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The U.S. Government is currently
inadequately organized to deal with the challenges of the global era. The
challenges noted above call for revamping the policy process and better
integrating the military and nonmilitary components of national power. The
following general steps are among those that can be considered by the Bush
administration:
- Successful strategies and policies in the global era require much
closer coordination among the economic, security, law enforcement, environmental,
and science and technology policymaking communities in Washington.
- There should be far more
dialogue and structured interactions among the various elements of government
than there are now, along with more coherent, high-level guidance and
coordination. Because such a bureaucratic transformation would have to begin at
the top, the President must set the tone. Such steps will likely require specific
changes in each agency's personnel system in order to become institutionalized.
These personnel systems should encourage rotational assignments and reward
individuals who break down agency barriers, rather than those who protect
them.

Sunset near mosque in Burnei, oil-rich nation of Southeast Asia. AP Wide World Photos (David Longstreath)
The Bush administration should undertake a comprehensive review of
all interagency working groups in relevant policy fields to assess areas of
overlap and potential areas for better policy fusion. It might also consider
combining the National Security Council and the National Economic Council to
ensure better integration of these policy streams. Another option that merits
careful review would be to unify several major elements of the Executive Office
of the President--the National Security Council, the National Economic Council,
and parts of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other White House
offices involved with the effects of globalization. Such a body could ensure more
effective interagency coordination of policies critical to coping with the
challenges presented by globalization.5
The need for greater interagency
coordination applies not only in Washington, but also to U.S. operations overseas
in virtually all regions. Today, DOD is best organized to carry out coordinated
regional policies. Indeed, key regional CINCs have broad areas of responsibility
and are often charged not only with operating U.S. forces but also with trying to
coordinate a wide range of other governmental activities. Steps to strengthen
interagency regional teams in the field could enhance the ability of foreign
policy to blend disparate military and nonmilitary activities into a coherent
strategic program, one that does the best job of pursuing its goals with the
means at its disposal.
- DOD should take steps to ensure effective coordination of policy
analysis and appropriate force planning by its elements with global and various
regional responsibilities, including the major regional CINCs. The Pentagon also
needs to find a workable bureaucratic mechanism to integrate economic,
environmental, and cultural factors into its policy planning. These two functions
might be performed by a small group of senior planners with a mandate to provide
direct, cross-cutting support on global security affairs to the Under Secretary
for Policy. The Service secretaries might consider developing a similar group of
advisors.
- The
ability to shape globalization rather than just react to it requires adequate
resources and a better balance between hard and soft security. The Armed Forces
will still need robust funding to remain prepared to fight wars and conduct the
demanding range of global era military operations. But this military strength
needs to be supplemented by enhanced capabilities in other areas of statecraft.
Nonmilitary instruments of foreign policy, such as foreign aid, educational
exchanges and scholarships, visitor programs, public diplomacy, and contributions
to humanitarian programs and multilateral organizations, are pitifully small in
comparison with U.S. military power and global reach. Spending on these
nonmilitary instruments has shrunk steadily over the last 20 years, from 4
percent of the Federal budget in the 1960s to 1 percent today. Inexpensive
programs to promote democracy, civil society, the rule of law, and certain
economic reforms in some of the key countries buffeted by globalization, such as
Russia and the new states of Eurasia, could yield enormous dividends and prevent
future crises. These soft power activities can have great effect over time, and
they are more important than ever because even overwhelming military power is
often of limited use in dealing with the social turmoil and other consequences of
globalization.
More effective use of these nonmilitary shaping and
crisis prevention instruments could reduce demands on U.S. and allied armed
forces for peace operations. This would have a salutary effect on military
readiness and preparations for major combat operations. Without a well-stocked
and more diversified diplomatic and foreign assistance toolbox, U.S. military
forces will be under mounting pressure to solve problems for which military power
is not well suited.
- The global era requires a streamlined, flexible, and integrated U.S.
Government decisionmaking process adapted to the Information Age and capable of
responding quickly to fast-moving foreign crises. Decisionmaking and military
operations will have to become speedier, communications more direct, and
organizations flatter and more streamlined. This change will be difficult because
of the wide variety of perspectives that need to be built into an effective
strategy. But compartmentalized activities will become riskier. This is true not
only in the Armed Forces but in the rest of the foreign policy community as well.
- Policymakers and
military planners need to be more aware of historical, technological, cultural,
religious, environmental, and other aspects of world affairs than they have been
to date. More people with expertise in nonmainstream fields should be hired and
utilized in mainstream positions. Nongovernmental actors of all backgrounds
should be consulted routinely by both diplomatic and military planners.
- Building and maintaining
coalitions with friends and allies to channel globalization in constructive
directions and mitigate its harshest aspects should receive high priority.
Enlisting effective support from friends and allies warrants enhanced regional
engagement activities by each of the services, including the Coast Guard.
Developing and sustaining such efforts may sometimes require political or
military operational compromises, but the dividends are worth the risks.
Complex contingency operations conducted abroad and at home have continued to
grow. They demand more effective interagency and international civil-military
coordination. Crisis and conflict management will require better integration of
all the tools of the U.S. Government, as well as leveraging of the capabilities
of allies, partners, and NGOs, across a range of activities, including
humanitarian, economic development, law enforcement, and external security
concerns.
Globalization holds great promise in ways that are
broadly consistent with U.S. strategic interests and with the long-term needs of
most people. Over time, globalization promotes openness, encourages political and
economic reforms, strengthens the demand for the rule of law, fosters
integration, and reduces the likelihood of conflict and resort to force. From a
security perspective, the worrisome term is over time.
To remain
highly effective, the Armed Forces must meet two different requirements: staying
prepared for major combat missions, while performing such global era operations
as presence, engagement, strategic shaping, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief,
and crisis intervention. The future will present many challenges for the entire
defense establishment, including the Navy. Their ability to face this future will
play a major role in determining whether the United States copes effectively with
the new promises and stressful dangers of the globalizing world.
Notes
5James B. Steinberg in an address delivered
at the National Defense University on October 18, 2000. [BACK]
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