

TESTIMONY OF
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Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is an honor for me to have been invited to appear again before this Committee. The views I will express are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or any agency of the Government.

I have been asked to address the question of how to design a sound non-proliferation policy as part of our national security strategy. I believe this to be one of the most important challenges that we face as a nation and am encouraged that this Committee has taken up this critical task. More so than at any time in the past, the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical and biological -- represents a profound and urgent threat at home and abroad. At least until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, we treated proliferation more as a political problem than as a security threat. This was true for countries of concern in South America, South Asia and in Africa. Although this may not have been the best foundation for policy, it was understandable.

The clear, urgent and overwhelming threat was the Soviet Union. It was against this threat that we concentrated our resources, structured our forces and designed our deterrent strategy. We knew the Soviet threat was real and we were determined in fashioning and implementing sound diplomatic and defense policies and programs in response. In contrast, while the United States certainly did care about and actively sought to dissuade potential proliferators from acquiring nuclear weapons, the security implications of proliferation were generally more removed and abstract. For example, the regional rivalries that once encouraged the nuclear weapons aspirations of Argentina and Brazil -- and that still drive those of India and Pakistan -- were not central to our security calculations. Perhaps as a consequence, our non-proliferation policy throughout this period took a different course. Although various tools such as forceful diplomacy and arms exports were used in specific cases, our policy was based primarily on multilateralism and the building of international norms.

Today we no longer have the luxury of approaching proliferation as a political problem. We are confronted with a wide range of threats that include both states and terrorist groups that view the United States as the enemy. They tell us this. We also know from what they are saying and doing that a number of these states and groups are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), either to deter us from intervening into their regions, or to employ against our forces or those of our friends and allies, or simply to threaten or kill our people. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons -- as well as increasingly longer-range missiles as a means of delivery -- are seen by our most likely

adversaries as possessing substantial utility either for use against neighbors or as instruments of asymmetric warfare to overcome the conventional superiority of the United States. No longer confined to being weapons of last resort, these weapons -- and particularly chemical and biological weapons -- may well become the weapons of choice. As a result, the contemporary security environment is very different from that of the Cold War. It is more complex and, I would argue, more dangerous. It requires us to think differently about the motives and implications of proliferation and about the tools to counter it. These include diplomacy and arms control, export controls and sanctions, interdiction and, if prevention fails, deterrence and defense. None of these tools is a silver bullet. All must be brought together into a coherent national strategy.

To design an effective non-proliferation policy in this new security setting, it is useful to start with the fundamentals that can help to define sound policy. Three principles stand out as guides. The first is to establish realistic goals that can contribute, individually and collectively, to our national security. We must set our objectives high and work toward the outcome we would like to achieve -- but we must understand that our ability to affect the outcome we desire will be limited. This is not a call to abandon the goal of stopping, and even reversing, proliferation. In fact, I believe we must re-double our efforts in this regard, especially in those critical areas where we can have the greatest impact in denying access to sensitive technologies, materials and expertise. These include national and international export controls and cooperative threat reduction programs such as with Russia and other former Soviet states. On this point, Mr. Chairman, I agree with your stated position that the first line of defense is preventing proliferation at its source. If we do so with discipline and accountability, we can make a real contribution to our security. I am much more cautious about the role of arms control in non-proliferation. I believe that arms control can be an important tool of U.S. security policy.

Treaties like INF and START have enhanced our security. If it were to be ratified and implemented without changes to its basic provisions, and specifically the ban on land-based MIRVed missiles, START II would also make a substantial contribution. All of these treaties were carefully negotiated with great attention to the implications of their provisions for the defense and deterrent postures of the parties, and, of course, all established detailed measures for monitoring and verifying compliance. By contrast, early non-proliferation arms control treaties were comprised of at least three parts idealism for every part realism. They sought to establish international norms against the possession and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - without effective verification or enforcement provisions. This was clearly the case for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The norms identified in both the NPT and BWC, and later in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), have and continue to make an important contribution to the goals of non-proliferation. For most states, membership in these treaty regimes makes proliferation an unacceptable choice. For others, including several that at one time pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons but later abandoned this pursuit due to changes in their own security calculations, these treaties added a further incentive to change course. In sum, these

norms should be maintained and strengthened. However, these treaties have little impact on those states that do not respect international norms.

In fact, for such states, these treaties are viewed in the most cynical way: as an opportunity to further their weapons programs. This was the case for the Soviet Union when it used the BWC as a cover for an expanded offensive biological weapons program. Today, for those countries of greatest concern to us from a security perspective -- those that our State Department has branded as rogues -- this is also clearly the case. States like North Korea and Iraq have a demonstrated record of flaunting norms and manipulating verification measures, such as IAEA safeguards. And there is no more bitter irony than to listen to Russian officials tell us that Iran, as a member in good standing of the NPT, is not only deserving but entitled to the dual use technology that Moscow has contracted to sell it, and that we know will be helpful to further Iran's nuclear weapons program. Because membership in these international conventions bestows legitimacy and, at least for the NPT, access to sensitive materials and technologies, my recommendation for dealing with states such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran is not to seek their participation in these conventions but rather to keep them out. Instead of offering concessions for commitments that we know will be violated, we should practice strict containment of these regimes, beginning in our own national non-proliferation and security policies. We should also seek to convince others to follow this same path, while recognizing that pursuing such a course will be unpopular and difficult to sustain.

We will be confronted with hard choices regarding standards of evidence and intelligence sharing, and in other cases we will be trying to persuade third states that may have much different perceptions of, and economic incentives for dealing with, these rogue states. We faced many of the same challenges in the past when we sought to contain a much larger and more powerful threat. It was not easy and we certainly did not win every challenge. But we persisted and, most important, we led. In the end, we also prevailed. A corollary to the first principle is to do no harm. In the past, we -- the United States and the international community -- have been unwilling to confront the limitations of norm building as a basis for policy.

The result has been harm to the cause of non-proliferation. Perhaps it is because, at least for some states, arms control has become an end in itself. Or perhaps it is a reluctance to accept the fact that regimes like those in North Korea and Iraq neither share the same goals as we, nor play by the same rules. Whatever the reason, it seems it is difficult for the international community to chart a course based on a realistic assessment of the threat and the need to counter the threat with sound security policies. Within the international community the lure of arms control idealism almost inevitably prevails over hard-nosed security judgments. For example, looking to the upcoming NPT Review Conference later this spring, I am confident that the United States will come under significant criticism for falling short in meeting its commitment under Article VI of the NPT to negotiate effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Already we have encountered the initiative from Brazil, Mexico and others pushing what they call the new agenda that seeks the speedy and total elimination of nuclear weapons, and to take other measures that would serve to

de-legitimize nuclear weapons. Such proposals, and they are hardly new, must be resisted and their underlying arguments must be refuted.

It is, of course, imperative that the United States fulfill its obligations under the NPT, as we have done so to date. In terms of Article VI, we have an outstanding record in negotiating reductions in strategic forces and in taking unilateral actions to reduce and eliminate theater nuclear weapons. In fact, even before START II implementation, U.S. deployed strategic warheads have been reduced by about 50 percent. With START II, that number will be reduced by a further 40-50 percent. A START III Treaty at 2,000-2,500 warheads would represent a reduction of about 80 percent from the Cold War arsenal. The United States has also eliminated 80 percent of its theater nuclear stockpile. Moreover, in the context of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, we have assisted Russia and others in the destruction and dismantlement of their nuclear forces. The numbers of nuclear weapons eliminated are very 380 ICBMs and 354 silos; 91 SLBMs and 176 SLBM launchers; and 57 heavy bombers. In all, over 4,900 warheads have been deactivated under the program.

The United States has no apologies to make. Most important, these measures have both served our national security and promoted the goals non-proliferation. They have demonstrated that the relationship between security and non-proliferation objectives can be reinforcing and certainly need not be mutually exclusive. In contrast, proposals for elimination or radical reductions in nuclear weapons would undermine our national security and international stability in a way that would likely fuel proliferation. In this context, we must recognize that our nuclear weapons continue to be essential to our deterrent strategy. The credibility of this deterrent should not be placed in doubt, whether in the context of the NPT Review Conference or through other arms control initiatives. Here, perhaps the prime example is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- a treaty that could call into question the reliability of our nuclear deterrent. There is no evidence that the Test Ban Treaty will reduce proliferation. None of the so-called unrecognized nuclear weapon states -- India, Pakistan and Israel -- will be convinced by this Treaty to give up their weapons programs.

Most important, those countries that are currently seeking nuclear weapons -- including Iran and North Korea -- will either not sign the Treaty or, more likely, will sign and cheat. These states have demonstrated the value they place in weapons of mass destruction and are not going to give them up because others pledge not to test. Contrary to its advertised purpose, the CTBT could actually lead to more proliferation not only by our potential adversaries but also by allies and friends who have long relied on the American nuclear umbrella as a cornerstone of their own security policy. In other words, if the Treaty were to lead to uncertainties that called into question the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the result could well be further rather than less proliferation. The United States has for many years relied on nuclear weapons to protect and defend our core security interests. In the past, nuclear weapons were the central element of our deterrent strategy. In today's security setting our nuclear weapons play a less prominent role. But in a world where weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles are increasingly available to rogue states, they remain an indispensable component of our

national security strategy. By calling into question the credibility of the extended deterrent that our nuclear weapons have provided for allies in Europe and Asia, the CTBT could also spur proliferation by those states that have long relied on the U.S. nuclear guarantee.

For over half a century, the United States has successfully promoted non-proliferation through the reassurance of allies that their security and ours were inseparable. U.S. nuclear weapons have always been a unique part of this bond. Allies in Europe and Asia continue to benefit from this protection. Should the U.S. nuclear deterrent become unreliable, and should U.S. allies begin to fear for their security having lost faith in the U.S. guarantee, it is likely that some of these states -- especially those located in conflict-laden regions -- would revisit the question of whether they need their own national deterrent capability. Maintaining a reliable and credible nuclear deterrent has also contributed to the reassurance of other important friends in regions of vital interest.

Countries like Taiwan have to date shown considerable restraint in light of the nuclear, chemical and biological threats in their region. They have done so in large part because they see the United States as committed and capable of coming to their defense. While strong security relations have encouraged these states to abstain from their own nuclear programs, an unreliable U.S. nuclear deterrent might actually encourage nuclear weapons development by these states.

A second principle to guide sound non-proliferation policy is to pursue -- with determination and consistency over the long term -- meaningful approaches that have the prospect of success in impeding proliferation. Many of the tools that can contribute to non-proliferation have been around for years. National and international export controls and sanctions, for example, were long considered a central part of the West's security strategy. In the past, the United States and our allies were successful in denying key technologies to the Soviet bloc, such as advanced machine tools and high speed computing capabilities that would have undercut our collective security.

This was possible for two main reasons. First, we had a consistent policy on controls and established effective internal and external mechanisms for enforcing the policy. Second, the United States exercised leadership with allies in setting up a standing coordinating agency to monitor transactions and to ensure compliance. This was never easy or popular. But U.S. leadership and the perception of a common threat made it work.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been neither effective U.S. leadership nor an appreciation of a common threat from proliferation, including by many of our allies. Given the absence of consensus on the threat, there is little agreement on the types and levels of technologies that should be denied. Consequently, export controls have lacked focus and the mechanisms that were in place have been eviscerated. Even in our own government, the emphasis on export controls has been significantly diminished as policy has consistently promoted commerce and trade over security considerations. If we are to design a sound non-proliferation policy, we must begin by restoring a proper

balance. Only then will we be able to promote meaningful international controls. Renewing an effective export control regime, one that is responsive to legitimate export needs while denying key technologies to proliferators, will require several actions.

First, the Administration and Congress should work to identify the most pressing proliferation issues, in terms of both the target regimes and the technologies of concern. Too broad a definition will likely result in an unworkable system, while too narrow a definition will allow for damaging leakage of technologies. One of the most difficult aspects of an effective export control policy is to secure the support other nations in a position to provide similar technologies. In part because our current policies are viewed as inconsistent and ineffective, we have achieved little success in influencing others. Once a consistent national policy is established, the Administration should undertake a concerted effort, at the highest levels, to seek support for the policy both at home and abroad. My expectation is that such an effort could pay significant dividends in slowing and making more costly the weapons programs of proliferators. Yet, leading by example, while essential, will not be sufficient. More direct means, including the application of sanctions, will be required to deal with supplier countries like Russia and China, both of whom have dismal records in assisting nuclear weapon and missile programs of other states.

Next, because of the inevitable competition between the need for enhancing exports to the benefit of U.S. corporations and the need to deny certain goods and technologies to proliferators, the Administration and the Congress should work to establish an effective process for enforcement of the policy. The current system, with split responsibilities and cumbersome procedures for resolving disputes among the agencies involved has proven to be a failure. Given the inherent conflict of interests among the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Department of Commerce, assigning the lead to any one of the Departments is only a formula for continued bickering and delays in administering export control policies. For this and other reasons, it may well be time to consider the recommendations of the Deutch Commission (Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) to create a National Director for Combating Proliferation and to empower that individual with staff and resources adequate to meet the bureaucratic challenges that have impeded past non-proliferation policy. This may be the only way to ensure that the concerned agencies are able to secure a fair hearing, and that decisions that balance security with trade can be made expeditiously.

A third principle of a sound non-proliferation policy is to prepare to deal with the consequences of proliferation and to treat proliferation for what it is: a central security threat to the United States. If the United States can acquire the military capabilities to deter and defend against the proliferation threat, we will undercut the incentives to proliferate in the first instance. Equally important, these capabilities will ensure that we have a hedge against deterrence failure. Experience suggests that countries determined to acquire chemical and biological weapons and, as we look to the future, nuclear weapons as well, will ultimately succeed. Given that the states developing and improving such

weapons today are our most likely adversaries in the future, we must be ready to deter these states - and especially their use of weapons of mass destruction. If deterrence fails, we must be prepared to fight and win even if these weapons are used against us. It is in this area of counterproliferation that I have conducted most of my work at the National Defense University.

From this research, ranging from bioterrorism and consequence management to doctrine and adversary use concepts, a number of conclusions are evident. Old models of deterrence are not likely to be successful. In a situation involving a rogue state armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, deterrence will be less stable and more likely to fail than deterrence as we knew it in the East-West context. The conditions that we valued in our deterrent relationship with the Soviet Union -- such as mutual understandings, effective communications and symmetrical interest and risks -- simply do not pertain with states like North Korea. Moreover, such countries are much more prone to risk taking than was the Soviet leadership. As a consequence, the threat of retaliation or punishment that formed the basis for our deterrent policy in the Cold War is not likely to be sufficient.

Therefore, it is essential that the United States acquire the capabilities to deny an enemy the benefits of these weapons. These capabilities - including passive and active defenses as well as improved counterforce means (such as the ability to destroy deep and hardened underground targets and mobile missiles) - offer the best chance to strengthen deterrence, and provide the best hedge against deterrence failure. A further dimension of the WMD threat that undercuts deterrence is the growing ability of adversaries to deliver these weapons against the United States homeland, including against our cities. This is most visible with the North Korean long-range missile program but also includes the potential for unconventional delivery, especially of biological agents. For rogue states, acquiring the capability to strike our population centers denies us the convenience and simplicity of thinking in terms of fighting a purely theater war, and makes essential our development and deployment of new defensive capabilities. In this context, I commend the initiatives undertaken by the Senate to insure that our first responders are trained to deal with chemical and biological incidents, and for the passage of the National Missile Defense Act. I do not want to give the impression that the threat of punishment is not unimportant. Although not adequate by itself, such a threat remains essential for deterrence of both initial use and follow-on use of WMD by rogue states. Here, conventional superiority alone cannot provide for a credible deterrent. In fact, despite sustained and determined efforts by some to de-legitimize our nuclear weapons and assertions that their utility ended with the Cold War, our nuclear weapons play a unique and indispensable role in deterring the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in regional contexts. This is in addition to the hedge our nuclear weapons provide against the strategic uncertainties associated with Russia and China - two states that continue to value and modernize their nuclear forces.

From our examination of the real-world case of deterring Iraqi chemical and biological use in Desert Storm, and from our extensive experience in gaming, we have concluded that our nuclear weapons are the single most important instrument we have for

detering the use of chemical and biological weapons against us by rogue states. Conventional superiority, which in certain critical ways is perceived as vulnerable, especially if the enemy uses his WMD capabilities early in a conflict, is not enough. Our conventional and nuclear forces must work together to enhance deterrence in a very complex and dangerous environment. In conclusion, preventing proliferation -- and especially the spread of nuclear weapons -- has long been a stated goal of U.S. policy, beginning in the months immediately following the conclusion of World War 11 and continuing to the present. Every Administration, from President Truman forward, has made non-proliferation a central element of American foreign policy. This was evident in the Baruch proposals and in President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative. It was also apparent in the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty under President Johnson and in the conventions on prohibiting biological and chemical weapons negotiated Nixon and Bush respectively. Presidents Kennedy and Carter were not only eloquent but also passionate in their stated goal of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and President Reagan held the vision of eliminating these weapons altogether.

As the most important leader of the international community, the United States should retain these goals and work toward their achievement. But we must do so recognizing the real world conditions and threats that we face. While we should strive to take advantage of every opportunity to shape these conditions, we must do so understanding both the strengths and limitations of the tools available to us -- from diplomacy to the application of force. The skill is bringing together all of these instruments into a coherent and mutually reinforcing policy that promotes non-proliferation and our national security.