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NATO Defense College
Collège de Défense de l'OTAN

Research Seminar "Transatlantic Relations and 21st Century Radical Novelties"

Scope Papers

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Transatlantic Relations and 21st Century Radical Novelties

Scope Papers

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About the Seminar

Transatlantic relations are currently in a phase of twofold change.

On the one hand, political leadership in a number of the larger Alliance member countries has already changed or is about to change (GE, IT, US, FR, UK). This necessarily leads to the question of the nature of transatlantic policies after the new governments and administrations have taken office and elaborated their foreign and security priorities.

This short-term change, however, is embedded in a more fundamental long-term change of the strategic environment in which transatlantic relations will exist and evolve.

The art of statesmanship includes managing the short-term challenges in government and their associated policies, whilst recognizing, anticipating and adapting to long-term change.

The difficulty, however, is when long-term challenges come in the form of radical novelties. Radical novelties are synonymous with tectonic change and can be compared in their importance to paradigm-breaking developments, such as nuclear weapons, the pill, and computers. Nuclear weapons made large scale war irrational and chilled open confrontation. The pill severed the link between sexual activity and reproduction, spawning a sexual revolution and relentless, unanticipated demographic changes. Computers have accelerated the pace of life and marginalized geography, transforming almost everything from how we learn, to how we work, to how we communicate, to how our brains are "wired", to how we perceive and think about the world in which we live.

As with nuclear weapons, radical novelties often announce their arrival with staggering impact. They may proceed at a pace that causes them to go unnoticed, until they collide with human perception and shake the foundations of conventional wisdom, as happened with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Or they may proceed more rapidly and like falling rain slowly gather momentum until floodwaters overwhelm man's view of his own rationality, as happened most recently in Rwanda. Or they may come upon the unaware like a bolt of lightning from out of the blue, as happened on 9/11. Whichever way, in their aftermath beliefs will have been shattered and replaced with new realities, whether one is ready to confront them or not.

Because radical novelties tend to be unwelcome, suppressed, ignored, or even denied, they present a unique challenge to the international community for the following reasons.

- They present a sharp discontinuity between the present and the future.
- Normal coping mechanisms for trying to link the new to the old and the novel to the familiar are insufficient. Analogies are too shallow and metaphors are misleading. Incremental change, central to character development and normal learning, proceeds much too slowly to keep pace.
- One must approach them without preconceived notions, as if learning a new foreign language entirely different from one's own mother tongue.
- Experience can be fatal.

- Change itself becomes the enemy.

As the global security environment continues to change, other forces—all interrelated—multiply and with creeping certainty march the international community to a destination that promises to be very different from that which we imagine today. Herein lies the dilemma of radical novelties: Do we anticipate what they might mean for our governments and societies and to the international community, and take action despite the cost; or do we resolve to cope with new circumstances only as they arise and otherwise resist change? Is it even realistic to believe that the West can summon the political will to shape an uncertain future, when signs of fatigue already threaten solidarity among Western allies and when maintaining the status quo is more consistent with human nature?

We suggest that radical novelties be used as the context for discussions of how transatlantic relations must be adapted to the rapidly changing 21st century security environment. We also suggest that rather than focusing on specific issues and circumstances affecting NATO in the shorter term or discussing "good" ideas that have not led to productive change in transatlantic relations, it would be more beneficial to develop and debate sub-themes within the set of radical novelties identified for the conference. As a point of departure, the following radical novelties have been identified.

- Demography
- The changing nature of warfare
- Globalization and its discontents
- Globalization of Information, Media and Security Policy

The enclosed scope papers serve the purpose to identify sub-themes for each radical novelty and questions that suggest ways to debate them.

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CHANGING POLICY OR STAYING THE COURSE?[1]

Introduction: NATO Adrift?

How does a changing world affect the transatlantic relationship and the institutional epitome of that relationship: NATO? The title appears to suggest that the transatlantic partners have a choice between continuing a status quo policy (whatever that may be) and adopting a more ambitious or forward-looking agenda.

Whenever the notion of choice is put in such stark terms, it is intended to frame the issues in a certain way. For decades, this has been the preferred approach of – mainly American – NATO-watchers. If NATO does not adopt policy "A", or if it does not endorse initiative "B", US interest in the Alliance will wane and the Alliance is bound to unravel. By contrast, if the Alliance would do as prescribed, rejuvenation would be the reward. Due to the use of such drama, the whole debate about NATO is a debate framed in choices.

The current situation is no different. Many see NATO as being in a state of strategic drift, doing either just what it can do best or simply what others want it to do. A sense of clear-cut identity is missing, as NATO is increasingly perceived to be driven by outside events rather than by collective Allied interests. Various examples are quoted to support this perception: the humanitarian relief operation after the Pakistan earthquake in October 2005, which also led to disagreements over funding; the political disagreements over the employment of the NATO Response Force in Afghanistan; and not least an enlargement process that raises the question whether it is still about "hard" security interests or whether it has turned into social policy by other means. The recent debate on missile defence has revealed yet another problem: some Allies feel that NATO's protection may not be enough, and thus seek additional reassurance through bilateral arrangements with the United States. In sum, the unease with the current state of affairs is palpable.

Illusions of Choice

There are, at the same time, widely different views as to how to overcome this perceived drift. On the one hand, there are the maximalists, whose policy prescriptions range from admitting Israel to NATO (Asmus), turning NATO into a major anti-terrorist organisation (Aznar), or into a global Alliance of likeminded states (Daalder). On the other hand, there are the moderates, who want to save the Alliance from over-entanglement by re-focussing it on its core missions, i.e. a combination of collective defence, long-term stabilisation missions, and the well-established partnership dimension. This "back-to-basics" approach would act as a firewall against operational over-extension and also allow Allies to allocate scarce resources more efficiently.

While these schools could not be more different, they appear to agree on one next step, namely to codify the necessary changes in a new Strategic Concept. For some, the main argument for such a document appears to lie in the drafting process

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[1] Contribution by Dr. Michael Rühle**,** Head, Speechwriting & Senior Policy Adviser, Policy Planning Unit, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General. Personal views only. Special thanks to Rad van den Akker for comments and suggestions

itself. They see it as a therapeutic exercise for the Allies to re-visit NATO's current problems, and to adopt new policies accordingly. Others have been going further, arguing that a new Harmel exercise may somehow bring back the notion of a political "end-state" that served the Alliance so well in the Cold War.

Alas, none of these prescriptions is likely to achieve the desired goal of making the Alliance more coherent. A quick glance at NATO's history reveals that this Alliance does not evolve according to blueprints or grand designs, but rather by reacting to concrete challenges. This pattern started with the very creation of the Organisation itself by way of "spontaneous combustion" (Dean Acheson) during the Korean War. It was repeated in the agonizing transition from massive retaliation to flexible response, as a result of increasing US vulnerability to Soviet intercontinental missiles. One could observe it after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the adoption of a policy for pan-European consolidation through partnership and enlargement. NATO's role as a peacekeeper in the Balkans only came about after another agonizing debate; and the transition from a geographical to a functional security approach, which saw NATO's first operation out-of-continent, came in the wake of "9/11". In each case, a significant change in the strategic landscape prompted NATO to respond – sometimes quickly, and improvised. Arguably, major adaptations occurred only when a cataclysmic event fundamentally altered the broader strategic context.

This pattern is unlikely to be broken, neither by the maximalists nor by the moderates. For while one camp is trying to push the clock ahead too far and too fast, the other tries to turn it back. The maximalist visions of a future NATO overtax the consensus among the Allies. Allies may not be good at formulating what they want, but they certainly know what they don't want. The moderates' back-to-basics approach will fail as well, however, because NATO's evolution from a "single issue" collective defence organisation into a multiple purpose security agency is in essence a reflection of today's much more complex security environment and, hence, not really negotiable. It may be deplored, but it cannot be reversed.

An Incomplete Transatlantic Security Consensus

A realistic approach for moving NATO forward must first of all acknowledge that the transatlantic security consensus post-"9/11" is incomplete. To be sure, there are many positive developments. The need to move from a geographical understanding of security to a more functional understanding has been widely accepted. There is a general agreement on the direction of Allied military transformation, namely towards expeditionary capabilities for operations far away from NATO's traditional European perimeter. The need to accept nation-building as a central part of modern security policy has sunk in even in the minds of those who long rejected that concept. The need for closer cooperation between the main institutional players and for a "comprehensive approach" in crisis management and stabilisation operations is now widely acknowledged as well, even if views on the right balance between the various military and civilian elements may differ. The logic of addressing the Middle East conundrum through a transatlantic approach remains as valid as ever and has been underscored by the attempts to revive the Quartet and by the joint US-EU approach on the Iranian nuclear programme. Finally, one might also point to the declared willingness of the United States to acknowledge rather than prevent a distinct EU security dimension.

While these elements of a post-"911"/post-Iraq consensus demonstrate the transatlantic community's potential for adaptation, there is a striking difference of views in other areas. For example, while the US has made the "war on terror" its central security paradigm, others have not. Views on the legitimacy of preventive or pre-emptive military action differ, with some nations applying these concepts across the range of threats, while others accept them only in a counter-terrorist context. In a similar vein, views on the centrality of, and approaches to, democracy promotion as part of security policy continue to differ widely. Despite transatlantic cooperation on Iran, the significance of, and response to, WMD proliferation remain contested. The mounting problems in Iraq may have led to a reappraisal of permanent alliances vis-à-vis coalitions of the willing, but this reappraisal may disappear with the next crisis. For the US, at least, the question whether to rely on the UN or NATO frameworks or rather on a coalition of likeminded nations has not been answered – and probably cannot be. Finally, the role of the EU as an autonomous security actor remains a challenge to the transatlantic security arrangement in NATO: what is sometimes cast as a bureaucratic challenge of building a workable EU-NATO interface masks a transatlantic power struggle that will probably never be fully resolved.

Solidarity in Operations

There is no *a priori* reason why this lack of consensus in specific areas should preclude the search for a new "grand bargain", either through a document or major new initiatives. If one is willing to settle for the lowest common denominator and for very general language, one could certainly obtain "agreement" in virtually all these areas. This impression of a "fresh start" might be facilitated by the advent of new governments in several key Allied countries. With a bit of public spin, therefore, one might indeed be able to create the impression of a re-juvenation of the transatlantic security relationship. However, another factor works fundamentally against such a calculus: NATO's increasingly operational focus. This operational focus is pushing NATO into a situation where statements of principle are increasingly less relevant than operational performance and, even more importantly, where a fragile consensus will be immediately tested – and probably exposed – in practice. As NATO has moved beyond the "deterrence-only" and peacekeeping business, and is now involved in serious combat operations, the true litmus test for the Alliance is how well it masters operational challenges. As the NATO Secretary General has noted, in the 21st century, institutions are not judged by what they represent, but by what they achieve.

Arguably, this new operational reality has already started to expose an entirely new set of transatlantic challenges. For one, it has revealed differences not only in the threat perception of Allies, but also in their respective strategic cultures, For example, mounting casualties in Afghanistan dramatically raised the significance of national caveats and made them a major theme in the run-up to the November 2006 Riga Summit. In the same vein, the reluctance of some NATO nations to get involved in the volatile South of Afghanistan clearly demonstrates the limits of solidarity in operations. In addition to different cultural attitudes towards warfare and casualties, there are also different constitutional realities. Some Allies feature "parliamentary armies" that require the agreement of their legislative bodies for virtually every change or extension of the employment of their national forces. Paradoxically, not only does this make the avoidance of casualties a precondition for

military engagement, it also holds any national military involvement hostage to domestic politics – and politicking.

A Realistic Approach

In the absence of a solid transatlantic consensus on many security issues, and given that operational demands may expose new fault lines, the true challenge for NATO as an organisation is threefold. First, it needs to improve its collective military-operational performance. Second, it needs to create the mechanisms and relationships necessary to "embed" NATO's military contributions into a broader international setting. And third, it must also seek to identify and address new areas where the NATO framework can conceivably add value, even if a solid consensus on these areas may not (yet) exist. Such an approach might be dismissed as defensive and piecemeal. However, it offers considerable scope for progress. Indeed, if one looks at NATO's recent evolution in the context of what may well be the best known set of predictions, namely the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project[2], it becomes clear that even in the absence of a comprehensive transatlantic consensus, let alone a "grand bargain", NATO is progressively addressing many areas that are likely to characterise the future security environment. Put differently, while only a cataclysmic event may compel Allies to effect radical policy changes, NATO can nevertheless be positioned in such a way as to provide a framework for common transatlantic action across a broad range of future contingencies.

Based on the assumption that globalisation will continue as a mega-trend, the NIC 2020 Project lists 13 "relative certainties" about the world in 2020. Some of these are rather general; others do not have a distinct security dimension. Those of direct security relevance, however, offer an interesting checklist against which to measure NATO's ability to embrace change.

Relative Certainty No. 1: "Globalization largely irreversible, likely to become less Westernized." This prediction is too general to distil specific implications for NATO. However, to the extent that NATO should be enabled to address challenges posed by globalisation, the stage has been set, at least conceptually. Largely as a result of "9/11", the re-definition of NATO from an Alliance with a regional, "eurocentric" focus to a framework for global action is well underway.

Relative Certainty No. 4: "Rise of Asia and advent of possible new economic middle-weights." NATO's engagement in Afghanistan has become a catalyst for a variety of political changes that enable the Alliance to build political and military ties with the Asia-Pacific region, including with the two rising stars India and China. And although the global partnership approach has not gone as far and as fast as initially intended by Washington, NATO's relations with Australia and New Zealand, as well as with Japan and South Korea, are bound to intensify. If NATO's outreach experience is any guide, these ties will spark the interest of other countries in the Asia-Pacific region in moving closer to NATO.

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[2] See NIC 2020 Mapping the Global Future (2005), at: www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html. The predictions not dealt with here are No. 2: World economy substantially larger; No. 3: Increasing number of global firms facilitate spread of new technologies; and No. 12: Environmental and ethical issues even more to the fore.

Relative Certainty No. 5: "Aging populations in established powers." NATO's long-term stabilisation operations are manpower-intensive and thus might be affected by low birth rates and other related societal changes (e.g. casualty avoidance). Efforts by NATO members states reveal an attempt to at least alleviate this problem – both nationally, by moving away from conscription, and collectively, by increasing the number of countries participating in NATO-led operations, or by employing new technologies and concepts (such as PRTs) to minimise manpower requirements.

Relative Certainty No. 6: "Energy supplies 'in the ground' sufficient to meet global demand." However, given the uneven global distribution of energy resources, and given that both Europe and North America are becoming more dependent on imported energy, the need for ensuring uninterrupted supply will gain in importance. The Riga Summit tasking to examine NATO's role in energy security, e.g. in the protection of critical infrastructure or crisis response options, provides the Alliance with a mandate to develop a common approach.

Relative Certainty No. 7: "Growing power of nonstate actors." Irrespective of US-ideas to give NATO a role in homeland security, it is unlikely that NATO could ever play more than a secondary role in dealing with domestic security issues, such as traditional terrorist acts or organised crime. Still, NATO's first ever invocation of Article 5 was in response to an attack by non-state actors, and NATO's major operation in Afghanistan is aimed at preventing that country from becoming again a terrorist training ground. This suggests that NATO's foremost contribution to the fight against terrorism will consist of stability operations in terrorist-prone regions, as well as in dealing with prevention aspects (Operation Active Endeavour").

Relative Certainty No. 8: "Political Islam remains a potent force." NATO's major operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan have been taking place in areas with predominantly Muslim populations, and largely on their behalf. Outreach efforts to the Arab world as well as to other key Muslim states (Pakistan) offer opportunities for constructive engagement. Public diplomacy efforts are being re-focussed accordingly, and the need for more regional expertise is addressed by training and hiring staff with Arabic language skills, etc.

Relative Certainty No. 9: "Improved WMD capabilities of some states." NATO's role in countering proliferation remains constrained by different Allied views of the problem. Thus, as with other security issues, a major NATO role is only likely in the wake of a "shock", for example if a state of concern would test a missile of a certain range, or if an NBRC terrorist attack would occur on or close to NATO territory.[3] Yet even in the absence of such a cataclysmic event, the growing salience of proliferation could lead, inter alia, to a dedicated NATO role in the Proliferation Security Initiative, or the implementation of a UN maritime embargo against proliferators.

Relative Certainty No. 10: "Arc of instability spanning Middle East, Asia, Africa." NATO's major operation is in Central Asia; NATO is conducting naval patrols in the Mediterranean Sea that links Europe to Africa and the Middle East; the

[3] A WMD attack by state or non-state actors is clearly the most significant "wildcard" in any prediction exercise; see Richard K. Betts, The Future of Force and U.S. National Security Strategy, *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, Winter 2005, pp. 15-17.

Alliance now entertains relations with several Gulf states and seeks to play a stronger training role in the area. NATO's support to the African Union in training and capacity-building is also likely to grow. While this engagement does not yet amount to a coherent strategy, let alone a leading role for NATO, it suggests that the political focus of NATO is gradually shifting to new geopolitical flashpoints. It also suggests that any attempt at defining a geographical demarcation between NATO and the EU (e.g. have the latter deal with sub-Saharan Africa), is futile.

Relative Certainty No. 11: "Great power conflict escalating into total war unlikely." This assumption has been reflected in NATO's military changes since the end of the Cold War. However, since inter-state war cannot be ruled out altogether; since even humanitarian interventions may require forced entry; and since Afghanistan demonstrates the need for performing combat and stabilisation missions simultaneously, the military challenges for NATO remain formidable. One particular challenge will be to avoid the emergence of a two-tier Alliance, with some countries focusing on stabilisation missions and others on the "high end".

Relative Certainty No. 13: "US will remain single most powerful actor economically, technologically, militarily." This will ensure NATO's uniqueness as the only collective American-European defence and security forum even as the EU's weight increases, and that will compel even the most ardent Europhiles to maintain a degree of "co-operability" with the United States.

Conclusion

As the NIC 2020 puts it, "[a]t no time since the formation of the Western alliance system in 1949 have the shape and nature of international alignments been in such a state of flux." While terms like globalisation and interdependence suggest a certain commonality of interest of likeminded states, the implications for an Alliance such as NATO are not at all that clear. Terrorism, proliferation or failed states affect Allies differently and may lead to different responses; the need for rapid or even preventive action runs counter to the logic of consensual collective decision-taking; and the need to engage in dangerous and potentially open-ended operations exposes differences in military performance and risk-taking. Despite these structural limitations, however, and even in the absence of a solid consensus on many issues, the gradual broadening of NATO's political scope and military toolkit suggests that the Alliance is well-placed to support an increasingly complex transatlantic security agenda.

DEMOGRAPHY TRENDS PANEL[1]

Will demographic forces pull the United States and Europe further apart or will the increasing isolation of the West vis-à-vis the wider world actually draw the transatlantic relationship closer? In order to address this question, the panel should focus on at least the following three aspects of demography that are likely to have an impact on transatlantic relations as we advance toward the middle of the 21st Century—the changing global population mix, Europe's "diminishing" role, and the United States' shifting balance.

First, the panel should address the overall transformation of the world's population that will continue to reflect the slow, inexorable shift from a Euro-centric world (political, economic, social, and cultural predominance of recent centuries) to a more truly global one. How will the diminishing overall "weight" of the "West" affect both Europe's and the United States' position and role *in* the world?

According to the U.N. Population Division's 2006 estimate, the world's population will increase by 2.5 billion (roughly the same number of people who populated the planet in 1950 when NATO just emerged) from 6.7 billion to 9.2 billion in 2050. Most population growth will occur in less developed countries (from 5.4 billion in 2007 to 7.9 billion in 2050). By contrast the population of the "richer" countries (many whose populations will actually decline—Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, etc.)[2] will remain largely unchanged at 1.2 billion because of immigration of roughly 2.3 million annually.[3]

- World—population/GNP--2006/2025/2050 (India/China/Muslim/Europe/US)

  --disproportionate growth in Asia (China, India) and Muslim countries
  --economic shrinkage of EU and FSU European countries
  --ageing of 1st world and youthful 3rd world with increased immigration from 3rd to 1st world

Second, the panel also should examine how Europe's "diminishing" global presence and shifting internal demographics (significant ageing coupled with immigration flows from Turkey, Muslim east, and North Africa) will affect Europe's identity and the transatlantic relationship.

Europe (whether defined as NATO's 26 or the EU's 27) will comprise a shrinking portion of the global population which will likely have significant economic, social, and international security consequences. According to some estimates Europe's (the EU at 27) share of the gross world product (GWP) will decline from roughly 22% in 2003 to 12% in 2050.[4] At the same time, Europe's fertility rates remain low (from

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[1] Contribution by Jeffrey Simon, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
[2] Between 2000 and 2050 Germany could decline from 82 to 70.8 million; Italy from 57.5 to 42.9 million; Spain from 39.1 to 31.2 million; and Russia from 145.5 to 104.3 million with Muslims approaching the majority of the population. Others that are far worse include Ukraine, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Baltic states. See, UN Report, E/CN.9/2001/4, p. 20.
[3] UN Report, E/CN.9/2001/4, p. 9; and Associated Press, March 14, 2007.
[4] John Vinocur, "A Gloomy Scenario for Europe's Economy," *International Herald Tribune*, May 14, 2003.

1.9 in the mid-1980s to 1.4 and will continue to decline over the next decade),[5] its median age will increase from 37.7 years in 2000 to 49.5 in 2050),[6] and its active working population will decline (from 331 to 243 million).[7] Hence, fewer productive people will have to devote more resources to health and social services. Europe's internal demographics will have a dramatic effect as well. Islamic immigration, which has resulted, in part, to fill the labor shortfalls already is having an impact on inter-communal relations, which will likely have an impact on Europe's relations with the Islamic world.

- Europe—population/GNP—2003/2025/2050
- Impact of ageing population:
  -- increasing social costs
  --declining work force
  --static or negative economic growth
- Impact of Muslim immigration—Turkey, Southwest Asia, North Africa
  - growth in EU
  - dominance/in Russia
  - in the Balkans

Third, the panel should also assess how the U.S.' "slightly enhanced" global role and shifting internal demographics (only slight ageing coupled with immigration from Hispanic and Asian countries) could affect its identity, relations with the outside world, and the transatlantic relationship. Will these trends "loosen" or actually undermine the transatlantic foundation of the past half century or will these trends actually breed a common sense of increasing isolation of the Euro-Atlantic community from the global community that could pull both sides of the Atlantic together to fend off the outside world?

The United States faces very different demographics from Europe. Its birth rate is higher and it can absorb many more immigrants, many who are Hispanic (Spanish is rapidly becoming its second language) or Asian. Hence, in marked contrast to Europe, the U.S. share of GWP is likely to *increase* (from roughly 23% now to 26% in 2050 by some estimates).[8] At the same time the U.S. population will actually increase due to higher fertility rates of 2.1 and immigration flows. Hence, the U.S. population which had a median age of 35.5 years in 2003 will only slightly change to 36.2 years in 2050,[9] and its active working population will actually *increase* from 269 million in 2003 to 355 million in 2050.

The United States' internal demographics could also have a dramatic effect on its identity and orientation. During this period, when India will overtake China with 1.62 billion and 1.47 billion people respectively (both representing 37% of the total world population), the two will play a larger role in the world economy. The EU's share of gross world product (at 12%) in 2050 will be roughly one-half that of China or the United States, each who will share about 25% of the gross world product. Hence, while Europe will remain important to the U.S. in social and economic terms, Asia and Latin America will gain in relative economic and social (and domestic political)

[5] Special Report: "Half a Billion Americans?—Demography and the West," *The Economist* (London), August 24, 2002, p. 22.
[6] UN Report E/CN.9/2001/4, p. 29
[7] John Vinocur, op. cit.
[8] Ibid.
[9] *The Economist*, Special Report, op. cit.

importance. These trends are likely to have an impact on the transatlantic relationship as we move toward mid-21st century.

- U.S.—population/GDP—2006/2025/2050
- Impact of ageing
- Impact of Hispanic/Asian/Muslim immigration—Hispanic/Chinese/South Asian--Indian

GLOBALISATION AND ITS DISCONTENT[1]

Why Globalisation Matters to NATO

Ten of the twenty most globalised countries are members of the Alliance.[2] It is worth considering whether there is a connection between this fact and the fact that the most important mission for NATO at the moment is the mission in Afghanistan, thousands of kilometres from the North Atlantic Area.

Globalisation sets the economic, personal, technological and political agenda for NATO's members, as globalisation is increasingly setting the agenda for the Alliance itself. Globalisation is not just something which is changing the rest of the world – it is changing us too. It is changing NATO's member states and NATO as an organisation.

NATO is changing because of globalisation, so the real question is *how* NATO changes. NATO has to establish how to formulate an answer to the challenges of globalisation.

What is Globalisation?

The essence of globalisation is the way in which information, communication and transport technologies are making the transaction costs of the international system increasingly smaller. In other words, globalisation makes it ever easier to talk and trade. However, globalisation is not merely about trade and communication. Trade and communication is the matter of globalisation, but the lower transaction costs have social, economic and political consequences which in many ways is a bigger issue than the volume of trade and investment.

The most important social consequence of lower transaction costs is that it puts change on the political agenda. Whether people in manufacturing industries in the West will keep their job, depends on competition from the Far East. How a national economic policy is to be conducted depends on how the nation is to stay competitive on the world market. How the education system is to be organised depends on how to best attract bight young people from all over the world to your national universities. Whether a country is a democracy or a dictatorship is not only decided by local power-struggles; foreign donors take an active interest in democratisation and 'good governance'.

Change is expected; and change defines the political discourse in the globalised countries of the North Atlantic Area. One might even argue that many of the issues that divide North Americans and Europeans – and indeed divide the Europeans themselves – stem from different approaches to globalisation.

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[1] Contribution by Dr. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, head of the Danish Institute for Military Studies. See www.difms.dk for details. Dr. Rasmussen has elaborated on the role of globalisation in strategic affairs in his recent book *The Risk Society at War* published by Cambridge University Press.

[2] According to *Foreign Policy*'s annual globalisation index. All members of the Alliance are within the top 35 of the index, 'The Global Top 20', *Foreign Policy*, November/December, 2006, pp. 74-81.

Does globalisation make the World more Peaceful?

After the Cold War we came to expect that the future entailed more democracy, more wealth and less conflict. The former US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, refers to the relative peace and quiet after the end of the Cold War and notes that there was a tendency in the 1990s to regard 'this favorable circumstance was a permanent condition'. 'The September 11 attacks,' Wolfowitz goes on, 'have awakened us to a fundamental reality: the 21st century security environment will be different from the one we faced in the 20th century – but just as dangerous.'

Will the historians of the future look back on the 1990s as yet another 'belle époque'? A period which looks in retrospect more and more prosperous, more free and peaceful, the harder and more dangerous the present becomes?

The problem is that lower transaction costs mean more interaction, but that greater interaction does not necessarily mean fewer conflicts. On the contrary, one might argue that the more one is in contact the greater are the possibilities of conflict.[3]

Considering this question it is worth noting that the first process of globalisation ended in 1914 with the First World War.

What conflicts does globalisation make possible?

The lower transaction costs of a globalising world have profound consequences on strategy by creating a global security environment.

Lower transaction costs mean that more and more powers will have greater and greater power projection capabilities. Table 1 shows one estimate of the power projection capability of leading powers from 2000-2030.

[3] Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Myth of National Interdependence', in Charles Kindleberger (ed.) *The International Cooperation* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 205-223.

Table 1. Global Power Projection Capacity

Power Projection	2000	2015	2030
Global Capacity (everywhere)	USA	USA	USA, China, EU (France, UK and Germany)
Multi-regional Capacity (own region and other regions)	France, UK	EU (France, UK and Germany), China, Russia	Russia, India, Japan
Regional Capacity (own region)	Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan, India, Japan, Iran, N.Korea, Taiwan, Libya, S.Korea, Iraq, Germany, Tyrkey, Australia	India, Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, Japan, Libya, Iran, Taiwan, Egypt, Irmak, N and/or Skier, Australia	Turkey, Libya, Pakistan, Israel, Taiwan, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, N and/or S.Korea, Australia

Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Strategic Trends (Swindon: JDCC, 2003), 8:5.

A world where many more states have the possibility of projecting power will present a very different security environment for Western security policy. We have become used to the fact that NATO, or the NATO-countries, conduct interventions around the world. What will happen, and how will the Alliance respond, when this capability is more widespread?

The increased power projection capability reflects the fact that globalisation redistributes wealth and power in the international system. In the globalisation period that ended tragically in the First World War it was exactly such an redistribution of wealth (the rise of Germany) which destabilised the international system.

Tabel 2. Projected GDP for Leading Industrial Nations



Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Strategic Trends (Swindon: JDCC, 2003), 5:10

What role do Non-state Actors play in a Globalised Security Environment?

Globalisation makes conflict easier and it enables non-state actors to take part in armed conflict simply because in a globalised world war is affordable. The same technological factors which make it possible for more and more states to project power thus make it possible for non-state actors to project power. Furthermore, globalisation gives such non-state actors reasons, or at least motives, for using armed force because the international consensus provokes them. The technologies that further globalisation are also tools of war.

In the 1990s military transformation was often associated with 'clean', zero-casualty wars. But the technologies of military transformation have the potential for unleashing devastating total wars, if the technologies are employed in conflict in ways different than they are today.

The rise of new states with the capability to make their own military transformation makes it possible, perhaps even probable, that in a few decades the Western powers will no longer be the only ones with a high-tech military. From a military point of view, then, the 1990s will indeed look like a time when wars were easy, because of crushing superiority.

How does NATO do Strategy in a Globalised World?

Globalisation opens many new possibilities and many potentially dangerous scenarios. But these scenarios need not become real – in the same way as it does not necessarily rain because the weather man says so on the morning news show. The point is that in a time of change, strategy needs to reflect what might happen in the future. In other words, not only are the threats new, the strategies for dealing with them are also new.

Perhaps this is the real challenge for NATO. Following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has been remarkably successful in dealing with managing future risks in Europe. However, NATO has had a much more difficult time in focusing on threats beyond the geographical confines of Europe. In many ways, NATO has done strategy by the old geopolitical concepts. But today geography makes little strategic sense. This means that the security of NATO's members are not defined by direct threats to the North Atlantic area alone; European and American security depends on managing the risks arising from all over a globalising world.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE[1]

NATO is a military alliance with political purposes. Though many of its tasks have a political character, success cannot be measured solely in terms of the degree of peace and stability NATO has created through dialogue and partnership. Its forces have to prevail in armed conflict in order to be a valuable security policy tool for its members. The complex globalized security environment, fraught with uncertainty and asymmetric confrontations, makes this warfare role more and more difficult to fulfil.

Technological superiority might help to prevail over the mostly weaker forces NATO has to confront, but cannot be the only adaptation. Force transformation must be oriented to coping with these risks. The organizational and doctrinal reform of armed forces has been a successful action program to help member states to move away from the inappropriate legacy of forces with structures and material suited to fight the Cold War. It has been an inspirational paradigm for focusing on the capabilities of flexibility and mobility the military needs to quickly respond to sudden crises.

Transformation has not yet fully enabled the Western forces to go into military and psychological combat against seemingly weaker actors, who can apply the advantages of guerrilla tactics and have a different rationality regarding the cost-benefit ratio of human loss versus political gain. There are various new forms of confrontation looming, with ample opportunity for miscalculation and political division. NATO must go through organizational and doctrinal adaptations and adopt a new political consensus about the use of force and the resulting responsibilities.

Seen from the outside, the Alliance should be perfectly suited to becoming an effective security organization under changing conditions. NATO has an impressive record of conducting operations in ever more difficult theatres, with a great variety of missions, and an impressive number of sometimes ill-suited allies. It has also survived some very painful transatlantic struggles, because it has made adaptability one of its main features. Despite this, its members have to negotiate the political consensus on its new role over and over again.

This paper will look at trends in modern warfare that might create difficulties for NATO's operations. It will then analyse the differences among the United States, Canada and the European allies over coping with these difficulties. Focused questions should assist the workshop to consider a NATO role in finding a response to these frictions. The idea is to chart the way forward for radically innovative approaches.

Different types of mission create contradictions

Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that from the initial phases of the operation on, military missions must shoulder numerous and conflicting tasks in parallel. Invasion, combat, counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance and civil support are no longer successive elements of a developing operation, but have to be conducted simultaneously. During a counterinsurgency, forces might be fighting against smaller adversaries asymmetrically, connecting with the population with greater cultural

[1] Contribution by Dr. Henning Riecke, Resident Fellow, DGAP.

awareness, all while conducting conventional warfare to hold territory elsewhere at the same time. Military forces are but one element of a larger spectrum of simultaneously applied instruments that must be planned and mustered in an integrated way. [2]

This creates problems during the conduct of the operation, as was experienced during the recent Iraq war. Namely, to create a balance and a logical nexus among different types of missions in the operational theatre, a connection that is understandable and acceptable to the people suffering the temporary presence of foreign troops on their soil. With the partners and even with potential enemies in conflict-resolution, the frictions between the types of missions must be solved to make success possible.

Secondly, in coping with these challenges, force generation and planning must be adapted. In intervention scenarios, the military must take the lead in planning and conducting the mission. Defence planners must rely on civilian input in the planning phase, but must enable their troops to apply a number of functions themselves before access for non-military agencies can be provided to fulfil their role. The awareness for the operational need of flexibility has grown, for instance among the American and British defence planners. With new institutions to better integrate civilian actors in the fact-finding and planning phases of an operation, new thinking has developed on the national level.

Thirdly, for international cooperation as in NATO, this multiplicity of tasks creates problems. The current dispute over the German *Bundeswehr* participation in the fighting in the Southern provinces of Afghanistan is a reflection of a transatlantic clash of concepts about conflict management. Some members see the civilian build-up and development, as a fundament for stability, as the clear priority. They accept a protective role for the military but fear disturbances in their efforts when their troops engage in robust counter-insurgence in other regions of the country. Others, like the US, argue that neutralizing the Taliban is a precondition for any civilian build-up and hence has a higher importance for the overall objective of the war, due to its connection with global terrorism. The merging of the stabilization operation ISAF and the robust OEF ran into difficulties that might not be repeated in a future operation, but should be used as a lesson.

Nevertheless, political frictions must be taken seriously and solved as a priority. They might generally impede the decision-making process, complicate planning and jeopardize an operation. Diverse caveats on where not to send troops into battle have become serious obstacles to NATO's ability to act in a crisis and to adapt ongoing missions to new circumstances. Allies will find it hard to surrender authority over the deployment of their troops. Thus, NATO's ability to find a consensus on the nature of an operation, and a joint understanding as to which facets of military force an operation should include, are key to making it happen in the first place and to making success possible. NATO has reacted and conducts NRF exercises while preparing for different and simultaneous military roles, a mix that can make planning difficult. The Allies are currently negotiating a new strategy in Afghanistan that aims

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[2] See John C. Clarke, What Role and Missions for Europe's Military and Security (The Marshall Center Papers, No.7), Garmisch-Partenkirchen, August 2005; See Headquarters, Department Of The Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (FM 2 24), Washington, December 2006
< http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf>.

at cautious reconstruction, even in provinces that still see armed conflict. How easily political support can be rallied when a real crisis demands quick intervention, however, is still an open question. The following areas need to be clarified:

- What transatlantic frictions exist over the use of force in the fight against terrorism and conflict resolution? How will the ongoing dispute affect Alliance solidarity and political determination? Can a principled debate in NATO start about the balance between moderate and aggressive uses of force, perhaps in the context of talks on a New Strategic Framework? If yes, how?

- How can force transformation under NATO's custody be focused on the multiplicity of tasks? What kind of forces do we need to create new military capabilities? What tactical adaptations are needed to better coordinate the different roles of the military in a complex operational setting? How can NATO educate and train soldiers to be effective under circumstances that demand adaptive behaviour?

- How can the dynamics of force transformation help non-military agencies to improve their abilities for international missions? How can such actors be incorporated in the planning process? Can this be done through NATO or is this the domain of member states? What could be a methodology for evaluating progress?

NATO forces must operate with weak partners.

From the Kosovo war on, from experiences with the Northern alliances in Afghanistan up to the diverse challenges in Iraq, fighting with partner states and even with local forces has been a persistent feature of Western intervention strategy. This is also a challenge NATO will have to face in future operations.

Different coalition agreements are possible. NATO conducts many multinational operations with non-NATO countries that are part of partnership programs, like Georgian support in KFOR. If future operations were to involve coalitions of the willing, without consent in the NATO Council, non-members could take part. Operations with local security forces, either in the intervention phase or later in support of civil authorities, are quite common as well. Finally, the creation and training of new local security forces is a typical feature of multinational stability operations, making joint operations possible at a later stage.

The coalition partners are in many cases equal to NATO forces, but often not. The standard of military organization, preparedness and doctrine, even in PFP countries and certainly in Developing countries, may be too low to make them trustworthy allies in future operations. Countries in crisis regions with a more effective and better organized military can be expected to have an interest or stake in the emerging conflicts themselves, and consequently might prove unreliable supporters of a joint goal.

The problem is even greater when local sub-state forces come into play that might be needed to assist in counterinsurgency.[3] Some local militias – sometimes badly trained, insufficiently disciplined or simply corrupt – play a part in driving a conflict.

[3] See Daniel Byman, Going to war with the allies you have: Allies, counterinsurgency and the war on terrorism (Strategic Studies Institute). Carlisle, PA, November 2005.

While this creates a high degree of initiative and determination that might be seen as useful to ending a confrontation quickly, problems are looming. Such partners will hardly share the values that NATO Allies hold dear, especially with regard to human rights, military conduct during wartime or links with organized crime. These inadequacies create dilemmas: All these actors can be indispensable partners when a complex operation is planned.

Such partnership dilemmas might create transatlantic frictions.

Firstly, with non-state actors abroad. The role of the KFC during the Kosovo war and its subsequent reluctance to disarm, and the role of militias in Afghanistan give an idea of the sensitive nature of this relationship. If NATO saw itself under pressure to cooperate with such actors, tensions between members could emerge.

Secondly, in strategic partnerships with international organizations, like the African Union. The prospect of helping the AU become an effective projector of force is limited. More energetic and costly endeavours by NATO members would be needed to inch forward in this process, without great promise of immediate success. It would be difficult to obtain transatlantic consent to such an unreliable strategy.

Thirdly, the approach to build partnerships itself has been at the centre of a transatlantic conflict: Some members have already criticized what they see as an attempt to build partnerships with democratic, industrialized countries like Japan and Australia with a view of turning NATO into a pool of interoperable forces for US-led operations without Alliance consent. NATO would lose its Alliance spirit (Article 5 would not apply to Japan) and become much more globally involved at the same time. This difference has not been resolved and has overshadowed the Riga summit.

To bridge the gap between global interests and limited resources to export stability, NATO could produce a network of partnership relations in the long run. The Alliance would still have the ability to project force, but no need to be present in every corner of the world. It would be the power centre of a global network, aiding the UN and assisting Regional Organizations in partnership with stable countries in unstable regions. The benefit would be that states and organizations in distant regions can take responsibility for solving conflict, without NATO engaging in costly and long-lasting operations with large numbers of troops. There would also be a network of actors with much deeper experience of the societal, economic and cultural conditions in conflict areas than NATO planners might have. NATO could rely less often on local coalition partners.

- What are the diverging positions that create disputes whenever NATO's global role is at stake? How can the members promote a debate about the global nature of NATO?

- Can NATO be the facilitator of a partnership network that extends beyond its existing programmes? What can NATO do to improve existing partnership programmes? How can the financial means be increased to create incentives for countries outside the Alliance to really adapt to become able partners?

- Can NATO build up intelligence capabilities to better assess the difficult partners it might have to work with? Can intelligence exchange become a more central element of partnership programmes?

NATO faces a problem of legitimacy

NATO members face an even more intricate challenge. The uncertainty of the modern security environment makes a joint assessment difficult about which development is dangerous for Western security, what can be done about it and which role the existing instruments could play. During the Cold War, the threat could be easily identified: There was an actor, a recognisable intention and quantifiable capabilities.

Today, clear-cut threats have been replaced by risks: In the trans-national dangers of crime, migration, pollution, proliferation and terrorism, at least one of the three – actors, intentions or capabilities – is unknown. The uncertainty can relate to whether there is an individual culprit for a threatening development, whether we assess his actions correctly, whether an ongoing harmless process might lead to a threatening outcome, and finally whether our available instruments are appropriate and well-suited to prevent a dangerous development. Uncertainty like this is the largest obstacle when it comes to creating political support for military operations, because it leaves ample room for mistrust and manipulation.

In times when NATO's most effective instrument, the NRF, relies on the quick consent of the many nations to equip its ranks with forces – some with strict rules that call for a parliamentary co-decision – uncertainty will become the greatest source of weakness in security policy. Ironically, a comprehensive insight of the complexities of a globalized world will make reliance on the use of force unlikely, the possible unintended repercussions of a military intervention too dangerous. A recent poll of Foreign Affairs has shown that even in the United States, the support for military solutions in foreign policy has been substantially eroded. Only a minority of Americans believe the government is telling the truth in foreign policy questions.[4] This problem of legitimacy has been exacerbated in every case when political leaders have used inaccurate information to convince the public and contradictory evidence is later revealed.

This is not to say that political control over the military is a source of weakness or to demand that the use of force should be unhindered by political hesitance. The fact that the use of force is tied to parliamentary control is an opportunity to discuss questions of legitimacy in public. When the use of force is an indispensable element of a comprehensive strategy, though, and NATO is a suitable framework to organize it, the Alliance should be able to do what is needed.

Looking at the scarce footage of the war against the Taliban, one of the most forceful operations in NATO history and decisive for the Alliance's global role and its deployment of Special Forces there, one might feel that NATO is showing signs of fear of losing legitimacy and public support. A more transparent and proactive presentation about what NATO does might help to open minds, but could lead to complex transatlantic friction. Reliance on non-military means is a strong element of the political culture in many European countries. The public in Europe sees military means as counterproductive, although the allies' political elites have a more pragmatic view. More transparent coverage of operations might point to the unavoidable concessions that NATO leaders have to make in multinational settings, and even lead to questions about the legality of warfare against adversaries that

[4] Nikolas Busse, Amerikaner zunehmend besorgt über eigene Außenpolitik, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5.4.2007

mingle with the local populations. Paradoxically, this might compromise the high foreign policy principles that are demanded by their electorates.

- Must NATO seek a more transparent communication strategy, to spur debate over how it conducts its operations?

- Must NATO seek a linkage, in raising support in the theatre of operation for certain elements of its operation, to better explain to the public the rationale of its mission? Can strong public support be utilized to appear more determined in conflict?

- Can the normative framework of the Alliance's force deployments be used as a unique selling point to promote NATO's credibility as an actor in a crisis? Can NATO play a role in promoting a new legal understanding about martial law, including containment of non-combatants?

GLOBALISATION OF INFORMATION, MEDIA AND SECURITY[1]

It's 8:20 pm on 6 March 2007, and Fox News is airing for its U.S. audience a video taken by an infrared camera from a U.S. gunship flying at altitude. On the ground are terrorists preparing to ambush a U.S. patrol, when they become aware of the aircraft overhead. Some of the terrorists quickly adjourn to a truck and drive away, others scatter into the woods, and still others flee into hiding places where they think they cannot be seen. Caught in the act of attempting to kill members of the Coalition Forces, the terrorists know their fate. There is no escaping their guilt. The camera has captured the evidence. The gunship opens fire, the results never in question.

Is this a message to shore up public opinion, to inform the American people that its government is vigorously pursuing the war on terror? Or is this broadcast an attempt to deter terrorists who might try to arrange another "wedding party" in the wake of a massacre?[2]

Who is the intended audience of this "domestic news report"? To what extent is it also aimed at terrorists abroad?

Prince Harry Goes to Iraq

The story was designed to make Britons proud of their royal family.[3]

"Prince Harry of Britain will be sent to Iraq to command a tank unit," declares the Defence Ministry to the Kingdom. Prince Harry, it's said, insists he doesn't want special treatment. This is a rite of passage in the footsteps of his father, Prince Charles. But the halcyon days when the dashing young prince goes off to serve with commoners and makes headlines kissing young girls are over. Royal military service is no longer simply a domestic affair.

"Al Qaeda Targets Prince" is the new headline a short two weeks later.[4] Extremist websites are full, Sky News informs us, with death threats against Harry: "May Allah give him what he deserves." Will the United Kingdom let its prince go into a war where he is not "just another soldier" but Target Number One? Who "wins" if Harry's attempt to join his unit in Iraq is aborted out of concerns for his safety? Who loses? Who is the real target of al Qaeda's zeal?

How did a routine news report on a celebrity blog come to galvanise the enemy? Or have such news reports become not just news, but intelligence?

Globalisation of Information

Four radical technological changes serve as the foundation of the information age.

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[1] Contribution by Dr Samuel Grier, Dean, NATO Defense College. The author wishes to acknowledge Dr David Yost and Dr Carlo Masala, both researchers at the NDC, for their comments.
[2] *BBC News*, "US denies bombing wedding party," 20 May 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
[3] *Celebrity Blog*, "Prince Harry Will Go to Iraq," 22 Feb 2007, www.styleikon.com.
[4] *Sky News*, "Al Qaeda Targets Prince," 5 Mar 2007, http://news.sky.com/skynews.

1. The most important technology breakthrough is that virtually all forms of recorded information can be converted into digital format, or "digitized." While the information may require different means to filter and constructively make sense of it, it is essential to realize that information—whether text, numeric, voice, sound, pictures, video, or some unique format that allows a computer to perform a special function such as face or voice recognition—can be converted and recorded using the identical technological basis. Like the human brain, which can process information that has been converted for storage via the body's five senses, computers can also store information and, much like memory recall, present digitized information for human consumption with all the attendant intellectual, emotional, psychological and physiological responses.
2. The second is the continued impact of Moore's Law.[5] Information can be stored with ever greater fidelity in ever greater quantities and processed ever faster. There is more digitized information stored on computers than the entire human race has the capacity to track, process, comprehend and absorb.
3. The third change, one which has set in motion radically new ways of transforming, manipulating, and thinking about how to use information, is the merging of communications with digitized information. This is most evident in the development of the Internet and the evolution of portable media devices, which include the mobile telephone, laptop computers, IPODs and digital cameras, all of which can record, receive and transmit virtually all forms of information at any location where a communications hub is present. The only limitation is the volume of data that can be recorded on a portable device, but this limitation is diminishing rapidly.
4. The fourth radical change has been the emergence of wireless communications, both through terrestrial transmission sites and satellite networks. Thanks to wireless networks, developing nations have almost overnight progressed from communication deserts to state of the art telecommunication giants, with minimal investment costs. With wireless communications, information can be exchanged between virtually any two points on the globe with negligible delay. The speed with which information can be received and transmitted may limit the rate of information exchange, but wireless bandwidths are increasing.

It must be recognized that any event can be presented to the world in real time and recorded, with no means to retrieve it, once it is broadcast to a second source.

A War of Ideas

A Western government passed a law that criminalizes the filming or broadcasting of acts of violence by people other than professional journalists.[6] This attempt illustrates why we in the "aging West" are being overwhelmed by our much younger adversaries in the War of Ideas. It also exposes the technical chasm that separates older and younger generations.

[5] Moore's Law, articulated by Intel co-founder Gordon Moore in 1965, states that the number of transistors on a computer chip doubles every two years. The first microprocessor had 2200 transistors. Intel processors today boast more than a billion. See www.intel.com/technology.
[6] Peter Sayer, *IDG News Service*, "France bans citizen journalists from reporting violence," 6 Mar 2007, www.macworld.com/news.

Conflict in the 21st century is as much a war of ideas—a war of information—as it is a war between combatants. Failing to acknowledge that the information age has brought the power of ideas to the forefront, the West has been no match for groups like al Qaeda—a new breed of adversary adept at propaganda that puts a priority on reporting and "marketing" its side of the conflict, and which uses information technology to recruit and abet terrorists.

One major "front" in the war of ideas is the Internet. Extremists have created a new "planetary space" of violence and extremism on thousands of websites that circumvent government censorship. These "exciting and intoxicating" websites of violent radicalism are infecting young people with extremist ideas.[7]

One website shows viewers how to "strike a European city" and another informs viewers how to make and use biological weapons.[8] Impressionable young people can download video games from the Internet in which players shoot down American soldiers with President Bush's face, or they can play the "Mujahedeen World Cup" on the worldwide web, complete with a U.S. troop vehicle exploding over an announcer shouting "Goooaaal!" [9]

Still other websites show photos of maimed and wounded U.S. soldiers, videos of improvised explosive devices blowing up military vehicles, and videos of suicide bombers in the act. The influence these websites impose on the minds of young people can be compared to the phenomenon of "Internet porn addiction".

Internet pornography affects many adults in the United States, and the number one consumer of Internet pornography now is children, ages twelve to seventeen. With substance addictions, the substance ingested hijacks the brain and produces the "buzz." But in porn addiction, the mind itself is consumed and hijacked from within. Thoughts of sexual pleasure cause the brain to produce endorphins, which in turn produce a "high." Some leading researchers are now suggesting that treating porn addiction is so difficult that it rivals the challenge of successfully treating heroin and cocaine addiction.[10] In a similar way, young people who turn to extremist websites may become addicted to violent images. Hollywood violence, regardless of its realism, is still synthetic. But the fascination and exhilaration engendered by continuous exposure to pornographic violence—where real people suffer and real people die violently—produces at first revulsion and then a buzz, entrapping viewers with a power on par with sexual pornography. This "pleasure response" ensures that the behaviour, visiting extremist websites, is repeated over and over and that the addiction to pornographic violence deepens.

Given an opportunity, drug addicts and porn addicts will act on their addictions. Given an opportunity, those addicted to violence may act on their addiction as well, joining a terrorist organization or associating with groups espousing or planning violence. Unconscious that they are suffering from a psychological addiction reinforced by physiological factors and with no intention of fighting it, they will not—or even more frightening, they cannot—break free.

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[7] Gilles Kepel, "Le quitte ou double d'al-Qaida," *Le Figaro*, 26 July 2005.
[8] *Timesonline*, "Finger points to British intelligence as al-Qaeda websites are wiped out," 31 Jul 2005, www.timesonline.co.uk.
[9] Michael Hill, "Research center at West Point aims to teach about the enemy," *Stars and Stripes*, 12 Feb 2007, p 4.
[10] Tim Clinton, "Imaginary Lovers," *Christian Counseling Today*, 2004 vol. 12, no. 3, p 86.

What this means for the future is unclear. But what seems certain is that the number of terrorists, addicts whose motivation is undergirded by extremist religious ideology, will continue to increase and that their commitment to execute acts of terrorism, to include suicide attacks, is unlikely to wane anytime soon.

Media's Impact on Security Policy

The media have always endeavoured to influence foreign policy, but rarely have print media in the recent past had immediate impact. It is television, including television on the Internet, with the advent of 24-hour global news coverage that has the greatest potential to sensationalize events and thereby influence security policies. The so-called "CNN effect" in particular has influenced security policy in primarily two ways.

1. Because of its ability to saturate viewers with coverage of a particular story, television creates a sense of urgency in the minds of decision-makers and the public—a conviction that something has to be done in response to what is displayed on the screen.
2. Because of its ability to project news to a global audience in real time, television may be the first purveyor of information to the public, even before governments have become fully aware of rapidly unfolding events and their magnitude.

On the battlefield, commanders have mitigated the CNN effect by the introduction of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to conduct reconnaissance, the equipping of weapons systems with cameras that record hostile engagements, and the practice of embedding reporters with combatants during operations.

Commanders have little control, however, over controversial pictures taken by soldiers or undetected observers. Particularly if they provide evidence of wrongdoing, the consequences when these photos hit the Internet or the airwaves can be catastrophic.

The most remarkable example of the CNN effect in recent history was the real time reporting of events on 9/11. Terrorist attacks were shown to a worldwide audience before anyone had any idea what caused them. These events, which affected the psyche of every American witness, would change the direction of American security policy and lead the U.S. to take military action with far-reaching consequences.

But generally, the impact of the CNN effect is declining. There are thousands of television channels that offer everything from sports to movies to news to cartoons to music to pornography, and there has been an explosion in the number of CNN clones that broadcast news 24 hours a day, including the BBC, Fox News, EuroNews, Chaîne française d'information internationale, and Al Jazeera.

Internet websites continuously broadcast everything from current news to current weather to current stock exchange reports—all in real time—and email along with "text messaging" has replaced the postal service, face-to-face interaction and talking on the telephone as the preferred means to communicate with friends, co-workers, and even strangers.

Consequently, people are subject to information overload on a continual basis, and the huge amount of data, much of it of little value or untrustworthy or of little interest, has transformed the way people choose from where they get their news and when they view it.

News sources are no longer selected by viewers because they are the most reliable or the most honest, or because they have the best and most complete coverage. Rather, people choose their news sources because they broadcast in a particular language, are associated with a particular religious identity, or support a particular ideological or cultural orientation. Furthermore, Western values and views no longer dominate the international media. This chaos is made worse by the fact that people distrust news reported by sources other than their own.

In this new environment, the truth of what happened on 9/11, or whether Coalition Forces in Iraq killed terrorists or innocent civilians attending a wedding party, have come to be seen as debatable.

The result is that there is no "ground truth" as a point of departure to debate security policy: no common view of what is true or not true, what is real or not real, what is accurate and what is not, what is moral and what is immoral, what is known and what is not known, what constitutes a threat, what constitutes a proper solution, or what reflects the rule of law.

This fractured kaleidoscope of events, encouraged by the globalisation of information and the proliferation of the media in the 21st century, is interpreted by each individual according to his own personal tastes and ultimately divides public opinion, weakens solidarity within alliances, frustrates international organizations, and creates discord between peoples.

Questions for the Alliance

- What response mechanisms should be created to counter and react effectively to distortions and propaganda, or to legitimate but unexpected developments? Can prevention mechanisms be developed?
- To what extent—and how—can Alliance members prevent exploitation of their national media by extremists and ideologues? How can the Alliance become conscience of this phenomenon?
- How can the West exploit this environment to support its own purposes and values, and to defend its interests? What ethical principles should be respected in this regard? What mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration would be appropriate?
- What responses are necessary to counter Internet sites that further extremism? Are similar responses justified for other media sources of information?
- How do these changes influence information sharing in the Alliance? What is the distinction between information and intelligence?
- How can the Allies and their security partners reach consensus when there may be no ground truth concerning particular issues?
- How does the West influence a developing world that rejects its version of truth, its purported values?
- How will closed societies react to hearing their beliefs and values challenged by the international community? How will they react and what will be the impact

when members of their societies desire to exercise freedom of expression and freedom of conscience?

- Which existing disagreements within the Alliance will be affected and how? How can the Alliance promote an agreed transatlantic response? How can solidarity be preserved and enhanced?