

The lessons learned that emerged from the presentations and discussion groups is as follows:


- Plan early, and bring all those involved in the various issues to the negotiating table as early as possible.
- Communication was key to the program's success. The inter-agency process was vital throughout the planning and implementation phases, both at the national level and in the international or regional environment. One notable discrepancy in this lesson was the fact that not enough information made it out of the government's hands and into those of the general population once the program was in place. For instance, public transport became a problem because insufficient data was available to the public on how to use the CWC venues.
- National interests must be considered, as any decision made in the regional or coalition program remains in place after the event. Though it has applications across the spectrum of issues, this lesson dealt specifically with negotiations between the ICC and the Caribbean states as a whole. In many instances politicians ceded to ICC demands, even if this ran counter to national or regional interests. After the ICC and the cricket teams left, the decisions left an impact on the region, not always for the good. A caveat is added to this lesson, however, as national interests should not be so rigid as to prevent cooperation.
- Flexibility in command decision at all levels is the only way to make such an overarching program succeed. There were many examples provided where the system as designed was too rigid, most of them relating to the previous lesson about considering national interests, in that the politicians signed agreements with the ICC regardless of the impact on the region's governing institutions. The accreditation of security personnel to the venues proved cumbersome and inflexible, with many ground commanders feeling constrained in their own countries, despite being the final authority responsible for area security should any threat become active. In the end, both the ICC and the security personnel recognized that the threat environment as foreseen would not materialize, and the inherent flexibility of the individuals involved relaxed sufficiently to reach accommodation.
- International cooperation is vital to such a program's success. There was unanimous praise throughout the Seminar for all the various international agencies that provided assistance, worked with, or otherwise contributed to the CWC. This was emphasized in relation to the regional organizations already in place to carry

out specifically such projects. One of the principal legacies of the CWC 2007 is the recognition that the Caribbean states can successfully carry out parts of the global agenda. The national security forces acted regionally, and the region's diplomats acted globally.

- Don't ignore the private sector. Private security forces were given a greater role in the security program than most government officials thought possible, and they came through with flying colors, providing a force multiplier – in some cases quite literally – not otherwise available.

#### CONCLUSION

The legacy of the CWC has been good for the region, but there is a window of opportunity for taking advantage of this legacy. There is a volume of trained police officers, military personnel, private security forces that must maintain that expertise or run the risk of losing it. There is also a legacy of more intangible assets, such as the "sunset legislation" designed to allow national forces to cross borders for specific purposes during a specific time period, after which the legislation expires. But even if the legislation expires, the precedent remains, available the next time a situation arises where similar legislation can be of value. Specifically, this precedent is one of increased integration and cooperation, and the window of opportunity for its use will not close as quickly as that involving equipment and personnel training. Incidentally, the next opportunity will arrive in 2009,<sup>5</sup> so the experience of CWC 2007 should not be shelved too quickly, and care should be taken that the window of opportunity not be closed too tightly.



<sup>5</sup>"In addition to the two events mentioned earlier, the Inaugural Caribbean games will be hosted by Trinidad & Tobago during July 2009, involving teams from 26 different countries."

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#### Authors:

**James Zackrisson** is Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at CHDS. He has published extensively on issues of transnational organized crime and counterinsurgency in the region. **Dr. Hilton McDavid** is the Academic Director of the National Security and Strategic Studies Programme at the University of the West Indies, Jamaica. He previously served for over 20 years in the Guyana Defence Force.

**Director:** Dr. Richard D. Downie

**Editor:** James L. Zackrisson

**Chief of Strategic Communications:** Martin Edwin Andersen

# REGIONAL INSIGHTS

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## CRICKET WORLD CUP 2007 SECURITY MASTER PLAN: LESSONS LEARNED

by James L. Zackrisson, Dr. Hilton McDavid

**Abstract:** During June-July 2007, the Cricket World Cup tournament was hosted by a consortium of 10 West Indian island states. This issue comprises the rapporteur's notes as presented by the Course Director of the CHDS Senior Leadership Seminar held in Tobago in December, 2007. The Seminar brought together defense and security practitioners from throughout the region to discuss how the Security Master Plan for the tournament was developed and implemented, and to extract lessons learned from that process.

#### INTRODUCTION

The security environment in the Caribbean has been altered over time by many factors, among them developments in communications and transportation technology – globalization – but more significantly in how politicians define risk and threat. High unemployment, marginalized citizens, terrorism, organized crime, and human rights violations have been added to the list of issues that the defense forces must contend with, which stresses budgets and resources.<sup>1</sup> States have, since the 1684 treaty of Westphalia, been expected to operate within the parameters of their national laws as the only source of authority empowered to make and enforce law, to include the fair and just treatment of citizenry, the containment of violent non-state actors, and stopping illicit acts which reduce law and order both domestically and in the international arena.<sup>2</sup>

How to confront this new expectation is increasingly critical for small, developing states. A logical conclusion is the effort to achieve a unified civil-military effort, applying the state's full resources and those available from the international community toward any single solution. A transnational problem requires a multilateral solution. One good example of this can be found in the Caribbean itself, in the cooperative venture organized to provide security for the April-May 2007 Cricket World Cup tournament (CWC). Nine host countries joined forces to develop a *Regional Security Programme* (RSP), bringing together forces and institutions from ten regional states, three regional organizations, and over seven extra-regional states. [See textbox]

#### RAPPOREUR'S NOTES

It always helps to compare current issues with similar historical examples, if only to help explain why events occur in today's defense and security environment. One speaker early in this seminar commented that most regional politicians involved in the early stages of the CWC believed that the unifying force of cricket would overcome all obstacles to a safe and successful program. Such an attitude among national leaders is, of course, nothing new. Philip II of Spain in 1587 told his ground commanders – the Dukes of Santa Cruz and Medina-Sidonia – that his religious belief and faith in God would overcome all obstacles to the planned Grand Armada operation the next year. The point here is that we should never ignore history, because in neither XVI Spain nor the CWC 2007 did the identified unifying force overcome the foreseen obstacles to achieving the mission

objectives. I shall not delve into why Philip's Armada failed, but it has been apparent in this Seminar that obstacles to the CWC security program were overcome by good training and personal expertise, rather than by the unifying affection for cricket amongst the West Indians. The speaker mentioned earlier correctly noted that the politicians believed so, and also correctly assessed that such a force is insufficient to accomplish the stated objective, an important distinction that all policy analysts should understand and remember.

One significant lesson for good training is the use of pre-existing regional structures for cooperation, and this proved invaluable for developing the RSP. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, representing 15 members and 5 associate members, already had in place a process for coordinating forces and policies, and it served as the basis through which the RSP was developed. Another structure

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is the Regional Security System (RSS), which combines the security and police forces of the eastern Caribbean states; it was used to coordinate their specific contribution to the CARICOM process. There were also several extra-regional structures that came into play, such as Interpol, various national armed forces educational or instructional centers, such as the British marines, South African police, Canadian armed forces, the U.S. Southern Command. One presenter noted that even CHDS had contributed by sending one professor to speak on the inter-agency process for counterterrorism programs.

How the RSP threat assessment developed caused some concern – even discomfort – among some participants. The first presentation of the seminar discussed this issue, noting that the list of possible threats initially placed visitor safety from petty crime as the primary concern, and the threat of

#### CRICKET WORLD CUP TOURNAMENT 2007:

The International Cricket Council (ICC) awarded the CWC 2007 to the West Indies Cricket Board (WICB), which represented teams from Antigua, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad & Tobago.

The ICC and WICS agreed to a Master Security Plan, which evolved into the Regional Security Programme developed through CARICOM; its overall cost topped \$13 million. A Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre and an Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) were established; a Regional Law Enforcement Operation team of 400 military and police personnel moved among the venues as needed.

The host countries, joined by Dominica, established a “Single Domestic Space” to last throughout the Tournament, requiring a CARICOM Special Visa, so fans could move freely from venue to venue. Its cost – \$100 – and availability became problematic just before the event began.

Strict security procedures imposed difficulties on the fans, as did the monopoly concessions for food, drink, and merchandise, reducing attendance and profits. One newspaper\* characterized the event as “empty stands, expensive tickets, dull matches, a ‘sterile’ atmosphere and the unexplained death of a coach in his hotel room.” The premise behind the high-risk security concern – terrorism from Islamic countries – dissolved when two of the cricket powerhouses, Pakistan and India, were eliminated early in the event.

The Tournament began on 5 March, between teams from Australia, Bangladesh, Bermuda, Canada, England, Holland, India, Ireland, Kenya, New Zealand, Pakistan, Scotland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, West Indies, and Zimbabwe. The championship match took place on 28 April, during which Australia (281-4) defeated Sri Lanka (215-8) by 53 runs [D/L method].

\*Steve Deane, “Cricket: When you believe your own spin,” *The New Zealand Herald* (5 June 2007).

terrorism and nuclear, biological, or chemical attack was at the very bottom of the list. However, when the first RSP draft was adopted, the order was reversed, because of the political assessment that while petty crime against visitors was a more credible threat, the result of failing to stop a terrorist attack had a much higher consequence (to the politicians). This assessment is true, in the absence of any analysis on the probability of such a threat occurring, even considering the factor of fans visiting the Caribbean from Islamic regions of the world where terrorism is a daily event. Again seeking refuge in history, one must ask, when was the last time a cricket fan from an Islamic country made an attack in the Caribbean region? Was there any credible intelligence that led to this decision?

Threat-based planning is an acceptable tool for planning purposes, but it needs to be balanced with credible probability. Richard Reid’s shoe bomb, proven repeatedly as incapable of downing any commercial aircraft in use today, is still cited as justification for making all airline passengers in the U.S. remove their shoes for inspection prior to boarding. Now, failing to prevent a single airline crash caused by such a device would be catastrophic, and not just to those on board; however, the probability of any such failure is too high to justify the cost and inconvenience imposed on airline companies and their passengers. In applying this argument to the topic at hand, this cost arguably proved too high for the average cricket fan attending the CWC 2007, as attested in various presentations and break-out group discussions at this seminar.<sup>3</sup> The bar of tolerance for risk needed to be raised; the RSP needed to accept more risk in order to make life bearable for those implementing the plan as well as for the fans. Interestingly, there was a split opinion among the attendees in this regard, with operational personnel requesting more risk while policymakers seeking to reduce the risk tolerance. This division is normal, as policymakers and politicians are much more susceptible to the political fallout of policy failures than are the ground commanders, while the latter bear the brunt of public scorn at the moment when unpopular policies are applied. We may never have access to the data to support the ground commander’s assertion that some policies were misguided, but I suspect the CWC 2007 would have been called a greater success by the financial backers, by the fans, and even by the politicians, had security been less restrictive. More fans would have attended the event; sales of souvenirs, food and water at the venues would have been higher; profits to the tourist industry would have been higher, and so on down the list of complaints. Perhaps in a historical study 25 years from now when the data is declassified this argument will be supported. At the very least, it would be fascinating to learn the rationale used to reverse the order of the risk assessment underlying the RSP.

There was almost total agreement that increased dialogue

between civilian leaders and their uniformed counterparts would have led to a smoother transition between the proposed CWC event and its implementation. Several presenters noted that the political leaders thought little of “giving away national sovereignty” to the International Cricket Council (ICC), a problem the security forces had to overcome, given their role as the final guarantor of the state’s sovereignty and security. One participant noted that the dialogue during the Seminar was sufficiently frank that it “re-opened wounds I thought had already healed,” recalling that, as a high-level police official, he was awarded a security pass that only allowed him access to 2 of 6 security zones surrounding a cricket venue, a direct result of the political decision to cede much authority to ICC officials, rather than using regional or national assets to guarantee security and safety during the Tournament. Nonetheless, he was ultimately responsible for security in all six zones.

One presenter believed that politicians had signed away the region’s sovereignty to a non-governmental entity that acted as a sovereign state, a negative opinion backed by others. The opprobrium may be well deserved, though the argument is not totally convincing, as the speakers either ignored or misinterpreted the politician’s objectives. The politicians merely sought to bring the CWC to the West Indies, with the added bonus of praise and adulation for their wisdom and vision in signing the contract with the ICC. Implementing the security program, working out the logistics, ironing out differences, doing the actual work of making the CWC a success was not part of the politicians’ objective, and thus the heaping of scorn is somewhat undeserved. It would be nice if in the process of attracting the ICC those politicians had read the documents they signed, and then followed up on their promises by granting the authority and resources required to implement the objective. But that job belongs to the civil servant, the policeman, the soldier or sailor and their officers, those individuals working through the institutions of government established to implement any program authorized by the elected political leaders.

One surprising lesson learned was the process of working with private security forces, which proved much easier than anticipated. It must be pointed out, however, that this was not the first time Caribbean governments have relied on the private sector for security: in the late 1600s Jamaican Governor Lyttleton appointed Henry Morgan, who could be called a private security expert, as admiral in charge of defending the island from a threat of invasion, a charge he met with professionalism and a great degree of success, both personal and national. Several times the discussion noted that private agencies served as a force multiplier requiring little training to integrate smoothly with the existing state resources.

Specialized expertise was brought in from outside the region, such as combat divers from Colombia, EOD personnel from India, riot control forces from S. Africa, all of which required

sensitive legal negotiations among the ten participating countries to allow armed foreign military personnel within their national borders. A legacy of cooperation remained, along with a considerable volume of equipment to implement the expertise thus gained, specifically in the form of the regional intelligence coordination center and a quantity of command and control equipment distributed among the participating forces.

Passport and visa requirements led to innovative “sunset legislation” that produced a regional visa arrangement, though a lack of early preparation delayed its implementation and increased discontent among fans wishing to attend the games. The enabling legislation was designed to expire at the end of the events, though the precedent remains for any future requirement.

Cultural issues were somewhat controversial throughout the planning and implementation procedures. These should have been considered as early as possible, because the local fan base could react to specific instances in different ways, often unpredictably. In retrospect it seems amazing that even politicians would accept the extra-regional requirement for staffing and operating the security program, despite knowing some tactics would not work in the Caribbean. For instance, prohibiting fans from bringing water bottles into the venues and allowing vendors to charge \$6 per bottle, or the imposition of overly strict pitch infringement rules, or the prohibition on musical instruments in the stands makes little sense in any situation, given the region’s economy and traditions. In this instance, communication could have been crucial, both at the regional level by briefing the ICC officials on specific cultural preferences, and at the local level by informing the fans of ICC requirements well in advance. At the very least, some level of accommodation could have been reached.

Perhaps the most basic but significant realization throughout the region was voiced one of the attendees to the seminar, noting that the successful coordination of all the various components required for the tournament to occur in safety: “We did it! No one can challenge the fact that the West Indians proved they could rise to the challenge of a global program and deliver on their promise. The example set by the cooperative venture is proof positive that the region can join together when needed, even in politically sensitive issues such as security and sovereignty.”

The legacy of legislation and regional integration is probably the best lesson learned, a precedent for increasing integration and cooperation among the governments and security forces almost where little has existed. This has opened a window of opportunity, though for how long it will remain thus no one can tell for certain. The suggestion was made that it be kept open at least until two major international events scheduled for 2009 are successfully completed.<sup>4</sup>

#### ISSUES TO CONSIDER

<sup>1</sup> See Craig Shapley, “The Study of National Security Versus the Study of Corporate Security,” in Martin Gill, ed., *The Handbook of Security* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> See Max Manwaring, “The New Global Security Landscape: The Road Ahead,” *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, 11 (#2/3, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> Early games played to mostly empty stadiums as a result of restrictions on what fans could take with them, combined with high concession and ticket prices.

<sup>4</sup> The Caribbean region will host the 5th Summit of the Americas in April of 2009, anticipating approximately 67 heads of state in Trinidad and Tobago, and the Commonwealth Heads of Government in September of 2009, anticipating approximately 135 Prime Ministers and HM Queen Elizabeth II.