repeated on pages 7 and 8 of this paper) provide an excellent set of direct requirements for tools, models and studies and indirect requirements to implement these goals. Many elements of these requirements already exist but do not necessarily interact because they were developed for a specific application, for a specific agency or service, perhaps duplicating efforts that already exist, or they are not well publicized. In some cases, we should be investigating what models, tools, and techniques our international partners have developed.

A great deal of research has been carried out in developmental economics, urban planning, and regional development. Some of the tools and techniques developed in these areas

can be levered for SSTRO, but may need to be refined to properly model other societies and cultures. Some city planning models have the ability to display all infrastructures in a city and their interconnections. Population, traffic, crime, and sales data can be identified at the street level. This does, however, assume that such data is available – often a difficulty in a failed or failing state.

Very large scale planning tools, with the associated acquisition, logistics, and allocation elements, will be needed to reconstruct cities, region, or nations. In some countries, with a long history of war and/or limited development, it may be more a case of original construction than reconstruction in some areas. Layers of infrastructure must be rebuilt. Their reconstruction must be planned, sequence, and phased with their interactions carefully considered in this complex system of systems. A water system without electricity for its pumps is ineffective. Restoration of electricity in an area where the distribution system is unprotected and local leaders fund operations by selling power from *their* generator will be ineffectual. Schools without books or blackboards will have less impact than anticipated. Any of these failures or shortfalls may cause a negative perception of the assisting forces, or worse, the legitimate government the assisting forces is attempting to strengthen.

This complex set of layered systems suggests different fidelities of planning models, that can be aggregated and disaggregated (with all the associated modeling difficulties) but have the ability to feed each other in an interoperable and compatible way. These models must also be able to consider operational, environmental, and physical risk factors. While large scale project management tools exist, they typically do not assume work on massive projects will take place in a conflicted area. Military construction units do, however, have some experience that can be


drawn upon. State and other agencies experiences, coupled with the knowledge and experience of non-governmental organization must be capitalized on in this quest.

The adaptive nature of the environment over a continuous time frame definitely suggests simulation approaches. Zacharias, MacMillan, and Van Hemel's forthcoming book *Behavioral Modeling and Simulation: From Individuals to Societies* (Zacharias *et al.*, 2008) should provide some assistance in the area of behavioral modeling. Appendix C of the text provides a brief review of candidate approaches for DIME/PMSEII modeling. System dynamics has shown some promise as a modeling approach (Richardson, 2004, Richardson *et al.*, 2004, Robbins, 2005), as has the use of complex adaptive agents. The tools and models developed for Operations Other Than War developed by the Marine Corps, NPS, and others should be a help.

A difficulty with a number of these approaches is developing the required data to populate the models with the appropriate fidelity and specificity. Further, the question of verification, validation, and accreditation (VVA) comes up, particularly when considering data and models to be adopted for planning and operations in the DoD. Complex models can be difficult to validate and verify. In addition, when modeling dynamic human, social, cultural, and behavior environments, replication may not be possible. When the purpose of SSTRO is to move a society to a more conducive environment, the very actions will preclude the model from reaching a steady state during the transitional phases. This is also likely to require continuous updating of inputs. These combined elements create a conflict in goals – the need for dynamic models and data which are constantly morphing against the very real needs and requirement for rigorous VVA of models that are used to make decisions where lives, large sums of money, and national objectives are at risk. This suggests that efforts to establish new approaches to verification, validation and perhaps even accreditation, that balance these competing

requirements, be developed. In addition, it may be necessary to establish new VVA (or a variation of such) for governmental approval of human, social, cultural, and behavior models and data to be used for SSTRO. Given the magnitude of the problem and the elements that could be at risk, this should be a major thrust. Fortunately, some efforts are available to build on. (See Evidence Based Research, 2007, Hartley, 2008, among others)

Measures for assessment of progress in a system must be developed with care. All disciplines require measures and metrics to assess progress. Error is always present in measurement. This error may affect ones decisions and ones models. Figure 2 provides a summary of the elements of system measurement. For assessment, one is trying to gauge the causal link between stimuli and response. As Bullock points out in Figure 3, controllable and uncontrollable inputs can cascade through a system precipitating both desired and undesired effects. These effects can evolve and/or precipitate other changes as they pass through the system (Bullock, 2006). Any effects based assessment system must account for these elements. This certainly presents a daunting task in modeling or conducting a SSTRO. The potential beneficial or negative effects of lower order effects in a system could be the difference between success and failure.



Inputs – any controllable or uncontrollable factor that enters the system

Outputs – system transformation of the inputs

Effect – changes resulting from the outputs

Outcome – the conditions created by system effects

Purpose/Impact – reason for system existence or expected system behavior

Measure of Outcome (MOO) – gauges conditions created by system effects

Strategic – directly concerns the system purpose or normative impact

Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) – measure changes resulting from outputs

Operational – intermediate events required to achieve the system purpose

Measure of Performance (MOP) – measure of system transformation of inputs

Tactical – short-term activities necessary to attain operational level outcomes

Figure 2: System of Measures

Bullock & Deckro, *Measurements*, p. 706




Figure 3 Effects and Causal Links
 Bullock, 2006, p. 39

Kwinn *et al.* had some partial success using the systems approach and Value Focused Thinking (VFT) in constructing an assessment model for CJTF 180. The model captured elements of both combat operations and nation building, considering such issues as the development of economic and social infrastructure and organizations, the development of government and security issues, among others. The VFT process starts with what is valued and continues to break down the values until a single dimension value function can be developed to capture the contribution to the overarching value can be developed. (Keeney, 1992) Using the VFT process, the model and measures were built up through interaction with each of the key functional areas, as well as with command. Measures varied from the existence of established teacher standards, the existence and availability of courts, acknowledgement of property rights, counts of criminal and civil cases processed by month, to the number of high value arms caches destroyed, number IEDs seized and the number of ambushes thwarted, among others. Final weighting was done at the command level that had requested the effort. Changes in the levels of the measures could also be tracked.

The adoption of this initial model was limited due to some of the same interagency problems plaguing other SSTRO. In addition, a change of command in the theatre resulted in the new commander not wishing to continue the assessment efforts begun for the previous commander. Any assessment modeling that is to be used over an extended period in a SSTRO, in addition to being dynamic, will have to have high level support to remain in use through the changes in command in a protracted conflict. ANDAS, the initial effort, did evolved into the Dynamic Planning and Assessment Support System (D-PASS) developed at West Point.

The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) initiative is an interagency effort to provide a framework, process and tools to “measure outcome trends” in assessing

conflict transformation and stabilization. (Sotirin, 2007, slide 3, Dziedzic, Sotirin, Lambert, 2008, p.2) Building on the principles in Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley's work (Convey *et al.*, 2005), the Fund for Peace, and other interagency groups, MPICE presents a "Theory of Change" to measure "conditions that impede stability in a society (the drivers of conflict)" as well as the performance of institutions for the resolution of conflict in society." (Dziedzic, Sotirin, Lambert, 2008, p.1) The MPICE process is outcome oriented focusing on five sectors critical to resolving a conflict: stable government, safe and secure environment, rule of law, sustainable economy and social well being seeking measures in each of these areas. (Dziedzic, Sotirin, Lambert, 2008, p.1) These sectors are further broken down into sub-sectors, goals, indicators and finally measures. (Sotirin, 2007, slides 10-11) Data is collected via content analysis of publications, expert knowledge, quantitative data and survey/polling data. (Sotirin, 2007, slide 12) Testing on the MPICE process has occurred in several conflict environments. Dziedzic, Sotirin, and Lambert report that "initial versions of the MPICE framework, handbook and software have been completed" and are being transitioned. (Dziedzic, Sotirin, Lambert, 2008, p.3)

A number of other research challenges exist in developing tools, methods and models to support operations and assessment of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. Table 2, taken from Convey *et al.*, provides an outline for desired end states. The MPICE process provides generic guidance on common goals, objective and measures. The tailoring of these objectives and goals to a specific environment, however, to develop a final end state desired as the outcome of a SSTRO must be established by the host nation with the coalition partners. The absolute necessity of including human, social, cultural, and behavior factors increases the complexity. Finding and maintaining the right balance to attain actionable modeling will continue to be a critical challenge.

III. Epilogue

If you build it, he will come, voice to Ray in Field of Dreams

Stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations in modern irregular warfare present a number of complex challenges. Like the voice to Ray, we would like to believe as we conduct SSTRO that “If we build it, they will come”, with “it” being a nation and its people enjoying a self-staining peace. If we do not incorporate the cultural, behavioral, and human considerations into our SSTRO efforts, modeling, planning, acquisition, sequencing and actual execution, and further, overcome our difficulties with inter service and interagency cooperation, “they” will *not* come and our efforts will not bring either a viable peace to the areas in which we have entered into conflict.

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Begin at the beginning and go on till you come to the end: then stop.

Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. Said by the King to the White Rabbit