



Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP)
National Defense University
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Effects of Corruption and Information Operations in Irregular Warfare Workshop

11-13 May 2010

Security Breakout Group

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Sam Bendett, CTNSP



Security Working Group Members



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John Bullock	JBM, 1st IOC	Mark Metzger	95 th CA Bde, USA
Shireen Burki	CISA, NDU	William Osborne	HQMC
Deborah Duong	TRAC, Monterey	Sam Palmer	BAE Systems
Gerard Fischer*	4 th CA Group, USMC	Bill Patchak	Innovative Decisions
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Harold Henderson	MCIA, USMC	Al Sciarretta	CTNSP, NDU
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Breakout Group's Focus

- Security of U.S. Forces
- Security of Afghanistan at the national level
- Security of tribes
- Security of districts/provinces  Supports primary focus
- Security of villages 
- Security of individuals  Supports primary focus



Goal



- Goal: develop a stable village environment that has an acceptable threat level
 - International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – Afghan National Army (ANA)forces initially secure village
 - Then transition responsibility of security to Afghan “rule of law” (Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan judicial system)
- How secure is secure?
 - Enhance physical security to reduce threat of insurgent, terrorist, nationalist, ethnic, extremist, and criminal groups to a level that is manageable by Afghan “rule of law” (ANP and Afghan judicial system) and is perceived by villagers as being secure
 - Physical security may be measured as incidents per month
 - Perception of security is that, despite the number of incidents per month, it is safe to start businesses, to be out and about, etc.



Context

- Enhance security at the village level to:
 - Support “rule of law” initiatives
 - Establish and enforce rules within villages
 - Legitimize governance
 - Primarily to add credibility to national level governance
 - Support governing bodies at other levels
 - Enhance economic development at the village level
 - Attract store owners
 - Provide banking services
 - Increase employment opportunities – create situation where villagers have a vested interest in the economic situation
 - Promote welfare of the people
 - Improve daily life – the “pursuit of happiness”
 - Income, food/shelter/clothing, access to utilities, medical treatment, leisure activities, safety in the streets, etc.
- Combined U.S. – Afghanistan local/government initiatives
- Consider influence of corruption and information operations



Context

Village Model View: Level 0

Level 0

Security
Governance
Econ Dev
IO

Inconsistent
with campaign
objectives

Insurgent
Activity

Corruption
and Crime

Bad Behavior
(e.g.,
Government
Actors)

Popular
Rage

ANA: Afghan National Army
ANP: Afghan National
Police
DoS: Department of State
IDLG: Independent
Directorate of Local
Governance
ISAF: International Security
Assistance Force
MAAT: Marja Accelerated
Agricultural Transition
NGO: Non-Governmental
Organization
ME: Main Effort
SE: Supporting Effort



Context

Village Model View : Level 0

- Conditions:
 - Local authority objectives not consistent with campaign objectives
 - Local economy is sustained by illicit markets
 - ISAF/GIRoA is not the dominant security influence / not a relevant security influence
 - No effective CF IO/messaging



Context

Village Model View: Level I

Level 0

Security
Governance
Econ Dev
IO


Inconsistent with campaign objectives

Insurgent Activity

Corruption and Crime

Bad Behavior (e.g., Government Actors)

Level I



Popular Rage

- ANA: Afghan National Army
- ANP: Afghan National Police
- DoS: Department of State
- IDLG: Independent Directorate of Local Governance
- ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
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Context

Village Model View: Level I

- Conditions:
 - Security buffer provides time and space for emergence (re-emergence) of traditional government
 - Security buffer provides time, space, and Local National (LN) FoM to facilitate alternative economic infrastructure
 - Local security does not have a negative impact on security environment / stability
 - Traditional government is perceived by village as legitimate and effective
- Indicators
 - Are traditional village leaders present?
 - Do villagers feel protected from insurgent violence?
 - Do villagers feel quality of life is improving (has improved)?
 - Do villagers look to the Taliban for protection?
 - Do villagers support local security initiatives?
 - Do villagers believe that the local government can positively affect their problems?




Context

Village Model View: Level II

Level 0
Security
Governance
Econ Dev
IO

Inconsistent with campaign objectives

Insurgent Activity



ANA: Afghan National Army
ANP: Afghan National Police
DoS: Department of State
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SE: Supporting Effort



Context

Village Model View: Level II

- Conditions:
 - Traditional government is inclusive and recognized by ISAF and/or GIRoA
 - External support increases village market efficiency and interaction with markets outside of the village
 - Local security / ANSF (Afghan National Security Force) coordination
 - ANSF does not have a negative impact on security environment / stability
 - Perception of villagers is that they are protected
 - Population and some “little t” believe their self-interests are better served by the ISAF/GIRoA
- Indicators
 - Do GIRoA officials meet publicly with members of traditional government?
 - Does the majority of the villagers participate in selecting representatives of traditional government?
 - Does the population believe that local government serves them?
 - Example: Does government follow through on promises? Does government inhibit local activities?
 - Are local goods being sold outside the local area?
 - Does the population discuss poor ANSF conduct?
 - Does the population feel safe?
 - Is reintegration occurring?




Context

Village Model View: Level III

Level 0
Security
Governance
Econ Dev
IO

Inconsistent with campaign objectives



ANA: Afghan National Army
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IDLG: Independent Directorate of Local Governance
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NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
ME: Main Effort
SE: Supporting Effort

ME: ANP
SE1: LD
SE2: ANA
SE3: ISAF



Context

Village Model View: Level III

- Conditions:
 - Traditional government has formal relationship with centralized government
 - Licit markets can generate revenue consistently over time
 - Local security and ANP have formal relationship
 - Population and insurgents believe grievances can be resolved using the political and legal processes
- Indicators
 - Are District Councils manned?
 - Do licit goods generate profit?
 - Is a GIRoA entity in command of local security?
 - Are reconciliation talks underway?



Context

Alternate Village Model View: Level 0




Influence on Village ~ $f(1/\text{radius})$

Level 0

Security
Governance
Econ Dev
IO

Inconsistent
with campaign
objectives



ANA: Afghan National Army

ANP: Afghan National
Police

DoS: Department of State

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Agricultural Transition

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Context




Alternate Village Model View: Level I

Influence on Village ~ $f(1/\text{radius})$

Level 0

Security
Governance
Econ Dev
IO

Inconsistent with campaign objectives



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Context




Alternate Village Model View: Level II

Level 0

Security
Governance
Econ Dev
IO

Inconsistent with campaign objectives



Corruption
And
Crime

Influence on Village ~ $f(1/\text{radius})$

Level II

Reintegration of the Insurgents

IDLG/ISAF Support

Level I

Local Participation
(Legitimacy)

Jirga/Shura
(Organization)

Community Council

Traditional Govt

Local Security
(Stability)

Economic Infrastructure
(Incentive)

ISAF/DoS/NGO Support

Bad Behavior
(e.g., Government Actors)

Insurgent Activity

Popular Rage

SE1:
ISAF/ANA

SE2: ANP

Example:
MAAT Program

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


Context

Alternate Village Model View: Level III

Level 0
Security
Governance
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Inconsistent with campaign objectives



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
Potential Impact of Corruption

Level 0
Security
Governance
Econ Dev
IO

Inconsistent with campaign objectives

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Context

Impact of Corruption


- Conditions:
 - Traditional corruption levels are acceptable among villagers
 - Do not affect security posture within the village
 - Corruption resulting from outside influences (e.g., GIRoA, U.S. contracts) may have negative security implications
 - Power base for security shifts
 - Person (perhaps wrong person) with the money influences security posture for his benefit
 - May slow progress or cause regression
- Indicators
 - Does external funding increase unwanted corruption?
 - Are external contracts executed in the best interests of the village?
 - Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) may have village involvement – thus lowering probability of corruption
 - Corps of Engineers (COE) and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) contracts may be at GIRoA level – increasing probability of corruption
 - Is funding changing the power base?
 - Does corruption impact the plan for enhancing village security?



Context

Potential Impact of IO

Level 0
 Security
 Governance
 Econ Dev
 IO
 Inconsistent with campaign objectives




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
ME: ANP
 SE1: LD
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
Progress Can Be Viewed In Spider Charts




Spider Chart



Highly Successful Effort




Impact of Corruption



Positive Impact of IO

Current Progress



Negative Impact of IO

Perceived Situation



MG Flynn Questions for Consideration



- How do people (at district; group-level) define “security”?
- How will the population respond to U.S. security actions (more units, increased combat operations, etc.)?
- Do leaders of social networks want central government delivered security, rule of law, taxation, and oversight of their activities?
- Does the population want central government delivered security, rule of law, taxation, and oversight of their activities?
- Will more local interaction (e.g., embedded PRTs) result in improved security, reduced corruption and greater employment?
- How do we split the population from the insurgents, especially in Helmand/Kandahar?
- How does the population relate to different insurgent groups as organizations, not as insurgencies?
- What is the relationship between physical security, level of insurgency support, and the degree of development in an area?



Five Questions Generated 5/11/10



- How secure is the village?
- To what extent does ISAF presence undermine the traditional security system?
- How much does corruption affect security at the village level?
- How much do information operations affect security at the village level?
- What is the relationship among security, level of insurgency support, and degree of development?



Question



What is the population response to ISAF security actions?

- Metric: Movement
 - Village
 - Key leader presence
 - Taliban sympathies
 - Livestock
 - Nomads / Sharecroppers
 - Capital / Remittances
 - Vehicles
 - Crops to market / agricultural products
 - Refugee / Internally Displaced Person (IDP) Camps (where, size, demographics)



Question



What is the population response to ISAF security actions?

- Metric: Engagement
 - Level of participation
 - Prominence of participants
 - Speed of trust building
 - Evidence of cultural bonding
 - Frequency of inducements (pay-to-play)
 - Willingness to associate
 - Willingness to participate



Question



Is ISAF presence increasing or decreasing security?

- Metric: Correlate anomalies of security baseline with types of project (CERP, COE, NGO)
 - Where is authority (power) in the village
 - Security situation
 - SIGACTS
 - Content of key leader engagement
 - Local participation
 - Measures of projects
 - Number/type of projects (include usefulness to village)
 - Dollar value (at village level) of projects
 - Cost to village to maintain
 - Number of locals employed
 - Demographics of locals employed
 - Presence of forces
 - Is there a change in NGO activity



Question



Will local interaction (with outside entities) improve security, reduce corruption, increase employment?

- Quantity
 - Number of NGOs
 - Development projects (CERP/USAID) approved by locals
- Quality
 - Number of times invited to Friday meal
 - Children waving – i.e., reception of soldiers by children
 - Number of times invited to tea (and quality of service)
- Security
 - Retention/desertion rates in security forces (local, ANP, ANA)
- Corruption
 - Once-a-month test ring road extortion (illegal vehicle check points, amount charged, etc.)
 - Price of commodities
 - Ask: survey people



Question

Do villagers feel quality of life is improving?

- SIGACTS
 - Number of reports by locals to ISAF
 - Amount of violence
- Price/availability of cooking fuel and essential food items
- Economic activity
 - Number of markets
 - Number of vendors
 - Percent of essential supplies/services when compared to perishable/more expensive/luxury items
- Presence of educational facilities/supplies and attendance
- Children playing / women outside at a distance from front door / working in the fields



Question

Do villagers feel quality of life is improving?

- Social interactions
 - Traffic density (people)
 - Size of family gatherings
 - Quality of sermons at Mosques
- Refugees returning / people leaving
- Number of vacant homes/compounds



Question

How much do IO efforts affect security?

- Synchronization between IO and operations
 - What we say is what we do
 - Percentage of projects promised and time to complete them
- What is time lag between message and response?
- Leverage other metrics of security

Need more time to address this question.



Question

Do people believe they are secure?

- Economic activity
 - Number/types of stores open
 - Are stores locked at night
 - Inventory in stores
 - Source: ISAF report
- Medical clinic visits
 - Number of visits by women/children
 - Source: ISAF report; GIRoA- Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)
- Movement for social visits
 - Reports of changes
 - Source: ISAF report
- Civilian traffic on roadways
 - Source: National collection assets or ISAF ISR assets



Question

Do people believe they are secure?

- Price and availability of ammunition
 - Price of ammunition (sharwal taxes)
 - Source: ISAF report
- Presence of personal security detail
 - Size of key leaders PSDs
 - Source: ISAF report
- Capability of local security forces
 - ANP/ANA capability evaluations (CE) reporting
 - Source: Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs)
- Amount of damaged structures
 - Change in amount of damaged structures
 - Source: ISAF report



Question

Do people believe they are secure?

- Marriage ceremonies
 - Number of marriages
 - Source: ISAF report
- Funerals
 - Number of ceremonies
 - Source: ISAF report
- Religious activity
 - Number of men attending
 - Source: ISAF report
- Public assemblies (hujrahs)
 - Size of assemblies (number attending)
 - Frequency
 - Source: ISAF report



Question

Do people believe they are secure?

- IED events
 - Number of tips
 - Number resulting in successful finds
 - Number of events
 - Including attacks, finds, etc.
 - Source: ISAF report (including TF Paladin)



Question



What is the relationship between physical security, level of insurgency support, and the degree of development in an area?

- Data Sources
 - Tactical Conflict Assessment and Preparedness Framework (TCAPF)
 - Surveys
 - ISAF Nation Wide Survey (NWS) – every 3 months



Question



Relationship of presence of leaders to security?

- Are traditional village leaders (and their families) present?
 - Source: ISAF report
- Do they leave for travel/work?
 - Source: ISAF report



Question

Do villagers feel protected from insurgent violence?



- See others



Issues

- How to aggregate numerous village reports up to ISAF HQ level?
 - May need composite indices
- How to mitigate variations in qualitative assessments caused by individual characteristics (optimist versus pessimist)?
- Quantitative data/information also requires qualitative context to be understood
- Validation of the assessment is decision maker's acceptance or rejection
- Validity of reporting – difficult to validate qualitative data
 - E.g., responder provides information that he “thinks” he should provide
 - E.g., data collector may not be competent/knowledgeable to create an accurate “ground truth”



Issues

- Context of data is perishable
 - As information goes up the chain of command
 - As the operational environment changes
- Mismatch between data desired by analysts and data collected by operators
 - Requires cleaning/formatting on the part of the analysts
 - Data collection may not be systematic (as perceived by the analyst)
- Anomalies may skew data collection
 - People may report GIRoA security support that does not exist
 - IO may create perceptions that don't exist



Issues

- Inconsistencies in data
 - Lack of standard data architecture resulting in information excesses and gaps
 - Lack of centralized repository or management approach, leaving existing data inaccessible or unknown
 - Lack of adequate collection program standards to address irregularities, inconsistencies
 - Incompleteness of data
- Commander's assessment will not stand up to political scrutiny when confronted by opposing viewpoints backed up by quantitative data unless it is supported with similarly robust analysis
- Many metrics, when viewed individually, have inherent validity issues – so a systemic view may be better
 - E.g. SIGACTS



Recommendations

- Military data collection needs to include a common set of “agreed upon” objective indicators to back up a commander’s subjective assessment
 - Need methodology for consistent translation of subjective to objective data
 - Develop standard data architecture/formats
 - Collection program standards to address data irregularities, inconsistencies
 - Need centralized data collection, storage, and management organization
- Tools and techniques that allow a near-real time collaborative exchange of data – to deal with dynamic, changing operational environment
- At beginning of each assessment effort, define baseline and assumptions
- Have follow-on assessments to identify trends/consistency of actions/beliefs
- Develop methodology/tools for creating seamless transfer of knowledge/understanding during relief in place and transfer of authority (RIP/TOA)
 - Focus on continuity
- Develop systemic view of metrics, rather than focusing on individual metrics