

Getting Here from There: Multinational Force and Haiti's Quest for Democracy

Walter E. Kretchik
Western Illinois University

On 29 February 2004, Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide resigned his office and fled into exile after internal upheaval and external pressure from both France and the United States (U.S.), both of which had ordered their citizens out.¹ On 29 February 2004, after a request for support from the interim Haitian government, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1529 authorized a three month Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to secure and stabilize the country and to "support [newly appointed] Haitian President Boniface Alexandre" in his quest for political harmony.² MIF troops from Canada, Chile, France, and the U.S. arrived to ensure stability until a robust UN peacekeeping force appeared. In April 2004, UNSCR 1542 created the UN Stability Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a force capped at 6,700 troops and 1,600 civilian police. Brazil provided the majority of forces (about 1200 troops) under Brazilian Lt. Gen. Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira with mission handover occurring on 1 June 2004.³

Aristide's departure signaled the continuation of yet another troubled period in Haiti's history, an account rife with political discord and human rights violations. In considering these political woes and repeated multinational efforts to assist in rectifying them, at least two questions come to mind: "How did Haiti's security situation evolve into its present situation?" and, arguably more importantly, "How effective has multinational force been in assisting the government of Haiti in its quest for democracy?" By properly analyzing these queries, the Haiti case may yield valuable lessons that will aid hemispheric nation-states seeking to build capacity for the conduct of current and future multinational peacekeeping missions. That said, no analysis of present conditions in Haiti can be considered adequate without understanding past events. Haiti's current circumstances are rooted in experiences that can be divided into two categories suitable for the purposes here: what transpired before the intervention of multinational forces in 1994 and what has occurred since that point.

¹ Paisley Dodds and Ian James, "Aristide Flees into Exile; U.S. Dispatches Marines." *Associated Press*, 1 March 2004.

² "United Nations Security Council Resolution 8015." [resolution online], accessed 31 October 2004; available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8015.doc.htm>.

³ "United Nations Security Resolution 1542 30 April 2004." [resolution online], accessed 1 November 2004; available from http://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/peace_security/peace_ops/conflicts/Haiti_Articles?SCRes_1542.pdf. Other force contributors included Argentina, Chile, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay.

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The Pre-Multinational Era: 1804-1994

Recent United Nations (UN) and other organizational forays into the Western Hemisphere's most impoverished country follow in the wake of what Donald E. Schulz calls periodic waves of political violence with the Haitian people as its victims.⁴ The evidence for such social pandemonium is both profuse and well documented. Scholars such as Robert Debs Heinl, Deidre McFadyen, Pierre Laramee, Mark Fried, Fred Rosen and Robert Fatton have described Haiti as a place where violence reigns and people are victimized. Once considered by many observers as the pearl of the Caribbean for its natural beauty and French colonial architecture, Haiti now conjures up images of filth, utter despair, and endemic political corruption.⁵

The 2004 example of violent behavior notwithstanding, Haitian political mayhem can be traced at least to a late-eighteenth century uprising against French colonialism. In 1791, Haiti's revolution commenced when inspired Haitian war veterans of the American Revolution gained knowledge of the French Revolution's recognition of the Rights of Man. Political intrigue with Britain, France, Spain, and the U.S. soon followed, as well as a bloody revolt to eradicate French colonial power. Ultimately, the so-called "first Black Republic in the Western hemisphere" emerged on 1 January 1804.⁶

Fearing that mob rule might affect them in the same way it had their former French masters, the revolution's leaders cast aside the ideals of liberty, equality, and freedom to impose an iron-fisted caste system upon the country. Rooted in Haitian mulatto and slave culture, the rigidly controlled political framework embraced privilege, family allegiance, and racism.⁷ Trickery kept the superstitious masses terrified, illiterate, impoverished, and powerless. Meanwhile, political tactics designed to retain power through fear and distrust imposed both dread and a respect for authority upon Haitian society.

Consequently, while Haitians considered themselves a separate people due to language and culture, Haiti's elites consolidated power--the ability to make, execute, and enforce policy--at the top. The masses became quarry for the upper class and soon trusted few individuals outside of family bloodlines. Over time, a predatory society developed, one so lacking in public virtue that John Sweeney described it as "the

⁴ Donald E. Schulz, "Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart?" *Parameters*, Winter 1997-1998, 73-91.

⁵ Robert Debs Heinl, *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995*. New York: University Press of America, 1996. Deidre McFadyen, Pierre Laramee, Mark Fried, and Fred Rosen, *Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1995. Robert Fatton, *Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

⁶ James G. Leyburn, *The Haitian People*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 196), 22-23. The point of Haiti being a republic is debatable, for autocracy, not republicanism, has driven Haitian politics for two centuries.

⁷ Haitian racism is based upon skin tone, with the lighter the skin the better. See Karen Richman, "The Protestant Ethic and the Dis-Spirit of Vodou" in *Immigrant Faiths: Transforming Religious Life in America*, Karen Leonard, ed. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2004.

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poorest, least educated, and most socially polarized country in the Western Hemisphere.”⁸

Emerging from these restless social conditions was Jean-Jacques Dessalines, an illiterate military commander who named himself governor-general for life. Elites quickly opposed Dessalines for seeking popular support through land reform; he was murdered in 1806. The homicide served to reveal three Haitian societal realities: civic virtue (for political gain or otherwise) leads to intimidation or assassination, violent removal of officials or opposition is an accepted engine for social change, and populist leaders threaten the privileged classes. Guided by those social rudders, the Haitian people endured twenty-two heads of state between 1843 and 1915, with fourteen removed by force, two with fates unknown, and only one completing the term of office.⁹

By 1915, Haiti’s geographic location along the Windward Passage enmeshed it within a U.S. government hemispheric quest to expunge European imperialism and thus protect liberty through the creation, shaping, and regulation of stable, free market societies.¹⁰ Haiti, as with many Latin American and Caribbean states of the time, was a target country for such policy due to the high amount of debt owed to foreign banks, primarily German. But one regional entity that often defaulted on repaying foreign loans, the Haitian government was particularly adept at siphoning money gathered from import taxes to enrich itself.

More importantly, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, European powers projected naval power into the western hemisphere and occasionally shelled regional states to encourage the payment of foreign debt. After August 1914, the Great War in Europe incited an American government fear of Haitian debt collection by foreign powers. Capital was required to pay for the conflict and Europeans had already demonstrated a willingness to use coercive force to extract money owed from western hemisphere states. If rival fleets clashed in the Caribbean or sought bases there, the region was certain to become destabilized and the Panama Canal threatened. A neutral America would then be dragged into a foreign conflict.

In 1915, the murder and public dismemberment of Haitian President J. Vibron Guillaume Sam provided President Woodrow Wilson with a motive to invade the troubled country and prevent international mischief there. Citing the rationale of protecting U.S.

⁸ John Sweeney, “Stuck in Haiti.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 102 (Spring 1996), 1142-151.

⁹ James G. Leyburn, *The Haitian People* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 16-17, and Robert Heintz and Nancy Heintz, *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995*, Michael Heintz, ed. (New York: University Press of America, 1996), 33.

¹⁰ In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine, an outcome of Thomas Jefferson’s views of the so-called “American System,” had proclaimed that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonialization as a reaction to a British treaty suggestion that also involved Russia. An unenforceable proclamation given the weakness of the American military and economy relative to the powers it had just threatened, it regardless indicated a growing U.S. government intolerance for European empires and their economic hegemonic policies. The Monroe Doctrine later served as a driver for U.S. government foreign policies in penetrating regional countries to expand free trade and to further U.S. business interests.

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citizens and property as legal justification for intervening in sovereign states, a small invasion force led by Rear Admiral William B. Caperton landed in Haiti on 28 July 1915. Although intended to provide temporary security and stability characteristic of the “Banana Wars” era of U.S. history, initial success evolved into an enduring occupation lasting until 1934. For nineteen years, the U.S. government improved Haiti’s politics, economics, culture, and infrastructure, fought off uprisings, and created national police forces to help ensure order.¹¹ American efforts succeeded in the short term but the methods used often reflected racial attitudes of the time that alienated the elites. Moreover, the American occupiers shunned training and educating the Haitians to maintain their rejuvenated society, which soon returned to pre-invasion norms after 1934 due to the lack of interest, funds, and job skills.

Between 1940 and the 1960s, a relative political calm ensued in Haiti as bi-polar Cold War maneuverings kept the country in the U.S. orbit. Under Haitian strongman and proclaimed anti-communist François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, Haiti followed a policy of “negritude,” which combined mysticism, Haitian *voudoun*, and African-roots revivalism while also promoting terror and brutality to keep social order. Duvalier transformed the U.S.-created Haitian police or *gendarmierie* into a predatory force that only served him and also formed the *tonton macoute*, a militia named after the Haitian folklore figure “Uncle Knapsack,” the malevolent kidnapper of troublesome children.

After Papa Doc Duvalier’s death in 1971, Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier succeeded his father by a resolution that passed 2,391,916 to 0.¹² Yet, the younger Duvalier shunned ruling, even to maintain his own position. After \$2 million was spent on his wedding to a wealthy mulatto, the impoverished masses were so sickened by the extravagances of wealth that many fled across the Caribbean by boat and thus attracted international attention. Forced to resign in 1986, Duvalier’s absence led to an ill-fated junta under Haitian Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy. Ousted in 1988, Namphy was replaced by Prosper Avril, who served for a year before leaving office for an interim presidency.

By early 1990, events suggested that the country’s grim past might take a more sanguine twist. Centuries of dictatorship and military rule ended in 1990 when Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a populist and Roman Catholic priest, campaigned as a political reformer with *Lavalas* (“the flood” in Haitian Creole) as his platform. After six weeks of stumping, Aristide became Haiti’s first democratically-elected president after garnering sixty-seven percent of the votes.

After assuming office on 7 February 1991, Aristide spoke of an aggressive and unachievable array of social reform programs, to include minimum wage increase, a national literacy campaign, land reform, the abolition of rural section chiefs, tax collection from the rich, ending drug trafficking, and cracking down upon government corruption. Initially, Aristide’s publicly-mandated government showed signs of competency and

¹¹ See for example, Lester D. Langley, *The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988.

¹² Elizabeth Abbott, *Haiti: An Insiders’ History of the Rise and Fall of the Duvaliers*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 159.

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general acceptance. His populism, however, signaled his downfall. One month after Aristide took office, Roger Lafontant, the former Interior Minister and head of the *tonton macoutes*, attempted a coup. The overthrow failed but Aristide never reconciled his political agenda with Haiti's elites, military leaders, and the masses.

In the wake of Lafontant's power bid, President Aristide verbally attacked the prevailing upper class in his *Pe Lebrun* speech of 27 September 1991. Although claiming non-Marxist leanings, Aristide chastised the predatory upper class as "bourgeoisie thieves." Demanding that the wealthy and powerful cease the fleecing of the people and instead invest money in jobs, Aristide warned "if you don't do it, I am sorry for you! It's not my fault, you understand?"¹³ Such threats rattled Haiti's elites and the military; Aristide soon fled to Venezuela after a coup led by Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras.

Numerous acts of barbarism marked the Cedras regime to include the arrest, murder, torture, and rape of thousands of Haitian citizens and prominent Aristide supporters. At least 5,000 Haitians were killed while another 10,000 fled the country. About 300,000 people became internally displaced out of fear of their lives.¹⁴ Pressure by the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the U.S. brought economic sanctions upon the country, a situation that barely affected the Cedras junta while driving the masses into further despair. The sanctions had some positive effect, however, for on 3 July 1993 both Cedras and Aristide separately signed the Governors Island Accord, setting an October 1993 date for the junta to leave Haiti, with amnesty.¹⁵

On 11 October 1993, the junta orchestrated a potentially violent dockside demonstration that repulsed a UN peacekeeping force aboard the USS *Harlan County* that was sent to set conditions for Aristide's return. Cedras and his thugs embarrassed both the UN and the U.S. government as the naval vessel departed without discharging the multinational force. Military planning soon commenced, headed by the U.S. Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia. Negotiations and sanctions failed to convince the junta to leave and, on 31 July 1994, UNSCR 940 authorized all means necessary to restore democracy in Haiti under Chapter VII of the UN charter.¹⁶

The passage of UNSCR 940 allowed the U.S. government to forcibly invade Haiti in September 1994. On 18 September, one day prior to the intervention, U.S. President William Clinton announced that the MNF was deploying "Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 940," as a heavily-weighted U.S.-led international coalition from twenty-five nations tasked to create a safe and secure environment and support the

¹³ "President Jean Bertrand Aristide's Speech of Friday, 27 September 1991, translated by the *Haitian Observateur*," [document online] accessed 16 September 2004; available from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43a/009.html>.

¹⁴ Karin von Hippel, *Democracy By Force: US Military Intervention in the post-Cold War World*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 98.

¹⁵ "Governors Island Accord," [document online] accessed 12 October 2004; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1998/kretchik-appendixd.htm>.

¹⁶ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 940." New York: United Nations, Resolution S/Res/940, 31 July 1994.

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return of exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti.¹⁷ With military forces converging on Haiti by air and sea on the night of 19 September, only a last minute peace delegation approved by President Clinton and led by former-President Jimmy Carter averted combat operations. While saving lives, the decision proved unwise. Combat was required to conquer the country and thus force the junta's unconditional surrender or obliteration, a necessary condition for reinstating democracy by force.¹⁸ Without a conquering army on the ground upon Aristide's return, a complete societal overhaul by the occupying nations, something that Haiti clearly required, was now impossible.

The Post Multinational Force Era

Humanitarian efforts may have spared lives and property damage but it also left the American-led invasion force in the ignoble position of orchestrating both the removal of the junta and the return of President Aristide while working alongside the unrepentant Haitian military. The international community and the Haitian people were stunned as the UN forces of democracy apparently tolerated a military known for brutality and predatory traits. The situation set the tone for future UN force rotations in Haiti: international agencies sought to build democracy through a variety of cooperative and persuasive measures rather than by outright domination.

Operation Uphold Democracy (September 1994-March 1995)

Under the moniker of Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S.-led multinational peacekeeping force (MNF) underwrote Aristide's ensuing return to office.¹⁹ Conducted from September 1994 through March 1995, about 20,000 American service men and women and approximately 5,000 non-U.S. forces served in the MNF.²⁰ While the U.S. had the capacity to accomplish the invasion without outside help, CARICOM forces

¹⁷William J. Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Haiti, 18 September 1994," [speech online] accessed 5 November 2004; available from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_n38_v30/ai_16354742.

¹⁸Karen von Hippel, *Democracy By Force*, 185-189.

¹⁹UNMIH was originally established by Security Council Resolution 873, 23 September 1993, to help implement certain provisions of the Governors Island Agreement signed by the Haitian parties on 3 July 1993. Its mandate was to assist in modernizing the armed forces of Haiti [to instill civic values] and establishing a new police force. However, due to non-cooperation of the Haitian military authorities, UNMIH could not be fully deployed at that time and carry out that mandate. After the U.S. invasion, UNMIH assisted the Haitian Constitutional Government and multinational force. UNMIH's mandate was revised under UN Security Council Resolutions 940 and 975 to assist the Government of Haiti in sustaining a secure and stable environment and protecting international personnel and key installations, as well as professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force.

²⁰United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti." New York: United Nations, Report S/1994/1143, 28 September 1994.

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provided the multinational gilding authorized under UNSCR 940.²¹ MNF operations achieved the peaceful restoration of President Aristide to office while propping up a frail government and creating something Haiti never had: a police force that embraced western democratic views of civic virtue.

Possibly the MNF's greatest contribution was to improve but not totally eradicate a malevolent human rights situation. Violence continued, however, spawned by a variety of cutthroats such as section chiefs, attaches, and alleged members of the Revolutionary Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress (FRAPH), although the last assassination attributed to those groups occurred on 4 November 1994 in Mirebalais.²² Under the watchful eye of foreign military power, Haitians assembled freely and expressed their opinions, less the Artibonite region where former-junta thugs still wreaked havoc. Nonetheless, large numbers of internally displaced persons came out of hiding and a sense of security returned where the multinational force established a presence. However, one or two criminal murders occurred daily without respite, an indicator that military security occurs only where the forces are physically located.

Under MIH assistance, Aristide's government took steps to disband the military. Yet, confusion reigned over the former soldiers, particularly with compensation and re-employment. Promises were made to offer jobs within government ministries and retraining programs to be made available. Yet, as assurances proved slow to materialize, a deadly incident on 26 December 1994 at the Haitian army headquarters confirmed the anger of dismissed FAd'H members who needed money, not words, for sustenance. Moreover, although paramilitary forces had declined in visibility, section chiefs and other ruffians continued to intimidate and extort.²³

Although Aristide placed justice system reform high on his list of priorities, finding qualified and incorruptible legal officials proved problematical. The majority of the country remained under the legal interpretation of *commissaires du gouvernement*, some of whom were closely involved with the Cedras régime or had records of human rights violations. Haitian legal system authorities were either incapable or unwilling to prosecute criminals, either fearing family retribution or future lack of patronage. In response, frustrated citizens often resorted to vigilante action and revenge, two well-established Haitian cultural values.

Local assemblies were to appoint Haitian judges but that had not occurred by mission handover. Indeed, many judges were illiterate or not grounded in the law; U.S. Army Colonel Mark Boyatt recalled having to provide copies of the Haitian Constitution to such individuals and then offering classes in citizenship.²⁴ Suitable jails for detaining

²¹ Interviews with Lt. Col. Phil Idiart, Lt. Col. Chris Olson by author, December 1995, United States Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia. Both officers were involved in creating Contingency Plan *Jade Green*, the plan for invading Haiti.

²² United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti." New York: United Nations, Report S/1995/46, 17 January 1995.

²³ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti." New York: United Nations, Report S/1995/46, 17 January 1995.

²⁴ Interview with Colonel Mark Boyatt by author, 28 February 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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prisoners until trial were in short supply, although some were upgraded due to independent Special Forces initiatives, not the MNF. The lack of electricity for the facilities was also a concern, for Haiti lacked a power grid and was dependent upon dozens of diesel-driven power generators. Escapes were common place, records nonexistent, and families provided prison food, not the State. Although the Haitian government established the Commission on Justice and Truth to investigate and correct such matters, little was accomplished by the MNF in this area, for nation-building was not a task.²⁵

Interlaced with the Haitian justice system was law enforcement, in this case the formation of an Interim Public Security Force or IPSF. This police organization, under the training and supervision of the International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program (ICITAP), numbered approximately 3,000 personnel and was comprised of former Haitian military police, FAd'H, Guantánamo detainees, and Haitian expatriates. The force was vetted to ensure they had no human rights violations attributed to them and provided basic police functions until a permanent Haitian national police force came into being. After a dubious background screening, the recruits underwent a six-day training course to instill a police code of conduct and civil rights concern where none existed for two hundred years.

About 800 International Police Monitors (IPM) provided the force with two hours of on-the-job-training each day with mixed results. While enthusiastic at first, many IPSF members became skittish of going on patrol, especially at night when criminal activity intensified. In some cases, international policemen made arrests (although these actions were forbidden by mandate and Haitian law) when crimes occurred but an IPSF officer failed to act. Moreover, the IPSF lacked essential equipment such as communications gear and proper vehicles and their effectiveness was limited. By March 1995, the UN had serious doubts that most IPSF members could join the to-be-formed Haitian National Police (HNP) due to its minimum education requirement for police school being the tenth grade and a baccalaureate required for academy entrance.²⁶

Foreign intervention alone under the MNF did not end the turbulent undercurrents in Haitian society although, to some pundits, political violence tempered to some degree. While true when comparing the rate of violent incidents taking place before and after intervention, Haiti's imbedded social beliefs, attitudes, and values remained virtually untouched. One informed Haitian said, "It won't take much for things to go back to what they were."²⁷ As with an outwardly calm volcano, lava bubbled deeply within.

²⁵ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti." New York: United Nations, Report S/1995/46, 17 January 1995. Karin von Hippel, *Democracy By Force*, 103-104.

²⁶ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti." New York: United Nations, Report S/1995/46, 17 January 1995.

²⁷ Interview with Anthony Ladouceur by author, March 1996, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Schultz described Haitian culture as dysfunctional and the development of a "syndrome of destructive/self-destructive political behavior marked by authoritarianism, paternalism, personalism, patronage, nepotism, demagoguery, corruption, cynicism, opportunism, racism, incompetence, parasitism, rigidity,

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United Nations Mission in Haiti (March 1995-June 1996)

With a belief that international military power might remedy Haiti's troubled political situation, UNSCR 944 of 29 September 1994 also set the stage for eventual mission handover from the MNF to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Over the next few weeks, UN observers and their equipment flowed into the country and by 5 October the advanced team totaled forty-nine personnel. UNMIH personnel worked with the MNF to keep track of ongoing events and also achieved a mission first. In late February to early March 1995, the UNMIH headquarters staff underwent group training in planning and decision-making before mission assumption under the tutelage of a U.S.-led international team.²⁸ For reasons that remain unknown, no UN mission since then has undergone similar pre-deployment training.

For all that the MNF accomplished in providing stability, Haiti was still a dysfunctional country in March 1995. Despite MNF command proclamations of a secure environment as UNMIH mission handover approached, Haiti's violent political realities resurfaced. During the afternoon of 28 March 1995 and three days before UNMIH assumed its mission, Mireille Durocher Bertin and Eugene Baillergeau Jr. were shot dead in their car along Martin Luther King Boulevard in Port-au-Prince. Bertin was a prominent lawyer and an outspoken Aristide critic. Baillergeau was a client and had the misfortune of accompanying her to a meeting. Members of the MNF and the IPSF responded quickly, albeit too late to save either Bertin or Baillergeau. Doubtful that the investigation could be handled with internal security forces, U.S. Department of State representatives contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation and asked them to investigate the brutal killings.²⁹

After six months of MNF intervention to stabilize the country and to support the UN mandates and various agencies involved, the responsibility for assisting the Government of Haiti fell to UNMIH on 31 March 1995. Operating under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the force supported the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in

intolerance, rivalry, distrust, insecurity, vengeance, intrigue, superstition, volatility, violence, paranoia, xenophobia, exploitation, class hatred, institutional illegitimacy, and mass apathy, aversion and submission. See Schultz, "Whither Haiti?," 3. Interviews with various U.S. military members revealed that they reflected little upon the time they spent in Haiti and their views regarding effectiveness contained only personal experiences. Thus, opinions varied from soldier to soldier.

²⁸ Walter E. Kretchik, "Multinational Staff Effectiveness in UN Peace Operations: The Case of the U.S. Army and UNMIH, 1994-1995." *Armed Forces and Society*, 29:3 (spring 2003), 393-413.

²⁹ See The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 19. As reported in that document, Haiti plagued American foreign policy because "In the Western Hemisphere, only Cuba and Haiti are not democratic states." For an assessment of half-way measures and Haitian cultural intrigue see Schultz, "Whither Haiti?," 2-3. For Clinton's rationale for invasion see Schultz, "Whither Haiti?," 20 and Bob Shacochis, *The Immaculate Invasion*, 51-53. For a detailed report on the Bertin-Baillergeau murder see the testimony of William E. Perry, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI, March 30, 1995, <http://www.us.net/cip/perry.txt> (24 June 2000).

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establishing free and fair legislative elections. The 6,000-personnel multinational force was led by U.S. Army Major General Joseph Kinzer.

Upon arrival, Kinzer found that Haiti was more unstable than imagined. Finding Chapter VI unsuitable and requesting what he called “Chapter VI and a half,” he proceeded to establish five patrol districts that covered Haiti in its entirety. A Pakistani battalion controlled Zone I, while a Nepalese battalion was responsible for Zone II. A Dutch company operated within Zone III and CARICOM located itself within Zone IV. U.S. forces patrolled Zone V (Port-au-Prince) and Zone VI fell to the Bangladesh force.

By March 1995, Haiti’s government was to have assumed responsibility for its own security with UNMIH in support. Crime, however, was higher than even acceptable Haitian norms and the IPSF was not up to the task. While the people were joyous at having Aristide back as president, a feeling of public insecurity and mistrust permeated society, for the police proved incapable of securing the country from violence.

The lack of an effective police force posed problems for the national elections scheduled for June 1995. In March, forty-three Haitians died due to vigilante killings, while three more incidents occurred in the first few weeks of April. The Haitian government’s response was to make the public aware of the legal consequences of vengeful murder, although that had limited effect. For some UN observers, UNMIH’s operating under Chapter VI instead of Chapter VII led to continued crime because the probability of coercive measures was reduced, although the threat to UNMIH personnel was low. Regardless, as the UN Secretary-General reported, “the possibility of incidents during routine operations should not be underestimated.”³⁰

UNMIH faced two significant issues in its initial stages, the status of the Haitian police and parliamentary and local elections slated for 2 and 25 June, respectively. The force was also involved with the Haitian Police Academy, established on 3 February 1995, and its four-month academic program. In the meantime, the IPSF continued to operate at a low level of motivation; future unemployment possibilities and failure to be paid salaries being but several factors. Morale slumped due to the government’s failure to consider the IPSF members for alternative employment when their mission ended.³¹

As far as the elections were concerned, the process was complicated by 27,000 candidates for 2200 office positions and forty-five political parties, of which eighteen were considered viable. UNMIH personnel attempted to work with Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Committee (CEP) but found most of the members inexperienced in how to plan, prepare, and execute legitimate democratic elections. UN troops found themselves assisting Haitians to not only comprehend the intricacies of democratic elections but also with locating polling stations, arranging for ballot security and distribution, and providing

³⁰ United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti.” New York: United Nations, Report S/1995/305, 13 April 1995.

³¹ United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti.” New York: United Nations, Report S/1995/305, 13 April 1995.

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discreet site security. The UN charter forbade personal protection for candidates, although several people asked for such security.³²

International support for the Haitian elections fell to the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), a group chartered to monitor unrestricted ability to express public opinions, resolve differences, and investigate irregularities. When the OAS recruited and deployed international observers for the elections, UNMIH military personnel assisted in this effort, a significant assignment considering that Haiti's estimated 2,500,000 voters were only fifteen to twenty percent literate. Handbills and leaflets were of limited worth, so UNMIH relied more upon radio and television broadcasts when announcing election-related information.³³

The road to Haitian elections in June 1995 was filled with pitfalls. Haiti's streets were places of murder and attacks during all hours of the day and UN and OAS observers talked of likely voting irregularities. For both the Haitian government and UNMIH, however, the elections were a necessary step toward legitimizing the progress of democracy, both internationally and nationally, and for gauging the success of multinational forces in such endeavors. For his part, Aristide and his government had to prove that their own and international efforts to democratize Haiti were not in vain.

The weeks prior to the election saw violent attacks on candidates and the loss of 800,000 voter registration cards. Although the government claimed three million Haitians were registered to vote, all the parties criticized the process. Growing apathy among the populace indicated a fear that their vote was insignificant or would result in additional violence. Their concern was well founded, for a candidate from the *Union des Patriotes Democratres* (UDP) was shot and wounded at a political meeting on 28 May 1995. Two days later, Senate candidate Renaud Bernadin, head of *Pati Louvri Barye* and an Aristide advisor, was attacked in Cap-Haitien, apparently in an effort to influence the elections.

In the wake of this violence, 408 Haitian police officers graduated from the academy on 4 June. At the highly-publicized ceremony, President Aristide announced that the new force was to increase from 3,300 officers to 6,000. Haiti's national police force now numbered about the size as its predecessor, the 7,000-man FAd'H. Unlike their repugnant predecessor, however, the new force was to embrace democratic but alien societal views of being removed from politics and having a sense of civic virtue. President Aristide, a product of his own societal norms, failed to make the transition when he reminded the "apolitical" graduates, "Alone we are weak, together we are strong, [and] together we are *Lavalas!*"³⁴

When elections were held in June, both Haitians and neutral observers contested the results. While some saw Haiti's voting as "generally free and fair with some

³² Kinzer interview.

³³ Kinzer interview.

³⁴ "US pushes for 7,000 Haitian cops." *Weekly News Update on the Americas*, Issue 227, 21 May 1995. Secretary Of State Warren Christopher, "Remarks At Haiti Police Academy Graduation Ceremony." Presidential Palace, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 4 June 1995.

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irregularities," the voter turnout was hardly overwhelming--about 70% of the eligible electorate. Several polling stations were burned down and two weeks later the results were still not officially announced, partially due to accommodating voting places that had remained open for but a short time. UNMIH had provided sufficient logistical assistance to ensure that ballots were delivered, used properly, safeguarded, and counted. A pro-Aristide, multi-party coalition called the Lavalas Political Organization or *Organisation Politique Lavalas* (OPL) won a landslide victory at all levels.

June also brought a UN resolution to extend UNMIH and its monitoring of Haiti's human rights policies until February 1996. Tension was heightened during this time by anticipated violence in reaction to the eightieth anniversary of the U.S. 1915 intervention but no major incidents occurred. With UNMIH now in continued support of the Haitian government for several additional months, the Haiti's political leaders created several new ministries, to include administration and public service, social affairs, environment, and commerce and industry.³⁵

During the fall of 1995, UNMIH forces continued to patrol the Haitian countryside in anticipation of a government announcement for the expected presidential election. The announcement came on 13 October, and two days later UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali attended ceremonies commemorating Aristide's return of the previous year. As with the previous elections, much was expected both domestically and internationally regarding Haiti's transition to democracy and UNMIH again played a role.³⁶

An unfortunate incident soon marred Haiti's anticipated elections. On 9 November, the killing of President Aristide's cousin, Jen Hubert Feuille, and the wounding of pro-*Lavalas* supporter Gabriele Fortunet nearly derailed the elections scheduled for 17 December 1995. For his part, Aristide accused UNMIH of providing insufficient security for the tottering country, thus directing the fury of his own personal grief onto the international agency. In a way, Aristide menaced the democratization process by talking of remaining in office for three additional years, since he had been denied a full term because of the coup. Although supported by his followers, Aristide came to understand the ramifications of this course of action and later decided not to attempt to extend his term of office. He then unleashed a flurry of activity in his final weeks in office: firing his police chief, announcing plans to marry, and phasing out the tiny Haitian navy with a coast guard.

When the election came, Rene Prével took eighty-eight percent of the vote. Sworn to a five-year term on 7 February 1996, Prével became the first person in Haiti's history to transition between two democratically elected presidents. Agreeing to uphold the constitution and enforce its laws, his vision for Haiti's future was not immediately clear. In sweeping statements calling for Haitians to "join intelligences and unite efforts" in order to do away with "the profound inequities of our society," Prével was leading a country wracked by political violence. Knowing that UNMIH was scheduled to depart on

³⁵ John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 173-174.

³⁶ John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy*, 175.

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29 February 1996, Préval requested that the force to remain in Haiti for his transition period, resulting in a UN extension of the mission until June 1996.³⁷ On 1 March 1996, command transferred from Maj. Gen. Kinzer to Canadian Brig. Gen. J.R.P. Daigle.

Haiti's transformation to democracy lurched forward under UNMIH's supervision. The headquarters provided technical and logistical support to the Haitian authorities responsible for organizing and conducting parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995 but ensuring that the elections were free and fair was never its charter. Although UNMIH provided some assistance in support of the new HNP, transferring democratic values of civil responsibility and apolitical views to a society where such things were unfamiliar concepts went unaccomplished. In truth, UNMIH civilian police were much more adept at organizing Haiti's new Criminal Investigation Unit and helping with formal police training at the Haitian Police Academy under ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Assistance Training Program) than changing Haitian attitudes toward society and each other.

According to Maj. Gen. Kinzer, UNMIH's most significant efforts occurred through more than 1,000 small projects, to include bringing electrical power to the people when such contrivances had never functioned properly or at all. As with the American occupation force of 1915-1934, UNMIH personnel worked with Haitians to improve living conditions such as water, sanitation, electricity supply and roads. Police stations, schools and other public facilities were repaired and training was provided in disaster management, first aid, and other fields.³⁸ Unlike that occupation, UNMIH forces also attempted to educate the Haitians to appreciate such things and to maintain them.

There are, of course, problems when foreign powers intervene to advise and assist desperate countries, especially among Haitians who can prove recalcitrant when it comes to accepting outside ideas. Thus, UNMIH officials had to be culturally sensitive when working with Haiti's government and people as it assumed its responsibilities and functions. Patience, not paternalism, was extremely important in maintaining a secure and stable environment; not only when guarding Aristide or providing security to humanitarian convoys, airports seaports, and storage locations and a myriad of other missions. Haiti's people also required nurturing by building lasting relationships that in turn developed into something that Haitians lacked: trust for perceived authority.

Sensitivity was also necessary when cooperating with representatives of the Haitian government, the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti (Argentina, Canada, Chile, France, the U.S. and Venezuela), and MICIVIH, the entity that assisted with Haiti's many democratic transitional issues. UNMIH efforts thus complemented those of numerous countries and agencies. The burden of overall responsibility, however,

³⁷ United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1048 (29 February 1996) extended and modified the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) mandate until 30 June 1996. See UNSCR 1048 [document online] accessed 12 October 2004; available from <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/resolutions/SC96/1048SC96.html>.

³⁸ Kinzer interview.

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remained firmly situated upon the back of the Haitian government as UNMIH's mandate finally drew to a close.

United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)

With the end of UNMIH, the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was established under UNSCR 1063 of 28 June 1996, to operate under Chapter VI. Consisting of 1300 UN personnel (including 300 police trainers) drawn from Canada and Pakistan, 700 troops remained under separate control of the Canadian government. According to UN Political Affairs Officer Karin von Hippel, the operation was more a U.S.-Canadian venture than international, despite the absence of American troops and the presence of Pakistani forces.³⁹

UNSMIH's mandate continued in the same vein as UNMIH, to assist the government of Haiti in professionalizing its police force and to maintain a secure and stable environment for establishing and training an effective national police.⁴⁰ These missions proved difficult to attain due to ongoing turmoil within Haitian society. Haiti's police force was not competent enough to maintain security, a situation that Préval freely acknowledged when stating "withdrawal of international support at this juncture could jeopardize the objective of completing the creation of the new civilian police" and furthering democracy in Haiti. Indeed, Préval had requested an extension of the UNMIH mandate, or some sort of multinational presence, for six additional months, noting "The current context of the social climate in Haiti requires the Government to have at its disposal an adequate public force for the maintenance of order and security. Our newly established National Police Force is unfortunately not fully in a position to assume that responsibility."

That request, plus UN understanding of the situation, led to the establishment of UNSMIH.⁴¹ It also meant that UNSMIH's civilian police were thinly spread across Haiti, with five detachments in Port-au-Prince and ten in the provinces. Regardless of location, they accompanied the HNP and informed the public about the benefits of community police work, as well as supervising police training through the *programme de formation*, which focused on conflict resolution, human rights issues, immigration, and narcotics, among other matters.

As with previous Haiti missions, UNSMIH's missions were subject to Haitian political chicanery and violence. No sooner had Préval settled into office than former President Aristide verbally attacked his designated replacement as encouraging corruption. Préval, highly dependent on Aristide's nod for popular support, as well as constitutional authority, soon lacked a strong political base to further his own aims. In November 1996, Aristide broke with *Lavalas* and formed the *Lavalas Family*, claiming that the intent was not to undermine the Haitian president but to revitalize the parent

³⁹ Karin von Hippel, *Democracy By Force*, 105.

⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council, "Press Release SC/6237," 28 June 1996.

⁴¹ United Nations Security Council, "Press Release SC/6237," 28 June 1996.

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organization that had been split into several factions, to include the *Organization Politique Lavalas* (OPL) and the *Front National pour le Changement et la Democratie* (FNCD).⁴²

July through September saw increased amounts of violence despite UNSMIH's presence and its augmenting of HNP crowd-control units or *compagnies d'intervention et de maintien de l'ordre* that deployed when trouble arose. Beginning in October, however, politically motivated violence actually decreased but did not end completely, for reasons that still remain unclear. Perhaps the reduction in violence was due to the arrest of Sergeant Joseph Jean-Baptiste, the leader of the *comite revendicatif des militaires*, who led former soldiers in militant actions against the government. Nevertheless, UNSMIH's rules of engagement allowed for the use of force in self-defense and in attempts by any individual or group to impede the execution of the mandate. In an attempt to deflect such incidents, seventeen Creole-speaking policemen arrived from the U.S. in mid-October, a necessary requirement for not only interacting more effectively with the populace but also gathering information about criminal activities.

If UNSMIH could claim any early mandate successes, the training of police certainly fell into that category. On 23 October 1996, sixty Haitian university graduates undertook the required entrance examinations for civilian police training. UNSMIH police assisted the Haitian government in selecting applicants, as well as reviewing files to identify up to thirty candidates for a new criminal investigation unit. Infrastructure repair was also accomplished, to include UNSMIH personnel renovating twenty police stations. More significant, however, was that the Haitian police received paychecks and new police cars, a timely boost to morale. HNP competency also improved, and absenteeism dropped but was not totally eradicated in most districts. One blot on such improvements was that some officers abused their powers, with forty of them being dismissed for serious infractions of their code.⁴³

Despite some success, it was apparent to both the UN Security Council and the government of Haiti that the HNP had not yet attained sufficient proficiency and confidence to undertake their duties without multinational assistance. This was especially true once civil violence again broke out in November 1996, the result of high unemployment, inflation, and the Haitian people's ebbing tolerance for the slow pace of change. Several police officers were killed in the Capital and gang warfare over control of drug trafficking along Haiti's borders and coastline increased. The rise in such incidents, coupled with President Préval's 13 November 1996 request for yet another mandate extension, resulted in UNSCR 1086 of 5 December 1996, with a new mission termination date of 31 May 1997.⁴⁴

⁴² Rebecca Bannister, "Former President Jean Bertrand Aristide Forms New Political Group." *Latin American Affairs*, Vol 6, No. 42, 8 November 1996.

⁴³ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support mission in Haiti." New York: United Nations Security Council Report S/1996/813/Add.1, 12 November 1996.

⁴⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1086, 5 December 1996.

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The extension brought a change in force structure, with 800 additional personnel financed with voluntary contributions from Canada and the U.S. to augment the authorized 800 troops on the ground. During the extension period, UNSMIH troops continued their patrols, renovated additional police facilities, assisted with community policing, and prepared study guides and information sheets for Haitian police and detectives. Unfortunately, many of the Haitian officers refused to avail themselves of these tools, thus again reflecting a cultural trait to treat foreign assistance with suspicion.

Shunning the advice and experience of professional law enforcement officers was an unfortunate course of action for many policemen, given that the inhabitants of Haiti's cities were only partially obeying the rule of law. Indeed, frustrated Haitian security forces were known to engage in "thuggery and disintegrated into warring factions," apparently to impose their own brand of righteousness at a quicker pace than that at which the fledgling justice system operated. Such actions were more characteristic of a frontier zone than a nation-state and caused the Haitian government to declare on 10 December 1996 that the HNP was the only sanctioned law enforcement entity and parallel organizations were not to be tolerated.⁴⁵

Such announcements did little to change matters. By March of 1997, gangs, an illegitimate but *de facto* source of power at the local level of society, caused the deaths of ten people in Cite Soleil. The HNP's ability to arrest gang leader suspects calmed matters for the moment but did little to staunch the flow of drug trafficking and contraband smuggling across Haiti's porous borders and coastline. When the police attempted to crack down, local thugs organized protests that resulted in the burning of a police station and the blocking of roads. Such actions served to demonstrate the strength of self-appointed local potentates through their ability to shun law enforcement and to embarrass the government in its failings to meet the security needs of the people.

By mid-July 1997, and with the UNSMIH mission about to end in two weeks, the Haitian people's ability to transition to democracy was in doubt due to a demonstrated lack of voter confidence and continuing incidents of political violence. Haiti's government was smarting after the 6 April Senatorial election, where voter turnout saw participation by only 10% of registered voters, and also the forced resignation of Prime Minister Rosny Smarth on 9 June.⁴⁶ For many Haitians, irregularities in the electoral process and perceived lethargic government reform created public doubt as to the efficacy of it all.

Clearly, the UN forces had little effect upon Haiti's political transformation but it was not their mission to do so. Focused upon security and legal matters in the realm of law enforcement and assistance, UNSMIH members continued to provide instruction (albeit reluctantly accepted or even ignored) to Haitian police in the areas of conflict resolution, marksmanship, human rights issues, basic driving skills, and immigration and narcotics investigations. UNSMIH's training of *companies d'intervention et de maintien*

⁴⁵ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti." New York: United Nations Security Council Report S/1997/244, 24 March 1997.

⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti." New York: United Nations Security Council Report S/1997/564, 19 July 1997.

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de l'ordre or CIMOs and their movement by helicopters proved essential for crowd control and delivering voting materials to remote areas for the election process. Regardless of such progress, the Haitian police remained a partially-trained force incapable of dealing with the magnitude of the security situation.

In July 1997, the Haitian government's fragility was apparent to many pundits. While the Haitian people in general viewed the reinforcing of democratic institutions as fundamental to a better life, the economic growth and employment opportunities necessary for creating public confidence in a democratically based society had not achieved realization. Progress was slow and both the UN Secretary-General and Haiti's political leaders believed that long-term international support was necessary to thwart a potentially deteriorating security situation.

United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)

On 30 July 1997, twenty-four hours before the expiration of UNSMIH's mandate, UNSCR 1123 established yet another multinational force, the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH). As the third UN effort in Haiti to date and acting under Chapter VI, the force consisted of fifty military personnel and 250 policemen from Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, and the U.S. Headed by Brig. Gen. Robin Gagnon of Canada, UNTMIH's police advisors were tasked to train Haitian policemen in crowd control, rapid reaction force procedures, and National Palace security. UNTMIH members also followed past practice and worked with the UN Development Program to assist with improving law enforcement expertise while furthering the development of the Haitian judicial system. The mandate was to remain in effect until 30 November.⁴⁷

As part of its mission, UNTMIH security forces were also to protect any personnel who assisted the Haitian police. This mandate nuance demonstrates the realities of the situation, for not only were Haitian police subject to attack but also those who stood by them. This was no insignificant matter, for previous UNSMIH diagnostic studies had revealed numerous problems in the area of Haitian police leadership. Among the nine police districts, only three had shown progressive improvement in police behavior toward the populace; the remaining six continued to perform human rights violations and demonstrate abuses of authority.⁴⁸ When UNTMIH forces were deployed to these districts, their ability to influence and reform local police authority remained questionable.

Some analysts may point to the lack of resources and facilities as diluting the effectiveness of the HNP but the issue is much more complex. Traditional Haitian cultural tendencies to form vigilante groups that seek retribution, as well as the formation of private security firms to earn much needed revenue, served to undermine government

⁴⁷ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1123." New York: Security Council Resolution 1123, 30 July 1997.

⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti." New York: United Nations Security Council Report S/1997/832, 31 October 1997.

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authority. Moreover, the government failed to break toleration of such practices not only due to a weak police force but also the lack of public education in such matters. Eliminating the public's desire for revenge requires both education and observable positive results, something that the UN and Haitian government had yet to overcome.

Haitian security woes were in part due to a government that had not functioned for at least four months. A major rift existed between the two major factions of *Lavalas*, a political rip that amplified Haiti's long established social divisions. Polarization forces not only kept Haitians living on the island from benefiting from the wealthier Diaspora who had fled to safer environs but was also a circumstance that further divided the privileged and the impoverished, educated and illiterate, and mulatto and black.⁴⁹ Such political and social disarray created an atmosphere of international and public doubt over Haiti's ability to make democracy work and further complicated the UN mission.

For four months, UNTMIH forces achieved marginal mission results. The Haitian government remained paralyzed due to internal divisions while human rights violations continued; many abuse cases were attributed to the Haitian police. In response, the Haitian government removed many untrustworthy police commissioners from office, although the replacements in some cases were no better. Poor discipline concerns, absenteeism, uniform violations, and lack of motivation continued despite ongoing UN supervision and training.

By 1997, it was apparent to many observers that police problems originated from the character of the individual policemen. UNTMIH troops were forced to work with what the Haitian academies produced and despite a system of examinations and preliminary requirements to cull out only the best-qualified individuals, what passed as the fittest recruits were substandard. Civil responsibility had never been a national virtue and thus was difficult at best to institute.⁵⁰ Moreover, immature policemen, some issued a weapon for the first time, turned to the hasty use of firearms resulting in eight people shot dead by the HNP between September and October 1997. While some of the killings were in self defense, others were determined to be unnecessary. During the same period, one detainee died in jail, allegedly from being beaten to death by the police.⁵¹ Such scandals did little to win public trust and eventually contributed to the failure of a HNP experiment to train northern Haitian communities in mediating their differences peacefully.

United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)

UNTMIH's mandate furthered Haitian police professionalism but was not absolute; all UN military personnel left Haiti in November 1997 upon expiration of the mission's mandate. To honor yet another President Prével request for continued international

⁴⁹ Michele Wucker, *Why the Cocks Fight: Dominicans, Haitians, and the Struggle for Hispaniola*. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1999), 238-239.

⁵⁰ Interview with Anthony LaFontaine by author, November 1997, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Mr. LaFontaine was instrumental in recruiting Haitian police academy cadets.

⁵¹ United Nations General Assembly, "The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti." New York: United Nations General Assembly Report A/52/687, 18 November 1997.

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support, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 1141 on 28 November 1997 and created the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), a force to serve for one year beginning on 30 December 1997. The mandate was later extended by UNSCR 1277 (30 November 1999) until 15 March 2000 to ensure a phased transition to another organization, the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH). MIPONUH was authorized 300 civilian police personnel from Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, and the U.S. and was tasked to further assist the Haitian government in its continuing efforts to professionalize the national police.⁵² As of 12 February 1998, 285 police officers and a special ninety-man police unit were in country, headed by Colonel Claude Grude of France.

Soon after MIPONUH's arrival, President Préval praised the HNP in a February 1998 speech. While violence, banditry, and drug trafficking continued to mar the official record, the national police had become less dependent upon their foreign mentors for assistance. This was due in part to eliminating unsuitable officers and placing more competent ones in positions of authority while simultaneously improving police coverage throughout the country. Yet, police-driven human rights abuses continued and policemen continued to arrest Haitians on grounds of subversion against the State, an indicator that free speech was not yet a universally accepted democratic value.

Part of the problem was that the HNP were city-based for resource purposes, which in turn led to outbreaks of lawlessness and vigilantism in the countryside where the police had little to no presence. In an effort to extend police coverage to outlying areas, President Préval suggested that a rural police force be created. The proposal soon elicited numerous complaints from government officials due to concerns that the rural police would be less qualified than the national police, paid less, and be subjected to local political pressures more intense than within the more developed cities. The proposal stalled due to political and financial constraints, yet such discourse demonstrated that the government recognized a security problem and sought a solution to it.

In spite of Haiti's political gridlock, the national police showed major improvement by fall 1998. Efforts continued to clear away corrupt leaders such as the director of the *Police Judiciaire*, who resigned and was later prosecuted under government defamation charges. When compared with previous years, fewer violent incidents between Haitians and their police forces occurred. Still, detainee abuses continued, as well as police beatings of protestors in Cabaret, Cite Soleil, Ile de la Tortue, and Ganthier that led to angry crowds besieging police stations. International policemen found themselves mediating strained civil relations between an enraged citizenry seeking retribution and local law enforcement.

By late November 1998, the UN found the stalemated political conditions in Haiti a risk for peace and development, so much so that MIPONUH's charter was extended for

⁵² United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1141." New York: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1141, 28 November 1997.

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an additional year.⁵³ The extension paid some dividends by early 1999, for the HNP displayed some often remarkable professionalism in the face of numerous demonstrations while enduring a continued political crisis and several incidents where heavily armed criminals broke the law. One indicator of the growing competency of the police was marked by a decrease in shooting incidents: fifty-nine in 1996, thirty-one in 1998 and three in early 1999.⁵⁴ However, many incidents occurred where the local police officials showed reluctance to punish officers who took part in citizen beatings or other forms of illicit behavior. Again, Haitian culture played a role, for many local policemen refused to take action against one of their own out of fear of reprisal by the particular officer's family.⁵⁵ In a society where familial ties are stronger than national agendas, apprehension over revenge can be a power unto itself.

Despite MIPONUH and HNP efforts, political violence continued in Haiti's streets. On 11 January 1999, President Préval broadcast a speech to the nation that declared the end of terms for Deputies, 1/3 of the Senators, and all local authorities. Citing Haitian law, Préval was unable to dissolve Parliament or extend its mandate, calling upon all Haitians to find a solution to the problem. Taking emergency measures, the Council of Ministers froze bank accounts and cancelled diplomatic passports in what many political parties interpreted as a coup. In the wake of such measures, Préval's sister and a personal secretary were seriously wounded in an assassination attempt; the automobile driver was killed. In spite of such security setbacks, MIPONUH policemen continued weekly training on police administration, arrest procedures, community relations, crowd control, and report writing, among other subjects.⁵⁶

Despite continuous training efforts, MIPONUH members and Haitian police were unable to prevent the politically motivated violence endemic to Haitian society. On 20 April 1999, a member of the *Lavalas Family*-associated group *Jeunesse Pouvoir Populaire*, was killed, allegedly by Haitian policemen. Two days later, several deputies of the *Organisation du Peuple en Lutte*, (Organization of People in Struggle or OPL), sought refuge in the Chilean Embassy after threats were made against their lives and property. They subsequently left the country but these incidents continued a pattern of violence against political figures that local law enforcement alone was powerless to prevent. The events were certainly inauspicious as Colonel George Gabbardo of France assumed command of the force.

By 30 November 1999, the security situation in Haiti became more unstable, with frequent incidents of violence, robbery, and civil unrest. Yet, the UN Security Council believed that sufficient progress had been made to extend MIPONUH until 15 March 2000 under UNSCR 1277 with the intent of transitioning to yet another headquarters, the

⁵³ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1212." New York: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1212, 25 November 1998.

⁵⁴ United Nations General Assembly, "The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti." New York: United Nations General Assembly Report A/53/950, 10 May 1999.

⁵⁵ LaFontaine interview.

⁵⁶ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti." New York: United Nations Security Council Report S/1999/181, 19 February 1999.

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International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH). Under UNSCR Resolution A/54/193, a phased transition from MIPONUH to MICAH was envisioned, with in-place officers gradually relinquishing responsibility for assisting the HNP to the new international support mission.

Haitian realities soon marred this planned changeover. With national elections scheduled for November 2000, the winter of 1999-2000 saw continued outbreaks of violence. In December 1999, politically-motivated arson was blamed for the burning of several homes in Jeremie. A fourteen-year-old boy was killed on 11 January 2000 when a mob in Fort Liberte attempted to free and then lynch a police-held prisoner.⁵⁷ Yet, despite these outbreaks of violence, plans to remove MIPONUH's law enforcement became finalized and force withdrawal occurred on 15 March.

International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH)

MICAH's one-year mandate consisted of building upon the mixed results of previous UN force missions and MICIVIH in the further promotion of human rights in Haiti. Specifically, the support mission was to "reinforce [the] institutional effectiveness of Haitian police and judiciary, and to coordinate and facilitate international dialogue with Haiti's political and social leaders." With assistance as the primary mission, MICAH consisted of eighty non-uniformed UN technical advisers advising the Haitian government in the areas of policing, justice, and human rights. Participating countries included Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, and the U.S.

Under MICAH's mission term, the security situation in Haiti eroded significantly. Much of the turmoil was due to a year dominated by numerous elections, to include local and parliamentary polls on 21 May, additional voting through August, and presidential and partial senatorial contests planned for November and December 2000. Complicating matters was a non-functioning parliament since President Préval dissolved it in January 1999. By 2000, political stagnation had generated tremendous international pressure upon the Haitian government and the termination of multilateral funding totaling U.S. \$500 million.

Despite the international community's efforts to affect police work in a positive fashion, Haiti's propensity for political violence continued throughout 2000. Human Rights Watch recorded at least seventy cases of murder, intimidation, beatings, and assorted thuggery between January and June. Haiti's well respected journalist Jean Dominique was one such victim, shot to death along with security guard Jean-Claude Louissant on 3 April. Criminals stole and burned election ballots after the 21 May elections in several districts, forcing election workers to tally votes in police stations to avoid intimidation. When open ballot boxes and their spilled contents littered Haiti's

⁵⁷ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti." New York: United Nations Security Council Report S/2000/150, 25 February 2000.

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streets the following day, the government undertook no serious investigation and cries of fraud were soon raised among the international and domestic communities.⁵⁸

Public outcry against the police also increased. Many members of Haiti's law enforcement community continued to side with the party in power and either participated in the beatings of opposition members or failed to intervene when witnessing such episodes. Of note was that inappropriate Haitian police behavior continued despite 673 police officers having been dismissed for wrongdoing between 1995 and 1999. Even the threat of job dismissal had little influence over police conduct in a society where fear of retribution and family intrigue are imbedded into the cultural fabric.

In November 2000, with multinational presence having succeeded in some areas and failed in others, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended against renewing MICAH's mandate. Annan remarked, "Haiti's political and electoral crisis has deepened, polarizing its political class and civil society," conditions unsuitable for the international organization to function successfully. In an exclamation point to Annan's statement, seven bombs exploded in Port-Au-Prince on 22 November, killing a young boy and injuring fourteen people. MICAH's mandate ended on 6 February 2001, coinciding with the end of the Préval administration and Aristide's subsequent return to office the next day.⁵⁹

Multinational Interim Force (MIF)

On 7 February 2001, Aristide returned to the presidency with promises of national reforms and new schools, roads, electrical systems, and an independent judicial court.⁶⁰ Yet, the Haitian security situation continued to worsen even with the numerous multinational military and civilian missions that had attempted to alter police practices since 1994. Between 2002 and early 2004, Haiti's security situation reflected a frontier, not a nation-state, with numerous cases of murder, intimidation, bombings, and the fleeing of refugees. While many of the incidents were related to criminal activity, political violence also was prevalent. The police were either unwilling or unable to handle such situations; on 14 November 2003 a number of law enforcement officials were swept away by a crowd of rock-throwing protestors at an anti-Aristide demonstration.

In February 2004, in the face of increased shootings and beatings by the police and thugs attributed to Aristide and others, the United States and France exerted pressure upon the UN to act. With Aristide reluctantly fleeing the country and under UNSCR 1529, 29 February 2004, the UN authorized the deployment of a Chapter VII Multinational Interim Force for up to three months to contribute toward security and stability in support of interim Haitian President Alexandre's request for international

⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2001," [report online] accessed 7 December 2004; available from <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/americas/haiti.html>.

⁵⁹ British Broadcast Corporation, "UN Mission in Haiti 'To End'," [article online] accessed 8 December 2004; available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/general/2000/haiti.htm>.

⁶⁰ "Aristide Picks Premier for an 'Open Door Government'." *Haiti Progrès*, 14-20 February 2001.

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assistance. On 1 June 2004, the force transitioned to MINUSTAH, as authorized by UNSCR 1542.

Conclusions

In exploring 200 hundred years of Haitian history, this study sought to shed additional light upon the role of multinational force in assisting the Haitian government and its transition to democracy. In answering the question “How did Haitian’s security situation evolve into its present situation?,” Haiti’s current political and social instability go back at least 200 years. While Haitian’s espouse Republican government, actual practice deviates from that reality. This circumstance does not bode well for building democracy in Haiti, where the lack of a concept of power-sharing for the betterment of society is a major obstacle to institutionalizing democracy.

Haitian culture is thus a major hindrance to democratic reform, particularly in implementing law enforcement to create a secure and stable environment. In Haitian society, two levels of public violence affect stability and security: “routine” criminal activity and politically-motivated action. Although routine criminal activity slowed to nuisance levels between 1994 and 2004, culturally imbedded societal practices surfaced within HNP behavior. Law enforcement’s decision-making was weighed against the possibility of revenge or vigilantism by the arrestee’s family. Moreover, eradicating political violence in Haiti is impossible without altering cultural values. As long as Haitians believe that intimidating or killing political figures is an effective way to force governmental and social change, it will continue.

In answering “How effective has multinational force been in assisting the government of Haiti in its quest for democracy?,” true effectiveness in that troubled country means that no further multinational intervention is required. Since the Haitian government has yet to implement and sustain democracy under the rule of law, multinational force did little to bring permanent change to Haitian society from 1995-2004. As this study suggests, multinational forces only assisted in the transformation process with UN and other international groups working with the Haitian government across a broad band of issues at many levels.

Unfortunately, international forces have made little headway in stopping political violence, for that has not been the focus, as the UN has pointed out. For example, a Secretary General report notes in the case of MIPONUH that the force trained the police in border police operations, crowd control, and first aid, as well as community policing, maintaining law and order, fighting capital crimes and drug trafficking, and reinforcing police administration and logistics.⁶¹ Yet, the missions did not seek to directly educate the Haitian people that political violence is not a legitimate means for change. The question remains: Should the UN or other foreign agencies proceed in this direction? Given the Haitian people’s tendency to shun foreign advice, this approach does not seem likely to succeed.

⁶¹ United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti.” New York: United Nations report s/2000/150, 25 February 2000.

Getting Here From There

Education, however, has at times proven to be an effective tool in furthering democracy by force. Unfortunately, the two most significant cases of this are post-World War II Germany and Japan, countries that were conquered and then occupied by outside forces that still linger there today. According to some experts, building democratic institutions in those occupied countries also depended upon high literacy rates, industrialization, and unconditional surrender, in addition to a respect for mass education. Unfortunately, Haiti lacks all of these components. Thus, an unconquered Haiti is more of a peacekeeping experiment where the government allows a foreign presence to assist in establishing democracy by invitation, not by force.

Multinational force effectiveness has been limited by two additional factors, Haiti's propensity for lawlessness and the ad hoc nature of the multinational forces. Where a very volatile situation periodically displays stability, progress is still far below what is expected of western-oriented governments. Corruption can only be blamed for part of this problem, for time and resources are also a factor. It is helpful to remember that the U.S. formed professional law enforcement agencies in the 19th century but it took decades to professionalize the thugs that constituted many police forces. U.S. law enforcement agencies still suffer from corruption, but politically motivated killings by such officials is atypical. Haiti cannot make the same claims. As far as the multinational forces are concerned, they were mostly unplanned and the continuous rotations impeded mission performance. UNMIH, with its dedicated headquarters training prior to mission assumption, was the exception and lead nations undertaking future missions should consider similar practice.

While stability and security missions dominate the role of multinational forces in Haiti, the various rotations address only the symptoms of social disorder but not the cause. Between 1995 and 2004, Haitian stability and security proved to be temporary in nature, given that yet another UN force is in that country as of this study. Law enforcement is necessary but so is cultural overhaul through education, a crucial necessity for building legitimate institutions that care for the needs of the people. To have social order, people must believe in their system of government and society and for Haitians that means confidence from results, not promises. Until human rights are guaranteed and enforced by an incorruptible government dedicated to making life better for all, Haiti's stability and security will remain problematic no matter how many rotations of UN or other forces occur.