Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare

						--Martin Van Creveld

						The Transformation of War

Of greater concern, however, was the fact that the US Navy had wargamed similar events in 1994 at the Naval War College. There, a resurgent Chinese military had badly bloodied US forces. The reasons were quite evident-the PRC had a 21st century military while the US had fielded an updated version of its Gulf War forces; and, of greater importance, the Chinese had understood early on that "zhan zheng xiang tai"-a change in the form of war-had taken place. They seized upon the concept of Information Based Warfare and melded it into their way of thinking and consequently set forth doctrine and strategy for "Bin Fa"-military tactics. (Note 1)

The 1993 publication of a book entitled, Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?, had not been taken seriously by US policy makers. Caught up in events in Bosnia, Central Africa and election year rhetoric, the thrust of the book-the invasion of Taiwan, the seizure of the Spratleys and the Paracel Islands, with the United States China's principal military adversary-had been lost in the presidential campaign.

As the date for the transfer of Hong Kong neared in July 1997, the world was focused upon the increasingly belligerent actions of the Beijing Government. Refugees had begun leaving he island colony, en masse, in early June. World-wide concern was heightened by a series of international financial crises as financiers attempted to compensate for the outflow of money as the shadow government in Bejiing-still crippled by the long-anticipated death of Deng Xiaoping-sought to shape policy with the result being a series of pronouncements and actions that left western analysts even more confused.

Already stretched thin by a sophomoric national security policy that optimistically called for the US military to concurrently cope with two major regional crisis (MRC), the US Pacific Fleet was ill-prepared for little more than a show of force along the Asian mainland. Still wary of PRC military exercises in December 1995 and the pre-election show of force in the Straits of Taiwan during March of 1996, the National Command Center was operating at a heightened state of readiness. But, as has been the case historically, operating in DEFCON II for an extended period of time left the national nerve center fatigued. What would have been recognizable to alert, rested analysts, was lost by those who had been working 12 hour shifts for almost 45 days.

On 18 July 1997, the President informed the American people that relations with the Peoples Republic of China were tenuous at best. This announcement was driven by SIGINT intercepts that revealed heightened military activities in the PRC. A US carrier battle group, steaming in the north Pacific reported that it was being shadowed by several PRC submarines. The US military attach‚ in New Delhi reported that PRC long range aircraft had overflown Indian airspace on three occasions. Reports coming out of one of the few news services remaining in Hong Kong noted that the 2nd Artillery-the PRC's nuclear rocket force-had begun to disperse firing battery's well south of Lop Nor, near the headwaters of the Mekong River in terrain that might preclude the travel of US cruise missiles through the rugged Himalayas.

Definition

Information-based warfare is an approach to armed conflict focusing on the management and use of information in all its forms and at elf fevers to achieve a decisive military advantage in especially in the joint and combined environment. Information based-warfare is both offensive and defensive in nature-ranging from measures that prohibit the enemy from exploring information to corresponding measures to assure the integrity, availability, and interoperability of friendly information assets.

While ultimately military in nature, IBW is also waged in political, economic, and social arenas and is applicable over the entire national security continuum from peace to war and from 'tooth to tail.' Finally, Information Based Warfare focuses on the command and control needs of the commander by employing state of the art information technology such as syntheticenvironments to dominate the battlefield.

			-Working definition recognized by the School of Information

			Warfare of the National Defense University as of 16 Nov 96.

The United States shares a similar legacy with early China. As the world superpower it must have information from around the world upon which to base its' policies and strategies-in effect no different than Chang Liang's search for the information that enabled him to establish power and consolidate the authority of the Han dynasty. (Note 4) Like ancient China, the United States today has not the resources to sally forth at the first sound of trouble. Like China, the US must develop a strategy by which information can be acquired, evaluated, and acted upon- using methods short of war as the weapons of first choice. The concept of Information Based

Warfare has become a necessity for the US as it attempts to define and protect its national security interests over a world that makes the Celestial Kingdom appear small by comparison.

Today, controversy rages in the US military establishment as to both definition and application of Information Warfare. The current Joint Staff definition of Information Warfare is: "Actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversary information and information systems while leveraging and protecting our information and information systems."

It is our belief that this definition highlights only the broadest character of IW and as such is far too abstract, depending on a narrow strategic environment which is inadequate when assessing the future conflicts that our national security strategy must address. This is not to assert, however, that little has been accomplished in attempting to better understand and appreciate the intricacies of IW. On the contrary, there exists a vast literature on the subject which spans from the civilian sector to the highest levels of the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense.

While the literature concerning IW is substantial, we believe that there still exist gaps in its overall conceptual and theoretical framework. For purposes of clarity we have chosen to use the more descriptive-and conceptually more correct and advanced concept-of Information Based Warfare as opposed to Information Warfare. We believe IBW more accurately represents the "zhan zheng xing tad"-change in the form of war-that is currently being addressed by those who wish to understand the reality of future conflict. (Note 6)

Not surprisingly, it is the ancestors of Sun-tzu, Sun Ping, Ssu-ma, and Wei Liso-tzu who appeared to have also seized upon the concept of Information Based Warfare and moved it beyond the present level of US debate. As a potential adversary, the United States must quickly step up to the next theoretical plateau. To that end, we propose to trace the evolution of Information Warfare-a concept that we believe is second order in scope-to the next logical plateau of Information Based Warfare.

The Evolution of Information Based Warfare

Therefore, at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the scientist's perception of his environment must be re-educated-in some familiar situations he must learn to see a new gestalt.

					-Thomas S. Kuhn 	

					The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

					-The Times (London), 1862

In the early 1980's the Soviets noted that "the emergence of advanced non-nuclear technologies was engendering a new revolution in military affairs. They were particularly interested in the "incorporation of information sciences into the military sphere" and in the idea of a "reconnaissance-strike complex. The events in the Gulf War convinced them of their hypothesis (comparative strategies). RMAs matter principally for two reasons. First, being second best may lead to catastrophic loss in future wars. Since the only objective benchmark for determining the relative effectiveness of forces (that is, success in combat) is unavailable in long periods of peace, there is great potential for asymmetries in combat effectiveness between militaries, observable only when the next war occurs. Secondly, as equipment life cycles, especially for platforms, steadily grow to encompass decades, many of the principal weapons systems of 2025 will likely be designed and built in the next few years. Since militaries are stuck with force structures they choose for long periods, it is more crucial than ever to think about them now, in peacetime, about the revolutionary changes in the nature of war and the about what will matter in winning wars in twenty or thirty years. Today with the United States arguably the only superpower for the foreseeable future, one might ask why this issue is especially pressing. Replicating the US force structure is clearly beyond the reach of all but a few other nations, even in the long term. This may not be relevant. Even small-to medium sized powers may be able to exploit specific technologies for significant military leverage in certain areas. The current rate of change suggests that state of the art in any technological context will be an extremely short-lived phenomenon, particularly with respect to the technologies that were key to the success of Desert Storm: space systems, telecommunication systems, computer architecture's, global information distribution networks, and navigation systems. Future revolutions will occur much more rapidly, offering far less time for adaptation to new methods of warfare. The growing imperative in the business world for rapid response to changing conditions in order to survive in an intensely competitive environment is surely instructive for military affairs. (Note 6)

The present RMA entails a fundamental change in who, how, and, perhaps even why wars are fought. It is driven not only by new technologies but by new operational concepts, new tactics, and new organizational structures. The impact of the current confluence of social, political, economic, and technological forces on American society and armed forces may equal-or exceed-what occurred during the 1960's and 1970's during the turmoil associated with the war in Vietnam. (Note 7)

The question that must be asked as we attempt to understand this RMA, is what were the results of change wrought by past Revolutions in Military Affairs? It has been suggested that accelerated interservice rivalries and over-reliance on management systems marked the last RMA, driven by the advent of atomic weapons at the end of WW II and the relatively stable and sparse defense budgets of the 1950's. (Note 8)

The current RMA is characterized by four types of changes:

Many analysts see a number of benefits from harnessing the current revolution in military affairs and using it to build 21st century US armed forces:

Steven Metz and James Kievit of the Strategic Studies Institute argue that a cost /benefit analysis of the present RMA needs to be pursued. One the one hand, they argue that a case can be made that costs and risks of vigorous pursuit of the current RMA outweigh the expected benefits. These include the risk that:

it should bring significant increase in combat effectiveness against some mid-level opponents; a force built around stand-off, precision weapons and disruptive information warfare capabilities would be more politically usable than a traditional force-projection military; the RMA could augment deterrence; and, the United States may need to pursue the current RMA to avoid stumbling into strategic inferiority. (Note 10)

Lastly, they posit-and we strongly agree-that if policymakers decide to pursue the present revolution in military affairs, strategy, rather than technological capability should guide force development. The key question is: What do we want the future US military to be able to do? (Note 11) [We would go one step further and suggest that the RMA must lead toward answers to the question that is really the essence of strategy: How do we win?]

Unfortunately one finds little discussion of the foregoing ideas in the DOD's recently completed "Bottom-Up" Review. Former Secretary of Defense Aspin initiated the review with the laudable goal of rethink the basis for US defense planning. It placed emphasis in many of the right areas: readiness, keeping forces for more than one regional war, acquisition reform. This review built a substantial consensus in the Pentagon behind the new force structure. Nonetheless, the review offers a classic example of military leaders planning to fight the last war. The report's proposed force for a single regional contingency-four to five Army divisions, four to five Marine brigades, 10 Air Force fighter wings, 100 heavy bombers, and four to five carriers-mirrors almost exactly the forces deployed in Operation Desert Storm. The review offers few thoughts on new technologies or techniques that might change the nature of war in coming decades. (Note 12)

Clearly, the challenge is to move beyond the last war-an undertaking that is fraught with peril and promise.

An Information Based Warfare Model

We are pilgrims, Master; we shall go

Always a little further...."

-Inscription on the Clock, Bradbury Lines, Hereford, Home of the Special Air Service Regiment

							J. F. Flecker

We believe that it is instructive to review the Program of Analysis for FY 1996 as set forth by the Directorate for Combat Support, National Military Intelligence Production Center, Defense Intelligence Agency. Entitled, Intelligence Support to Infrastructure Warfare, the thrust of this paper is directed toward a new paradigm that is centered on the principal of attacking an adversary's infrastructure to degrade or deny mobility, support to combatants and leadership. The paper sets forth valid arguments to support the thesis that to a large extent, recent advances in weapons and tactics were driven by the strategic objective of penetrating and rupturing the physical and psychological "centers of gravity" of the enemy warfighting capability. It is clear that new technologies have spurred an entire new generation of warfighting capabilities and, of equal importance, fundamentally altered the construct and performance of the modern nation-state. Discrete centers of gravity are giving way to diversification and interdependence in the modern nation-state. Information is the raw material that fuels productivity and power. Critical systemic nodes in the dynamic flow of commodities-consumables, services, and information-are at the same time increasingly obscure, strategically important, and tactically vulnerable. Fine grain analysis [read Intelligence writ in large script] and precision targeting fin both the conventional and non conventional sense] of these nodes and their synergistic dependencies is the centerpiece of Infrastructure Warfare. . (Note 13)

The primary elements of Infrastructure Warfare are:

First, the mix of forces facing each other has not been very different, regardless of the type of war being fought. Navies have been conspicuous by their absence or their modest role. Air forces have played a secondary role. Almost without exception, wars in the TW have been won or lost by ground troops.

Second, the type of war has not necessarily determined the tactics used; in fact, it has blurred the differences between them. Furthermore, as the frequent oscillations in tactics and strategy suggest, both irregular and regular armies in recent years have shared much in term of their ability to implement offensive doctrine. With the exceptions of campaigns involving an industrialized power, it seems that the defense has become the most effective form of warfare in the TW. With the exception of Israel and the war in Lebanon, none of the Third World combatants that have used an offensive doctrine has been able to effect a decisive breakthrough or cause the defenders to retire in disorder or retreat.

Third, the duration of recent wars have generally been protracted and have engaged large arrays of national and subnational forces. Most of the wars fought between regular lesser developed country army's have not been shorter.

Fourth, the involvement of external nation forces has been large. Of the wars fought between 1945 and 1976, 38 percent were fought with foreign participation.

Lastly, because guerrilla wars pose particularly difficult challenges for governments, they represent a new and difficult form of conflict. (Note 14)

If the foregoing is correct, then we believe that the Infrastructure paradigm must address the Gray Area Phenomena (GAP). GAP is defined as threats to nation-states by non-states actors and non-governmental processes and organizations. The Gray Areas at once appear to be strikingly new and uncomfortably old. Simply put, they are the most critical issues confronting the world community as we enter into the Century. Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible futures-both of which look bleak. The first is the retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a Lebanonization of national states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe-a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of globalization and interdependence.

The second is being borne by the onrush of technical, economic, and ecological forces that demand increased integration and uniformity. The planet, it appears, is both falling apart and coming reluctantly together at the very same time. (Note 15)

The GAP consists of the following "arena's of conflict":

Tomorrow

We should be seeking tentative answers to fundamental questions, rather than definitive answers to trivial ones.

								-James Billington

in a military sense alone, information warfare refers to both sides' attempt to gain the initiative of the battle through their control over information and flow of intelligence. With the support of information, both sides intend to comprehensively apply military deception, operational secrets, psychological warfare, and electronic warfare to destroy the enemy's information systems, block the flow of the enemy's information, and create false information to affect and weaken the enemies command and control capability. At the same time, they must ensure that their command and control system is not damaged in the same way by the opponent. (Note 16)

Further addressing the issues, Shen Weiguang illuminates a number of thoughts that cut to the heart of the concept of Information Based Warfare. He correctly argues that IBW in one sense is the "quiet battlefield," something we attempted to portray in our opening scenario. Turning toward the concept of "centers of gravity" we feel that his descriptions of "attacks on the enemies cognitive and trust systems" perhaps better portrays the idea of attacking C2 and C4I nodes. This, he argues, is the main target of information warfare. The concepts of "hard attack" and "soft attack" with "soft damage" are noted as the two end-product manifestations of IBW; and, the concept of "war of structural damage" [read Infrastructure War] is thought to come into full play only when "it has absorbed the essence of information warfare."

Technology, he argues, does not determine superiority. It is determined by new tactics [in part this could be naval guerrilla warfare-PRC style] and "independent creations of commanders in the field. Information based warfare enables one to break with "traditional stylized engagement, " something we feel will give new impetus to the military arts.

Like a number of perceptive US thinkers, Shen Weiguang, has seized upon the Toffler' work to understand and further flesh-out the idea of "niche-warfare." And, he appears to understand that IBW will spawn special operating forces [differentiated from special forces] in the IBW setting.

His comments about command and control are perceptive:

The operational target of information warfare lies in control rather than bloodshed;

The key to victory lies in human policy decisions rather than technology [hopefully a lesson learned and re-learned in the Naval War College games]; genuine advantage does not necessary lie in the leading technology but the leading ideas. History has given evidence to the fact when some new technology brings mankind brightness, a shadow is cast simultaneously. Advanced electronic computers and information technology link society and the army to an integrated network; the result is very high efficiency and great fragility;

The input in grasping knowledge, costs far less than directly purchasing advanced weaponry [a Sun-tzuian slip, particularly in light of the fact that the PRC has taken this approach for years as it has covertly acquired primarily mid-level technology from the West, enabling them to jump the learning curve]. (Note 17)

A Tentative Idea

Returning again to the working definition of Information Based Warfare we suggest the following changes as noted in italics:

Information-based warfare is an approach to [quiet war and ] armed conflict focusing on the management and use of information in all its forms and at all levels to achieve a decisive military advantage especially in joint and combined environments [through the use of special operating forces that are an integral part of the overall force structure. capable of traditional force on force war and the execution of "quiet-war] Information based-warfare is both offensive and defensive in nature-ranging from measures that prohibit the enemy from exploiting information to corresponding measures to assure the integrity, availability, and interoperability elate of friendly information assets.

While ultimately military in nature IBW is also waged in political, economic. and social arenas and is applicable over the entire national security continuum from peace to war and from 'tooth to tail.' Finally. Information Based Warfare focuses on the command and control needs of the commander by employing state of the art information technology such as synthetic environments to dominate the battlefield.

We have added the concept of "quiet-war" because we believe that the information/communications tools that technology brings to the IBW table offers theoreticians strategists and tacticians the opportunity to plan and implement courses of action as exemplified by the opening scenario in this paper. We believe that it is this element- unattributable strikes which by their very nature preclude moving further up the conflict spectrum-is the concept that holds the most promise in the execution of Information Based Warfare.

A tentative Model

General Capabilities 				  	Weapons Systems

	

Strategic Agility 					Long-range, stand-off, precision strike 

Precision Intelligence					weapons[lethal and electronic]

Mission driven joint forces 

Information dominance systems 				Stealthy ships and planes

[deception, denial, sensors, virtual quiet-war reality capable]



Defense against chemical and 				Force Structures

biological attack					Special operating forces w/in overall force structure



							Light mechanized ground forces

							Brigade sized task forces  (Note 18)

We argue that the very soul of strategic thinking is the search for the answer to the question: How do we win? That answer is to be found in the strategic principals:

First, consider strategy as a mosaic, each of the pieces of which must be understood in terms of what the sum total means.

Second, geography is the most fundamental of the factors which condition national outlooks on security problems and solutions. Geography, treated properly in political and strategic analysis is not a rigidly determining factor. The influence of geography is truly pervasive, notwithstanding the fact that influence must vary in detail as technology changes.

Third, is the use, abuse and often simply nonuse of historical experience in strategic theorizing and strategic planning. The United States in the closing years of the twentieth century is a political culture characterized by a short attention span for difficult issues of international security; by a proclivity to seek pragmatic solutions to problems which may be conditions to be accommodated rather than puzzles to be solved; and by a very noticeable historical ignorance and general disinterest.

Fourth, American strategists must begin to be aware of the influence of different national cultures upon choices for, and performance in, statecraft and strategy.

Fifth, strategists must beware of the sin of technicism-the proclivity of a materialist school of thinking about defense questions to reduce issues of means and ends to the promise in particular new military machines. Technicism shows itself in an unbalanced interest in the machine in a man-machine system (i.e., in the crossbow as contrasted with the crossbowman). But technicism refers to the disorder when that which is only technical displaces, and effectively substitutes for, that which has to be considered tactically, operationally, and strategically in far more inclusive analysis. (Note 20)

Intelligence

Intelligence-in essence, evaluated information-is the lifeblood that courses through the strategic soul. While we could wax eloquent and long on the virtues of intelligence, it is our sense that the evaluated information that is the grist for Information Based Warfare is be found in what Sherman Kent called the "Substantive Content of Strategic Intelligence-The Speculative-Evaluative Element." This information is what the United States must know in order to be foresighted-what it must know about the future stature of other separate sovereign states [and non-state actors], the courses of action they are likely to initiate themselves [read applied alternative futures methodology], and the courses of action they are likely to take up in response to some outside stimulus. (Note 21)

Technological tools driven by a "Merkava" frame of mind

"Merkava"(chariot of fire) was the name given to an Israeli designed, fast prototype, tank. The essence of this type of technology is that it is driven by the state of mind that recognizes dramatic, fast-moving change, and attempts to support strategy by being capable of thoughtful design and rapid fielding. In US terms, it is the stuff of the "Skunkworks"-a similar belief that things can be accomplished quickly and made to work-on the battlefield.

Information Based Warfare -The New Battlefields

Exiled to France, the Ayatollah Khomeni sought to maintain contact with the faithful. A cleric who espoused the return of his country to an Islamic theocracy-something: that many argued would move Iran back into the 16th century-the Ayatollah turned to 20th century tools to begin his crusade. Through the medium of cassettes, he began to record his message. After being mass-produced m 20th century studios, his 16th century message was smuggled back to Iran. Those tapes both planted the seed and inspired the flowering of a movement that brought Khomeni back to power m 1979.

								-anonymous

				--Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War

				Rick Atkinson

The evolution and ultimate "blurring" of military and civilian sectors came about in large part because of the growth in hardware and software. It was not so long ago, in the early 1960's, that the Pentagon provided the market for sophisticated electronics. Today, it makes up less than 1% of that market. In many ways, the military is following the revolution, not leading it. In 1962 Paul Baran of RAND developed a concept that permitted the linking of computers from distant locations. It was designed to preserve the integrity of the military command and control network in case of a nuclear attack. In 1969, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded the first test of the concept, and the first node was installed at RAND. The test consisted of scientists from remote locations passing findings and research notes back and forth. However, a year later it was being used like a mail box for the users and it proceeded to grow rapidly in use. In 1983, the military part and the nonmilitary part grew apart and finally split, the nonmilitary section grew up into what is now called the Internet.

For the first time in our nation's history, technology is no longer the sole domain of the military. The speed of the growth and application of technology is clearly a concern for defense planners. While the US used some of the world's most advanced weaponry and technology in the Gulf War (much of which proved inaccurate) it also used a great deal of older technology, some of which dated back to the 1960's. As B.R. Inman and Daniel F. Burton Jr. note in their article "Technology and US. National Security, "the 8088 microprocessor used in the Patriot missile was developed by the Intel Corporation fifteen years ago." (Note 23) This technology is not competitive today.

Opening and Closing Pandora's Box

In the center of Strike the battleship's commander, Captain David S. Bill, Ferched in his high backed padded chair. Although he occasionally glanced at the screens above, the captain s attention was largely fixed on the men clustered around four computers lining the far bulkhead. Something had gone awry with the ship's Tomahawk missile system. . For reasons no one could fathom, the Tomahawk computers seemed confused, refusing to transfer the necessary commands from the engagement-planning console to the launch console. The resulting impasse_"casualty" in Navy jargon_meant the missiles could not be fired. ..On Wisconsin, where the scheduled launch was now just moments away, the men in Strike were running out of solutions. ..As the request for additional time flashed up the chain of command, an excited voice from one of the nearby ships crackled through Strike: "Alpha, alpha.'' This is the Paul F Foster. Happy trails.'' Happy trails: the code phrase for missiles away. Operation Desert Storm had begun without Wisconsin.

			--Crusade- the untold story of  the Persian Gulf


			   Rick Atkinson

It must be assumed that everyone has access to technology, therefore the US is the most vulnerable to attack;

As the US's ability to wage IBW increases, so to do the IBW capabilities, and response capabilities, of other nation-states and non-state actors;

While at first glance it would appear that IBW is most effective against adversaries with like technological capabilities and infrastructure-the top end of the IBW target spectrum-it must be remembered that technology comes in two forms-high and appropriate-and it is the latter that will always defeat the former. Thus, the benefits of IBW in arena's of conflict as found in the Gray Areas are a target rich environment must be pursued alongside the force on force approach.

The technical realm of information based warfare can be split into two major areas: Netwar and Cyberwar. Netwar is the information related conflict between nations, societies, governments, or non-state actors with the targets being information systems and communications, and it consists of destruction of communications, acquisition of information, release of misinformation, and destruction or deletion of data. Cyberwar consists of militaries conducting their operations according to information based theories and principles. These terms can be broken down even further. Netwar can be broken into three main categories: Personal, Corporate, and Global. We are constantly warned about the personal level of Netwar, we have passwords to computer accounts, never give our social security number over the telephone, and generally try to be careful about our own information. But protecting yourself from someone who genuinely wants to conduct information war against you is nearly impossible. Corporations are subject to a barrage of information security problems to an even greater extent. The stealing of company secrets is a new form of economic war that is plaguing many companies. It is also possible for one company to release false findings that indicate that a competitor has a poor or dangerous product. IBW spawned misinformation-a fertile area for denial and deception techniques-are very difficult to combat and correct. Finally, on the global level, Netwar can be waged against industries, economies, nations, or non-state groups. It ranges from intelligence and information leads, to the terrifying possibilities of terrorist groups breaking into such communications as an air traffic control system at a major US airport. The impact at the global level can be much more wide spread and all threatening than that of the personal or corporate levels of netwar.

On both sides of the war, Netwar and Cyberwar, the key to good protection and offense is good software to run the systems, encode the data, and peck holes in other's data. The vital link for the information and the technology is software, which relies heavily upon implanted logic. The newest and brightest theories and concepts of logic center around what is called 'fuzzy logic'. The name fuzzy logic makes one think of a system that is inexact, but that is not the case, instead it has an infinite exactness. Fuzzy logic expands our normal computer principle of 0 or 1, true or false, and in the place of this is infinite degrees between 0 and 1. Fuzzy logic is used every day in the development of everything from smart washers to train systems in Japan. With a smart washer, you merely press a start button and the machine figures the cycle, how much detergent, and the water use; the logic train systems are smooth as silk, quick, and always on time. The theory started with a few paradoxes one of which is The Paradox of Theseus' ship:

When Theseus returned from slaying the Minotaur, says Plutarch, the Athenians preserved his ship, and as planks rotted, replaced them with new ones. When the first plank was replaced, everyone agreed it was still the same ship. Adding a second plank made no difference either. At some point, the Athenians may have replaced every plank in the ship. Was it a different ship? At what point did it become one?

At different points in time the ship was certain degrees the original ship, for instance when half the planks were replaced, it was .5 the original ship. This same principle of degrees can be applied to many concepts around us, and what you end up with is a very exact and reliable process for computers. When you tie this concept into ideas such as artificial intelligence, you may obtain a computer that has the capacity to learn because it can start to work with more than 0 and 1.

Because of the importance of the technical tools of IBW-and their fragility-we list below the possible contents of an IBW techno "kit-bag":

Computer Viruses - A piece of code, or code fragment, designed to begin replicating itself when a host program begins to run. It's objective is to erase data, software programs, or memory in order to interrupt the action of the computer it infests. These can be loaded unwittingly by a user off the Internet or some other disk.

Worms - Instead of being just a code fragment, a worm is an entire program in and of itself. The code begins to replicate as soon as it touches a computer system, not dependent on the start of execution of any other program. Its aim is to eat up computer resources and/or delete data to result in a crippling effect on the host computer.[We argue that it is such worms could cause the damage we allude to in the opening scenario.]

Trojan Horses - As the name would suggest, a Trojan horse is a program, or code fragment inside a program, that performs a function unbeknownst to the user. It usually performs a simple task on the outside, while unleashing a virus or a worm on the inside. It can also perform information retrieval while performing a task, leaving no trace.

Logic Bombs - Similar to a Trojan horse, a logic bomb is used to release a virus, worm, or complete some other secret task. These are usually planted by a programmer or system developer. This could be useful in US military strategy, instead of open bombs, the US could plant logic bombs to retrieve specific data from foreign users. This is plausible because many of the main software development in the world occurs in the US.

Trap Doors - The use of this is similar to a logic bomb. It is a secret way back into a system left by a programmer or designer. Unlike a logic bomb that executes, a trap door is merely an unknown security flaw. Chipping - This is the term for doing any of the above to the hardware of a system instead of to the software. One can build in circuitry to a chip that performs specific functions.

Machines and Microbes - Although one thinks of Star Trek and other science fiction when the subject of nanny machines comes up, it is actually a feasible plan. machines and microbes are tiny machines, like a small insect, that "eat" electronic circuits, oil, plastics, etc. If unleashed on a computer center, the result would be total shut down.

Electronic Jamming, HERF guns, and EM bombs- These are all forms of electronic signal jamming. One can jam communications, stopping computer information flow; shoot radio signals at an electronic target to shut it down with a High Energy Radio Frequency (HERF) gun; or send out a high powered electromagnetic pulse, an EMP bomb. [In the Gulf War, the allies used 35,000 different radio bands.]

Hitch-hiking- This is a group of people, a subsection of hackers, that merely sit on the net and wait. They wait for any information and interesting code to go by and then hitch a ride with it, they follow and delete it, or they simply copy and steal it.

Thinking in terms of closing Pandora's Box, the following techniques will have to be considered as an IBW operational security plan is built:

Firewalls - A limited gateway to the Interment from a company or group. Only passwords and certain configurations can get in, and everything is checked for viruses, etc. Only privileged personnel, or personnel with certain system configurations can get out. If implemented correctly they can be useful.

Encryption - This growing area of interest consists on coding data so that others can not place bombs in or around it or read the data. This is growing more difficult as hackers and other groups become more efficient at breaking the codes. This is one of the areas that fuzzy logic could come into serious play. (Note 24) If, at first glance, the foregoing appears to be merely a "laundry list," a reading of the following paragraph will surely prove sobering to the IBW planner:

The Defense Information Security Agency (DISA) conducts vulnerability studies of military and government computer systems. Their figures are truly alarming: 88% of defense computer systems are easily penetrated. Of the successful penetrations, 96% are not detected. Even worse, 95% of the detected penetrations are not reported or responded to. Even when an intrusion is detected, it is usually impossible to determine who did it. DISA studies indicate that there were possibly 300,000 intrusions into government computer systems in 1994 alone. (Note 25)

A distant bugle

Despite incessant barbarian incursions and major military threats throughout its history, Imperial China was little inclined to pursue military solution to aggression-except during the ill-fated expanionistic policies of the Former Han dynasty, or under dynamic young rulers, such as T'ang Tai-tsung, during the founding years of a dynasty. Rulers and ministers preferred to believe in the myth of cultural attraction whereby their vastly superior Chinese civilization, founded upon Virtue and reinforced by opulent material achievements, would simply overwhelm the hostile tendencies of the uncultured. (Note 26)

Today, there appears to be a striking similarity between a number of western nation-states and ancient China. This likeness is a reflection of a malady that continues to run its course through history as kingdoms, empires, and nation-states have lost sight of the fact that survival is always won-and maintained-at the point of the sword.

Modern states, especially those who have triumphed in the Cold War and have the greatest interest in preserving peace, and most particularly the United States, on whom the burden of keeping the peace must fall, now, and in the foreseeable future, are quite different. The martial values and the respect for power have not entirely disappeared, but they have been overlaid by other ideas and values, some of them unknown to the classical republics. The most important of these is the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and especially the pacifist strain of Christianity that emphasizes the sermon on the mount rather than the more militant strain that played so large a role over the centuries. Even as the power and influence of formal organized religion have waned in the last century, the influence among important segments of the population of the rejection of power, the evil of pursuing self-interest, the wickedness of war, whatever its cause or goal, have grown. There are now barriers of conscience in the way of acquiring and maintaining power that would have been incomprehensible to the Greeks and Romans... In spite of their victories in the Cold War and, more recently, in the Gulf War, the United States and its allies, the states with greatest interest in peace and the greatest power to preserve it, appear to be faltering in their willingness to pay the price in money and the risk of lives. (Note 27)

What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose. They must understand that no international situation is permanent, that part of their responsibility is to accept and sometimes even assist changes, some of which they will not like, guiding their achievement through peaceful channels, but always prepared to resist, with force if necessary, changes made by threats or violence that threaten the general peace. (Note 28)

Information Based Warfare gives the sword another edge.

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Last Update:  October 1, 2002