

Reinvigorating U.S.-French Collaboration

A Bilateral Workshop Report

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Foreword

The purpose of inaugurating a series of informal, non-governmental workshops between the *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique* (FRS) and the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the National Defense University is to augment and hopefully accelerate improving French-American relations at a time of new leadership and fresh perspectives in Paris and Washington. We began our series with a November 2007 workshop focused on each side's most important security concerns impacting our bilateral relationship. Each workshop will provide a frank, open environment that invites participants to think beyond familiar, long-held national positions. From this perspective, both enduring national positions and new possibilities for bilateral cooperation on security can be pursued.

Through a series of workshops, Hans Binnendijk, Director CTNSP, and Guillaume Schlumberger, Director FRS, are committed to bringing together the best minds on transatlantic security issues and elaborating their ideas for the benefit of American and French policymakers. The first workshop addressed U.S. concerns about the future roles of NATO, NATO-EU relations and terrorism, and French concerns over the development of force capabilities under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), security and insecurity in the EU neighborhood and the militarization of space.

This report reflects points made in major discussions at this workshop, not the official positions of the governments of France or the United States, or of any government officials in attendance.

The agenda of the workshop and a list of participants appear in the annex to this report.

Executive Summary

A new opportunity for improved U.S.-French relations is occasioned by the French election of 2007 and the American election of 2008. This opportunity unfolds over a relatively lengthy period (2007-2009) as new governments settle in on both sides and develop fresh policy perspectives on mutual interests and undertakings. Improved bilateral relations will require sustained investment in collaboration, patience with each others unique democratic processes, cultural understanding, and a new bias toward creative, open thinking.

Main Points

- There is reason to expect that the United States and France could agree over the next 24 months on a way for NATO to evolve that would bring full French participation in a reinvigorated Alliance. However, neither side has done substantial work on what such a NATO might look like. The French will have a fresh frame of reference when a new Defense White Paper is published in spring 2008. Thereafter, the French side of the equation will begin to take shape, although the U.S. side will still be subject to the transition to a new Administration. Moving forward will require sustained negotiations and multiple tracks.
- EU security concerns extend beyond Russia, the former CIS states, and the volatile areas south of the Mediterranean to environmental security, energy security, cyber security, and even the security of cultural values. Dealing with these issues requires, inter alia, updating organizations or building new ones. However, little has been done yet by NATO, the EU, the UN, or other organizations to address these new security concerns.
- International terrorism is a challenge dealt with primarily by non-military mean and addressing the conditions and issues that cause individuals to turn to terrorism. Thus far, neither the United States, nor France, nor any other power or organization has mounted serious efforts to address the basic conditions that nurture terrorists.
- The use of space for military purposes is a reality. Thus far, however, nations have refrained from deploying weapons in space. All sides support preservation of established international norms while recognizing that technological advances could lead to breaches in the future.

Topics for Further U.S.-French Dialogue

The following topics were identified as the most important substance for future French-American policy analysis. The United States and France should:

- Begin to formulate ideas for improving NATO processes and political-military structures and invite engagement by other Allies.
- Be supportive of any consensus to initiate a Harmel-like report on “future tasks of the Alliance” that might inform a 2009 NATO summit.
- Work to design a path through the impasse on NATO-EU relations. France and the United States should agree the foundation for an EU-NATO framework, perhaps based on the following:
 - Support for strengthening ESDP.
 - Consensus on the future roles and military missions of the Alliance.
 - Examination of the NATO military command structure to identify further rationalization and the possibility of French consideration of full participation in NATO’s integrated military structure.
 - Proposing modalities that create a Comprehensive Approach to operations by both the EU and NATO.
- Agree that modern military operations require civilian capacities as well in order to achieve political goals and return home.
- Discuss real options for further development of ESDP.
- Explore how ACT might be employed to experiment on how NATO and ESDP could evolve together.

I. Key Observations

A. It is possible that the United States and France could agree a way NATO might evolve over the next 24 months that will bring full French participation in a reinvigorated Alliance. However, neither side has done substantial work toward what such a NATO might look like. The French side is expected to adhere to traditional French positions on NATO until a new Defense White Paper is agreed in spring 2008. Bilateral progress will require careful negotiations and multiple tracks for the exchange of concepts and ideas to unfold with any momentum.

B. President Sarkozy's public pronouncements on France's willingness to consider participating fully in a "renovated" NATO have yet to be elaborated inside his government. The United States also has to show more clearly how it sees NATO evolving beyond its present ways of functioning; France wants to know what kind of Alliance the Americans have in mind. In any case, France's first priorities are domestic policies and economics, followed by significant progress on the development and deepening of EU Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which the President Sarkozy has set as a precondition for consideration of the NATO relationship. The absence of proposals from French policy analysts or bureaucrats notwithstanding, the fact that President Sarkozy made his vision public creates expectations that movement toward NATO under his leadership may go further than under his predecessors. In turn, NATO members will be interested to learn, along with French views on ESDP, French intentions with regard to their participation inside NATO.

C. A precondition of President Sarkozy's overture toward NATO is that full French participation will depend on further ESDP development. However, differing views across the EU make specific proposals for a significant build-up of ESDP more difficult. While the EU debate on ESDP continues, France urges that ESDP not suffer from less than robust U.S. support.

D. The EU's neighborhood includes Russia and former CIS states and the volatile region south of the Mediterranean. However, the EU's neighborhood is no longer just regional but global. Sources of insecurity go beyond classic issues of territory and population to environmental security—ranked as the greatest concern in European public opinion polls, energy security, cyber security and values security. Future EU security requires new organizations as well as the renovation of old ones to deal with new threats. Little has been done yet by NATO, the EU, the UN, or other international organizations to address these concerns, though recent international agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, provide grounds for optimism that greater consensus for action may be on the horizon.

E. International terrorists are a challenge to be dealt with primarily by non-military means, such as multiple levels of national and international police capabilities, investigative resources, and intelligence assets cooperating globally. The other half of any comprehensive counter-terrorist strategy is addressing the conditions and issues that cause individuals to turn to terrorist acts. Thus far, neither the United States, nor France

nor any other power or organization has mounted serious efforts to address the basic conditions that nurture terrorism. That said, those who are already committed terrorists cannot simply be engaged in dialogue; typically they must be brought to justice and eradicated.

F. The use of space for military purpose is already a reality; thus far, however, nations have adhered to the constraints of the 1967 treaty prohibiting the militarization of space, i.e., the deployment of weapons in space or the conduct of combat in space. With respect to national and collective defense, space is analogous to international waters and international airspace, which have long been mediums of military operations, including combat. It is also similar to cyberspace, where attacks on vital national interests have resulted in the deployment of defensive and offensive military capabilities. We should look to space with a view to its role in global security—including military use, the application of confidence and security building measures and arms control. These important considerations about military/defense space applications are made more complex by the increasingly close nexus of civilian and military-security applications—a nexus that may loom larger in the emerging European approach than in the historical U.S. approach.

II. Synthesis of U.S.-French Academic Dialogue

A. NATO's Future Roles

- The persistent differences in U.S.-French views of NATO's future role—strictly limited to Article 5 or open to a larger set of missions—are in part subsiding. The French appear to recognize that NATO members in many ways already have agreed, at least informally, to an Alliance able to conduct operations beyond exclusive Article 5 territorial defense in Europe.
- A core strategic question in renovating the Alliance is whether France and the United States can agree on the “broader NATO” favored by the United States, or on the future NATO preferred by France that is limited to its traditional military roles. The French are not ready to codify NATO non-Article 5 roles and missions, the types of missions already demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, and Hurricane Katrina in a way that would allow NATO to plan, resource, and exercise for such missions. However, accepting such missions as continuing to be in NATO's future is the first step toward the Comprehensive Approach to crisis management – an approach that commits all relevant civilian and military resources – as favored by the United States and several other Allies that have subscribed to the Riga initiative led by Denmark.
- The main challenge is France's preference for renovating NATO in a way that presumably would affirm the parallel role of ESDP and also afford the EU more influence in Alliance decisions than it now has. There should be room to build a wider package approach that could be in the interest of all concerned.
- The United States wants to move beyond ad hoc planning for NATO expeditionary operations and toward a Comprehensive Approach of bringing civil resources to bear in ways that all Allies regard as essential to resolution of any conflict. The French have resisted setting up institutional planning on, for example, civil-military operations, working with partners, homeland defense, and creating more organized and responsive stability operations forces. However, some U.S. participants see reason to believe the new French government may be open to discussion on reducing some of the ad hoc nature of NATO planning in concert with larger changes in NATO and ESDP.
- France has expressed interest in full participation in a “revitalized” or “renovated” NATO. However, as noted above, there is no indication yet as to what NATO France envisions. Notwithstanding, it appears that, if strides are made on President Sarkozy's precondition—further development of ESDP—France will consider participating in a NATO reorganization of both its political processes and military structures that will result in full French military integration. From the U.S. side there are few reasons to undertake a third military reorganization since 1990, other than to include the French. French participation in the reorganization process would be essential to France's acceptance of and integration in the outcome.
- The French have signaled without elaboration that the degree of NATO renovation that they would find acceptable would have implications for the U.S. leadership role in NATO. While putting the question of U.S. leadership on the table may be acceptable to the United States and other Allies, it is not possible to comment further without more specific information from French policy makers.

- NATO's success or failure in Afghanistan will have a major impact on Allies' perceptions of the Alliance's role in future expeditionary operations. To be successful, NATO will have to stay in Afghanistan for many more years. Future roles may depend on public diplomacy in Europe that garners support for missions and capabilities investment in Afghanistan. Sustaining the long-term commitment by NATO members that success in Afghanistan requires is a very difficult task, because most public opinion analysis indicates Europeans do not perceive that Europe's security interests are at risk because of what happens in Afghanistan.

B. NATO-EU Relations

- The NATO-EU impasse is frustrating and blocks progress for both organizations. The United States and France have a strategic but temporary opportunity to break the logjam through closer cooperation and dialogue. Several factors hamper NATO-EU relations:
 - The Turkey-Cyprus impasse has proved intractable over the long term and now impacts NATO-EU relations; and it is complicated by the broader context of Turkey-EU and Turkey-Iraq relations. The many ramifications of Turkey's position are viewed with particular seriousness in France.
 - Competition between the EU Commission and the EU Council and High Representative Solana still weaken EU ability to work externally
 - A new government in London remains skeptical of some proposed ESDP developments.
 - The United States and France have been on opposite sides during 15 years of institutional suspicion that each side was intent on undermining the relevance of the other.
- Neither NATO nor the EU will see the increased military spending by members that both advocate. Resource limits are not the problem. The reality is that while members have the wealth to invest more on defense, the case has not been made convincingly that investing more in military forces should take precedence over other priorities. In the near term, the only way to increase military capabilities for either the EU or NATO is to find efficiencies in organization and operations. In the mid to long term, NATO as a traditional military alliance and the EU as a political project must be able to convey to their collective citizenry the genuine need for increasing national security funding to avoid weakening their military capabilities. This is a greater concern in Europe, but it also a concern in the United States, where NATO has lost prominence as a central pillar of national security.
- To be successful in dealing with crises, both NATO and the EU need a civilian as well as a military dimension. In both categories there is only one pool of assets to draw upon, and these are mainly at the national level. What the institutions offer is options for employment—one European (EU) and one transatlantic (NATO)—based on political decisions in particular situations.
- Bosnia demonstrates that NATO and the EU can also work together in parallel, in mutually supporting operations with specific domains for each, and sequentially. It will be useful to both the EU and NATO to build on those experiences by institutionalizing sound cooperating methods, although not at the expense of further developing ESDP. NATO has also demonstrated its willingness to support the EU

under the 2003 Berlin Plus agreement, and it was noted by the U.S. delegation that NATO might benefit from a similar advanced commitment by the EU to provide specified EU-common (versus nationally-owned) essential civil resources to NATO-led conflict resolution operations. Both organizations should leave behind the ad hoc processes employed far less effectively in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere (e.g., Darfur).

- The Berlin Plus agreement has many valuable applications but also many deficiencies. We need to take the good in it and work to add the next level of cooperation by agreeing on a new “NATO-EU framework agreement” by the end of 2008. Such an agreement should be in place before attempting a new NATO strategic concept. It should define what NATO provides EU, what EU provides NATO, and how the two will relate at all levels, both in day-to-day peacetime employment and during crisis response.

C. The European Union’s ESDP

- The EU has conducted 15 operations since 2003, when the Headline Goal Force became operational. It also conducted many operations between 1988 and 2003 as the WEU and EU. All have been small operations, and the majority have been police operations, but they represent a significant evolution of the EU as international actor.
- Standby forces prove hard to use. 15 EU Battlegroups (each 1,500 strong, in essence a reinforced battalion) have been or are being created, with 2 Battlegroups on call at all times with 5 days response time. Though they have been operational since January 2005 (they achieved FOC in Jan 2007), they have not been used. (The NRF also has been relatively unused). Instead, the EU deployed other forces twice to Africa in 2006. The reasons are political, calling into question whether such forces are really deployable. This is why the EU may look at a more robust, deployable, military structure, such as the “Task Force 5,000.”
- In 2006, EU members averaged less than 2% of GDP in defense spending, according to the European Defense Agency, with four of the 26 members (France, the UK, Germany, and Italy) accounting for more than 70% of the total military spending of the EU. In contrast, the United States spends about 4% of GDP on defense. Yet the GDPs of the United States and the EU are both over \$10 trillion. In the absence of public support across Europe to increase defense spending, the only alternative is to spend innovatively and seek greater intra-European cooperation on defense. However, there will be limits on how much efficiency can be realized in the near to mid term as Europe works to coalesce defense investment.

D. Stability and Instability in the EU Neighborhood

- Events in Russia have to be carefully followed, as it shares borders with several EU members and its external policy *vis à vis* the West has hardened in recent years. Some French participants have emphasized the necessity to listen carefully to Russia when it comes to BMD. From the U.S. side, there were arguments defining the logic of missile defense as an emerging Article 5 matter that the Alliance has to address, independent of the changes in the potential sources of threat. Planning and negotiations should proceed such that as technology becomes available it can be

deployed, both as a deterrent and to reassure Allies of Article 5's credibility against new and future threats to NATO territory, as well as deployed forces.

- South of the Mediterranean is of great concern to the EU as a source of political instability and illegal immigration, either directly or transiting the area from beyond. President Sarkozy has proposed a new Mediterranean Union, though no specifics have been provided.
- The EU has to have (indeed, has developed documents articulating) global strategies for such threats as terror, pandemics, proliferation of WMD, and cyber attack. Such strategies are ideal areas for increased cooperation with the United States and other partners.

E. International Terrorism

- Governments in the West are preoccupied by terrorist threats and need synergy of analysis and response coordination afforded by international organizations or ad hoc group of countries.
- NATO is a useful venue, under Article 4, to help Allies understand or synthesize common approaches to dangerous situations, such as instability in Pakistan. The EU is making significant progress in harmonizing legal and police actions to fight terrorism. Just as situations are fluid and evolving, so too our diplomatic response must be flexible—the political equivalent to flexible military response strategies.
- The French have dealt with terrorists for far longer than the United States and are considered Europe's leading counterterrorism power. We are collaborating but can do more in terms of sharing methods and information fusion.
- The EU has growing capabilities to track terrorist activities but has to overcome structural difficulties that are increasingly apparent. Both at the EU and national level in Europe, counterterrorism activities are mainly police and investigative portfolios. These fall under the EU's third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs, which is intergovernmental not integrated. In addition, the European Commission exercises considerable prerogatives over civilian legal and police matters.
- Addressing the root causes of terrorism remains a void in terms of meaningful collective agreement on the nature of the problem or remedial actions. This is the toughest challenge to tackle because solving root problems requires very long-term, often low-visibility initiatives that may require basic changes in national policies and priorities that are widely accepted. A comprehensive analysis is needed on root causes, what strategies are required to deal with them, and what options are available for sustain multinational efforts.

F. The Militarization of Space

- We have not yet done sufficient analysis on the potential for or consequences of warfare in space. This is one area of potential future collaboration.
- Missile defense is a matter of Article 5 concern and should be debated fully and openly in NATO. No matter the source or the timing of technological maturity, the logic of defending allied territory and deployed allied forces against the threat of missile attacks is sound. Missile defense should be addressed openly and collectively, even if reservations remain on the effectiveness and the costs of such defenses.

- Security of all space assets is now a major concern, given the Chinese ASAT demonstration early in 2007.
- Space assets are essential to U.S., NATO, and national military capabilities and must be protected for the West's military to be a credible deterrent.
- NATO member's prosperity and way of life also have come to depend on space-based civil infrastructure that should be regarded as protected under the evolving nature of Article 5, as well as the Article 4 consultation mechanism of the Treaty. Free access to space is as essential today as was access to the sea in 1949.
- The November 2007 EU decision to continue funding the Galileo program, which is similar to the U.S. GPS system, is a testimony to the EU's desire to assert itself as a space power and to realize its own independent capabilities.

III. Topics for Further U.S.-French Official and Academic Discussions

A. French President Sarkozy has made public proposals that, while not defined yet in detail, appear to be new and beyond those heard from lower levels of the French bureaucracy. The United States should consider responding to these overtures soon in the spirit of informing French thinking as it evolves. Ideas presented by the United States in official and academic venues in early 2008 could provide insights to top French policymakers seeking to elaborate President Sarkozy's proposals in concert with the new openness between Washington and Paris he has created. French officials and academics also need to have a better understanding of what U.S. defense policy might look like after the November 2008 presidential election.

B. One topic to be put forward at the Bucharest summit should be initiation of a Harmel-like report on "future tasks of the Alliance." The study should be completed by late 2008 or early 2009, in time for recommendations to be incorporated into a 2009 NATO summit. The remit to the study members should be to define NATO future roles, including expeditionary roles in crises and conflicts beyond NATO borders. It must also address the changed nature of Article 5 collective defense, to include cyber security, energy security, missile defense, transatlantic homeland defense, and crisis management involving capabilities beyond traditional military ones.

C. U.S. and French policy analysts should design a path through the impasse on NATO-EU relations. These must be seen as two co-equal organizations such that each may be the lead operating agent with the other supporting, depending on political decisions, including the role of the United States in any operation. All appropriate linkages between the two organizations should be identified and energized toward substantive cooperation. Berlin Plus should be complemented by an additional framework that encompasses two-way cooperation that organizes civil and military resources toward a Comprehensive Approach to conflict resolution. Mechanisms for smooth cooperation in the run-up to NATO or EU operations should be agreed in advance and kept simple. France and the United States should agree the foundation for an EU-NATO framework, perhaps based on the following initiatives, pursued via bilateral cooperation:

- Seek consensus on the future roles and military missions of the Alliance, as well as ways to improve the effectiveness and timeliness of NATO's political decisionmaking process, either formally or informally.
- Examine together the NATO military command structure to identify further rationalization; several options might be considered that would favor further development of ESDP and the possibility of French consideration of full participation in NATO's integrated military structure.
- As emphasized by some French participants, support strengthening ESDP through an EU-level Operations HQ, and further development of collective force employment capabilities to address shortcomings identified during initial operations.

- Propose modalities to create a Comprehensive Approach to operations by both the EU and NATO by establishing a standing NATO-EU planning group.

D. On the NATO Comprehensive Approach, the United States and France should engage to agree that modern military operations require civilian capacities to achieve political goals. Agreement should also convey that NATO military commands need a minimum of skills and resources to take immediate stability and reconstruction actions in the aftermath of military success, when it is too dangerous to insert civilian resources. Finally, NATO military commands must define and provide support for civilian assets, as well as a process for ultimate transfer of control to civil authority while continuing to provide security and support. NATO must know in advance the source of required civilian assets, whether from national interagency resources, the EU, other international organizations, or a combination of these.

E. The United States and France should discuss real options for further development of ESDP, which, despite the vast resources of the EU, remains at a very modest level. EU Battlegroups and the European Rapid Response Force (ERRF), as well as NATO's NRF and CJTF forces all rely on the same pool of mainly European high-readiness forces. The training and readiness concepts of both the Battlegroups and the NRF have resulted in tremendous progress toward European military transformation. However, much more can be done within current resources. Thus far, neither force has been employed extensively (the NRF has seen small-scale uses), mainly for political and financial reasons. We should work together to get more out of these respective initiatives.

F. The United States and France should explore how NATO and ESDP should evolve together by working with ACT on operational experiments or possibly by planning exercises related to Afghanistan, Kosovo, or general crisis response and stability operations scenarios.

V. Recommendations for Follow-up to CTNSP-FRS Dialogue

Our discussions suggest that opportunities exist for the United States to discuss transatlantic initiatives on a broad bilateral front that can further the common interests of both the United States and France while strengthening the transatlantic relationship. These discussions should take place on both official and academic levels, which can deepen understanding, help overcome impasses, and maintain progress. On the CTNSP-FRS level we can:

- Collaborate to clear the way for a stronger ESDP with full U.S. support.
- Clarify future roles of the Alliance in the collective interest of its members, including regional security, partnerships, a Comprehensive Approach to crisis response, expeditionary operations, and elaborating the changing nature of Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations and missions.
- Share ideas on a reinvigorated political-military structure for NATO.
- Propose a formula for a Comprehensive Approach to conflict resolution in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and other, future NATO operations. Identify an advanced planning mechanism as well as dependable sources of civilian capabilities for future NATO operations, whether from Alliance members' national assets, new NATO capabilities, international organizations, such as the EU, or some combination of these.

The next proposed CTNSP-FRS meeting will be at the National Defense University (Washington) in May or June 2008.

Annex A

Workshop Agenda
1430, 29 November—1630 30 November
FRS—27 rue Damesme, Paris France

29 Nov—Afternoon Seminar on Major U.S. Security Concerns

- NATO's Future in International Security
- EU and NATO Cooperation

30 Nov—Morning Seminar on Major French Security Concerns

- EU and ESDP Perspectives
- Stability and Instability in the EU's Neighborhood

30 Nov—Afternoon Seminar on French—American Mutual Security Concerns

- International Terrorism
- Militarization of Space

Annex B

Workshop Participants

French Delegation

Mme Amaya Block-Lainé, GMF
Dr Yves Boyer, FRS
M Francois Campagnola, DAS
Dr Jean-Francois Daguzan, FRS
Col Thierry Delahaye, EMA
Mme Murielle Domenach, CAP, MAE
Col Benoit Durieux, EMA
M Benjamin Haddad, CAP, MAE
M Philippe Hayez, Univ. Paris
Gen Michel Klein, FRS
Dr Christian Mallis, Fond. St. Cyr
Col Bernard Metz, EMA
Dr Xavier Pasco, FRS
Contre-Amiral Bruno Paulmier, EMA
M Francois Raffenne, DAS
CV Eric Scherer, EMA
Lt Col Daniel Venturi, EMA

Notes:

EMA—Etat-Major Des Armées
MAE—Ministère des Affaires
Étrangères
DAS—Délégation aux Affaires
Stratégiques
FRS—Fondation pour la Recherche
Stratégique
CAP – Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision
GMF—German Marshall Fund of
United States

U.S. Delegation

Dr Charles Barry, CTNSP
Dr Hans Binnendijk, CTNSP
Mr Rodney Fabrycky, OSD
Mr David Gompert, RAND
Hon Frank Kramer, CTNSP
Dr Steven Kramer, ICAF
Dr Stephen Larrabee, RAND
Col Charles Lutes, INSS
RDML Gerard Mauer, ICAF
Mr James Townsend, ACUS
Mr Harlan Ullman, CTNSP
Dr Linton Wells, CTNSP

Notes:

OSD—Office of the Secretary of
Defense
RAND—RAND Corporation
ICAF—Industrial College of the Armed
Forces
INSS—Institute for National Strategic
Studies
ACUS—Atlantic Council of the United
States