

Lessons Of Peacekeeping Capacity Building: What We Have Learned From The Case Of Haiti

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Introduction

The ongoing United Nations mission in Haiti that began with the Multinational Interim Force-Haiti (MIFH) and continues with the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) raised questions about the capacity of the nations of the Americas to lead and conduct peacekeeping operations (PKO). To what degree were the individual states capable? Why would they choose to participate or not? What factors influenced the participants to do so? To what degree did the participants see the necessary capacity as an inter-agency effort? How well prepared were they to coordinate with other countries? What skill sets are required for effective strategic level participation in PKO? What are the measures of effectiveness for a PKO? And, last, what can the U.S. do to help the nations of the Hemisphere improve their capacity to participate effectively in PKO?

In this concluding essay, we seek to reflect on these questions in light of the research conducted on each of the participating countries. We draw conclusions based on that research that, while generally supporting our initial hypotheses, do suggest that certain modifications are in order. Finally, we offer a series of recommendations for the governments of the nations of the Americas if they desire to increase their PKO capacity. We emphasize here cooperative and collaborative actions that states can take together.

Key Factors Influencing the Decision to Participate

Our first hypothesis focuses on political capabilities, in particular, political will as the central determinant of participation. Our research questions highlighted a number of factors that contribute to political will. The first of these factors is prestige, a term we use in the same sense that Hans Morgenthau did.¹ Nearly all the research papers cite prestige as a key determining factor, most in a very direct form. The major exception is the United States, where prestige plays an important but indirect role. For the U.S., failure in Haiti results in a perceived loss of existing prestige, whereas success adds nothing.

¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978.

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For Brazil, prestige is a very direct and explicit factor. As Eugenio Diniz² argued, Brazil believed that, at best, its participation and leadership role would enhance its goal of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. At minimum, it believed that this role would give Brazil increased voice in world affairs. For Chile, according to Enzo Di Nocera and Ricardo Benavente, an important motive was, "To send a message that Chile's participation, along with that of Brazil and Argentina, in MINUSTAH constituted a strong signal of cooperation and leadership in the region." Luciana Micha argued that for Argentina, rivalry with the other two major MERCOSUR states, Chile and Brazil, was influential, both positively and negatively, in the Argentine perception of prestige attached to the Haiti mission. Argentina's failure to commit its forces rapidly precluded it from one of the two key leadership positions in MINUSTAH. Chile's political leadership role providing the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) and its rapid deployment of forces to both the MIFH and MINUSTAH, along with Brazil providing both the Force Commander and the largest troop contingent made Argentina's participation imperative if it did not want to lose prestige. Paraguay, too, indicated that prestige was a factor in its participation.

In short, a peacekeeping mission in the region, led by Latin American states (with Brazil providing the Force Commander and Chile the SRSG) and Latin Americans providing the bulk of the forces, was perceived as enhancing the prestige of both leading and following states. The prestige attached to being a part of this PKO was a significant driver of political will.

A second, and very important, factor influencing the decision to participate is the sense of international obligation on the part of the force contributors. Far more than the U.S., the research showed that these countries see an obligation to participate in PKO authorized and directed by the United Nations. The participants from all nine countries indicated in their respective research papers the importance they attach to their nation's obligations under the UN Charter. In the case of Paraguay, as is true of many Latin American states, an international treaty not only has the force of domestic law but is hierarchically superior to all conflicting domestic laws. For Paraguay and others, the Charter of the United Nations is just such a treaty.

Canada enters UN PKO as a long-standing matter of national policy. According to the most recent *Defence White Paper* (1994), a central part of the Canadian forces' mandate is "to contribute to global stability..." Specifically, states Glen Milne, "Canada will maintain multi-purpose, combat-capable maritime, land and air forces able to defend Canada and Canadian interests while providing the Government with the flexibility to contribute to international peace and security initiatives."

A third, and related factor, is that of hemispheric solidarity. This factor was specifically mentioned in the papers about six of the nine participating countries (exclusive of the US). Two of these are particularly revealing. Micha notes that the Argentine Minister of Defense stated explicitly, "It is time that Latin America shows that it

² The persons and papers cited in the text are the contributors to the workshop. Some of the comments appeared in the prepared papers; others were made in the context of the workshop.

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has put on long pants.” Milne reviews Canada’s increasing commitment to the hemisphere since about 1990.

While most of the countries engaged in MINUSTAH have some peacekeeping experience, several have either a long tradition or have established centers for PKO training. Uruguay is one of those countries with a long tradition that dates back to the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in the late 1930s. As Rosales states, this gives Uruguay more than 70 years of PKO experience. In addition, he notes that, “Uruguay is the country with the greatest [PKO] presence in the world after China.” It is “involved in 11 of the 16 current UN missions ... and has more than 2,500 troops in [PKO] missions outside the country.” Other countries with major PKO traditions, although they generally date from after the Cold War, include the guarantor powers of the 1942 Rio Protocol dealing with the Ecuador/Peru border - Argentina, Brazil, Chile - and Peru. The four guarantors, including the U.S., as well as Peru and Uruguay, have had long involvement in the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai. Finally, Canada can lay claim to having invented modern UN Peace Keeping with its leading role in – and since – the 1956 UNEF following the Israeli/Egyptian disengagement after the first Sinai war.

The long-term commitment of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Chile has resulted in PKO training and education centers in each of these countries. The two oldest are the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) in Canada and CAECOPAZ in Argentina. Although Chile’s CECOPAZ is relatively newer, it has already established a strong cooperative relationship with the PPC. The existence of these centers provides the potential for synergy in common PKO training for the countries of this hemisphere.

As the late Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Tip O’Neill, is reputed to have said, “All politics is local.” This statement is clearly true for all the countries participating in MINUSTAH, but for none so much as Canada. Milne points out that Montreal’s Haitian community is estimated at 70,000 to 120,000. It goes without saying that Haitian Canadians living in the Province of Quebec are French speakers. What needs to be made explicit, however, is that Haitian Canadians see themselves as Canadians, not as *Quebecois*, and have provided the margin of victory for a united Canada in recent referenda. As a result, Canada has provided significant developmental aid to Haiti, and participated in the MNF of 1994, UNMIH (and its successors – providing the leadership as well as troops and police), MIFH, and MINUSTAH. In addition, “On November 26, 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin announced the appointment of a Special Advisor for Haiti, Denis Coderre, Member of Parliament for Bourassa, in the province of Quebec – where the majority of Haiti’s immigrants to Canada reside.”

For the US, of course, a critical issue in 2004 – as it had been in 1994 – was illegal immigration, especially to south Florida. Napoli points out that the U.S. took great pains in the chaotic period prior to the deployment of the MIFH to preclude illegal Haitian migrants from reaching U.S. shores. According to Pacheco, Guatemala’s national leadership took advantage of the request for forces by the UN to “position the political leadership in the armed forces decision making process,” something that had never been part of the Guatemalan political culture. In fact, Guatemala introduced the PKO

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participation concept as one objective of a more ambitious defense transformation program that envisions new roles and rules for the Guatemalan Army in the post internal conflict period.

Although hardly so overt as Guatemala, Obando suggests that the decision to restructure Peru's armed forces for PKO had important civil-military relations goals. With regard to Argentina's participation, Micha notes the extensive debate in the Congress over the law authorizing the sending of troops and the political charges that the delay incurred placed Argentina at a disadvantage with respect to Brazil and Chile. The fact that Argentina, like many other countries of the region, must seek specific legislation to participate in PKO is significant. Finally, it should be noted that in Chile there was some opposition to the deployment of the *Carabineros* (national militarized police).

For some countries there were clear economic and military incentives to participate. In some cases, such as Peru, this amounted to "a significant increase in resources not only for the participating soldiers but also for the military institution itself." Obando also points out that for Peru participation provided excellent training opportunities for its forces, especially infantry.

Pacheco suggests that Guatemala is attempting to use participation in UN PKO – MINUSTAH – as a method to fund its armed forces modernization program through the UN monetary reimbursements allocated to those countries participating in peacekeeping missions. The wisdom of this approach is questionable, especially with respect to sustainability over the long term.

For a number of countries – perhaps the majority – the Haiti PKO provided an opportunity to support the U.S. on an issue of some importance while, at the same time, remaining true to their own strongly expressed preference for multinational operations within a UN context. Several researchers noted that their countries saw this operation as an opportunity to ease somewhat strained relations with the U.S. over their stances on the Iraq war.

All of these reasons support the notion that political will – in all its forms – is the critical factor in determining participation in the PKO mission. Nevertheless, the case of Paraguay strongly suggests that political will is a necessary but insufficient condition for participation to actually take place. Carlos Torales pointed out that first the Paraguayan military and then the Congress approved participation. Paraguay then identified 200 soldiers and began training them. At this point the economics of participation took over. Paraguay simply did not have the resources to support a deployment. Its expectation that those resources would be provided by others did not materialize and Paraguay's participation has been limited to six officers deployed to staff assignments. The deployment of the 200 remains in limbo due to a lack of resources.

The Inter-Agency Context of PKO

All of the researchers pointed out the inter-agency nature of PKO. In every one of the countries, the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry were involved in the decision

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making process. The Finance Ministry was also involved in most of the countries. And in a number of countries the legislature had to approve and, in some cases, be convinced that it was in the national interest to participate in the Haiti PKO mission. Nevertheless, the capacity for inter-agency coordination in all of the countries, including the U.S., leaves much to be desired.

National Inter-Agency Capability

Although the U.S. has been addressing the problem of inter-agency coordination in a conscious way since the end of the Cold War, it is clear both from experience and recent press accounts that U.S. interagency coordination still has a long way to go. The effort that resulted in the plans for the 1994 Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti included the first-ever inter-agency, political-military plan that the U.S. government produced. Yet, when it came time to rehearse the plan, one key agency had simply done nothing and had failed to notify the others.³

Milne points out that Canada has a well-developed inter-agency process and applies it regularly to PKO. He states that, "The decisions to participate in Haiti early in 2004 came primarily from the top, the Prime Minister, with assistance from bottom up scanning, analysis, options and recommendations from committees of officials and Cabinet ministers." The principal agencies involved were foreign affairs, defense, international aid, and federal police. "When the UN Security Council passed its resolution re Haiti on February 29th an options paper was prepared within a few hours by a special inter-agency task force of middle level officials and sent up to the Prime Minister..." It was signed by all of the Ministers involved. The decision was slightly different from the options "because it reflected some inputs from ... [the Prime Minister's] senior advisors, a committee of deputy-ministers (heads of departments) discussion of the options by a Cabinet Committee, and consideration of costs by the Department of Finance." As an aside, it should be noted that the Canadian system reflects a parliamentary model that most resembles that of the countries of the Anglophone Caribbean.

A particularly revealing case is that of Peru, as relayed by Obando (who, at the time, was the Director General of Policy and Strategy in the Ministry of Defense). When the UN requested that Peru send a battalion to Haiti, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces "took the easy way" and told the foreign ministry that it lacked the capability to meet the request. This response bothered the senior leadership of the defense and foreign ministries since it flew in the face of the new national defense policy. In addition, these officials, as well as some middle level staff officers within the Joint Command, saw political, military, and economic advantages in participation. The two ministries ultimately prevailed over the Joint Command (or won it over); however, the principal obstacle was the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which refused to provide the necessary funding because of its agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a stabilization

³ See Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, & John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998, Chapter 2.

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program. The problem was finally resolved by the UN suggesting a smaller Peruvian contingent.

The Peruvian case points to two important conclusions. First, a lack of resources may well result in a significantly diminished capability, reflecting a lack of political will on the part of one or more of the agencies engaged in the decision making process. Second, the impact of the stabilization agreement with the IMF on the finance ministry points to the criticality of the inter-agency process at both the national and international levels. (Note that in this case there was conflict between two parts of the UN family of organizations – IMF and Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO].)

In contrast to Argentina, where the role of the legislative debate over participation greatly reduced its ability to respond rapidly to the UN call for MINUSTAH participants, the role of the Guatemalan legislature was marginal. Instead, Pacheco points to a comprehensive assignment of roles and responsibilities to the institutions of the executive branch of government most directly responsible for PKO. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Joint Defense Staff have developed the capabilities for the design and planning of the various aspects of these missions. The highest level decision-making directly involved the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense demonstrating a capability to link staff planning to political decisions.

International Capability for Integrated Operations

As Enzo Di Nocera and Ricardo Benavente point out, the UN mandate for Haiti contemplated a mission undertaken in part under Chapter VI and in part under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They note that some countries have legislation that restricts their participation in Chapter VII missions. In this same vein, Diniz noted that Brazil does not like operating under Chapter VII, and, for that reason, has reduced its participation in PKO in recent years. Yet, Brazil accepted both the Force Command and a major role in providing forces under this mandate though it, nevertheless, sought to confine its role to one under Chapter VI. This situation appears to have produced a degree of conflict between Force Command (Brazilian) and the Brazilian contingent command – a problem of international inter-agency coordination played out between two components of the armed forces of the same nation.

Di Nocera and Benavente also point to the lack of experience of some countries in PKO which hampers their effectiveness. Di Nocera, in his remarks, strongly argued for pre-deployment training of the international force engaged in a PKO mission. In a similar observation, Kretchik, writing of the UNMIH mission, states, “In late February to early March 1995, the UNMIH headquarters staff underwent group training in planning and decision-making under the tutelage of a U.S.-led international team.” This training took place at Fort Leavenworth under the auspices and using the methodology of the US Army’s Battle Command Training Program. Yet, according to Kretchik, “For reasons that remain unknown, no UN mission since then has undergone similar pre-deployment training.”

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Trans-cultural Capabilities

An area of significant weakness among the participating countries that was identified by a majority of the researchers was what we are labeling here as trans-cultural capabilities. These include basic intelligence, language skills, and foreign area specialization. Of these, it should be noted that only basic intelligence is a collective capability; the other two are individual skills that in sufficient quantity can provide a force with a significantly greater capacity to operate in the PKO human environment. In fact, when required by special operations forces these individual skills can produce collective capabilities.

Basic intelligence refers to a body of knowledge about the area of the operation that is needed to conduct effective PKO, as well as other operations. Most of the MINUSTAH participants knew little about Haitian history, economics, politics, or culture. They were largely unaware of the factional conflicts at play, the relations of Roman Catholicism to *Vodun*, the history of internal Haitian violence dating back to its war for independence, or the class conflicts between mulattos and blacks. They generally did not know that nearly all Haitians speak Creole but that only the upper class speaks French. Not only were most of the contingents woefully ignorant about Haiti, they did not have the basic intelligence documents with the needed information.

Of the MINUSTAH participating hemispheric countries only Canada is French speaking and it alone has a significant population of Creole speakers. Thus the lack of the right language skills makes the Latin American participants dependent on interpreters who may, or may not, be trustworthy.

In dealing with Haiti, there is no country that specifically trains its officers or diplomats to specialize in that culture. Even the US generally assigns Africa specialists to attaché duty in Haiti rather than Latin American specialists. But Haiti is not Africa; neither is it like its Latin American fellows. If Haiti is a special case, it nonetheless illustrates the more general situation that few nations have comprehensive education and training programs to specialize their diplomats and military officers for assignment to a particular cultural area of the world. Thus, cultural skills tend to be haphazard at best. Only the US has a foreign area officer program – and then only for its military (and only really effective for the Army) – but not for its diplomats. And only the US has special operations forces – Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs – that have area specialization. The result is that in the area of trans-cultural capabilities Latin American PKO partners will be dependent on either ad hoc adaptations or US support.

Measures of Effectiveness

The issue of how to measure the effectiveness of the MINUSTAH PKO has given the least clear results of any of the research questions. Part of the reason is that there were multiple interpretations regarding what was being asked. Another partial explanation is because we don't really know how to measure the effectiveness of peacekeeping capacity. The researchers generally divided into two groups. The first group defined the question in terms of the UN mandate. They asked whether the political-military mission

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was accomplished. The second group looked more at the capabilities to conduct PKO, but these tended toward the tactical. A few researchers attempted to bridge the two, with limited success.

As far as MINUSTAH is concerned the UN mandate has been met only if it is defined in the narrowest possible way. As with all previous multinational missions in Haiti, dating to the 1994 MNF, MINUSTAH has had little impact on the Haitian future. While it has generally kept Haitians from killing each other, it has yet to institutionalize democratic and responsive government – perhaps, it has not even been successful in the basic establishment of such a government. In any case, for the purposes of this research, evaluating success in terms of the mandate is of little use. Our concern was to address the relative capacity for PKO evidenced by the hemispheric countries participating in MINUSTAH.

Obando argues that what is essential for PKO is adequate training at all levels and Rosales suggests that the way to achieve this objective is through staff and field training exercises. He cites SOUTHCOM staff exercises as particularly useful for the standardization of planning and operational procedures. He also cites field training exercises like the Cabañas series to standardize field operating procedures. The common element of these exercises is the after action review where senior observers give a “no holds barred” critique of the decisions made.

Pacheco suggests that the critical measure of effectiveness is that of integration both internal to the force and external with the other organizations engaged as well as the host country authorities and population. Milne identifies how this integration might be done:

- Conduct interviews and workshops with representatives of all PKO forces on “lessons learned, sharing best practices, and ideas for future operations.”
- Conduct interviews and workshops with local leaders, aid organizations, and citizens on “lessons learned, sharing best practices, and ideas for future operations.”

The essence of the training exercises is to use these to establish standards and procedures that can be evaluated in preparation for a PKO. The essence of the operational evaluation is to make use of the standards and procedures developed in the exercises to focus the evaluation of the lessons of real operations as well as to modify those standards and procedures based on experience in the real world.

Recommendations to Increase Capacity for PKO and Other Integrated Operations

The collective results of this research project suggest that there a number of areas in which hemispheric governments can improve the capacity of the nations of the hemisphere to conduct PKO and, by extension, other integrated operations. The areas of recommendations are those in which the research was conducted:

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1. Motivation for PKO participation.
2. Inter-agency capacity.
3. Trans-cultural capabilities.
4. Measures of effectiveness.

Motivation for PKO Participation

First among the motivations to participate in PKO is international prestige. Participation in international PKO missions is prestigious. Merely to participate offers prestige, especially for the smaller countries. Taking a leadership role – either political (Chile) or military (Brazil), or by being able to provide a PKO contingent on short notice (as Chile did) greatly enhances the prestige of the nation playing that part. As the Argentine defense minister stated, participation in PKO is evidence that the American states wear “long pants.” This same recognition resulted in the demonstration of Argentine maturity in accepting a follower role in MINUSTAH. By extension, then, states need to be realistic about what they can and cannot contribute. A commitment that cannot be supported is one that is better not made since it results in a loss of prestige rather than the desired increase.

As shown above, the Latin American states view their obligations under the UN Charter as both more important and more positive than does the U.S.. Therefore, to the extent possible requests for participation should be made in terms of UN (and/or OAS) obligations. Indeed, it is best if the U.S. is perceived as acting on behalf of, or in a supporting role to, the UN in seeking force contributions from the region.

There is significant residual support for the U.S. throughout the Hemisphere. At the same time, countries are seeking to act independently of the U.S. and, at times, in disagreement with U.S. policy. Countries seeking better relations with the U.S., even when demonstrating their independence, may well find it in their interest to offer to contribute forces to a PKO that is clearly a policy objective of the U.S.

Finally, when it is in the interest of the American states to gain the widest possible participation in a PKO, it will be in the collective interest to help countries where resources are in short supply, but the political will to participate exists. Therefore mechanisms need to be found to rapidly transfer the required resources. This will require significant multinational coordination and may require legislation (to include the appropriation of funds for this purpose) by several of the individual states.

Inter-agency Capacity

Building inter-agency capacity is an important goal inside the U.S. as well as for the region. Although we know what is needed, we have been less than totally successful in institutionalizing this capacity in our own country. Thus, we need a concerted effort to

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build the required capabilities at both the national and international levels. Several approaches commend themselves for consideration.

First, there is an educational (as opposed to training) dimension. Here we recommend that the established components of CHDS' basic course that deals with inter-agency coordination be expanded as well as the current Inter-agency Coordination and Counter-terrorism course. The latter might be expanded to two courses with the second, conceivably, having its secondary focus on PKO rather than counter-terrorism. Another possibility is to expand CHDS' Advanced Policy-making Seminars to include inter-agency coordination (as is planned for the Central American focused APS in May). Finally, crossing over into the training area, would be to emphasize the inter-agency coordination dimension of CHDS' National Security Policy-making Workshops (NSPW).⁴ In a similar vein, we suggest that CEDEYAC in Peru, the various national and service war colleges, and civilian universities expand their courses to include a greater emphasis on interagency coordination both at the national and international levels.

This leads us into consideration of training for inter-agency coordination and PKO. There are a variety of venues that can be utilized and expanded. We should point out that the principal training facilities or programs that can be used for this purpose include several peace keeping institutes and centers in the hemisphere – PPC in Canada, CAECOPAZ in Argentina, CECOPAZ in Chile, and the new Brazilian center – all provide a training capability. The US should support and encourage efforts by these institutions to provide PKO training that emphasizes inter-agency coordination. In addition, the U.S. should participate both by providing exchange instructors and students. Moreover, the U.S. should support collaborative training efforts among these institutions and with SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM. As Rosales suggests, the SOUTHCOM exercise program of both staff and field training exercises should be expanded to include a significant inter-agency component.

Based on the successful training for the UNMIH staff conducted at Fort Leavenworth in 1995, the U.S. should work with the peace keeping centers to develop a staff training program for deploying multinational PKO staffs. These should include the civilian as well as the military staff of the mission. A critical component of all training is the after action review. This can be conducted in the formal manner that the U.S. military uses or in the mode described by Milne and it should take place in both training events and as part of ongoing operations.

Trans-cultural Capacity

If we are serious about building the capacity of international partners to participate in PKO and other integrated operations, then trans-cultural capabilities are essential. The first step is to build up the basic intelligence database beyond what already exists in both unclassified and classified form. A good beginning would be to get the Area Handbook series up to date. This action should be followed by their translation into Spanish and

⁴ It should be noted that these recommendations can apply equally to the other four regional centers.

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Portuguese. The books could then be made available to all our hemispheric partners at no cost, perhaps by offering electronic versions. There is no reason that this effort should be exclusively U.S. Rather, all the countries of the Americas have the kind of expertise required to produce this kind of open source basic intelligence. The U.S. should also seek the reinvigoration of classified basic intelligence documents making every effort to identify as much documented information as possible that can be released to our allies in the Americas and elsewhere. In both cases, the development of these electronic documents should be prioritized based on best estimates of countries where PKO missions are likely.

With regard to language skills, the executive branch of the U.S. government should seek Congressional authorization for the language training of members of the armed forces of the Americas at the Defense Language Institute and the Foreign Service Institute outside the parameters of IMET funding. The argument can be made that such training is in the mutual national interest of all the American states since it will give needed skills to allied armed forces in ways that will relieve demands on U.S. military personnel and enhance the effectiveness of those armed forces in the conduct of PKO.

To increase the foreign area specialization skills of our regional partners suggests the need for a different kind of program. If we look at the components of the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program its three parts are language skill, an academic masters degree in the relevant area studies program, and an in-country training phase. The U.S. should develop a fellowship program for military officers and diplomats that would lead to area studies masters at U.S. universities that are of potential concern in terms of potential future PKO. This program should also be funded outside the current IMET system.

As far as special operations forces are concerned, the armed forces of the hemisphere should undertake the development or expansion of psychological operations and civil affairs capabilities.⁵ Both unit skills are particularly useful in PKO, and especially so when the units have access to good basic intelligence on the area to which they will be deployed and are leavened by a few officers with foreign area specialization.

Measures of Effectiveness

The problem of identifying measures effectiveness of the capacity of the states of the Hemisphere and their armed forces to conduct PKO is complex and reasonably difficult to define. The temptation is to seek measures to evaluate mission success or failure. That process, however, represents an exercise in frustration because it is dependent not only on the capabilities that the forces and civilian officials bring, but also on the will of their governments and the relevant international organization to see the mission through to the end.

⁵ Both Peru and Guatemala have demonstrated significant expertise in psychological operations while the latter has a well-developed civil affairs capability.

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Rather than evaluating mission accomplishment, this research suggests that what is needed is a method to evaluate the capabilities that each state and its institutions bring to a PKO mission as well as the degree to which those capabilities can be institutionalized as capacity. In this line of reasoning it appears that the most promising approach would be the development of standards and procedures against which inter-agency capabilities and other PKO skills can be measured. As recommended above, USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM should sponsor and support both staff and field training exercises using PKO scenarios. The regional peace keeping centers in collaboration with U.S. military organizations, should establish standards and procedures for PKO and other integrated operations that will be exercised. Exercise participants would be critiqued during the after action review (AAR) and the lessons captured for inclusion in the Joint Unified Lessons Learned system and the curriculum of the peace keeping centers. The AAR process would also be used to evaluate performance during ongoing PKO and the captured lessons would be used to modify both doctrine and curriculum. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned, with the support of the service institutions such as the Army's CALL and the Army Institute for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, should be given the responsibility to address this recommendation for the U.S. In addition, there needs to be a Memorandum of Understanding among all the U.S. institutions and the peace keeping centers in the hemisphere to share data, doctrine, and curricula.

A Final Comment

This project has shown that scholars and practitioners from around the region can bring together real expertise that both enhances our collective knowledge and provides practical suggestions for the successful building of the capacity to conduct PKO. This capacity can be extended to many other kinds of integrated operations. If a professional research team can be put together and produce a quality product of this nature in a relatively short time and cost effective manner, then there is no reason why the Americas cannot become the world leader in all aspects of PKO and integrated operations.

All this requires is the recognition that, as the Argentine defense minister said, Latin American states now wear "long pants." With that recognition a full partnership is well on its way to development.