MATRIX 1. NBC AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION—ACTORS AND GOALS

	ALLIES	NEUTRALS (E.G., INDIA, PAKISTAN)	ROGUES (E.G., IRAQ, IRAN, N. KOREA)	NONSTATE ACTORS
DETERRING ACQUISITION				
DERERRING USE (GENERIC)				
DETERRING USE AGAINST U.S. FORCES/ALLY				
DETERRING USE AGAINST U.S. TERRITORY				
DEFENSE/DAMAGE LIMITATION AGAINST UNITED STATES				

MATRIX 2. NBC AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION—RESPONSE TOOLS

	ALLIES	NEUTRALS	ROGUES	NONSTATE ACTORS
DETERRING ACQUISITION	• MAINTAIN ALLIANCES • U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES & COMMITMENTS • TMD/GPS	• DISSUASION • DENIAL • ARMS CONTROL • GPS	• ALL OF LEFT CELL + • SANCTIONS/ ISOLATION • PREEMPTION	• COOPERATIVE DISMANTLEMENT SAFETY/SECURITY • ACTIVE INTELLIGENCE SHARE • INTERDICTION
DETERRING USE (GENERIC)	• ESSENTIALLY SAME AS ABOVE	• STABILIZING MEASURE • SAFETY/SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS • CSBMS • GPS • 'ROLLING BACK'	• GPS • PUNISHMENT —MILITARY —ECONOMIC/POLITICAL	• IMPROVED DETECTION & INTERDICTION • IMPROVED INTERNA-TIONAL COOPERATION
DETERRING USE AGAINST U.S. FORCES/ALLY	NOT MEANINGFUL	• DETERRENCE • DECLARATORY POLICY • THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE • GPS	• PREEMPTION • DENY MILITARY UTILITY VIA DEFENSES —ACTIVE/PASSIVE • DECLARATORY POLICY • DETERRENCE • GPS	• PREEMPTION • COUNTERTERRORISM
DETERRING USE AGAINST U.S. TERRITORY	NOT MEANINGFUL	• PUNISHMENT • NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE	• PUNISHMENT • NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE	• COUNTERTERRORISM
DEFENSE/ DAMAGE LIMITATION AGAINST UNITED STATES	NOT MEANINGFUL	• THEATER DEFENSES • NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE • OFFENSIVE COUNTER-FORCE	• OFFENSIVE COUNTER-FORCE • THEATER AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE • PREEMPTION	• CIVIL DEFENSE MEDICAL PREPARATION • PUBLIC AWARENESS • LINKING FEDERAL & LOCAL AGENCIES

TMD: Theater Missile Defense
CSBM: Confidence and Security Building Measures
GPS: Global Protection System

MATRIX 3. NBC AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION—KEY QUESTIONS

	ALLIES	NEUTRALS	ROGUES	NONSTATE ACTORS
DETERRING ACQUISITION	• UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS MIGHT A US GUARANTEE BECOME NONCREDIBLE? • WHAT IS MEANING OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN PROLIFERATED WORLD?	• SHOULD THE UNITED STATES TRY TO EXTEND GUARANTEES? • CAN THESE BY CREDIBLE? • CAN GLOBAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS REDUCE VULNERABILITY?	• ARE "CARROTS" USEFUL OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE? • ARE THERE USEFUL REGIONAL DISTINCTIONS? • WHY DO STATES ACQUIRE NBC?	• HOW/WHY DO NONSTATE ACTORS ACQUIRE NBC WEAPONS?
DETERRING USE (GENERIC)	• HOW TO PRECLUDE USE BY ALLY IF CONTARY TO US INTERESTS?	• HOW IMPORTANT IS THIS TO UNITED STATES? IS A NUCLEAR PEACE INDIVISIBLE? IF USE OCCURS, IS PUNISHMENT AN OPTION?	• DOES POSSESSION IMPLY INTENT TO USE? • WHAT DIFFENCE DOES THE REGIONAL CONTEXT MAKE?	• DOES DETERRENCE HAVE MEANING HERE?
DETERRING USE AGAINST U.S. FORCES/ALLY	NOT MEANINGFUL `	• WHAT IS THE ROLE OF DECLARATORY POLICY? • WHAT IS ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DETERRENCE?	• DO U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETER USE OF CHEM/BIO? • HAVE U.S. DOCTRINE + OPERATING PRINCIPLES CHANGED ENOUGH?	• DOES STATE-SPONSORED AGAINST NONSTATE-SPONSORED MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
DETERRING USE AGAINST U.S. TERRITORY	NOT MEANINGFUL	NOT LIKELY	• WHAT LEVEL OF NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE? HOW SOON? HOW MUCH? WHAT ABOUT ABM? • CAN ONE MAKE PUNISHMENT EFFECTIVE?	• HOW CAN THE U.S. DETER NONSTATE ACTORS?
DEFENSE/ DAMAGE LIMITATION AGAINST UNITED STATES	NOT MEANINGFUL	NOT LIKELY	• HOW CAN ONE PREVENT/LIMIT DAMAGE RE REVENGE OR RETRIBUTION VIA UNCONVENTIONAL DELIVERY MEANS?	• ROLE FOR ACTIVE DEFENSES? • WHAT IF ANY ROLE DOES CIVIL DEFENSE HAVE IN THE UNITED STATES?

MATRIX 4. REGIONAL DETERRENCE OBJECTIVES

	PRE-WAR	WAR	POSTWAR
DETERRING USE AGAINST U.S. FORCES			
LIMITING DAMAGE IF USE OCCURS			
PREVENTING FURTHER USE			

MATRIX 5. DETERRENCE AND OPERATIONS—A FIRST CUT

	PRE-WAR	WAR	POSTWAR
DETERRING USE AGAINST U.S. FORCES	• DECLARATORY POLICY —AMBIGUITY VS. CLARITY —ROLE IN U.S. MILITARY PLANNING • COMMUNICATING INTENT • MAKING CAPABILITIES VISIBLE • DIMINISHING ADVERSARY'S ABILITY TO DETER UNITED STATES —ACTIVE MEASURES —PASSIVE MEASURES —TRAINING IN NBC • COALITION BUILDING	• DETERRENCE BY DENIAL —ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENSES —OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS • DECLARATORY POLICY AND COMMUNICATING INTENTIONS • MINIMIZING TARGETS SUITABLE FOR NBC USE • PREEMPTION —COUNTERFORCE —SPECIAL OPERATIONS	• RE-ESTABLISHING NBC TABOO • PUNISHMENT • WAR CRIMES • DESTRUCTION OF NBC INFRASTRUCTURE
LIMITING DAMAGE IF USE OCCURS	• ACQUIRE NEEDED CAPABILITIES —DETECTION —DEFENSES, ACTIVE AND PASSIVE —COUNTERFORCE	• DAMAGE LIMITING OPERATIONS STRATEGIES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENSES: NBC TRAINED FORCES; DISPERSAL • PORT AND AIRFIELD PROTECTION AND DECONTAMINATION • CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS • DETECTION	MEANINGFUL?
PREVENTING FURTHER USE	NOT MEANINGFUL	• COUNTERFORCE • DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT	• IAEA-LIKE INSPECTION, DESTRUCTION

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