

Effects of Corruption and Information Operations (IO) in Irregular Warfare (IW)

Synthesis Team

Dr. Stuart H. Starr, Chair

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Agenda

- Context
- Plenary Discussions
- Synthesis Findings, Recommendations
- Next Steps

Nature of the Problem

- There is a great deal of *subjective* discussion about the implications of corruption and Information Operations (IO) on Irregular Warfare (IW)
- Policy makers lack the ability to assess alternative policy options *systematically* to address actions to deal with corruption and IO

Karzai's Baggage





Synthesis Panel Goals, Objectives

- Goals
 - Provide an overview of the entire Workshop
- Objectives
 - Based on the presentations at the Plenary
 - Identify key challenges
 - Capture the state-of-the-practice
 - Clarify the nature of the problem by conducting internal panel discussions
 - Derive key insights from the deliberations of the individual working groups
 - Characterize the progress and provide observations on useful next steps

Approach

- Beginning with selected questions posed by MG Flynn, assess the ramifications with respect to, *inter alia*, methodology, data, tools, intellectual capital (e.g., metrics), research
- Develop a “Corruption Tool Box” that will enable senior decision makers to evaluate alternative policy options; e.g.,
 - Bottom up (e.g., begin to develop a macro-model that relates the IW “pillars” (e.g., economics, rule of law, governance, security) to meaningful outcomes)
 - Top down (e.g., Corruption Perception Index (CPI))



Prior/Future IW Conferences/Workshops


Organization	Activity
MORS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Assessment of MOOTW (96)• IW (I), NPS (08)• IW (II), Tampa (09)• IW (III), Orlando (10)
Selected IW Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• IW MmAWG (08)• IW Conference, Ft. Bragg (09)• Data for IW, NDU (09)• IW WG (periodic)• IW M&S SCG (periodic)• AMSAA IW Summit, Suffolk, VA (10)
NATO	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SAS-071, Munich, GE (09)• SAS-081, Sofia, BU (10)• HFM-202, Amsterdam, NL (10)

Recruiting Was Tough...



“But I don’t want to model corruption!”

Synthesis Panel: Concept of Operations



Synthesis Team Members

Group	Synthesis Team
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Christina Krause, CAA• John Tiehem, NGC
Economic Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Jacek Kugler, Claremont University• Bob Sheldon, MCCDC• Traci Swanson, OSD CAPE• Ted Woodcock, Consultant
Rule of Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Dean Hartley, Hartley Consulting• Jack Jackson, TRAC Monterey
Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Dave Davis, GMU• Debbie Duong, Augustine Consulting• Christophe McCray, OSD CAPE

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IO to Shape Behavior in Afghanistan, Dr. Arturo Munoz, RAND

- IO in Afghanistan is dominated by PSYOP
 - Downplay
 - Leaflets
 - Press releases
 - Emphasize
 - Meetings with shuras, jurgas
 - Traditional leader engagements
 - Relationships with local journalists
- Taliban lead on PSYOP ... we do not!

Issues:

- Integration of PA with IO
- “failure to frame messages within appropriate cultural context...”

Transparency International, Mark Pyman

- Definition of corruption:
 - “The abuse of entrusted power for private gain”
 - “Corruption *is* a system”
 - Seems *not* to be cultural, but there are national differences
- Selected results
 - CPI (Afghanistan is next to last)
 - UNODC 2010 (Corruption is issue #1)
- Counter-corruption strategy is an element of all four paths of the ISAF overarching support plan
 - Security/military
 - Political/diplomatic
 - Governance
 - Economic

Dr. Collins' Panel: Culture


- LTC Dan Moy, PRT in Paktya
 - Innovative idea: Generate a District Development book, in Pashtun, with letter by Director of Economy
- Rich DeVillafrance, ICAF
 - The Lockean “social contract” is a *western* concept, that is inconsistent with Pashtun culture
- LTC Steve Erickson, PRT in Afghanistan
 - Control the narrative!
- Shireen Burki, CISA, NDU
 - Need to understand/leverage the culture
 - Employ Afghanistan mores to discredit Dushman's (i.e., the enemy) narrative/ IO strategy (e.g., humiliation)
 - “The Dushman cover their faces ... like women!”

Dr. David Kilcullen (1 of 2)

- Key: how people *feel* about the situation
- Measures of Merit: we tend to focus on *inputs* and *outputs* vice *outcomes*
- Promising tools to identify grievances that we can address
 - Tactical Conflict Assessment & Planning Framework (TCAPF)
 - District Assessment Framework
- Multi-Line of Operations (LOOs)

Dr. David Kilcullen (2 of 2)

- Selected Conceptual Models – cyclical, not linear
 - “Cross over point”: Adversary capability, host nation, coalition
 - Absorption of resources
 - Foreign resources
 - Ability to absorb resources
 - “Vicious cycle” (address simultaneously)



Brian Tomney, DoJ

- “It is 1389; Afghanistan is a process of immersion -- there are few ‘true’ experts!”
- Afghanistan is **not** ... Iraq, the US, isolated, a credible partner????
- What works in Afghanistan (e.g., polygraphs, mentors, money, security)
- Corruption in Afghanistan is endemic, opportunism
 - Local (e.g., beat cops; road blocks)
 - Provincial, National (e.g., skimming profits, kickbacks, drug trafficking)
- Competing interests
 - CT vs COIN
 - Intelligence vs Evidence

“We don’t give our strategy enough time to work!”

Jim Bexfield's Panel: Data

- LTC Dave Sanders, CAA
 - “Tons of data...but problems exist with format problems, usability,...”
 - Issue: how do we roll up village data?
- Major Norb Karczewski, USMC
 - Challenge: interpretation of data with respect to the commander's objectives
 - Corruption: the cost of toothpaste (e.g., the bazaar vs institutional prices)
- Jack Jackson, TRAC Monterey
 - “Context matters with respect to data”
 - Perform exploratory analysis to discover key variables, identify response variables
- LTC Al Leonardo, Skope
 - The key is to organize, set up, and manage the data – it's all about the “back end”!
 - Challenge: reduce wasting time in acquiring, adapting, and “cleaning” data – innovate!
- Bobby Claflin – focus on
 - Alignment
 - Integration
 - Innovation

Congressman John Tierney (D-MA)


- Challenge: to what extent are coalition contractors involved in corruption?
- Observations
 - Prime contractors lack trucks; how do they cope with this issue?
 - They are subject to extortion by warlords (e.g., \$1,500 per truck)
 - Furthermore, we have “zero visibility” on the status of trucks and their cargo
- Concern: To what extent are the Taliban participating in extortion?

Supply chain: Our weak underbelly

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Decomposing the Cultural-Social Modeling Problem




“Measuring Progress in Afghanistan”

Indicators	Representative Metrics
Population-related	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Transportation prices• Taxation collection• Progress of NGO construction projects
Host Nation Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Capital flight• Budget execution• Nepotism
Security Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Kill ratio• Recruitment vs desertion rates
Enemy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Price of black-market weapons• Presence of foreign advisers

Source: David Kilcullen, “Measuring Progress in Afghanistan, December 2009

NATO COBP for C2 Assessment



Governance Working Group (1 of 2)

- Definition – the function of Government is...
 - Management of state resources for populace
 - To solve common action problems and resolve disputes
- Observations
 - Location, location, location! [Note: Governance, Rule of Law, Economics vary according to location]
 - Key to understanding governance causes
 - Personal motivation
 - Role relationships
 - Challenges in governing well
 - Old ways (e.g., jurga)
 - New ways (e.g., corrupt bureaucracy)
 - We have few hard metrics, but many inexact, “soft” metrics of corruption

Governance Working Group (2 of 2)

- Key issues, gaps
 - Modeling the breakdown of institutions and the effects of intervention on new institutions
 - Validating models against many uncertain and conflicting data
 - Identifying general types and the causal patterns behind them so that appropriate treatments may be tested
- Selected recommendations
 - Fund technological solutions to draw correspondence with, and validate against, many uncertain data
 - Fund integrative frameworks to compose general models into specific localized scenarios
 - Fund agent based models of the emergence of institutions


Create a CorruptionTool Box

- Approach
 - Employ a mix of tools (e.g., wargames, M&S)
 - Employ a hybrid mix of tools to explore “possibility space” (e.g., “punctuated simulation”)
 - Human-in-the-loop employing wargames to address long-term issues
 - Automated M&S to address short-term issues
- Begin VV&A
 - At the outset of the effort
 - Continue throughout the life cycle of the tool box
- Orchestrate a mix of tools
 - “Top down” tools (e.g., CPI)
 - “Bottom up” tools (e.g., four pillars)


A Corruption Tool Box Should Contain...

- *Agent based models* that focus on personal motivations and role relationships; e.g., Nexus Network Learner, Cultural Geography model
- *Cognitive agent-based models*; e.g., model “Perception is Reality”
- *Natural Language Tools* (e.g., Indra, LSA)
- *Automated Analysis Services* that data farm the strategic space
- *Automated Validation Services* to deal with uncertain data
- *An integrative framework* (e.g., XBM, COMPOEX)

Preliminary Model of Rule of Law



Candidate Approach: “Punctuated Simulation”



Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

- Re-evaluate the methodologies that are being employed by alternative organizations; e.g.,
 - ADB: Country Performance Assessment ratings by the Asian Development Bank
 - BF: Bertelsmann Transformation Index by the Bertelsmann Foundation
 - GI: Global Risk Service by IHS Global Insight
 - WB: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment by the World Bank
 - Transparency International (source: Professor Lamsdorff, Passau, Germany)




Observations: *Polling*

- Capture information on the population
 - Evaluate complications caused by multiple, disconnected pollsters
 - Ensure the topics are nested, relating to campaign plan objectives
 - Record the impact of coalition actions and incidents
 - Minimize duplicative polls
- Examine the credibility of polls
 - Standardize the questions
 - Examine the quality control of the poll execution
- Develop central repository of all interagency polls
 - CAA has initiated an effort for Afghanistan polls

Establish an enterprise approach to polling

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Next Steps

- Expand the Community of Interest (CoI) / Community of Practice (CoP)
 - Leverage LinkedIn CoI/CoP
 - DIME/PMESII (Dean Hartley)
 - Corruption (Al Sciarretta)
 - Expand the participants
- Refine the Measures of Merit (MoMs)
 - Begin with, adapt Kilkullen's MoMs
 - Build on the construct in the NATO Code of Best Practice on C2 Assessment (e.g., MoPs, MoEs, Measures of Policy Effectiveness (MoPEs))
 - Iterate!
- Create the Corruption Tool Box
 - Select, employ an appropriate wargame
 - Refine the conceptual models of the four pillars
 - Construct a macro-model (built on the four pillars) to help senior decision makers evaluate options to deal with corruption, IO
 - Observations
 - Employ an evolutionary acquisition approach (iterate!)
 - Begin VV&A throughout the life of the Corruption Tool Box
 - Need: modelers to continue the job!
- Feedback!
 - Go to Survey Monkey to provide your feedback on the workshop!

Portnoy's Complaint: Punch Line

So [*said the doctor*]. Now vee may perhaps to begin. Yes?

-- Philip Roth

Back-up Slides


Rule of Law Working Group (1 of 2)

- Definition: Dispute resolution (e.g., person to person, person to group, group to group)
- Observations:
 - Both formal systems and informal methods of dispute resolution and justice can support effective rule of law
 - Transparency and accountability are foundational and relatively straight forward to measure
 - At the local level, measuring the frequency and level of bribes to police, prosecutors and judges are a priority
 - GoIRA constitution embraces Sharia law and contains language supporting Rule of Law IO to counter Taliban propaganda
 - To some extent the Taliban have been effective in IO campaign to impugn [for somewhat different reasons]
 - Formal system
 - Traditional (local) systems [for somewhat different reasons]

Rule of Law Working Group (2 of 2)

- Issues:
 - Systems and methods to measure and promote consistency and accountability in informal systems are especially problematic
 - The GoIRA constitution invests extensive power in the executive supporting centralized top-down justice and law enforcement
 - Key issues
 - What is the true state of Traditional (local) ROL system (by village)?
 - Is it operational or is it revivable?

Security Village Model View



Phase 0

Security
Governance
Econ Dev
IO

Inconsistent
with campaign
objectives

- ANA: Afghan National Army
- ANP: Afghan National Police
- DoS: Department of State
- IDLG: Independent Directorate of Local Government
- ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
- MAAT: Marja Accelerated Agricultural Transition
- NGO: Non-Government Organization
- ME: Main Effort
- SE: Supporting Effort

- ME: ANP
- SE1: LD
- SE2: ANA
- SE3: ISAF


Security

- Definition (at village level):
 - A stable village environment that has an acceptable threat level that can initially be managed by ISAF/ANSF with an end goal of being managed locally by local security forces.
- How secure is secure?
 - Enhance physical security to reduce threat of insurgent, terrorist, nationalist, ethnic, extremist, and criminal groups to a level that is manageable by Afghan “rule of law” (ANP and Afghan judicial system) and is perceived by villagers as being secure
 - Physical security may be measured as incidents per month
 - Perception of security is that, despite the number of incidents per month, it is safe to start businesses, to be out and about, etc.

Security

- Topics
 - Focused on security activities at the village level
 - Included interaction with economic development, governance, rule of law
- Issues
 - How to aggregate numerous village reports up to ISAF HQ level?
 - How to mitigate variations in qualitative assessments caused by individual characteristics (optimist vs pessimist)?
- Recommendations
 - None at this time

FAST Study Analysis Process



Simple Economic Development Influence Model

 = Points of Influence of Corruption

