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**New Regionalism and Leadership in Brazilian Security
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Abstract

Brazil had advanced the proposal for the South American Defense Council, shortly before the Summit that created UNASUR, and had it approved a few months later in another summit. The Defense Council is unprecedented in the region, but theoretically the idea is no less challenging. The literature on foreign policy analysis unveils the decision-making process and in this work we will focus on leadership of institution building. This work will focus on Brazilian leadership in security and defense matters and the new move towards regionalism. However, especially during the Lula da Silva administration there have been some other attempts at governance-building in and outside the region under Brazilian leadership. The previous administration implemented a civilian-led command of the armed forces and a national defense policy, but the leadership theme is recurrent since the military rule in Brazil. Is there old wine in new bottles or just the other way around? *Why Brazil? Why now?* – these are the main research questions of this work. Both the distinction and the connection between defense and security will be explored in the analysis of leadership and regionalism in Brazilian foreign policy and its recent move towards institution-building to deal with security and defense matters.

Introduction

South America is part of a nuclear weapon free zone and one of the most demilitarized regions in the world. This situation had been reinforced by a long embargo the US had on advanced weaponry sales to Latin America imposed by former president Jimmy Carter (Diamint 1998). However, this region is rapidly rebuilding its arsenal since former President Clinton lifted the ban, and especially since the civil war in Colombia was included into the framework of the “War on Terror” led by former President George W. Bush.

Following these changes, not only the Organization of American States (OAS) has been increasingly devoted to security matters, but also new initiatives have been brought about in the sub-regional level for the creation of agencies primarily concerned with security and defense matters.

In a world where there is an enormous gap in military power between one superpower and the rest of the world, is there room for a regional power to develop a security and defense policy and organize its neighbors in an independent fashion? The relations between the United States and the European Union (EU) suggest that this is a difficult but not impossible task. This work looks into the security architecture of the hemisphere and offers an analysis of the project for a South American Defense Council (SDC), advanced by Brazil, a country that has recently shown a will for leadership in security and defense matters.

By looking at the traditional world map, especially the Robinson projection, it is easy to see that Brazil is equivalent in area to half of South America. What is much less readily clear is that Brazil is larger than the continental United States (without Hawaii and Alaska, the latter being the largest of the all states of that country). Claiming that Brazil had the potential for becoming a great power, the military rule (1964-1985) started a few projects that would consequently push Brazil into the position of a regional, perhaps global leader. The country was, however, unable to fulfill this role until later when a new wave of regionalism emerged in international politics around the late eighties and the early nineties (Ethier 1998).

The end of the Cold War removed the east-west tension from the top of the agenda and regional problems could thus gain more relevance for countries in the hemisphere, previously busy fighting communism within their own borders. The nineties saw a new move in defense and security matters with the establishment of regular meetings of defense ministers across the hemisphere and the reactivation of the OAS through the Summits of the Americas. The first of the summits took place in Miami after almost thirty years since the last meeting that united leaders of the whole hemisphere and was the first ever of this kind to hold a majority of democratically elected leaders.

Later, OAS members created agencies devoted to security and incorporated the oldest military organization in the hemisphere, the Inter American Defense Board (known for its Spanish acronym, JID). At the same time, sub-regional integration was going deeper in the political arena, even though the economic integration provided a not yet quite stable basis. In 2008 the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) emerged from a previous meeting of South American leaders already with the project of a defense coordination agency, which was soon later agreed.

This time, Brazil was behind the idea and actively campaigned for the establishment of the SDC even before UNASUR was made official (Caro 2008). What role is this institution to play? Why is Brazil leading this initiative? Why is it doing so now? Taking into account the prior opposition to such arrangements long held by Brazil, this study focuses on this watershed in Brazilian foreign and security policy, and analyzes the existing security architecture of the hemisphere vis-à-vis the Brazilian proposal for the SDC.

The bulk of the research work presented here is divided into three main parts. First, I shall look on the background of the security arrangements in the Americas. The OAS is identified as the reason why Brazil would not commit to other arrangements up until Brazil proposes the SDC. The proposal of a mechanism to coordinate defense in what is supposed to be an integration effort is certainly new in South America. However absent in the sub regional level, a more encompassing arrangement, the OAS, has been dealing with security issues in the Americas for over sixty years now. Its history and role are analyzed here.

Then, the article will focus on the Brazilian proposal and the institutional design of the SDC, problematizing a few open ends. Whether that Council will work as an alliance or as an organization can affect its goals and endurance. In case the Council develops an institutional dimension, it may look inwards and work on local issues or as well look outwards (and deal with international security). States in the region certainly have an interest in projecting power in the international arena: Uruguay is among the top ten and Brazil among the top twenty largest troop contributing countries to UN peace missions. In the latter case it would be following the European and Atlantic security arrangements, which lead expeditionary operations in diverse areas of the world.

Finally, because the Council is a Brazilian proposal, I shall focus on the Brazilian leadership in the region, and determine why Brazil is behind that and why now. Some considerations on the topic of Brazilian leadership in security and defense matters and how this could potentially change hemispheric relations.

A Few Theoretical Considerations

Liberal thought in International Relations (IR) will seek the sources of peace either in the international relations themselves, or in internal regimes. Less war-prone relations will be included in international trade and have the form of a republic. (For instance: Moravcsik 1997).

On the other hand, according to traditional realist IR theory, peace can be achieved or maintained through two distinct arrangements: one is normative limitations (such as Law, Morality and Public Opinion) and the other is a self-adjusting mechanism of competing units, the balance of power. The balance of power approach, based on capabilities, is considered superior to normative limitations (Morgenthau 1973, p.24).

The English School, on the contrary, will find some limitation of aggression in norms, and its approach is based on the existence of an international society (Bull 1997).

In further developments, there are theories on how institutions can be limitations to war. International organizations are part of regimes, which may help actors in making international relations more predictable or at least creating punishment and benefits for the behavior of actors (Keohane and Nye 1989).

A point of some convergence in the latest security theories is that in order to replace conflict with cooperation, the security dilemma must be overcome. (Bellamy 2004)

How can one increase the level of trust among actors less than inclined to exchange sensitive information about issues regarded as classified? There one will find the role of institutions, be they mere alliances or sophisticated organizations, either among states alone or involving other actors.

States could tend to establish alliances so as to avoid unduly binding commitments in their foreign affairs. Unlike organizations, alliances are generally looser arrangements, which always keep possibilities open for today's friend to become tomorrow's foe. As an *ad hoc* arrangement, an alliance tends to dissolve whenever a shared perception of a threat or a limited goal ceases to exist.

Putting together a security organization, on the other hand, requires a long-term agreement around common rules and shared principles for guiding behavior of actors. While the decision to join such an arrangement generally yields several benefits, it is also true that it poses more restraints to their policy-making than the participation in an alliance would. An organization often has its own headquarters, staff and delegations, and even when serving a single purpose, might as well develop a network of agencies that will help it fulfill its mission. In other words, it is an arrangement both more difficult to put together and to tear apart.

Security Arrangements in History

In recent history, the occurrence of a major conflict has been able to drive states into the creation of organizations charged with the burden of keeping peace among peoples. The League of Nations, emerging after World War I, was not merely Wilson's brainchild but the concrete product of several foregoing ideas. Although the League has failed in its practical task to eliminate war, it served as a model for the ensuing organization, of the post-World War II era. Universalism prevailed over regionalism and the United Nations (UN) became a global organization that would start not from scratch but rather start from a stock of "lessons learned".

However, the Cold War much too soon made the Security Council ineffective and actually turned it into a stage where the expected great power dialogue gave way to head-on confrontation. A tragic outcome of this situation is that the UN Security Council was practically frozen while the Cold War lasted. Ultimately, the UN survived a war it was clearly not fit to fight, with hardly any institutional changes.

Thus, during the Cold War, instead of the UN, two regional security organizations played a major role, each headed by one superpower. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) placed Western Europe under the nuclear and conventional military umbrella of the US. Analogously, the Soviet Union gathered Eastern Europe and the Balkans under its protection. The United States and the Soviet Union then reached further to place their colors all over the world and defend their corresponding areas of influence.

The United States, in particular, extended its institutions along with influence. Between 1945 and 1949, driven by fear of a communist expansion, the US signed a series of treaties that potentially forced it to give an amount of consideration to the security of other 42 nations in its own security policy-making (MacCloskey 1967).

Should that number not sound impressive enough, the proportion sure is appalling: considering that in 1949 only 57 states were members to the United Nations, the US was then formally bound no less than 70% of them by force of a security treaty.

Some of these treaties materialized in organizations, of which two well-known examples of failures are the South Eastern Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Although NATO was used as a frame, these organizations were quite distinct from its mold. For instance, SEATO did not involve collective security commitments (Walt 1988)¹.

With regard to CENTO, the US was not even a member, albeit a supporter. It was the United Kingdom who took on the role of superpower pillar for the Middle East, but changes in internal regimes soon broke it apart. Both organizations were short-lived and disbanded before the early eighties.

¹ The United States tried, in vain, to mobilize SEATO members to join it in the Vietnam War. See: GLEASON, Gregory & SHAIHUTDINOV, Marat E. "Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia." *International Studies Perspectives*, 2005(6): 275

The OAS, on the contrary, still stands, but unlike the two organizations just mentioned, it finds its origins in a time of peace, much earlier in history than the Cold War.

Background on Security Arrangements in the Region

OAS headquarters, located in Washington between the State Department and the White House, were originally built for an organization that preceded it. Created in 1890, the International Union of American Republics started as a series of conferences sponsored by the US and a Commercial Bureau that two decades later gave way to the Pan-American Union (PAU), the first organization to gather all states in the continent, in 1910 (Vivian 1974, p.555).

In all fairness, the ideal of a regional organization that would unite the Americas, however, started with Simon Bolívar's proposal of a Confederation in the Panama Congress of 1826.² For southern countries newly independent at that time, security was a top priority. In order to avoid any attempt at restoring the foreign rule of the former colonies, Latin Americans needed a consensual mechanism for solving disputes and a military alliance devoted to keep continental unity (Wickham 1935, 103-104).

The presence of the United States in that organization was still a controversial point, but its economic interests in Latin America were certainly less than appealing to the rest of its neighbors. The US and Latin America were then at odds when integration issues were at the table, but eventually the US decided to make a case for investing in north-south relations in the hemisphere.

It took some American States quite long to ratify the convention that created PAU, which was not permanent for several years. The hassle was mainly over proper democratization within the institution. Latin Americans ultimately had it their way: The

² Only four heads of state, out of the few six that actually made it to the convention in Panama signed the "Treaty of Union, League and Perpetual Confederation". For a detailed account of the Panama Congress: Aguirre, Indalecio Lievano. "El Congreso de Panama: Bolivarismo y monroísmo". *Desarrollo Económico* 8(30/31), *Latin America Series* 4 (Jul. - Dec., 1968), pp. 193-241 and also Reinhold, Frances L. "New Research on the First Pan-American Congress Held at Panama in 1826". *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 18(3):342-363, August 1938. Interestingly, although that Congress was a flop, its centennial was celebrated, in tribute to Simon Bolívar. See: Collings, Harry T. "The Congress of Bolívar". *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 6(4):194-198, November 1926.

US secretary of State was no longer to be declared chairman *ex officio* of the Governing Board and this position was thereafter to be filled by ballot (Casey 1933, pp. 450-452).

Aware of the residual prominent US presence in the administrative level of UPA, in ratifying the Convention that would make it permanent, Latin American States made it clear that “neither the Pan-American Union nor the Governing Board [its executive organ] shall exercise functions of a political character.”³

Latin Americans did not, however, leave their security issues unaddressed. During hemispheric conferences held between 1902 and 1936 several treaties on themes such as compulsory arbitration of conflicts, non-aggression, conciliation, good-offices and mediation were ratified by a number of states that, however, fell short of the total number of members to PAU (Atkins 1977, p. 313-315).

Out of the several specialized agencies created before the end of World War II in the hemisphere, two concerned security matters. One was an ad hoc forum, the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which was to consider emergency security situations, such as the war in Europe.⁴ It met 16 times in its first 36 years of history, from 1939 to 1975. The other was IABD, a permanent body devoted to defense coordination, created in 1942. IABD is composed of a Secretariat, a Council of Delegates and the Inter-American Defense Council.

Security Architecture in the Americas

Cold War Arrangements

In 1945 a considerable system for cooperation was already in place in the continent: thirty permanent regional governmental agencies, seventeen official bilateral governmental agencies, and over thirty semi-official or private agencies, regional or

³ According to Article VI of the Convention of the Pan-American Union and the Following Resolution. See: Dreier, John C. “The Council of the OAS: Performance and Potential”, *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 5(3) July, 1963, p.298

⁴ For instance, as a result of the meeting of 1939 ministers declared the neutrality of the continent during World War II. See: Masters 1945, p. 728 and following.

bilateral, of diverse scope (Inter-American, Caribbean, Latin-American, or South-American) (Masters 1945, p. 713).⁵

Most of these agencies were contained in the Inter-American System back in 1945, a group of institutions instrumental for the maintenance of peace and security and welfare of peoples of the Americas (Pan American Union 1945).

Without naming it so, Ruth Masters defines the Inter-American System in 1945, very much in the way Krasner defines a regime in 1982, except for the crucial last part “around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area”. Masters could not have said that of the Inter-American System, since most of the rules were in practice disregarded by most of the actors. (Krasner 1982, p.185).

As opposed to the League of Nations, an integrated organization, Masters states that

“The Inter American System consists, rather, of 1) a body of rules, principles and modes of action which are expressed in numerous declarations, resolutions, agreements and conventions adopted by the American governments, and 2) a variety of common agencies created piecemeal in response to specific needs, the principal one being the Pan American Union.” (p. 714)

The document of the Pan American Union produced in the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held in Mexico City shortly before the end of World War II was later known as the *Act of Chapultepec*. It paved the way for changes to the Inter-American System that would increase interagency cooperation within the system and between it and the UN, the world organization that was about to rise. The OAS then swiftly took over from PAU, making it one of its bodies and conveniently fitting itself in the Inter-American System.

The *Act of Chapultepec* also made provisions for a future collective security system. Thus, the United States signed in 1947 what would be the first of many regional

⁵ Here Masters adds in a note that nearly a dozen of such agencies were created in wartime and for war purposes.

security arrangements with its Latin American counterparts in Rio de Janeiro. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, commits the US and its Latin American counterparts in the region to collectively defend themselves against aggression to any of them. What goes unstated there is that aggression can be internal or external, and the former rather than the latter has been most common in the early days of the Cold War. More particularly, in its first thirty years the treaty was applied with some frequency because of threats to peace in the hemisphere. None of them, however, involved external aggression, and all disputes were located in the Caribbean (Atkins 1977, p. 331).

The Rio Treaty established sanctions, but these were agreed on an *ad hoc* basis. The OAS was used for peace operations, because that treaty failed to provide for any level of force coordination or interoperability. Neither did the OAS. Even though its Charter contains provisions on collective security, it only goes so far as to peaceful means of dispute resolution (Organization of American States 1948). On one occasion alone the OAS established a peace operation, in the Dominican Republic. Still, it happened after US action and with US forces seven times larger in number than the total of all Latin American troops.

Both the Rio Treaty and the OAS were then widely disregarded whenever the US embarked on unilateral (military or not) intervention in Latin America, which was quite often during the Cold War. However, either one or the other arrangement was used by the US in its Cold War policy of “trying the OAS first”, in keeping with article 52 of the UN Charter, but at the same time completely disregarding the following article, which brings an important caveat that enforcement actions are forbidden unless authorized by the UN Security Council. (Claude 1964, p. 6-17)

Although the US initially opposed having regional agencies working before the UN in case of regional crises, given the ensuing US anti-communist policy, having the Soviet Union considering issues such as a revolutionary Cuba was clearly out of the table for the US. The Cuban “Bay of Pigs” counterrevolution is perhaps more famous, yet the reaction to the coup d’état in the Dominican Republic remains the most significant example to date of unfettered US intervention in Latin America. On top of that, it was backed by an instrumental OAS, dragged into the conflict only to play a sorry role in the

final act. According to Jerome Slater, “(...), the United States has attempted to influence the OAS to play one of three roles – that of a collective security system, of an anti-Communist alliance, or even on occasion of an anti-dictatorial alliance.” (1967, p.5).

Post Cold War Arrangements

Among the most impressive phenomena of the post-Cold War era one can easily single out the impressive rise in the number of institutions beyond the state. A study stresses that in the early nineties there were roughly two regional intergovernmental organizations for each organization with universal one, founded after 1945 (Bennett 1991).

After the Cold War there was new hope among Latin Americans that the OAS could for once be a meaningful organization in hemispheric affairs. As soon as 1991, OAS member states gathered in Santiago, Chile, saw in the “new world order” a window of opportunity for establishing new parameters for a renewed Inter American system and “starting over” in the matter of US-Latin American relations to address security concerns other than communism.

A special commission within OAS was created to manage hemispheric security one year later and became a permanent body in 1995. The Commission on Hemispheric Security (CHS) had the difficult task of finding a common ground amongst several new threats in an expanded concept of security, well beyond the military or political realms, which would fit the Americas from North to South. The first Conference on Hemispheric Security, however, did not happen until 2003. In comparison, before that there had already been three meetings of the Summit of the Americas and five meetings of the Defense Ministerial of the Americas. The first of such ministerial took place on the initiative of William Perry, then US Secretary of Defense, which noticed that the First Summit of the Americas did not address security issues.

The most significant achievement of CHS, however, is the multidimensional concept of security, which basically brings to the top of the agenda issues not traditionally addressed as security concerns, such as poverty, trafficking in drugs, natural and man-made disasters, and environmental degradation, for instance. Although they

were called “new threats” they are anything but new in the hemisphere, not even terrorism, which was already in the agenda in the first summit of the Americas in 1994, because of problems in Argentina with bombings of Jewish institutions.

What is new about these threats is that they were then *securitized* (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al 1998). This move has had important effects over Colombia, for instance, under the auspices of *Plan Colombia*. The government of Colombia picked two distinct problems, namely: trafficking in drugs and paramilitary insurgency, combined them into a single one, and conveniently labeled it *terrorism*. With a little help with friends from Washington, Colombia militarized its police, and move it to the barracks alongside its armed forces in the local version of the fight against terrorism.

For all Latin American countries which have been under military rule, part of the democratizing process involved building a strict distinction between military and police roles. There is even a particular caveat that the military should not get involved in internal affairs in Argentina, for instance.

After the 9/11 attacks, however, the US changed priorities and moved security and democracy back to the top of the hemispheric agenda. This change once again did not promote unity in OAS, since the need to engage in the fight against terrorism does not resonate uniformly with Latin Americans. As a consequence, several limited regional integration processes became increasingly overarching so as to promote an independent political interface for smaller groups of countries. Many states have, however, called for a faster process of integration, Chile for instance (Bachelet 2008).

In conclusion, one could say that while the OAS does not seem to be merely an instrument of US policy after the Cold War, it is still ill-equipped to deal with security issues in the hemisphere. Even after the incorporation of IABD into OAS, this body was given advisory, but no operational capabilities with regard to security and defense.

Thus, in matters of security, one can say defense integration and interoperability as experienced in NATO or the EU is not yet available in the Inter-American System. Still, Brazil has always opposed a NATO-style military alliance with the US (Miyamoto 2004; 1985), in keeping with the long attachment to sovereignty and independence and aware of US unilateral policies in the region.

In the next section we shall see then what has changed so that now Brazil proposes a military arrangement for South America (with a five-year time lag before other Latin American countries can join it) and what the nature of this proposal is.

The Brazilian Proposal – SDC

After the Cuban Missile Crises there was widespread fear of a nuclear war taking place in the Americas. It was motivated by that fear that Latin America and the Caribbean have decided to commit as a region to a treaty for prohibition of nuclear weapons, known as the *Treaty of Tlatelolco*. It not only prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America but also binds all recognized nuclear powers in a perennial commitment not use nuclear weapons against Latin America by declaring it a zone of peace under the UN authority.

In addition, by its turn, South America has been much less war prone than the Caribbean. The only current UN peacekeeping operation in the hemisphere is located in the Caribbean and all UN past operations in the Americas involved Caribbean countries, just like applications of the Rio Treaty (mentioned earlier in this text).

That is not to say that South American countries have no disagreements, but that most of them are minor border disputes (Rudzit 2003).

As Grabendorff pointed out, “(...); conditions here have always led to conflict situations between the various countries, but specific historical factors have kept these conflicts from erupting to the same extent they have in other regions of the Third World.” (1982, p.267)

The latest major conflict in the region was the Malvinas/Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982, which did not involve any coalition. The latest minor conflict, between Ecuador and Colombia in 2008, involved Colombia’s army temporarily crossing the border to fight Colombian guerrilla groups hiding in Ecuadorian ground. And that is part of a Colombian conflict with guerrilla groups which fits into the category of civil war, where there is two-sided sustained violence between the state and a domestic political actor, and which results in more than 1,000 war-related deaths per year. It is actually listed as one of the fifteen longest ongoing civil wars in the world (Hironaka 2005, p.3; p. 27).

This domestic conflict has been the motive officially given by the President of Colombia for opposing an immediate adhesion to the Council of Defense during the signing of the Charter of UNASUR. He was alone in that position, but effectively did have a role in the final decision to keep the Council out of the Charter. However, on the same occasion signed in for a seat in the working group that was commissioned by UNASUR to study the Brazilian proposal for the Council and reach an interstate agreement. The Council shall be created officially in early 2009 (Folha de S. Paulo, 2008).

In the UNASUR treaty, therefore, the Council of defense was absent, unlike the Energy Council of South America (*Consejo Energético de Suramérica*), which had been created earlier, in a 2007 meeting in Venezuela. Security issues ranked literally low in the Charter, below all other specific objectives, and are absent in wording of the general objectives (South American Union of Nations 2008).

The SDC was only created when leaders met again in Brazil, and under the main idea that by coordinating defense and security they would build confidence and prevent situations like the Colombian crossing of the Ecuadorian border to hunt down guerrilla fighters. Even before its formal institution, the SDC acted by mediating the internal uprising in Bolivia against President Morales, which was repeatedly thankful.

As per declarations of the Brazilian Minister of Defense, the Council will perform the following functions, divided between inward and outward objectives⁶ in the following table:

Table 1: Objectives and Related Area of Concern for the CSD of UNASUR.

Objective	Area
integrating defense industries	Inward
establishing force exchange in educational programs	Inward
integrating force training	Inward & Outward

⁶ Please refer to the categories explained on page 5.

coordinating governmental policies for regional defense	Inward & Outward
creating a shared perception of strategic-military concerns	Inward & Outward
focusing on the issues of the three main areas within the region: the Amazon, the Andes and the Bay of River “ <i>la Plata</i> ”	Inward & Outward
creating a single voice for the region in other multilateral <i>fora</i>	Outward
coordinating force contributions to UN peace operations	Outward

Source: Declarations of Brazilian Defense Minister to the press.

As we could see from the information in the Table, the Council has inward and outward objectives aimed at both the regional and global levels. This research will go on to examine later the implications of such missions, as part of the scope of this institution and other aspects of the Council (membership, centralization, control and flexibility) with regard to institution design theory (Koremenos et al. 2001). For now in this text there is a short comparison of the models ascribed for the Council: either a NATO-like alliance or a EU-like organization.

SDC - An organization or an alliance?

Alliances can assume several forms, comprise distinct interests, result in different benefits, and form either at peace or at wartime. Most realists assume that alliances maximize states’ security, and not necessarily their power, precisely because they are not conceived as permanent arrangements. Alliances are not considered stable arrangements for two main reasons: first, because they restrict the freedom of an actor to pursue its interests, and second, because a current ally is always a potential enemy in the long run.

Amidst the most influential alliance theories, collective action theory and balance of power theory generally stand out in the literature. In the general balance of power

theory, a powerful state will be opposed by an alliance of lesser powers, united in order to effectively balance its power in the international arena and prevent a global empire.

However, Stephen Walt noticed exceptions to the traditional balance of power theory and developed a theory that substitutes 'power' for 'threat'. According to his theory, power is only one of the many sources of threat states could be faced with. The degree to which a state threatens the other is the product of its aggregate power, geographic vicinity, offensive capability, and aggressiveness of intentions. Changes to the balance of threat, and not only power, could account for alliance formation with or against another state (Walt 1998).

Collective action theory has a model where besides the idea that actors unite to balance a hegemonic power, there is also a possibility that weaker states might simply unite with a *hegemon*. By doing so, such states decide not to pay the potential costs of the balance of power and simply 'free-ride' or 'bandwagon' by allying with a major power. The impossibility of excluding a member from the benefits of an alliance would make it a kind of collective good (Olson & Zeckhauser 1966).

Among the several critics to the Olson-Zeckhauser model just described, Goldstein claims alliances formed from small states around a major power could still be easily broken, since states are embedded in an anarchical environment that allows for their behavior to sharply deviate from the one anticipated by collective good theory. He argues that security is a collective good that necessarily fails the test of impossible exclusion (Goldstein 1995, p.41).

Alliance theory focuses on the analysis of the formation and dynamics of this arrangement, a central phenomenon of international relations, but generally fails to explain its persistence. An alliance is bound to dissolve as soon as the threat that motivated its creation is extinct. Regimes on the other hand, are a much broader relationship of which an organization is part, generally encompassing several issues and operating at diverse levels. Such relationship is based on both explicit and implicit norms and patterns of behavior, thus constitutes a regime.

As opposed to the constraints to their sovereignty, states find the main benefit of regimes to be the reduction of insecurity, insofar as the regime increases costs related to

non-compliant behavior. As for a main constraint, the publicity of information and collective decisions could tend to level the differences between more and less powerful states.

The fact that NATO works both as an alliance and as an organization should not blind us to the fact that they are distinct arrangements. Could the Defense Council of UNASUR assume a NATO-like structure? Without any prospect for US membership, Brazil would assume the role of security provider, a role it has only now been willing to take on. However, the current situation in South America is nothing like the post-war Europe and Brazil is neither in a position to, nor willing to deploy permanently abroad by building bases in neighboring countries in order to assume a NATO-like military structure. Brazil is far too big and borders 10 out of the 12 South American Nations, therefore allowing regional hegemony if so concrete, to be achieved through an alternate way.

Brazil and the Change from Invisible to Visible Leadership in South America

Protected by the nuclear umbrella of the US during the Cold War, and considerably less threatened by its might than Mexico or the Caribbean countries, Brazil never developed nuclear weapons of its own but rather built up nuclear power plants, a move that raised tension among its allied and neighbors, especially Argentina.

For long, one of Brazil's main security concerns had been just across the border. The second largest state in South America was not regarded as an ally, but rather looked upon with suspicion. The arms race between Brazil and Argentina could potentially evolve into war and so the military were prepared for it. Unlike the European powers, however, the two great countries of South America did not fight opposite sides at war since the nineteenth century.

By taking an active part in proposal of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which created the first nuclear weapon free zone in the world, Brazil was fighting for peaceful use of nuclear power through multilateralism, therefore assuming a different posture from the great powers of the time and its own role as the natural foremost regional player. Brazil and Argentina eventually overcame differences and relations even evolved to cooperation

in the nuclear area (Sotomayor 2004).

However, it did not lead nor take part in any regional initiatives for security or defense integration, other than the Rio Treaty and the OAS (Hurrell 1983:188). It actually opposed them, especially in the South Atlantic Area, and later lead the initiative of UN approved South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, in a clear attempt to avert any militarization that could disrupt its main route of commerce.

And trade was for a long time the only area where Brazilian leadership was felt for a long time. It not only had incomparable economic might on its side but also the largest companies to provide public and consumer goods to all other South American neighbors. It has built up hegemony by establishing itself as the preferential trader with all major countries in the subcontinent, by means of an imperfect Free Trade Agreement named (MERCOSUR) still to evolve to an economic and political union in the shape of the European Union. And that is the idea behind UNASUR.

So far with MERCOSUR Brazil has managed to liberalize movements of goods and people by lifting tariffs and passport checks. Four countries identified as the Southern Cone now have a passport that brings the name of the bloc before the individual country. With UNASUR, Brazil has moved beyond what it already had in MERCOSUR, and reached the topic of defense integration.

First Brazil had to come up with its own idea of security reorganize its structure of defense accordingly, a task not achieved until 1996. A Ministry of Defense was resisted by the hard-line military as a foreign imposition since the first democratically elected civilian administration, but eventually came about during the second term of the Cardoso administration (1999-2002). Cardoso also started, in 2000, the Meeting of South American Presidents. UNASUR, an institution in the making, emerged from the South American Community of Nations (CSN) created in 2004 in Cusco, during the III Meeting of South American Presidents.

In Brazil, a short draft of a white paper for security and defense policy came out a bit earlier, in 1996 but was considered too generalist and updated later in 2005, already in the first term of the Lula da Silva administration. In a major move that set him apart from his predecessors in the civilian rule of Brazil, Lula da Silva resumed the long lost

tradition of planning and implementing state policy in Brazil with a project that had goal set for 2007, 2015 and 2022.

Part of the policies recommended in that project regarded security and defense policy, defined as one of the 50 strategic themes. While reaffirming a will for peace in international relations and renouncing conquest war, stated the need to modernize military capabilities and strengthen the domestic arms industry so that Brazil would be ready to face future challenges “either alone or as part of a defense arrangement with its neighbors” (BRASIL 2005). The most active role Brazil played for the establishment of both UNASUR and CSD, is a fine indication that this plan has been followed through.

Both Cardoso and Lula took important steps to extend the influence of Brazil not only within South America but also beyond. In the framework of the South-South Dialogue, Cardoso established partnerships and contacts with African nations, but in a distinct movement, Lula da Silva invested in a strategy for the whole of Africa, while still maintaining South Africa at a different level, together with India in a special forum for the widely considered key leading states in the large group of underdeveloped countries. The Lula da Silva government played a pivotal role in creating the IBSA in 2003 (a trilateral forum which unites Brazil with India and South Africa) and also in reactivating the meetings of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. After a long halt since 1998 the latest ministerial meeting took place in 2007 and another is schedule to take place in 2009. None of these initiatives, so far has encompassed security and defense matters.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The rise of several left-leaning leaders in South America has created a shared sense of anti-Americanism and desire for independent policies in the last few years. The most outspoken proponents of the SDC have been President Chavez of Venezuela and Mr. Nelson Jobim, the Defense Minister of Brazil. Venezuela in particular favored the idea of an anti-US alliance, of which the left leaning Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas was a sketch, while Brazil makes no ideological claims. A particular interest

Brazil may have as a leading aircraft and small firearms producer may be simply to boost its regional exports.

Dealing with security problems within the OAS, however revamped it may be now, may still mean going by Washington's rules under a strict agenda shaped by US interests that has either given more attention to topics such as terrorism, not a major concern to most other American countries or in the case of Colombia, converted their civil war into a "War on Terror". This has more often than not been met with disinterest in the OAS on the part of the bulk of the hemisphere.

The divide between US policies and priorities and Southern American concerns has grown larger. However, the presence of a world *hegemon* in the regional level is always to be considered a problem for regional integration, especially in sensitive matters such as security and defense, as shown by the history of OAS. This new institution is at the center of a great deal of controversy, and every detail regarding its design and activities will be important for the prospects of its success.

The UNASUR, thus, could be a watershed. A fine example is the fact that the question Condoleeza Rice asked the Brazilian Defense Minister on what role the US could play in the South American Defense Council was met with a simple answer: "none" (Garcez, 2008).

Recent changes in Brazilian foreign and security policies were shown to determine why Brazil has made such a bold move and why this proposal is innovative, in comparison with previous proposals for security arrangements in the region.

Although the media tends to portray this new organization as a Southern equivalent of NATO, with Brazil probably in the role of the superpower, all members (perhaps with the occasional exception of Venezuela) have dismissed those claims. The media has called SDC both an alliance and an organization, interchangeably.

The purpose of an alliance is to summon lesser powers that have a common enemy in order to counter any growth in the power of that enemy, and as *ad hoc* arrangements, they tend to dissolve quickly when a common threat no longer obtains. An organization, on the other hand, will last much longer for it is generally connected with a

regime, and performs functions such as executing mandates or merely facilitating cooperation between actors who are generally seeking broader goals.

South American nations often refer to UNASUR as an organization inspired by the EU and indeed a parallel can be drawn between the current security architecture in America and in Europe since the EU membership is not overlapping with that of NATO. Together with the unilateral policy of the United States, that factor is a source of increasing tension between NATO, an arrangement including the US and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

Other than a mere addition to the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the ESDP, active after 1999, can be otherwise seen as an autonomous expression of the EU in security and defense matters. For instance, the EU parliament has recently passed a resolution on the role of NATO within the security architecture of the EU of which one of the items pledges member states to set aside among their national military capabilities a portion to be exclusively dedicated to the EU, allegedly with a view to avoid duplicated efforts (European Union 2009, article 32). By creating the SDC, which is analyzed in this work, UNASUR has been accused of causing a similar rift with regard to the OAS (newspaper evidence).

Although both organizations have dismissed such a claim, does the new security architecture in the Americas now bear some resemblance to that of Europe? If the SDC does not deal with the security issues covered by the OAS, there would be no duplicated efforts so to speak. While the new organization has not yet found its place in the security architecture of the Americas and its mission is still unclear, given that the United States has been issued no invitation to take part in UNASUR, a similar scenario of tension may unfold.

In addition, the media has repeatedly called the proposed Defense Council a “Security Council”. A clear distinction between security and defense must be established if the South American Defense Council is to follow its designation to the letter. While security concerns the identification of threats and the establishment of a policy for countering those threats, defense would concern the means to achieve security, for instance, the protection offered by the military organization.

A few issues than must be clear. First, however portrayed as a forum for coordination of defense ministers, the SDC must have something different from the arrangements already in place within OAS, especially the hemispheric meeting of defense ministers, other than membership. Second, the fact that South American States have a robust record of participation in UN peacekeeping is a fact which does not to automatically translate into capability and political will for autonomous operations.

Two important facts explain why this is unlikely: South American countries are poor (none of them is among the top financing countries for UN peace operations) and have for long been attached to nonintervention as a principle in their foreign policy. This principle is in their every international document and in most national constitutions.

Surrounded by small neighbors, Brazil is definitely in a great position to be a regional *hegemon*. Moreover, it does not go against the shared ideas and values in Latin America, and therefore the leadership from Brasilia may be more in line with what the neighbors want, an advantage Brazil is willing to use up now that the priorities have been set in the domestic arena and the international environment is favorable. Already UNASUR instead of the OAS was the institution of choice during the last crises in South America.

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