

Capacity Building in Latin America and the Caribbean: PKO and the Case of Haiti

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In 2004, for the second time in a decade, the international community found it necessary to intervene in the Caribbean republic of Haiti to enforce and keep a peace. For the first time under a United Nations (UN) mandate Latin American countries stepped up to lead the mission. Political leadership, in the form of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), was provided by Chile. Brazil agreed to provide the Force Commander as well as troops. A number of other Latin American states also offered troops.

As a result of this unique circumstance CHDS decided to lead a research project that looks at capacity building in the hemisphere for the countries that have undertaken to participate in the PKO mission in Haiti. The objective of the project is to identify the strategic-level lessons learned in capacity building for peacekeeping operations (PKO) by those countries from the region that are contributing to the current Haiti PKO. This includes countries that contributed to the Multinational Interim Force – Haiti (MIFH) as well as those contributing to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Those countries, at present are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, United States, and Uruguay.

The method of the project is one of commissioned research papers elaborated by individual researchers or teams from each of the participating countries. All of the papers address the issues on the basis of nine research questions. These common questions make for comparability among the cases. One paper looks back to the 1994 intervention in Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy and UNMIH) to set the stage for the current PKO.

The project will produce several outputs. First, will be an Executive Summary report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other US government stakeholders. Second, the individual research papers will appear (in the language in which they are written with abstracts in the other two languages – English, Portuguese, and Spanish) in a Special Issue of the CHDS electronic journal, *Security and Defense Studies Review*. Third, three versions will be published as hardcopy books in each of the three languages of the force contributing countries. While the Executive Summary report will be aimed at the US policy community the other venues will address the larger community of influence and interest throughout the hemisphere. The result, we expect, will be something that is useful to policymakers, implementers, and academics throughout the region.

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We have designed the project to achieve three broad, policy related outcomes. As a result of this study:

1. OSD will be able to increase its ability to motivate and achieve increased regional participation in PKO and other multilateral missions.
2. OSD will be able to identify the kinds of incentives and disincentives that lead regional countries to sustain their participation in these kinds of missions.
3. Regional countries will be able to identify their own strengths and weaknesses in terms of participation in PKO and similar missions.

We also expect that all participant countries will be able to learn from the experiences of the several participating countries, thereby increasing their individual and collective capacity for PKO and other integrated operations.

DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

Because this project focuses on capacity, it is critical to explain exactly what we mean by the concept. For our purposes, capacity is a capability (or capabilities) that is sustained over time. This definition, then, requires us to define capability. Thus, a capability is a function of equipment, personnel, support, information, and doctrine. Expressed as a formula: $C = f(E,P,S,I,D)$. Clearly, this formulation implies that training is important, as are command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). What we have described here is a military or, what we might call, an integrated capability. In general, we would identify three broad categories of integrated capabilities – those of military, police, and interagency actors. With regard to military capabilities we see that each service has a set of combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities defined in the form of the function expressed above. Similarly, the police have a series of capabilities – paramilitary/gendarme, dispersed, and investigative. These integrated policing capabilities address the paramilitary constabulary function, the uninformed beat “cop” or patrol car operating in a dispersed way, and the investigative role of a detective force either local, state/provincial, or national. And the interagency actors, if we were to explore them, would have a similar set of integrated capabilities, e.g. intelligence, representation, consular and support (in a foreign ministry).

There is, however, a second type of capability that we have come to believe is crucial. It is a political capability that is made up of a national strategy and political will.¹ A national strategy links the integrated capabilities with political capability while political will determines, and is determined by, a state’s willingness to bear the burden necessary to achieve its strategic objective. The result is that political capacity is the key to success or failure. Lack of political will guarantees failure. Sustained political will over time gives the possibility of success. Integrated capabilities linked to political capability by a national strategy likely will strengthen political will. Integrated capabilities that are not well

¹ See Ray S. Cline, *The Power of Nations in the 1990s*, NY: 1994, Rowman & Littlefield.

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developed will tend to undermine political will. A strategy that fails to make full use of integrated capabilities likewise will tend to undermine political will. Thus, we expect that there is likely to be a strong relationship between political will and integrated capabilities in which increased integrated capabilities will strengthen political will while a decrease or weakness in integrated capabilities will have the opposite effect.

HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Initially, we conceived of this study in inductive terms. As a result, we developed a series of nine major research questions each with several supporting questions. These were shared among the researchers and serve to make certain that the products have a high degree of comparability.²

As we considered the project in greater detail, we revisited the issue of the study objective and the associated research questions. Starting with a clean slate we looked again at the concept of capacity and its building block concept of capabilities. These we discussed in the previous section. As a result of this analysis we developed two major hypotheses each with two sub-hypotheses. These are:

- H1: Countries decided to participate in Haiti based on their political capabilities.
 - H1a: Participating countries chose their role based first on their political capabilities and then on their integrated capabilities.
 - H1b: The same incentives that affected the decision to participate will affect the political capacity to sustain the effort.
- H2: More countries would participate in PKO if their political capacity for the conduct of PKO were strengthened.
 - H2a: Perceived lack of integrated capabilities adversely affects political will.
 - H2b: Countries would participate at a higher level if their political and (to a lesser extent) integrated capabilities were increased.

DISCUSSION

When we address H1 it becomes obvious that objectives are critically important. As the Cheshire Cat told Alice, “All roads lead there if you don’t know where you are going.” But “there” may not be where you want to be. Indeed, where you want to be at the end of the journey is the objective and it should be found in a national strategy. Thus, the political objectives of participating in a PKO are the first consideration in testing this hypothesis. A national strategy, however, consists of two additional parts beside the objectives. First, are the courses of action (COA) that lead to the objectives. The COA

² See Appendix for the list of research questions.

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answer the “how” question – how do we achieve the objective? Given that we can describe what we must do to achieve the objective, we must address the third part of the strategy – resources. This answers the question, “with what”? The assumed answer in H1 is that the resources are adequate to carry out the COA – or can be made so. In other words, a third party will supply missing resources. If a third party does not provide missing resources, then we would expect to find the force providing country waiting on the sidelines.

With regard to the first sub-hypothesis we expect to find that force providing countries weighed the interaction between their political capabilities and their integrated capabilities before offering to provide forces. However, we strongly suspect that the driving force behind their decisions were their assessment of their political capabilities. In some cases we would expect to find linkage between types of capability to have been made explicitly and addressed clearly. In other cases, the linkage is likely to have been only implicit. If this is indeed the nature of the relationship, it suggests that an appropriate direction for US policy of support for capacity building in the region is to assist in improving the analytical skills required to assess the capability requirements for participation in PKO.

The second sub-hypothesis states that the incentives that affected the original decision to participate will be at least equally important to the decision to sustain the effort. Some of those incentives are capability (both political and integrated), prestige, perception of obligation, treaty obligation, sense of hemispheric solidarity, and politics (both domestic and international). Clearly, however, experience over time will modify perception and the weight of particular incentives may very well change, resulting in possible changes of policy.

Hypothesis # 2 focuses on political capacity as the driving force behind participation in PKO. If political capabilities over time can be strengthened then we would expect to find more countries willing to commit forces to PKO missions. Nevertheless, the first sub-hypothesis suggests that there is an important relationship between political capability and integrated capabilities. The expected relationship is between the perception of integrated capabilities and political will. Stated in the opposite manner, it suggests that as the perception of a state’s integrated capabilities increases its political will to participate in PKO will also increase.

The second sub-hypothesis focuses on the level of participation. Here the expectation is that as political and integrated capabilities increase participation in PKO would rise to a higher level. In this case, we would expect to find states with greater political capabilities undertaking more leadership roles. We would also expect those states to have greater integrated capabilities and to assume a wider variety of tasks with larger numbers of deployed personnel.

In brief, our hypotheses suggest that capacity for PKO, and other integrated operations, is a result of the development of a number of discreet but related capabilities and the ability to use and sustain them over time. We expect to find that there is a powerful relationship between the components of the political capability – national

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strategy and political will – and the several integrated capabilities. We do not, however, expect to find that the relationship is one to one. Instead, as in most socio-political relationships, we expect the relationship to be complex both between the two hypothesized variables in that they may well tend to interact in reciprocal ways and in that there are likely to be a number of intervening variables to further add to the complexity. Moreover, the way we have structured this research we will not be able to show quantitatively the degree of correlation we expect to find. Rather, we will be able to demonstrate in a rigorous qualitative fashion how these variables relate to each other through the conduct of a series of comparative case studies among the participants in the MIFH and MINUSTAH missions. Comparability has been ensured by the use of a common series of research questions (see Appendix).

METHODOLOGY

We developed this research project by asking researchers from each of the countries from the hemisphere that participated in one or both of the Haiti operations – MIFH and MINUSTAH – to draft papers based on the common research questions. These papers were then presented and discussed at a workshop held in Washington on December 3, 2004. Based on that discussion and further guidance we requested the authors to revise their papers. .

In this final stage, we have lost the paper on Paraguay due to questions of time and priorities. Nevertheless, the important insights of the Paraguayan research are captured in the final analytical chapter of this report.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This chapter introduces the report. It has discussed the nature of the project and how it developed and was modified. It further identified the hypotheses and sub-hypotheses and discussed our expectations regarding each. The following chapters address each of the comparative cases beginning, first, with a chapter on the antecedents of the current intervention, and, in the next section, with the states that participated in MIFH – the U.S., Canada, and Chile. Chile forms a bridge case between MIFH and the UN mission, MINUSTAH. The next section looks at the countries with the largest contingents and longest PKO experience, as well as the state providing the Force Commander – Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Finally, we look at some of the countries that have not played such a large role in PKO in the past – Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru. We conclude the report with an analytical chapter that includes recommendations for countries that wish to conduct PKO and other integrated operations as well as states that seek to support those who would be force providers.

APPENDIX

Research Questions

1. What factors influenced the decision to participate in the Haiti PKO?

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- Capability
 - Prestige
 - Sense (perceived) of obligation
 - Legal (treaty) obligation
 - Hemispheric Solidarity
 - US – bilateral influence
 - Feeling of threat
 - Politics (domestic and international)
2. How was the decision taken?
- Was it top down, bottom up, or a combination?
 - What institutions were involved/consulted?
 - Foreign Ministry
 - Defense Ministry
 - Interior Ministry
 - Finance Ministry
 - Other ministries
 - IGOs & NGOs
 - What criteria were employed in making the decision?
 - What was the concept?
3. How was the mission designed and planned? By whom? To what extent was it shaped by external influences?
- Which ministries?
 - Which institutions? (Role of the Armed Forces [individually and collectively] and joint staff?)
 - Which ones dominated?
 - What were the external influences, if any?
4. What were/are the political objectives of the mission? Economic objectives (if any)?
- How do they relate to the criteria used to decide to participate?
5. What were/are the military/security objectives of the mission?
- Are they congruent with the political objectives? Economic objectives?
6. Have the objectives changed over time? In what way? Why?
- Political
 - Economic
 - Military (security)

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7. What independent variables influence the effectiveness of combined military forces, police forces, and civilian agencies in international missions to support governance, law and order, and institution building of fragile states (PKO)?
8. What performance measures can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of combined forces conducting integrated operations in international PKO either in the Western Hemisphere or conducted by nations of the Western Hemisphere?
9. What are the key recommendations for policy-makers to enhance the capabilities for PKO and other integrated operations within a framework of regional security cooperation?