



# China's Role in Asia: Access and Anti-Access



The Institute for National Strategic Studies,  
The Center for Technology and National Security Policy  
Marshall Hall Room 155, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC 20319  
July 24-25

## DAY 1 – Thursday, July 24

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- 08:15 – 08:30**            **Introduction and Administrative Remarks:** *James Keagle (CTNSP)*
- 08:30 – 10:00**            **Topic I: China's Role in Asia**
- China's Asia Strategy  
*Dr. Phillip Saunders, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU*
- China's Rising Influence in Asia  
*Dr. Jim Przystup, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU*
- 10:00 – 10:15**            **Break**
- 10:15 – 12:00**            **Topic I Continued: Asian Perspectives on China's Role**
- Dr. Ruan Zongze, Minister Counselor, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the USA*  
*Mr. Yoichi Kato, Bureau Chief, The Asahi Shimbun*  
*Dr. Hoang Anh Tuan, Counselor - Congressional Liaison, Embassy of Vietnam*
- 12:00 – 13:30**            **Luncheon Address: The Oil Card- Could a Blockade Cut Off China's Oil?**
- Mr. William S. Murray, Associate Research Professor, U.S. Naval War College*
- 13:30 – 15:00**            **Topic II: China's Access to Asia**
- Economic Access & Infrastructure  
*Mr. Charles W. Freeman III, Chairholder, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS*
- Energy Transportation and Sea Lanes of Communication  
*Dr. Bernard Cole, Professor of International History, National War College*
- 15:00 – 15:15**            **Break**
- 15:30 – 17:00**            **Topic II: China's Access to Asia**
- PRC Naval Strategy & Development Rationales  
*Mr. Daniel M. Hartnett, China Analyst, CNA*
- PRC Power Projection & Military Diplomacy  
*Mr. Roy Kamphausen, Vice President for Political and Security Affairs and Director, Washington, DC Office at the National Bureau of Asian Research*
- 17:00**                      **END**

## DAY 2 – Friday, July 25

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- 08:15 – 08:30**            **Administrative Remarks:** *James Keagle (CTNSP)*
- 08:30 – 10:30**            **Topic III: China’s Anti-Access Strategy**
- PLA Naval Capabilities  
                                 *Mr. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Analyst, Congressional Research Service*
- PLA Anti-Access Strategies – Taiwan and Beyond  
                                 *RADM Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret), Director Strategic Studies, CNA*
- Mr. Paul S. Giarra, Senior Program Manager, Strategic Assessment Center, Science Applications International Corporation*
- 10:30 – 10:45**            **Break**
- 10:45 – 12:15**            **Topic II Continued: China’s Anti-Access Strategy**
- China’s Approach to Space and Counter-space  
                                 *Mr. Kevin Pollpeter, China Program Manager, Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, Defense Group Inc.*
- PLA “Legal Warfare” and Maritime Sovereignty Claims  
                                 *Mr. Peter A. Dutton, Associate Professor of Strategic Studies, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College*
- 12:15 – 13:45**            **Luncheon Address**
- Ambassador Stapleton Roy, Vice Chairman, Kissinger Associates Inc.*
- 13:45 - 14:00**            **Break**
- 14:00 - 15:30**            **Chinese Objectives and Strategies & Policy Implications for the U.S., Region, and the World**
- Dr. Cynthia Watson, Chair, Department of Security Studies, National War College, NDU*  
                                 *Mr. Dan Blumenthal, Resident Fellow in Asian Studies, American Enterprise Institute*  
                                 *Dr. Phillip Saunders, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU*
- 15:30**                        **END**

# **China's Search for Energy**

Bernard D. Cole, Ph.D.


Captain, USN (Ret.)

Professor, National War College

## **Points of Discussion**

- **Energy Demands**
- **Reliance on Imports**
- **Sources of Energy: Domestic, Foreign**
- **Strategic Impact of Energy Requirements**
- **Affects on U.S. Security:  
Partnership or Rivals**


### China's Oil Production and Consumption, 1986-2006\*



Source: EIA *International Petroleum*


\*2006 is Jan-Aug only

### Top World Oil Producers, 2005




Source: EIA, *International Petroleum Monthly*

### Top Sources of China's Crude Oil Imports, 2005 and 2006\*




Source: FACTS, Inc. *China Oil and Gas Monthly*  
\*2006 data is January through June only

### Electricity Generation in China by Type, 1994-2004



Source: EIA International Energy Annual

**China's Coal Production and Consumption,  
1984-2004**



Source: EIA International Energy Annual



China's coal industry



## The Importing Issue

<b>From</b>	<b>To</b>	<b>Distance (nm)</b>	<b>Transit Time: days @ 16kts</b>
<b>Busan</b>	<b>Singapore</b>	<b>2,473</b>	<b>6.5</b>
<b>Singapore</b>	<b>Abadan</b>	<b>3,605</b>	<b>9.4</b>
<b>Shanghai</b>	<b>Abadan</b>	<b>3,717</b>	<b>9.7</b>
<b>Singapore</b>	<b>Fremantle</b>	<b>2,220</b>	<b>5.8</b>
<b>Fremantle</b>	<b>Abadan</b>	<b>5,411</b>	<b>14.1</b>

## **SLOCs and Pipelines**

**SLOCs: Coastal, East China Sea,**

**South China Sea, Indian Ocean**

**Narrows: Malacca / Sunda / Lombok /**


**Sulawesi / San Bernadino / Mindinao /**

**Andaman Sea / 9 Degree Channel / Hormuz**

**/ Bab el-Mandab**

**Pipelines: Kazakhstan, Thailand, Burma....**


# SLOCS





# East China Sea








1. KUWAIT
2. BAHRAIN
3. QATAR
4. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
5. TURKMENISTAN

# **COLLISION COURSE IN THE EEZ**


## ***LEGAL WARFARE AND THE BATTLE FOR IDEAS***



***Peter Dutton***  
***China Maritime Studies Institute***

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
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
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


*Peter Dutton*  
*China Maritime Studies Institute*


# CHINA'S PEACEFUL RISE




# THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE – CHINA'S ANTI-ACCESS STRATEGY




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
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
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
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# REDEFINING NORMS: CHINESE VIEWS ON LAW AND CONFLICT

*Achieving legitimacy through the “perfection of international law.”*

## Renmin Haijun May 29 2006 on Legal Warfare Doctrine

*“Military Warfare under modern high technology conditions is a political and legal battle of safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity against enemy countries’ military interference.”*

*“Using law as a weapon,...seize the opportunity to grab the initiative.”*


### Four “firsts” – resources, pretexts, initiative and strength

*Be far-sighted...*

*Provide a pre-text for military action...*

*Put the tremendous effects of ‘soft killing’ to good use...*

*Seize the right moment...*



## **“Searching for the legitimacy of military action”**

***“Legal warfare not only penetrates the entire process of local sea war, but is also an important means to strive for the initiative in military action, even becoming a new form of combat.”***

***“Legal warfare is a ‘soft weapon’ to obtain ... public opinion and the support of the international community.”***

***From... “Legal Warfare, New Forms of Combat and Future Naval War.”  
Director of the Political Department of the South China Sea Fleet***

# **CHINESE LEGAL WARFARE**

## ***“Three Warfares” and the nexus to Taiwan***

***Taipei Kuo-fang Cheng-t'se P'ing-lun/  
Taiwan Defense Affairs, Sept 2004***

***In December 2003 The General Political Department  
of the PLA added three new types of warfare  
to the Regulations of the PLA Political Work:***

***Public Opinion Warfare***

***Psychological Warfare***

***Law Warfare***

***“Law warfare means to generate legal combat  
based on domestic law, international law and  
international conventions.”***


***Preparation of the battle space “to obtain human will and thinking as the aim.”***

***“Declare the adversary’s military illegitimacy  
and manifest the legitimacy of self-defense.”***

# CHINESE LEGAL WARFARE

## *Strategic communications...beyond Taiwan*

### *Developing an “Asian consensus”*




### *“Handling sudden incidents”*

*“Handling sudden incidents according to international law is common international practice.”*

*“Law warfare must be effectively developed...to explain military actions and criticize perpetrators of sudden incidents as part of psychological and legal propaganda offensives.”*

*Zhongguo Junshi Kexue,  
China Military Science Volume  
6-2006*

# Maritime Zones



# EEZ – US PERSPECTIVE

## ◆ President Reagan:

*I proclaim ... an Exclusive Economic Zone ... which will provide United States jurisdiction for mineral resources out to 200 nautical miles ... Within this zone all nations will continue to enjoy the high seas rights that are not resource related, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight.*



# EEZ – US PERSPECTIVE

*Residual rights include use of Zone for all military activities not otherwise prohibited by international law.*

*Surveillance and reconnaissance flights are not prohibited by international law and are not a threat to coastal state's national security.*

*Due regard—safety of flight.*

*Renewed Russian military reconnaissance flights over EE Z of Canada, Norway, UK and others*

## **EEZ - THE CHINESE PERSPECTIVE**

***“Freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ do not include the freedom to conduct military and reconnaissance activities in the EEZ and its superadjacent airspace. Such activities encroach or infringe on the security interests of the coastal State, and can be considered a use of force or a threat to use force...”***

***“Coastal States have the right to restrict or even prohibit the activities of foreign military vessels and aircraft in and over their EEZ.”***

**Dr Ren Xiaofeng and Sr. Col. Cheng Xizhong  
Marine Policy, Vol. 29, pp. 139-146 (2005)**

## **EEZ - THE CHINESE PERSPECTIVE**

*Hydrographic surveys constitute battlefield preparation and thus a threat of force in violation of the UNCLOS principle of peaceful uses.*

**Sr. Col. Cheng Xizhong**  
**Marine Policy, Vol. 28, pp. 25-27 (2004)**

*“The Taiwan Strait is China’s EEZ...The Chinese side has always regarded the unapproved passage of warships, especially fully armed warships, as an act of provocation.”*

**Zhou Zhonghai, interview (2008)**

# UNCLOS and the Two 'Due Regards'

- ◆ Coastal State duties include responsibility to exercise “due regard” to the rights and duties other States and to act in a manner compatible with the LOSC (Art. 56.2)
- ◆ Other States, in exercising their rights of freedom of navigation, must have “due regard” for rights and duties of coastal State (Art. 58.3)
- ◆ Art. 59: Un-attributed rights or jurisdiction (residual rights):
  - Any conflict over such rights “should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the
    - The parties
    - The international community as a whole.

***LOOKING THROUGH THE LENS OF VALUES...***

## ON A COLLISION COURSE AT SEA?

**US:** EEZ is a zone of international waters

Coastal States have limited, specified jurisdictional authority related to resources and pollution.

Other rights, including military activities, belong to the international community.

**PRC:** EEZ is a coastal State's zone


Coastal States have sovereign-like authority and primacy of interests over the international community.

Legitimate international military activities are limited to passage.

*The 2001 EP-3 Incident provided China an international stage from which to articulate and apply their perspective.*


# Official US Statement

**“From all the evidence we’ve seen, the United States aircraft was operating in international airspace in full accordance with all laws and regulations and did nothing to cause the accident.”**



**George W. Bush  
President of the United States**

# Official PRC Statements



**Jiang Zemin,  
President PRC**

*The U.S.  
must bear full  
responsibility*



**MoFA:**

Foreign aircraft on reconnaissance missions in the airspace over the EEZ “pose a serious threat to the national security of China,” violate UNCLOS and principle of over flight freedom, and must be stopped .




**Xinhua:**

*“Reconnaissance flights are threats to the national security and peaceful order of coastal states.”*


# LEGITIMACY AND SEA CONTROL: THE NEXUS BETWEEN CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES, MARITIME CLAIMS AND STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES

***“Once the curtain descends on the Sino-Japanese dispute over the East Sea, then mainland China will be able to concentrate the East Sea fleet’s power to resolve the Taiwan problem. Moreover, the resolution of the Sino-Japanese East Sea dispute would enable China to successfully expand sea control in the direction of the East Sea.”***

**Liu Qia and Liu Yu  
Modern Navy  
October 2007**




# LEGITIMACY AND SEA CONTROL: THE NEXUS BETWEEN CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES, MARITIME CLAIMS AND STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES



**South China Sea Code of Conduct  
But...  
Philippines Baselines Bill**


**“Saying it will not yield any part of  
Philippine territory to China...”**

**“Chinese officials have been putting  
pressure on both chambers of Congress...”**



尖閣諸島  
Senkaku Shoto

# What about the November 2004 HAN Incident?




# SOME REMAINING QUESTIONS

**GIVEN EXISTING DIFFERENCES,  
WHAT IS THE WAY FORWARD?**

**IS THERE ROOM FOR COOPERATION  
UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS?**

**MIGHT THERE BE CONVERGENCE  
OF PERSPECTIVES BEYOND TAIWAN?**



# A FUTURE CONVERGENCE?

## Balancing National and International Authorities

- ◆ *Too much maritime sovereignty is destabilizing*
- ◆ Authority: UNCLOS interpretations based on enhanced jurisdictionalization of the maritime zones could add to littoral instability that threatens the global economy.
- ◆ Capacity: Weak coastal states with sovereignty-like jurisdiction that they cannot enforce are a danger to the entire core of countries integrated into the global order because they create *sanctuaries for destabilizing elements*.



The Institute for National Strategic Studies  
The Center for Technology and  
Security Policy  
National Defense University

China in Asia:  
Access and Anti-Access

China's Maritime  
Reconnaissance-Strike Complex:

Land Mobile, MaRV'd  
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)

Paul S. Giarra  
July 25, 2008

1

Maritime supremacy in the Pacific is a traditional American core military competence, and strategic oceanic mobility a fundamental premise of American security strategy. Chinese writings now propose new maneuverable re-entry anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities sufficient to overturn presumptive American maritime strategic superiority in an afternoon.[1]

The United States depends upon command of the oceans for access to global markets, and to leverage military strategic and tactical mobility. China has expressed at length its inherent need to challenge this fundamental American advantage. Chinese analysts and leaders have written extensively on the subject of challenging this American freedom of movement across the Pacific, and on being able to hold American military forces at great distance by controlling the three successive Pacific island chains.

The prospect of Chinese MaRV'd ASBM development, especially in combination with mobile missile launchers, presents great challenges for American and allied intelligence analysts. Understanding the Chinese resources, capabilities, and intentions necessary to support and enable a significant anti-access strategy -- scientific and technical, industrial, organizational, and military -- is a tremendous political, operational, and intelligence task. Given the potential strategic consequences, practical, actionable understanding as early as possible is vital for two reasons: first, to preclude Chinese strategic surprise; and second, to avoid over-reaction by not having a firm grasp of the realities of emerging Chinese military-operational capabilities, and in case of Chinese setbacks, failures, or Beijing's subsequent re-direction of strategic priorities and resources.

[1] CRS Report for Congress: *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities* — Background and Issues for Congress, November 18, 2005, p. 8, by Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division:

"Although ballistic missiles in the past have traditionally been used to attack fixed targets on land, observers believe China may now be developing TBMs equipped with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs). Observers have expressed strong concern about this potential development, because such missiles, in combination with a broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting system, would permit China to attack moving U.S. Navy ships at sea. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. Due to their ability to change course, MaRVs would be more difficult to intercept than non-maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicles. According to one press report (Yihong Chang and Andrew Koch, "Is China Building A Carrier?" *Jane's Defence Weekly*, August 17, 2005), 'navy officials project [that such missiles] could be capable of targeting US warships from sometime around 2015.' "

## Maj. T.J. "King" Kong (Slim Pickens)



## “DR. STRANGELOVE”

Dr. Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb

\* Director: Stanley Kubrick

\* Main Cast: Peter Sellers, Peter Sellers, Peter Sellers, George C. Scott, Sterling Hayden, Keenan Wynn, Slim Pickens, James Earl Jones


\* Release Year: 1964

\* Country: US/UK

### Plot

In 1964, with the Cuban Missile Crisis fresh in viewers' minds, the Cold War at its frostiest, and the hydrogen bomb relatively new and frightening, Stanley Kubrick dared to make a film about what could happen if the wrong person pushed the wrong button -- and played the situation for laughs. Dr. Strangelove's jet-black satire (from a script by director Stanley Kubrick, Peter George, and Terry Southern) and a host of superb comic performances (including three from Peter Sellers) have kept the film fresh and entertaining, even as its issues have become (slightly) less timely. Loaded with thermonuclear weapons, a U.S. bomber piloted by Maj. T.J. "King" Kong (Slim Pickens) is on a routine flight pattern near the Soviet Union when they receive orders to commence Wing Attack Plan R, best summarized by Maj. Kong as "Nuclear combat! Toe to toe with the Russkies!" On the ground at Burpleson Air Force Base, Group Capt. Lionel Mandrake (Peter Sellers) notices nothing on the news about America being at war. Gen. Jack D. Ripper (Sterling Hayden) calmly informs him that he gave the command to attack the Soviet Union because it was high time someone did something about fluoridation, which is sapping Americans' bodily fluids (and apparently has something to do with Ripper's sexual dysfunction). Meanwhile, President Merkin Muffley (Sellers again) meets with his top Pentagon advisors, including super-hawk Gen. Buck Turgidson (George C. Scott), who sees this as an opportunity to do something about Communism in general and Russians in particular. However, the ante is upped considerably when Soviet ambassador de Sadesky (Peter Bull) informs Muffley and his staff of the latest innovation in Soviet weapons technology: a "Doomsday Machine" that will destroy the entire world if the Russians are attacked. ~ Mark Deming, All Movie Guide

## The Slim Pickens View of ASBMs



From the Chinese Internet

<http://bbs.cjdbby.net>

Review -- Dr. Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb is widely regarded as the screen's greatest satire, a film that superbly encapsulates the fear and paranoia of the Cold War. There is not a sequence in the film in which the dialogue is not quotable -- indeed, there are so many well-remembered moments that viewers and critics will differ on the best, though surely the sight of Major Kong (Slim Pickens) waving his cowboy hat as he rides the bomb into oblivion is among the most enduring images of its era. As was consistently the case in his career, director Stanley Kubrick brilliantly matches actors with their roles, from Peter Sellers' three-character performance to the screen debut of James Earl Jones, whom Kubrick had spotted in a stage play. Similarly, George C. Scott, who plays the hawkish general Buck Turgidson, considered Strangelove among his greatest screen achievements. Every performance is top-notch, and many Kubrick trademarks can be found in the film, from the visual style to the shift to a hand-held camera when the Air Force base is attacked to the sparse and ironic use of music. ~ Richard Gilliam, All Movie Guide

### Cast

- \* Peter Sellers - Dr. Strangelove
- \* Peter Sellers - Group Capt. Lionel Mandrake
- \* Peter Sellers - President Merkin Muffley
- \* George C. Scott - Gen. Buck Turgidson
- \* Sterling Hayden - Gen. Jack D. Ripper
- \* Keenan Wynn - Col. Bat Guano
- \* Slim Pickens - Maj. T.J. "King" Kong
- \* James Earl Jones - Lt. Lothar Zogg

## Introduction

- My purpose is to introduce the idea of Chinese landmobile, MaRV'd, ASBMs.
- The serious work will have to be done on a much broader scale -- consider the ASW level of effort during the Cold War.
- There is speculation that the PLA will test this capability soon, against a mobile target at sea.

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## Introduction

- Chinese ASBMs are the manifestation of the advent of network warfare.
  - Without targeting the OTHT networks necessary for this capability, naval surface platforms are at significant risk.
- Part of a larger briefing

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# Range and Risk in Naval Warfare The “Anti-Access Battlespace”



RAND: *The Dragon's Lair*, 2007  
Portions of the Western Pacific Most  
Vulnerable to Chinese Antiaccess Measures

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## The “Anti-Access Battlespace”

## Range and Risk in Naval Warfare

- Maritime commanders try to range vessels at sea through stealth or weapons range because the offense -- firing first from the greatest range -- has the advantage.

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## Range and Risk in Naval Warfare

- Since modern naval vessels are “highly integrated physical platforms” (i.e., therefore vulnerable to disruption and mission kill), naval weapons have a high probability of at least mission kill if they can hit the target.

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## Range and Risk in Naval Warfare

- As at Gettysburg:
  - weapons are way ahead of tactics, and defenses.
- Therefore, if at all possible, Naval commanders must and will maneuver to avoid contact if the correlation of forces is unfavorable.

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## Range and Risk in Naval Warfare

- The inherent range advantage of Chinese MaRV'd ASBMs able to range surface ships at sea puts the Navy at severe risk --


what amounts to coastal artillery of extraordinary range

(1000s of miles vs. < 30 miles)

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## Coastal Artillery As We Knew It



One of the 16 inch rifles of Battery Williston  
Fort Weaver, in Hawaii in the 1920s.

<http://www.cdsg.org/home.htm>

Photograph courtesy Phil Whaley  
([pwhaley2@cogeco.ca](mailto:pwhaley2@cogeco.ca))

## Coastal Artillery of the Future?



DF-21 Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

# Coastal Artillery of the Future?





Figure 1 Schematic Diagram of Missile Flight Trajectory with Terminal Guidance

Operational profile with MaRV'd warhead

Courtesy of Richard Fisher, Jr.  
International Assessment and Strategy Center



July 25, 2008 PERSHING II trajectory showing the terminal guidance process

## Numbers Count

- There are only about two dozen capital ships in the U.S. surface fleet:
  - 11 or 12 heavy aircraft carriers operating in carrier strike groups; and
  - 12 aviation capable “straight deck” amphibious assault ships operating in expeditionary strike groups

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## Numbers Count

- Even adding to these numbers the other high value units of the U.S. and potential coalition fleets
    - major combatants, command ships, replenishment ships, hospital ships, and transports
- there are relatively few capital ship targets.

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## Numbers Count

- With so few high value assets, a successful attack against even one of these ships, let alone a loss, would be psychologically devastating at home and operationally debilitating at sea.
- The potential result would be a significant decrease in overall U.S. Naval power in the region.

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# Numbers Count

- Prudent allies and interested observers can do this math, and are making their own calculations in advance.

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# Thinking About ASBMs

- ASBMs are an extremely attractive, self-reinforcing option for China.
- Chinese ASBMs are technically feasible  
-- and unprecedented
- Chinese ASBMs are potentially destabilizing  
-- to U.S. strategic disadvantage.

# Thinking About ASBMs

- Chinese land mobile, MaRV'd ASBMs represent a significant leap forward, tilting the military-strategic balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.
- They raise the potential for significant surface ship “No-Go” zones, well beyond tactical radius of carrier air wings, thus negating our investment in short range air platforms.

## Thinking About ASBMs

- This is a lesson in “Jointness”: the other Services have a significant strategic stake in this ostensibly maritime issue.
- It is a reminder that in the Asia-Pacific, when the U.S. Navy catches cold, the other Services sneeze.
- Furthermore, the same enabling missiles and OTH-T systems hold land-based airfields at risk throughout the region.

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# Thinking About ASBMs

- ASBMs present a rationale for extensive Joint and Combined all-source collection and integrated analysis.
- They are an illustrative case for intelligence collection, analysis, force structure and resource planning.
- This briefing began as a paper on how to organize information collection and analysis when confronted by complex challenges.

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[http://www.homeofheroes.com/wings/part1/6\\_survival.html](http://www.homeofheroes.com/wings/part1/6_survival.html)

In the fall of 1920 Captain Chester Nimitz was tasked with overseeing some bombing tests on the old Spanish-American War ship, the U.S.S. Indiana. The Navy wanted to learn just how much damage bombs dropped from the air could wreak on its warships. An ancillary benefit would be the ultimate rebuttal of any claims that a warships could be sunk by these bombs. Few military men beyond Mitchell and a few old admirals like Admiral Winterhalter believed such a feat possible.

The tests were conducted under the most secret of conditions...no media coverage and results would be divulged only as necessary. Navy airplanes attacked the old vessel with dummy bombs while Naval technicians assessed the probable damage real bombs might have inflicted. Then underwater charges were exploded near the ships hull. The concussion split seams and ruptured the old ships hull, giving evidence to a concept in bombardment that would later become important to Mitchell--near misses could wreak more damage than a direct hit. As the testing neared its completion, the still floating Indiana was run aground where bombs were affixed to her deck to finish the destruction.

When the testing was done the Navy released an innocuous statement, not widely publicized, that it was improbable that a modern battleship could be sunk from the air. With that, the admirals hoped the question would go away.

Unfortunately for the Navy, somehow two pictures of the ruptured deck of the Indiana found their way into the London Illustrated News. Still the Navy tried to downplay the results of their tests--until Billy Mitchell showed up to testify before Congress in January, 1921.

# Thinking About ASBMs

## Reminder:

Some military-technical breakthroughs have dramatic operational effects.

- Shallow-running IJN aerial torpedoes at Pearl Harbor
- Monitor-Merrimack at the Battle of Hampton Roads
- Billy Mitchell's Ostfriesland bombing demonstrations

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The Battle of Hampton Roads, often called the Battle of Monitor and Merrimack, was a naval battle of the American Civil War, famous for being the first fight between two steam powered iron-covered warships, or "ironclads", the USS Monitor, an entirely new design, and the CSS Virginia (which had been rebuilt from the burned-out hull of the USS Merrimack). The principal confrontations took place on March 8 and March 9, 1862, off Sewell's Point, a narrow place near the mouth of Hampton Roads, Virginia.

The naval battle lasted two days. The first day was the debut of Virginia and was fought without Monitor. Havoc was wreaked upon the wooden Union ships, and the day ended with the Confederate side at a decided advantage. However, on the second day Monitor arrived and initiated the famous action known as the duel of the ironclads. Although the battle was inconclusive, it is significant in naval history. Prior to then, nearly all warships were made primarily of wood. After the battle, design of ships and naval warfare changed dramatically, as nations around the world raced to convert their fleets to iron since they had shown themselves to be clearly superior to wooden ships in their ability to withstand enemy fire.

# Thinking About ASBMs

- ASBMs are part of a larger Chinese strategic effort.
- Think of China's ASAT test last January 11 as an exposed piece of a broad effort to develop strategic capabilities to deter and defeat the United States near Taiwan, in the Asia-Pacific, and globally.
- Part of a strategy to exploit American "Soft Ribs"

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Wang Hucheng, "The U.S. Military's 'Soft Ribs' and Strategic Weaknesses", *Liaowang*, vol. 27, reprinted in *Xinhua Hong Kong Service*, 5 July 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0705, 25 July 2000.

## Thinking About ASBMs

- “This is asymmetric warfare in the sense that Andy Marshall originally meant when he talked about the Revolution in Military Affairs.”
- “For very little investment, relative to the capacity of the Chinese economy, the Chinese are acquiring an effective answer to forward U.S. deployment against them.”

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Senior American China expert, Correspondence with Paul Giarra, June 28, 2007


## “Strategic Mobility vs. Anti-Access” Competition

- This competition is about far more than just whatever missile the PLA might develop.
- Thinking about how to think about this collection and analysis challenge is the necessary first step in managing strategic organizational, resource, analytical, political, and operational responses.

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# QUESTIONS?



<http://bbs.cjdby.net>

## “Not Since the 15th Century . . .”

- Some have said:  
“The Chinese Navy hasn’t gone to sea  
in a meaningful way since the 15th century.”
- Does the PLA have to “come out”?
- Chinese strategists are arguing for sea control  
from the shore.

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## “Not Since the 15th Century . . .”

- Hypothesis:
  - In part, China’s naval emergence will manifest itself in over-the-horizon reconnaissance-strike complexes, dictated by the nature and extent of American naval power.

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## “Not Since the 15th Century . . .”

- Hypothesis:
  - In this regard, the PLA will have to succeed where the Soviets *appear* to have failed during the Cold War.

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## “Not Since the 15th Century . . .”

- Hypothesis:
  - We are facing “maritime warfare with Chinese characteristics”.

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
## “Not Since the 15th Century . . .”

Question:

- What are the strategic, operational, tactical, and force structure implications of this Chinese capability for American strategic mobility?

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## “Not Since the 15th Century . . .”

Question:

- What happens to American Pacific Theater presumptions, doctrines, strategies, and plans if U.S. Navy force structure and capabilities as embodied by CSGs and ESGs are not available?

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## “Not Since the 15th Century . . .”

Stipulation:

- American commanders and strategists should consider the implications for American aerospace power of U.S. Navy combat power held at “arm’s length” by the PLA.

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## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

*The Effect of Tactical Ballistic Missiles on the Maritime Strategy System of China*, Wang Wei, Shipborne Weapon (August 2006), No. 84, pp. 12-15.

(Translated and provided by the China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College)

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## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

A lot!

- Extensive writing in open source Chinese academic and military literature <sup>1</sup>

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(See Jason E. Bruzdinski, *Military Operations Research in the People's Republic of China: The Influences of Culture, "Speculative Philosophy" and Quantitative Analysis on Chinese Military Assessments*, June, 2007, The MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia)

## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

- “Movement Forecast Model and Precision Analysis of Maneuvering Targets at Sea,” Second Artillery Engineering Academy, 2005.
- “Concept of Using Conventional Ballistic Missiles to Attack a Carrier Fleet,” *Science and Technology Research*, No. 1., 2003.
- “Study of Attacking an Aircraft Carrier Using Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” Institute of Engineering (Second Artillery Corps), Xian 2002.
- “Preliminary Analysis on the Survivability of a US Aircraft Carrier,” *Guided Missiles*, No. 5, 2000.

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(See Jason E. Bruzdinski, *Military Operations Research in the People's Republic of China: The Influences of Culture, "Speculative Philosophy" and Quantitative Analysis on Chinese Military Assessments*, June, 2007, The MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia)

## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

- Frequent media speculation
- Emergence over time: this is not new news
- Strategic signaling?
- Spoofing/deception?

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## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

- Simply tracking and correlation of unclassified, open source information on this topic is a major task in itself.

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# What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

Why are ASBMs so appealing to the Chinese?

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## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

### ASBMs:

- Resolve China's operational inferiority at sea
- Control the sea from the shore
- Technically achievable
- Increase strategic-military space on the maritime approaches to China

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## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

### ASBMs:

- Provide strategic-political room for maneuver
- Avoid strategic complications of land attacks
- Establish escalation control/dominance
- Rationalize necessary and appropriate national level “public investment”

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## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

ASBMs:

- Can “win without fighting”

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## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

“Use of Tactical Ballistic Missiles Under the  
Concept of Relying on Land to Control the Sea”

- Simply put, the emergence of TBMs enables the weaker side for only a small price to offset to a certain extent the expensive air combat system effectiveness from the stronger side.

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From a colleague who is a senior U.S. observer of China, a retired army colonel with two tours in the Beijing Embassy:

January 18, 2008

(Anti-ship ballistic missile attacks against U.S. aircraft carriers) is a topic I have spoken to many PLA officers about, including the current Chief of the General Staff Department when he was an MR commander. Remember that they first conceived this idea of using ballistic missiles for access denial and keeping an American fleet at a distance after the two carrier battle groups showed up during the missile exercises against Taiwan in 96. It was then that the concept was loudly voiced in the PLA. I was Army attaché in Beijing at the time. Since then, I've heard it lots of times from PLA officers when I was at the Embassy, the Army War College and The Heritage Foundation.

(Continued next page)

## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

- . . . the surface vessel target creates a strong contrast against the background and is clearly much easier to recognize.
- Speed and maneuverability of the naval target is a relatively trivial matter, in relation to ASBM speeds.
- Surface ships are highly integrated (i.e., therefore vulnerable to disruption and mission kill) physical platforms.

July 17, 2008

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From a colleague who is a senior U.S. observer of China, a retired army colonel with two tours in the Beijing Embassy:

January 17, 2008

Subject: Re: Attacking a carrier

My reading is that some in the PLA believe they have solved these problems, at least in the lab and in physics. Now my weakness, is I don't have the capability of verifying their math. But you should see the series from Nanjing Hangtian Dianzi Duikang that ran in June 2006 from the 8511 Institute of CASIC. It's a three part series translated by OCS. One of the articles, "PRC S&T: Techniques for Penetration of Aircraft Carrier Defense Formation," is pretty clear that THEY think they have these problems mastered. It is OSC CPP20060822476001. All three can be recovered from the OSC site if you have an account.

(Continued next page)

## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

. . . . the key to ballistic missile strikes  
against targets at sea lies in the preparation  
of the maritime battle space.

• . . . [This will require] the timely precision  
reconnaissance of the target's orientation, as  
well as the problem of transferring of this  
data. This is the prerequisite condition for  
attack against a moving target.

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From a colleague who is a senior U.S. observer of China, a retired army colonel with two tours in the Beijing Embassy:

January 17, 2008

Subject: Re: Attacking a carrier (Continued)

See: PRC S&T: Techniques for Penetration of Aircraft Carrier Defense Formation

CPP20060822476001 Nanjing Hangtian Dianzi Duikang in Chinese 01 Jun 06 - 31 Jul 06 pp 4-8

[Article by Fang Youpei, Wang Liping, Zhao Shuang, Wang Gendi (No. 8511 Research Institute of CASIC, Nanjing 21007): " Study of Missile Technology for the Penetration of Aircraft Carrier Defense Formation"; author's information -- Fang Youpei, (1951-), male, senior engineer, mainly working in the research of aerospace electronic countermeasure technology]

Abstract: Aircraft carriers in formation have various advanced weapons and strong countermeasure ability, so it is difficult to attack them. However, they have become conquerable along with the development of precision guided technologies and missile penetration technologies. Missile penetration technologies are discussed from the angle of information countermeasures.

## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

- Preparation of the sea battlefield will require: marine surveillance satellites, electronic reconnaissance satellites, imaging reconnaissance satellites, communication satellites and other space-based systems; airborne early warning aircraft and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft; airbase systems; shore based over-the-horizon radars; and underwater sonar arrays.

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Conversely, a Taiwanese engineer's comments:

1. The re-entry vehicle, due to its high-speed and the air friction induced, will ionize the airflow at least in the nose cone area where the terminal guidance package is housed. The ionized air will disrupt most, if not all, electromagnetic communications from outside of the BM. This will make it extremely difficult, if not outright impossible, to render effective terminal guidance for practical anti-ship purposes.

2. For a large A/C such as Nimitz, its width is less than 45m. Even if we believe PLA's most accurate BM has the CEP of less than 50m and the US A/C doesn't move at all, aiming and hitting such a small target is next to impossible. Also, since the CEP is intrinsically (probability) oval-shaped, a battleship can move perpendicular to the azimuth angle from the launch site, thereby reducing the probable intersection area of the oval CEP and the elongated area of the ship.

(Continued next page)

## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

- “It is worth noting that these systems must be viewed as a ‘public investment’ -- part of a comprehensive naval combat operations system.”

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Conversely, a Taiwanese engineer's comments: (Continued)

3. A Nimitz class (aircraft carrier) can sail up to 33 kt. Suppose a SRBM's re-entry time is 3 min, that means the ship has sailed at least 1.5 nm from the point in time when the BM reached its highest elevation in the projectile. Additionally, a battle ship will almost certainly take evasive maneuvers to escape the incoming. So unless PLA's BM is nuclear-tipped, such attack will most likely be futile.

4. About 5–6 years ago, PLA published an article claiming to be able to maneuver the re-entry vehicles in a downward spiral projectile to elude anti-missiles such as PAC-2/3 or SM-2/3. While technically feasible, such maneuver will almost certainly defeat the purpose of precision guidance because the rapid spiral decent will make its impact point very hard to predict from the onboard computer. This is especially true if the BM is not equipped with a highly accurate altimeter which may not be functioning due to the ionization.

## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

- . . . for China, there will be no so-called technological “bottleneck” when it comes to controlled, motor-driven [course correction of] ballistic missiles in outer space.

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## What are the Chinese saying about ASBMs?

- . . . (missile) control during the reentry stage and other kinds of guidance technology during the final stage . . . were used for the "Pershing" missiles developed during the Cold War period. Currently, TBMs in the service of (the PLA) also use this kind of technology. Thus, it can be assumed that the technical problems of the missile itself are not insurmountable.

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# Implications for U.S. PACOM

- Held at long ranges
- Force structure implications
  - Surface unit vulnerability
  - Short-range aircraft
  - Optimized for offense
  - USMC over the horizon amphibious assaults and Ship - to - Objective Maneuver

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# Implications for U.S. PACOM

- At strategic disadvantage when on the defensive

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## Implications for U.S. PACOM

- Limited shipboard ABM missile magazine capability
- Imagine a “1942 campaign”, against an asymmetric peer competitor, having to peel back networks and systems to regain strategic mobility.

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## Implications for U.S. PACOM

- “Sea Denial with Chinese Characteristics”
- The renaissance of “coastal artillery”
- Turning of our maritime flank
- Implications for American strategic mobility

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# Implications for U.S. PACOM

- Short range offensive systems  
versus  
Long range defensive systems

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
# Implications for U.S. PACOM

- Network Warfare  
versus  
Platform Warfare
- Proliferation
- This is not just about Taiwan.

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# QUESTIONS?



<http://bbs.cjdby.net>

# China's Maritime Security Strategy and its Development Rationales

Dan Hartnett  
July 24, 2008


# Issue #1: Humility

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“As for me, all I know is that I know nothing.”

-Socrates

- Details of China’s naval strategy are not frequently discussed in public
  - Most data is likely classified
- Data used here is clearly not all-inclusive
- Not all sources are equal in value



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➤ Research Background

II. The “Seven Themes”

III. “What’s China Doing?”

IV. Two Final thoughts



# Research Background and Methodology

---

- **Starting point:** China currently does not have a maritime security strategy
  - At least not one that is **officially and openly published!**
- **Research questions:**
  - Why does China feel the need to strengthen its maritime security and develop the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)?
  - How are they addressing these issues?
- **Research approach:**
  - Reviewed c. 75 Chinese open source articles since the early 1990s on China's maritime security
  - Vetted for authoritativeness of **sources** and **authors**
  - Came up with seven “themes” in arguments for improving maritime security

---

## I. Research Background

### ➤ The “Seven Themes”

### III. “What’s China Doing?”

### IV. Two Final thoughts



# The “Seven Themes”\*

---

Seven themes commonly cited for why China needs to develop its maritime security strategy:\*\*

1. Territorial Integrity
2. Regional Resource Interests
3. Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC)
4. Traditional Security Threats
5. Non-traditional Security Threats
6. Recognition that the PLAN “Can’t go it Alone”
7. Nationalism/Prestige


\*Presenter’s categories, not the Chinese authors’.

\*\*Themes are in no particular order.

# Theme 1: Territorial Integrity

1. Taiwan
  - Primary focus of this category
2. Spratly Islands
3. Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
4. Paracel Islands

The last three are complicated by nearby maritime resource interests



# Theme 2: Regional Resource Interests

- Oil
- Natural gas
- Minerals
- Fishing

Exacerbated by nearby territorial disputes



# Theme 3: Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC)

- SLOC critical to China's economy
  - Maritime shipping
  - Import of natural resources
- Hu Jintao's "Malacca Dilemma"
- Protection of SLOC would likely fall to PLAN, but do they have the capabilities?
  - **And can (or would) anyone be able to blockade a SLOC?**



Potential Choke Points

# Theme 4: Traditional Security Threats

- Traditional security threats still cited as possibility
  - But a *distant* possibility
- Exacerbated by economic importance of China's eastern seaboard
- Authors argue for an in-depth defense



“China's economic center of gravity is increasingly concentrated in the coastal areas. If these areas are not secure, the security of China's economy is out of the question.”

RADM Yao Wenhui

Deputy Dir, Pol. Dept., PLAN

2007

# Theme 5: Non-Traditional Security Threats

- Recent writings have also focused on non-traditional security threats in the **maritime environment**
  - Disasters
  - Piracy
  - Terrorism
  - Transnational crime
  - WMD proliferation
- Mirrors Chinese thinking on overall security environment

“China’s maritime security situation ... not only faces traditional threats, but also faces the non-traditional security threats of terrorism, piracy, and transnational crime.”

ADMS Wu Shengli and Hu Yanlin  
PLAN Commander and Political  
Commissar

2007

“Non-traditional security threats are growing more prominent”

-2006 *Defense White Paper*

## Theme 6. Recognition that the PLAN “Can’t go it Alone”

---

- Frequent mentioning that PLAN cannot do it all
- Authors point out the need for using different players and means:
  - Civil maritime authorities
  - Diplomatic
  - Economic
  - Legal
  - Scientific & Technological

“Use diplomatic, economic, legal, military, and scientific means to defend our maritime rights and interests.”

Tang Fuquan, Ye Xinrong,  
and Wang Daowei

Dalian Vessel Academy

2006

“...Compared with the extension of China’s national interests, the means to protect them are too weak.”

RADM Yang Yi

Dir. of Institute for Strat. Studies, NDU

2006

# Theme 7: Nationalism/Prestige

- “Its what great powers do!”
  - References to British Navy
- China is an important international player
  - Politically
  - Economically
  - Culturally
- Yet PLAN is arguably **less capable** in some facets than other regional navies:
  - Japan
  - India?
  - Even Thailand has an aircraft carrier



“China is a great maritime nation”

Hu Jintao

2006



Zheng He

15<sup>th</sup> Century  
Maritime  
Explorer

---

I. Research Background

II. The “Seven Themes”

➤ “What’s China Doing?”

IV. Two Final Observations



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So...

...what is Beijing doing about these issues?

1. Modernizing the PLAN
2. Increasing the PLAN's functions
3. Expanding the PLAN's operational range
4. Making the PLAN more active in the region
5. Developing China's non-military maritime capabilities

# 1. Modernizing the PLAN

---

- **New vessels**
  - Submarines
  - Surface combatants
  - Amphibious
- **New aircraft**
  - Land-based aircraft
- **New weapons systems:**
  - Theater ballistic missiles
  - Land-attack cruise missiles
  - Anti-ship cruise missiles
  - Surface-to-air missiles

## *Defense White Papers on the PLAN:*

- “The PLAN is developing new combat ships, special-purpose aircraft, and relevant equipment” (2004)
- “The PLAN increasing its high-tech means and long-range precision strike capabilities” (2004)
- “The PLAN is emphasizing developing maritime information systems, and new-generation weapons and equipment.” (2006)

## 2. Increasing the PLAN's Functions

- **Capabilities:**

- “The PLAN increasing its high-tech means and long-range precision strike capabilities” (2004 *Defense White Paper*)
- “The PLAN is strengthening its overall capabilities for operations in coastal waters, joint operations, and integrated maritime support.” (2006 *Defense White Paper*)

- **Roles and missions:**

- “Non-combat operations *are already* an important component of PLAN military operations.”
  - *Science of Naval Military Training* (2006)




### PLAN non-combat operations:

- Disaster relief and law enforcement
- Demonstrations of military deterrence
- International security cooperation
- Military diplomacy
- Maritime search and rescue

### 3. Expanding the PLAN's Operational Range

- PLAN seeking to expand its operational range:
  - Hu Jintao calls for PLA to move beyond just territorial waters (2004)
  - 2004 and 2006 *Defense White Papers* emphasized expanding the navy's strategic depth
  - Calls for moving beyond first island chain to “distant ocean defense” (*yuanhai fangyu*)

No further details unfortunately



First island chain

## 4. PLAN Becoming More Active in the Region

- “Showing the flag”
  - Pakistan
  - India
  - Thailand
  - Philippines
  - Indonesia (1<sup>st</sup> in 12 years)
  - Japan (1<sup>st</sup> ever for PLAN)
- Regional military exercises
  - Pakistan
  - India
  - Thailand
- PLAN also involved in extra-regional activities



PLA Navy port call, Tokyo  
Nov 2007



Aman '07, Pakistan  
Mar 2007

## 5. Beijing Developing its Maritime Non-military Wherewithal

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- **Economic**

- State Council’s “National Maritime Economy Development Plan” (2003)
- State Development and Reform Commission’s “Plan for National Economic and Social Development” (2006)
- State Council’s “Outline of the National Maritime Enterprise Development Plan” (2008)

- **Scientific & technological**

- Oceanographic research (“908 Project”)
- State Oceanic Administration’s “Outline of the National Maritime S & T Development Plan for the 11<sup>th</sup> FYP” (2006)

## 5. Maritime Non-military Wherewithal (Cont'd)

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- **Civil maritime authorities**
  - Maritime Safety Administration
  - State Oceanographic Administration
  - People's Armed Police
  - Ministry of Agriculture
- **Diplomatic**
  - Attempts to diffuse and resolve maritime disputes peacefully
    - Maritime territorial disputes with Japan and Vietnam
- **International cooperation**
  - ASEAN + 3
  - ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
  - “East Asian Seas Congress 2006” (China)
  - “Shanghai International Maritime Forum,” 2007 (China)

- 
- I. Research Background
  - II. The “Seven Themes”
  - III. “What’s China Doing?”
- Two Final Observations




# 1. “It’s the Economy, Stupid!”

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- Beijing’s maritime security strategy is heavily economic driven
  - Regional resource interests
  - Extra-regional economic interests (via SLOC)
  - Economic importance of eastern seaboard
  - (Nationalism)
- Economic focus of maritime security likely to expand as does China’s **global economic activity**

## 2. More than Just Military Security

- Likely Beijing's maritime security strategy will not solely be military-focused
  - Although PLAN will probably be **main component**
- Instead, it will be a **comprehensive maritime security strategy**:



# Questions?

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# Asian perspectives of China's Role A view from Japan

Yoichi Kato  
The Asahi Shimbun  
July 24, 2008

# (1) Strategic Objectives of Chinese Military

Analysis of GOJ/MODJ---4 objectives

- (a) To prevent the operations of enemy as far from its own territory as possible in order to defend the territory and the territorial waters
- (b) to acquire the military capability to deter and prevent the independence of Taiwan
- (c) to obtain, maintain and protect the maritime interests
- (d) to protect the SLOC for globalised economic activities

## (2) Recent Developments of Sino-Japanese relations

(August 07) China's Defense Minister visit Japan

(September 07) Fukuda Cabinet formed

(December 07) Fukuda's first visit to China

(May 08) China accepts Japan's disaster relief team for Sichuan earthquake


(May 08) Fukuda-Hu talks; Agreement to "not to become the threat to the other party"

(June 24, 08) JMSDF Ship's first visit to China

(November 28, 2007) China's destroyer to visit Tokyo

(June 18, 08) Agreement to joint development of the two gas fields in disputed waters of East China Sea

# East China Sea gas fields eyed for joint Japan-China development



# (3) Analysis

- China's intention to improve the relations with Japan is clear
- **Set aside** history issue/territory issue
  - shut down the critical websites
- "Process of change for tolerance"
- Transmit the image of "cooperative partner" "benign leader"
- Road to "Major Power"
  - Major power of Peace
  - Major power of Civilization
  - Major power to be welcomed by the region



# Could a Blockade Cut Off China's Oil?

July 24, 2008

William S. Murray  
U.S. Naval War College

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China Maritime Studies Institute  
United States Naval War College . Newport . Rhode Island


Note: The views offered in this briefing are those of the author and do not represent the official assessments or policies of the U.S. Navy or any other element of the U.S. Government.

# Framework

- A blockade would be used only during war with the PRC
  - A blockade might appear attractive as an easily reversible coercive tool that limited escalation
- This analysis focuses on practical and physical aspects of a potential blockade, not the legalities

# Scenarios

- Supply side blockade
- Distant blockade
- Close blockade
- Blockade by convoy
- Precision attacks on oil infrastructure



# Supply Side Blockade


A large oil tanker ship is shown from a high-angle perspective, sailing on a dark blue ocean. The ship's complex superstructure, including masts and funnels, is visible against the sky. The ship's wake is visible in the water behind it.

- Organize an embargo of oil to China
  - Oil market trades a fungible commodity, making “targeted” effect difficult to achieve
  - Effects would be like the 1973 Oil Embargo
    - Oil, though more expensive, reached embargoed states through indirect routes
  - Likely to fail
    - Exporting nations’ cooperation debatable

# Distant Blockade

- Warships patrol Strait of Malacca
- Intercept oil bound for PRC
- Plays to naval strengths
- Puts PRC at serious military disadvantage

- 80% of China's imported oil passes through the Strait
- Nearly one third of all ships in Strait are tankers



# Beijing's "Malacca Dilemma"

- “可以说，谁控制了马立甲海峡，就等于谁把手放在了中国的战略石油通道上，谁就能随时威胁中国的能源安全。”

“—One can say that whoever controls the Malacca Strait, which is China's strategic oil supply channel, has the ability to threaten China's energy security at will.” (XDJC 12-2004)

# PLAAF / PLANAF

- Although the PRC's long range strike capabilities are improving
  - Many older aircraft in inventory
  - Weak aerial refueling
  - Little evidence to suggest China is pursuing the capability to conduct long range coordinated strikes

# Diesel Submarines?

- PRC fleet is large, modernizing, and has capable weapons, however...
- Combat zone is far from the PRC
  - 12 to 25 day transit
- Malacca Strait too shallow for submarines
  - Passage, operations, and weapons are all badly constrained
- Inexperienced in distant operations



# Nuclear Submarines?

中国海军潜艇

- Noisy and limited in numbers
  - Unlikely to survive against a capable enemy



《现代舰船》2007-09A期  
鼎盛王朝 我们爱科学 扫描

# PLAN Surface Ships?

- Limited open ocean experience
- No bases or support ships to support distant operations
- Limited Anti Submarine Warfare ability a critical vulnerability



# Possible PRC Responses to a Distant Blockade

- Provide economic incentives to runners
  - Fake bills of lading
  - Trans-shipment from neighboring countries
  - Resell oil cargo to China after passing chokepoints
  - Cargo parceling
- Exert diplomatic and economic pressure
- Implement austerity measures
- Horizontal escalation against civil and military targets

# PRC Tanker Re-routing Options

Lombok Strait adds 3.5 days to shipping time


Re-routing around Australia adds ~16 days

Tankers likely to divert around Taiwan during crisis

Re-routing tankers around Malacca would disrupt oil shipments to E. Asia for minimum of 3.5 days and could require at least 40 VLCCs worth of spare tanker capacity, driving up shipping costs

Around Australia

Lombok Strait




# Force Estimate

**Total For Sustained Ops:  
30+ vessels**

Malacca:  
~12 vessels

Lombok, Sunda, Torres:  
~12-15 vessels

SE Australia:  
~5 vessels



# Identify tankers bound for China?

- Strait of Malacca Traffic - 2003
  - 172 ships per day
  - 52 eastbound tankers per day (1 in 5 VLCC)
  - 11,000,000 bpd through Strait
    - Approximately 2.8 million bpd going to China
    - Up to 13 tankers going to China per day (avg)
      - Actual Chinese oil purchases are “lumpy” because buyers are price sensitive

Sources: Marine Department of Malaysia Malacca VTS statistics, & Mokhzani Zubir, The Strategic Value of the Strait of Malacca, Centre for Maritime Security and Diplomacy, Maritime Institute of Malaysia

# Challenges for Blockader

A large cargo ship is shown from an elevated perspective, sailing on the ocean. The ship is dark-colored with a white superstructure. The water is a deep blue, and the ship's wake is visible. The overall image has a blue tint.

- Stop, board, and inspect
- Flag State?
- Non-cooperative vessels?
- Disposition of seized vessels, cargoes & crews?
  - Prize crews?

# Chinese Oil Flows 2007



**Pipeline from Kazakhstan/Western Siberia:  
Up to 0.2 million bbl/day**



**Rail Imports from Russia:  
~0.3 million bbl/day**



**Domestic production:  
~3.7 million bbl/day**

**Maritime Imports:  
2.9-3.4 million bbl/day**



Total:  
 $3.7+3.3+0.3+0.2$   
**~7.5 million bbl/day**

**Non Maritime Oil Supply  
~4 million BPD**

# Distant Blockade Results

- Tactical success possible, strategic failure a strong possibility
- Duration of effort unknown
- High diplomatic, economic, and opportunity costs



# Close Blockade



- |                       |                          |                         |                          |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Wuhan, Hubei       | 11. Huangshi, Hubei      | 21. Qinhuangdao, Hebei  | 31. Wuhu, Anhui          |
| 2. Anqing, Anhui      | 12. Jiangmen, Guangdong  | 22. Rizhao, Shandong    | 32. Xiamen, Fujian       |
| 3. Basuo, Hainan      | 13. Jiangyin, Jiangsu    | 23. Sanya, Hainan       | 33. Yangzhou, Jiangsu    |
| 4. Changzhou, Jiangsu | 14. Jiujiang, Jiangxi    | 24. Shanghai            | 34. Yantai, Shandong     |
|                       | 15. Lianyungang, Jiangsu | 25. Shantou, Guangdong  | 35. Yichang, Hubei       |
|                       | 16. Maanshan, Anhui      | 26. Shenzhen, Guangdong | 36. Yingkou, Liaoning    |
|                       | 17. Nanjing, Jiangsu     | 27. Taizhou, Zhejiang   | 37. Zhanjiang, Guangdong |
|                       | 18. Nantong, Jiangsu     | 28. Tianjin             | 38. Zhenjiang, Jiangsu   |
|                       | 19. Ningbo, Zhejiang     | 29. Tongling, Anhui     | 39. Zhicheng, Hubei      |
|                       | 20. Qingdao, Shandong    | 30. Wanzhou, Chongqing  | 40. Zhongshan, Guangdong |




**SPR site**



**Refining Concentrations**

# Possible PRC Responses to a Close Blockade

- Naval war of attrition
  - Escalatory pressures
- Increased overland delivery
- Substitution, efficiency, & less economic resources



# Blockade by Convoy

A large oil tanker ship is shown from an elevated perspective, sailing on the ocean. The ship is dark in color and has a complex structure of pipes and equipment on its deck. The water around the ship is white with a wake, indicating it is moving. The background is a deep blue sea under a clear sky.

- All Asian-bound tankers escorted by warships to approved destinations
  - Five VLCCs per day on 22 day trips
  - 22 convoys just for VLCCs
    - Other tankers, other ports require further escorts
  - Would require an enormous navy and would disrupt energy distribution to many

# Energy Denial

- Ineffective blockade
- Precision attacks on refineries, pipelines, oil wharves
- Ample modern munitions
  - Kosovo, Gulf I and II
  - Many modern militaries are able to mimic, due to proliferation of precision munitions

Defeats an essential purpose of a blockade

# Conclusion

A large oil tanker ship is shown from an elevated perspective, sailing on the ocean. The ship is dark-colored with a white superstructure. The water is a deep blue, and the ship's wake is visible. The overall image has a blue tint.


- China is not fundamentally vulnerable to an energy blockade
  - The international energy market and shippers' profit motive provide China energy security
  - Few, if any navies could threaten China's oil imports
- China does not appear to require a blue water PLAN to protect against an energy blockade
- Opens the door for cooperation

Questions?



# China's Approach to Space and Counterspace

**Kevin Pollpeter**  
**China Program Manager, DGI**  
**25 July 2008**



**DGI** Defense Group Inc.

**CIRA**  
*Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis*

Advancing U.S. Intelligence Through Innovative Research, Analysis, and Public Outreach

# Overview

- Confrontation in space is inevitable
- Space control will be the deciding factor in future conflicts
- Anti-access measures involve deterrence and warfighting
- Deterrence is aimed at convincing adversaries that China can inflict unacceptable losses
- Warfighting involves counterspace and space-enabled operations
- China is using space to become a great power, providing opportunities for diplomatic and commercial access



# Definitions of Space War

- Military offensive and defensive operations in outer space
- Attacks against targets in air, ground, sea, or space from space
- Attacks against targets in space from air, ground, sea, or space
- Attacks against ground segments
- Space weapons can include ISR, communications, meteorological satellites



# Deterrence

- Aim of deterrence is to make opponent submit to China's will
- Convince adversary that he will suffer unacceptable losses
- Must be a viable space power
  - Strong overall space program, including civilian space program
  - Includes force enhancement, space control, and force application capabilities
  - Strong defensive capabilities



# Deterrence Aspects

- **ISR capabilities**
  - Determine enemy intentions and deployments before a conflict begins, e.g., Cuban Missile Crisis
- **Strengthening overall military power**
  - Helps determine enemy posture
  - Facilitates jointness and interconnectivity
  - Enables precision attacks
- **Counterspace**
  - Ability to take out adversary's satellites may deter adversary from conducting counterspace operations



# Deterrence Methods

- ASAT testing
  - If successful, can prove ability to attack adversary
  - If unsuccessful, can prove intentions
- Space wargames
  - Schriever wargames
- Use space power
  - U.S. operations since Gulf War



# Warfighting: Concept of Operations

- Quick war, quick resolution (速战速决)
  - Modern wars are decided by one campaign
  - Must gain initiative at outset of conflict
- Active defense strategy (积极防御战略)
  - Politically defensive, operationally offensive
- Gain mastery by striking first (先发制人)
  - Preemption
  - Surprise attacks
  - Natural aggressiveness



# Warfighting: Striking An Adversary's Vital Targets

- Targets that could have a direct impact on the overall situation of the campaign or produce an overall effect
- Attacking vital targets is especially recommended in cases where the PLA faces a “powerful enemy equipped with high technology weapons and equipment” rather than conduct wars of annihilation



# Warfighting: Information Warfare

- Vital targets are those involved in collecting and processing information
- Information superiority is now seen as the main determiner of success on battlefield
- Information control does not have to be achieved permanently across all battlefields
  - Can be achieved locally
  - For short periods of time
- Space warfare is subset of information warfare



# Why Space Is Important

- Whoever controls space will control the Earth
- Space is the new high ground
- Space is the most important component of modern militaries' information systems
  - Collects and transmits information
    - U.S. uses spaced-based ISR for 70-80% of its intelligence
    - U.S. uses satellites for 80% of its communications
  - U.S. space-based ISR provides exquisite intelligence



# Why Space Is Important

- Without space, conducting modern war is not possible
- Evolution of war from ground to sea to air to space as dominant domain
- Space power will develop as air power has
- Space war is inevitable
- Establishing control of space first priority of any campaign



# Warfighting: First to Fight

- If China believes that space is *the* vital segment of information systems, and if they believe that whoever controls space controls the earth, then achieving space control is necessary to win war
- If China emphasizes striking first to seize the initiative, then China could strike first in space to set the conditions to control the battlefield



# Warfighting: Counterspace Missions

- Space is viewed as a great U.S. strength and vulnerability
- Attacks against components of U.S. space system can debilitate entire information system
- Slow down U.S. OODA loop
- Only need to create window of opportunity



# Warfighting: Types of Attacks

- Combination of hard and soft attacks recommended
  - Hard
    - Permanent
    - Can create debris
  - Soft
    - Temporary
    - Do not create debris
    - Useful against third-party satellites



# Warfighting: Targeting

- Chinese writings on information warfare stress attacking ISR assets first
- Enables stratagems



# Warfighting: Force Enhancement

- Chinese concept is influenced by U.S. operations and writings on NCW
- China seeks to speed up its OODA loop
  - Transparent battlefield
  - Ability to attack quickly
- Improves efficiency of attacks against Taiwan
- Pushes U.S. carriers farther out
  - ISR and comms needed for ASCM, ballistic missile, submarine attacks



# Space: Access

- China's space program is increasing its political, diplomatic, and economic power
- China is taking a leading position in regional space cooperation
- China is striving to become a major commercial space power
- Space successes give it prestige to achieve great power status



# Conclusions

- CHINA IS NOT IRAQ!!
- Space war fits neatly into PLA concept of operations
- China wants to use space and deny its use to others
- Access Implications
  - Deterrence
  - Force enabler
  - Counterspace
- China's attractiveness as a rising space power provides diplomatic and commercial activities

