

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned for the Canadian Peace-Keeping Operation in Haiti, 2003-2005

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Introduction

This paper provides the Canadian portion of a study on peace-keeping operations (PKO) in Haiti commissioned by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) of the National Defense University, Washington. The objectives of the study were to determine the factors that motivated countries to decide to participate and sustain their commitments, the strategic-level lessons learned, and recommendations for the design of similar missions in the future. Eight research questions supplied by CHDS provided the framework for the study. At the time of preparation of this paper the Canadian PKO and other support for Haiti were changing in tune with events in Haiti and politics in Canada.

Research Sources and Methodology

In developing this paper the author shared the research questions with, and interviewed, a broad range of stakeholders in the Canadian Haiti PKO, including;

- Twelve officials from the range of federal departments involved in mission design and decision-making for the Canadian Haiti PKO mission.
- Two recently retired officials who previously were responsible for the Haiti file in the Canadian International Development Aid Agency (CIDA) and the Organization of American States (OAS)
- Four participants from non-governmental organizations working on projects in Haiti.
- Two academic experts on; violence and its effects, crime, and crime prevention
- One corporal in the Canadian Forces who recently returned from two years service in Haiti
- One Haitian who currently lives in Montreal with his young family.

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

All interviews were conducted on a confidential basis with the understanding that there would be no attribution of sources. Some of those interviewed supplied publications, and unclassified internal assessment reports dealing with the Haiti PKO. A web search produced about one hundred useful press releases, articles, and summaries of assessments and opinions.

Canada's Relationship To Haiti

Haiti is the underdeveloped country closest to Canada in terms of geographic distance, aid programs, shared language (French), and political visibility. Montreal's Haitian community is estimated at between 70,000 and 120,000 and is the third-largest Haitian community outside the Caribbean after New York and Boston. They are an important source of money to their families in Haiti, and the Haitian economy. Some Canadian churches and voluntary groups in Canada have been contributing to Haiti for over 50 years. The government of Canada has been assisting Haiti since approximately 1994. Canada is one of Haiti's key bilateral development partners (albeit referred to as a 'difficult partner'). For example in 2002-2003, Canadian Official Development Assistance to Haiti totalled \$23.85 million. The scope of Canada's aid program in Haiti includes;

- Social development and basic human needs.
- Food aid, health and education.
- Governance, democracy and human rights.
- Peacekeeping, public security, justice, prisons, elections, human rights.
- Economic and private sector development.
- Institution building

Since the political crisis triggered by the disputed legislative and local elections of May 2000, the Government of Canada's position has been to work towards a political agreement in Haiti that would be the result of broad-based consensus among the Government, political parties and civil society. Canada takes part in the work of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community ([CARICOM](#)) in supporting development of democratic processes and institutions by Haitians.

Key Recent Events

The following chronology of events provides an overview of the recent Canadian role in Haiti. In March, 2003 the Canadian Forces used four C-130 Hercules to evacuate 350 Canadians and others to the Dominican Republic to get away from gangs battling each other for power in Port-au-Prince. In December 2003, the Canadian embassy issued a statement condemning acts of violence and urging the Government of Haiti to ensure respect for human rights. Canada issued two other statements to the United Nations

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

Commission on Human Rights, and General Assembly condemning the status of human rights in Haiti. Minister Coderre spoke in similar terms at the Ministerial Conference of La Francophonie in Paris. At the Special Summit of the Americas, Canada proposed that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights consider the possibility of establishing a permanent observer mission in Haiti. In February 2004, armed conflict broke out in Gonaives and spread throughout the country. President Aristide left the country on February 29 and a UN resolution later that day led to the creation of the United Nations Multinational Interim Force (MIF). The MIF had a 90-day mandate to contribute to a secure and stable environment in Haiti, to facilitate the delivery of relief aid to those in need, and to help the Haitian Police and Coast Guard maintain law and order and protect human rights. In early March 2004 Task Force Haiti (TFH), consisting of 500 personnel and six CH-146 Griffon helicopters was deployed by Canada as part of the MIF. In June 2004, at the request of the United Nations, the TFH mandate was extended to permit it to transfer to the larger follow-on Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haiti (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti), or MINUSTAH. On July 6, 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin announced a change in the nature of Canada's commitment to Haiti from a *military* to balanced *military and police* emphasis by sending 100 police officers to Haiti for two years to help with security and training of Haitian police. The Prime Minister's announcement cited a "hemispheric and moral responsibility" and noted; " The police will be responding to an immediate need in Haiti as the country strives to restore law and order following the recent political crisis. Re-establishment of the rule of law is essential for all other economic, social and political efforts to succeed. This contribution is appropriate given Canada's well known and respected international policing expertise, and our past and on-going engagement in the region". Sixteen million in funding for this police deployment came from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) through a special program, the Canadian Police Arrangement, made up of Foreign Affairs Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

In addition to the funding for this deployment, since February 2004, Canada, through CIDA, contributed a total of \$15 million: \$5 million in support of UN programming including humanitarian, transition, and reconstruction efforts; \$5 million to strengthen the Special Mission of the OAS in Haiti; almost \$2 million to Canadian, Haitian and international organizations working in Haiti to support reconstruction, rehabilitation and humanitarian aid activities, primarily in the areas of health, education, human rights and efforts to stop violence against women; \$1.95 million in humanitarian assistance and food aid to World Food Program, the Pan American Health Organization, and the International Committee of the Red Cross; and \$1 million to the International Organisation of La Francophonie to help restore and maintain Haiti's democratic institutions. A further \$1 million was provided in humanitarian assistance to flood victims in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. On July 18, 2004 Canada announced a contribution of more than \$180M over two years to Haiti's reconstruction and development efforts, including \$147M in support for the transitional Government's Interim Cooperation Framework. Following the devastation caused by Tropical Storm Jeanne in September, 2004 Canada contributed \$6.5M through CIDA to support relief in Haiti, out of \$11.1M for the whole Caribbean region. In March, 2004 the Premier of the province of Quebec, Jean Charest, announced that Quebec was contributing \$1 M to Haiti for food, education, and health. In

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

November he announced an additional \$200,000 in emergency aid to flood-stricken Haiti and assured Quebecers that help would reach those suffering.

On November 14th, 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin visited Haiti to discuss Haiti's social and economic reconstruction and stabilization efforts with the interim President, Prime Minister, members of the cabinet, leaders of political parties, and representatives of civil society. During these meetings, PM Martin reasserted the need for all parties to participate in the implementation of the democratic process leading to elections in 2005. On November 26, 2004, Prime Minister Martin announced the appointment of a Special Adviser for Haiti, Denis Coderre, Member of Parliament for Bourassa, in the province of Quebec –where the majority of Haitian immigrants to Canada reside. He reports to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on issues surrounding the crisis in Haiti, represents Canada at international meetings on the topic of Haiti, and works with civil society to help find solutions for Haiti.

The Canadian approach to Haiti can be summed up by the following statement from the Prime Minister in July 2004. "The Government of Canada continues to examine all available ways to meet Haiti's needs and to ensure that Canada effectively helps the people of Haiti to find a solution to the political and humanitarian crisis and the violence that rock Haiti. As long as the political situation in Haiti continues, Canada remains prepared to play an active role, and to support the UN, the OAS and other international bodies in implementing support measures".

Factors That Influenced Canada's Decision to Participate in The Haiti PKO

Canada's stated defence policies were last clearly articulated in the 1994 Defence White Paper. It refocused Canadian defence policy in light of the end of the Cold War. The key tenets of the policy are as follows:

- while the possibility of a global conflict is extremely remote, the world continues to be highly unstable and unpredictable;
- the Canadian Forces' mandate is: (a) to defend Canada; (b) to defend North America in partnership with the United States; and (c) to contribute to global stability;
- Canada will maintain multi-purpose, combat-capable maritime, land and air forces able to defend Canada and Canadian interests while providing the Government with the flexibility to contribute to international peace and security initiatives.

In the past four decades the Government of Canada has preferred that international peace and security be pursued through multilateral co-operation, rather than unilateral action. Prime Minister Martin took office in November 2003. His priorities included a more outward-looking global agenda and organizational structure in and around his cabinet, particularly with regard to strengthening Canada-US relations, domestic and continental security from international terrorists, and participation in international affairs via multi-lateral policies and mechanisms. For instance, he is currently (January 2005) advancing and seeking

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

support for the formation of a G-20 group of nations that would provide a middle way between the US model of “uni-lateral with support from allies” and the UN model of “comprehensive multi-lateral process and debate for every decision” that limits and delays their effectiveness and timeliness. Although Canada has been involved in peace operations with non-United Nations organisations such as NATO, Canada has generally tried to promote the use of the United Nations as the only international organisation with the charter authority to promote peace and security throughout the world.

All the Canadian political parties that have formed the federal government in the past 35 years, have embraced high immigration levels and multi-culturalism as a defining characteristic of Canada, and a potential source of new voters. Between 70,000 and 120,000 Haitians live in Montreal in the province of Quebec where French is the dominant official and spoken language. As voters they have considerable strategic political importance within Canada. The distribution of population in Canada makes it necessary for a political party to win at least half the seats in the province of Quebec in order to form a majority government at the federal level. Haitian votes are important in three or four key ridings in both federal and provincial elections, and past and potential future referendums on the question of whether or not the province Quebec stays within Canada, or becomes an independent nation state. Keeping Quebec in the Canadian confederation is a paramount interest of major federal political parties other than the Bloc Quebecois – a Quebec-based party that is devoted to taking Quebec out of Canada . In the last (1995) referendum held in Quebec, the “stay in Canada” side won by a margin of only one percent. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Special Adviser for Haiti, Denis Coderre, is the Member of Parliament for the community in Quebec with a significant Haitian population.

Canadian interests in “La Francophonie” around the world, of which Haiti is a part, are directed to reflecting abroad the French fact in Canada, and ensuring that French culture and institutions in Canada are connected to that world.

The Caribbean region, including Haiti and Cuba, is important to Canada in economic terms. Many Canadian companies have been involved in banking, tourism, and extraction of natural resources in the region for over 50 years. Immigrants and seasonal workers from all over the region provide key parts of the Canadian labour force. Stability and development in the Caribbean region is also important to Canada in order to avoid: large numbers of refugees being added to our relatively open and overloaded refugee system; the spread of disease; and, the growth of traffic in illegal drugs, and associated criminal gangs and activities.

Design of Canada’s PKO Contribution

Peacekeeping has become a primary role for Canada in the international arena. Since 1947, Canada has participated in more than 36 peacekeeping operations, starting with Prime Minister Lester Pearson creating the modern concept of multi-national peacekeeping forces during the 1956 Suez crisis. Canada

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

is currently the 31st largest contributor of military troops and observers to the United Nations out of 90 contributing countries. Canadian military and police personnel are in demand for peacekeeping and stabilization projects in part because they have established a good international reputation and considerable experience in terms of values, attitude, skills and ability to work with indigenous institutions and international partners. This legacy causes Canada to consider participating in almost every PKO.

Haiti is generally regarded in Canada as being in need of almost everything. The Canadian Government is committed to do whatever it can for Haiti. That means that the criteria for the design of the mission are primarily related to feasibility of what Canada can supply that Haiti is in a position to use. The key concept of the current Canadian PKO program is to provide contributions to establishing order (stop looting and violence against persons) followed by interim police services in conjunction with Haitian police, and where feasible, to help build police capacity. The Government's other policy initiatives (e.g. substantial new funding for the national health care system) and parallel commitment to cutting taxes and paying down the national debt, make it very difficult to find new funds. The mission was shaped by determining the niche or highest value role that Canada could feasibly play in the total partnership of nations involved in the PKO as organized by UNDPKO.

After money the most important resource limitation was the current deployment of the Canadian Forces (CF). They are stretched thinly all over the world in peacekeeping projects. Many CF units have had their tour of duty extended several times, and are functionally overdue for a tour of home duty. The resources devoted to the police function are being drawn from existing RCMP, provincial and municipal forces, with the result that police service levels in Canada are noticeably lowered.

Federal Planning and Decision-Making

Canada is an unusual confederation with 'two plus one' levels of sovereign government: federal; provincial and territorial; and an emerging system of aboriginal governments. The federal and provincial governments have separate constitutional responsibilities and powers, as well as some that are shared. The federal government has responsibility for foreign affairs, including international relations, aid, and defence. Immigration is a shared responsibility. The decision-making structures and processes in the federal government are centred around the Prime Minister. He or she has the authority to make or delegate all major decisions and does this with the advice and consideration of senior officials.

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned




Figure 1 from Making Policy: A Guide to the Federal Government's Policy Process, by Glen Milne, 2004

The interactive network (not chain) of events and organization for the continuing analysis, development of options, funding implications, and decisions like those involved in the Haiti PKO are illustrated by the following diagram. The current minority government situation at the federal level in Canada means that much more consultation is being done with other parties and Parliamentary committees as part of the priority setting and decision-making process.

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned




Figure 2 from *National Security Decision-Making*, David Last & Glen Milne, 2004

Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) is the department responsible for the development, execution and administration of foreign affairs policy, including diplomatic missions and their activities abroad. Previously it was part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). In cases like Haiti FAC operates in day-to-day collaboration with the Department of National Defence (DND), the foreign aid agency, Canada International Development Agency (CIDA), The Solicitor General (responsible for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the national police force), Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), Canada Security & Intelligence Service (CSIS) and other agencies as the situation requires. FAC operates a 24/7 watch on global events from an operations centre in Ottawa continuously gathers information and news contact from Canadian diplomatic posts around the world, DND and other departments, police, intelligence agencies, national and international press media, etc. This centre provided an early warning of the potential departure of President Aristide and crisis months in advance. The flows of information gathering, analysis, development of briefings and options for Ministers, decision-making, and coordination in a case like the Haiti PKO is illustrated by the following diagram.

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned




Figure 3 from *National Security Decision-Making*, David Last & Glen Milne, 2004

When an international situation develops that officials identify as involving important Canadian interests, FAC organises and leads an interdepartmental task force to monitor events, anticipate potential crises and develop contingency options and plans for action. The mandate of the task force is to provide a forum where analysis, options actions at the strategic level can be developed, co-ordinated and directed. The task force is the organization wherein an overall strategic plan is defined for the Government as to how Canada will deal with a crisis, what resources the Government will use, etc. In this case, the tools were humanitarian assistance, police assistance and military power. This approach and these tools were also used for Kosovo, East Timor, and now Darfur. The task force can be called to meet daily when a crisis is happening. At the first task force meeting on a new topic, FAC provides an update on the situation and guidance on how Canada will respond, in general terms, in accordance with foreign policy imperatives. After discussion, members of the task force disperse to do their own analysis and strategic thinking, then meet again the following day with information on what their departments can provide for the crisis, and to begin to formulate the situation assessment, options, resource limits, costs and recommendations to the FAC

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

Minister, Cabinet and the Prime Minister. At this stage, approval of the operation is conditional on Government decision and the conduct of an interdepartmental strategic reconnaissance.

How the Decision Was Taken to Join the Haiti PKO

Officials in the FAC, along with their partners in DND, CIDA, and the RCMP were watching events in Haiti carefully in the latter part of 2003 for the reasons noted above. They prepared and continuously updated situation reports for consideration of their Ministers and the Prime Minister. When Haiti fell into crisis early in 2004 the mission design and decision to participate in the PKO came primarily from the top, i.e. the Prime Minister, with assistance from bottom-up scanning, analysis, options and recommendations from committees of officials, and Cabinet ministers. These considerations and decisions were undertaken in continuous consultation with the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) in New York. UNDPKO was the primary designer of the multipartite mission through an iterative process of asking potential participant countries what resources they might provide, and fitting their potential resources into an evolving, overall mission concept and deliverable package. When the UN Security Council passed its resolution re Haiti on February 29th an options paper was prepared within a few hours in Canada by a special inter-agency task force of middle level officials from the above group of agencies and sent up to the Prime Minister via a paper signed by all of the Ministers involved. The Prime Minister's decision and announcement of Canada's contribution a few days later was slightly different than the options presented because it reflected some inputs from his senior advisors, a committee of deputy-ministers (heads of departments), discussion of the options by a Cabinet Committee, and consideration of costs by the Department of Finance.

The Objectives of the Mission

The implicit *political* – as opposed to explicit *policy*- objectives of the mission included;

1. To serve the interests of Haitian-Canadians, and thereby indirectly;
 - Increase the probability of Quebec voting to stay in Canada in any referendum that might be held in the future.
 - Increase voter preference for the governing party among Haitian-Canadians
2. To improve relations with the US by taking some of the load where the US might not be able to as much as they wish due to extensive commitments elsewhere.
3. The implicit economic objectives of the mission included;

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

- Positioning Canada as a *partner* of developing countries and regions. That position may be of strategic economic value to Canada, our hemisphere, and globally as these countries become fully developed over the long term.
- Respect gained from doing everything feasible to help Haiti in turn that could help our economic relationships with USA, OAS and UN members, and other hemispheric partners.
- Avoiding high costs that could flow from Haiti to Canada and our region via mass migrations, refugees, drugs, crime, and social instability.

The military and security objectives of the mission, as well as MINUSTAH, are ultimately aimed providing a platform of security and civil order for developmental objectives rather than military objectives such as the elimination of a military or terrorist threat from another country. One might position the gangs fighting for power as terrorists, but in the current context of Haiti many of those gangs are competing for territory, control and resources in the current power/governance marketplace of Haiti along with a politicized police force, political parties, clans, etc. Accordingly Canada's military objectives are congruent with its political and economic objectives regarding Haiti.

Situation and Mission Creep

The objectives of the Canadian mission in Haiti have been continuously adjusted in the light of the frequent setbacks in meeting earlier objectives. In many cases the setbacks are seen by Canadian officials as due to politicization of the police, diversion of resources, and other interference by the government of Haiti. The thinking about realistic time frames for substantial progress towards a self-sustaining economy and democracy in Haiti, among those interviewed or read in this study, has shifted from years to decades. A recent strategic assessment by CIDA in an unclassified but unpublished document includes a change in nomenclature for Haiti from 'partner' to 'difficult partner' in order to reflect the increasing degree of difficulty seen in achieving development progress in some areas. Other assessments by the OAS and CIDA indicate the time has come to step back and learn from the few successes and many failures.

Lessons Learned so far in Haiti re PKO

The assessments by Canadian government agencies read during the study indicated the need for a more comprehensive mapping of the institutional and regional fabric of Haiti and an equally comprehensive and unified (not just coordinated) vision and strategy among the Haitian people and government, intervening nations, their programs and non-governmental agencies, to move that entire fabric along a development pathway. They also indicated that the UNDPKO has little capacity to develop on-the-ground intelligence that could make its planning for PKO more effective, and is hampered in its ability to design missions

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

by having to ask member states for what they can provide, rather than arrange the deployment of the right kind of personnel, equipment, logistic supplies, strategies, and tactics by member states.

Several of our sources pointed to the success South Africa gained through bringing key representatives from all competing power groups in the country together to develop three scenarios for their potential future. One of those scenarios showed a potential win/win pathway to a stable social situation. It included making Nelson Mandela the president. The other scenarios showed lose/lose pathways to anarchy and chaos similar to that of Haiti today and had the effect of drawing consensus on a development roadmap from a similar wide (and wild) range of stakeholders. Planning for the feasible emergence of Haiti from its current state of anarchy, economic and ecological devastation might benefit from such more comprehensive visioning and participation. Almost all source persons thought an empirical model of the emergence of governance from anarchy proffered by the author could help identify and analyse the current state of governance in Haiti. Here is a concept model for such a “governance ladder” with a notional example of a country at that level.

- 7. Governance includes collaborative vision, transparency, universal education, development & sharing (e.g. Scandinavian countries)**
- 6. Democratic determination of authority and rule of law (e.g. Canada)**
- 5. Rule of law made public and enforced.(e.g. Singapore)**
- 4. Order imposed by, or accorded to, one power group, leader or outside intervener (e.g. Saudi Arabia)**
- 3. Formal and informal agreements among power groups on territory, trade, rules of engagement, and dominance or hierarchy of power. (Iran)**
- 2. Emergence of orderly power groups, economic marketplaces and informal institutions, with some implicit rules of engagement among power groups.
(e.g. Somalia, England in 11th Century)**
- 1. Disorganized battles for power, without humanitarian rules of engagement, by leaders and members of power groups such as gangs, clans, militia, police, and armed forces. (e.g. Haiti)**

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

Other independent variables that determine the success of the PKO mission that were raised by the research sources included;

- Ability to speak French and Creole
- At least a minimal transportation and telecommunications infrastructure throughout Haiti.
- Long term horizons (five year funding, and ten year planning)
- Adequate funding for the scale of resources required.

Potential Performance Measurement of the Effectiveness of Multi-partite PKO

In the course of this study recommendations were sought and received on how to measure the outcomes of the PKO mission that been summarized as follows;

- Track local and regional rates of economic activity, employment, crime, etc. from pre-conflict, to PKO, and post-PKO periods.
- Conduct interviews and workshops with representatives of all PKO forces on “lessons learned, sharing best practices, and ideas for future operations.”
- Conduct interviews and workshops with local leaders, aid organizations and citizens on “lessons learned, sharing best practices, and ideas for future operations.” Develop these with insights gained from the South African post-apartheid process.

Recommendations for Future PKO within a Framework of Regional Cooperation

The design of the collective PKO mission should include identifying, assessing, mapping, and strategies for engagement with the complete range of social and economic institutions in the country being considered for PKO. These include government institutions, political parties, military, elements of the justice system, religious groups, clans, gangs, commercial enterprises, opinion leaders, investors, institutions, and all other significant informal and formal organizations and the mechanisms/ marketplaces through which they interact.

Analysis of the situation and design of the PKO should be based on an in-depth understanding of the generic and specific regional hierarchy of order, law, and governance, and feasible goals and strategies for moving the local institutional network up the hierarchy.

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

Mission goals and scope should be system-wide rather than focused on one institution. For instance building police capabilities and ethics should be done in conjunction with courts, correctional institutions and support systems for ex-prisoners and youth-at-risk.

Be prepared to work independently of the central government, if there is one, in the event that it is so dysfunctional as to be of no use, or a threat to its citizens.

Address the issue of post-mission systemic sustainability from the beginning of the mission. This includes:

1. Planned staging from initial replacement or infill of local military, militia, police, and civil governance institutions to post-mission mentoring and other follow-up support.
2. Developing a strategy for protection, first aid and development support for key community and national institutions, governance, infrastructure and natural resources.
3. Expert advice and services to help local population deal with trauma and improve conditions that are root causes of violence.
4. Maintaining and developing alternatives to loss of identity, jobs and hope in local population, particularly with regard to individual and gang violence and lethal weapons among young males.
5. Hand-off strategies among mission military and police forces, and local military and police forces, courts, correctional services, and other key institutions.
6. Leaving in place a feasible and functional set of institutions equipped with locally sustainable technologies and practices, rather than dependence on those of the PKO forces.
7. Adequate funding and commitment to provide enough personnel (including rotation) and logistic support to effectively build institutions, change values, establish trust relationships and establish a sustainable society and economy over a term of five or more years.
8. In Canada's case a prime issue is cost and capacity, and convincing Canadian government and citizens of value for money.
9. Collaborate on building analytic tools and system-dynamics models that can help each contributing state identify its special role in PKO, and the cost-effectiveness of missions' indirect contributions to their domestic society and economy.

Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned

Source Documents

1. 'Making Policy: A Guide to The Federal Government's Policy Process': by Glen Milne, October 2004 Edition.
2. 'Decision-Making for National Security'; Milne and Last, 2004.
3. 'Haiti: Strategic Approach'; Canadian International Development Aid Agency, October, 2004.
4. 'Notes for a Speech to the United Nations on an Intervention on Haiti, by David Lee, Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of the Haiti Special Mission; Organization of American States, April 14, 2004.
5. Approximately 12 announcements re Haiti PKO on the website of Prime Minister Martin in 2003 and 2004.
6. Approximately 6 announcements and articles re Haiti PKO on the web-site of the United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UNDPKO), 2004.
7. Approximately 40 announcements and reports re Haiti PKO on the websites of Canadian federal departments involved in the Haiti mission (Foreign Affairs Canada, Defence, Canadian International Aid Agency) 2003-2004.
8. Approximately 30 news stories on the Haiti PKO from the pages of Canadian newspapers (Globe and Mail, National Post, Le Devoir, Ottawa Citizen, Hamilton Spectator).