



Transforming Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations

A Study by the
Center for Technology and National Security Policy
National Defense University

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Objective


- Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate both the success of our transforming military and the creation of a new stabilization and reconstruction capabilities gap.
- The very success of military transformation has contributed to the creation of this gap.
- For American policy to be successful, we need to win both the war and the peace. This gap needs to be closed.
- The objective of this briefing is to suggest new organizational structures and strategic concepts to transform U.S. stabilization and reconstruction capabilities.



Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap Figure 1



Traditional Model






Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap Figure 2



New Challenges (Preemption & RDOs)






Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap Figure 3



Transformed S&R Capability (Bridge to Nation Building)





Lessons From History



	Germany	Japan	Somalia	Haiti	Balkans	Afghanistan	Iraq	Contribution to Success
Military Mission	Regime Change; Security; HA/Refugees/IDP; Reconstruction	Partial Regime Change; HA/Refugee/IDP; Reconstruction	Humanitarian Aid; Regime Change	Regime Change; Stabilization; Reconstruction	Stop Ethnic Cleansing; Stabilization; Reconstruction	Regime Change; Stabilization; Reconstruction	Regime Change; Stabilization; Reconstruction	Regime Change can be successful
Previous State of Society/Economy/Political Structure	Developed	Developed	Chaotic, Violent, Dysfunctional	Fragile	Unstable to Dysfunctional	Dysfunctional	Totalitarian, Unstable	High
Damage Caused by Military Action	Devastating	Devastating	Some	Very little	Moderate, Mostly warring factions	Some	Limited, Most due to neglect	Medium
Level of Continuing Hostile Activities	Low	Low	High	Low	Medium	High	High	High
Post-Conflict Duration	7 years	7 years	2 years	2 years	Bosnia: 7+ years Kosovo: 4+ years	2+ years	Months	Needs ~ 5 years
Peak Troop Strength Per Capita at Outset	High	Modest	Modest	Modest	High	Low	Low	High
Foreign Aid/Investment	High	Low	Low	Low	High	Low	Low	High
Multilateral Involvement	Limited	None	Medium	Medium	High	Medium	Limited	Medium
Degree of Success	High	High	None	Limited	Medium	TBD	TBD	



Lessons From Recent History



- Successive U.S. interventions increasingly more ambitious.
- Regime change/S&R missions can be successful in different cultures.
- But the risks and costs are high.
- Previous political and economic conditions are key uncontrollable factor.
- Controllable factors include level and duration of effort - - both troop levels and financial resources.
- Five to seven years is historic duration of successful S&R operations.
- Rapid and decisive military victory does not guarantee a peaceful post-conflict stabilization environment.
- A secure environment is necessary but not sufficient for success.
- Multilateral involvement contributes to legitimacy and burden sharing, but does not guarantee success.




Illustrative Strategic Operational Concepts



- Integrated planning of combat *and* S&R operations
- Coherent war winning *and* peace-winning strategies
- Concurrency of operations: combat *and* stability ops
- Unity of effort – joint *and* interagency
- Compelling and consistent strategic message
- Precision targeting of insurgent elements
- Improved cultural intelligence
- Early, demonstrable success in reconstruction
- Early introduction of indigenous capabilities
- Modular Security and Reconstruction capabilities




Planning Scenarios: Distribution of Size and Likely Conditions for Scenarios





Planning Scenarios: How Options Meet the Strategic Space of Requirements





Organizing for Stabilization and Reconstruction



How We Do It Now:

- Forces committed to Stabilization Ops only as Combat Ops subside.
- Combat forces augmented with Civil Affairs, PSYOP, engineers, MPs must also plan and control post conflict operation.
- Post-conflict force integration occurs at execution mission.
- Lite emphasis on Phase IV in planning, training, exercises, resourcing

A Transformational Proposal:

- Create 2 standing Joint S&R Commands, 1 AC and 1 RC
- S&R JCOM plans, trains, exercises, develops doctrine and deploys to AOR.
- Maximize jointness with Army lead.
- Capable of operating in hostile environment.
- Capable of operating under a Joint Command or as a separate JTF.
- Modular, scalable, tailorable for mission, embedded interagency.
- Provide link to NGOs, contractors to hand off to civilian leadership for nation-building.



Advantages of a Separate Combat-Capable Command Designated for S&R throughout the Campaign



- S&R campaign is primary mission focus for a high level HQ throughout: planning, resourcing, exercising, deployment, combat phase and post conflict for the Combatant Command
- Modular force package designated, integrated and exercised as a team before deployment, employment – an extension of the Army’s modular transformation concept
- S&R force commander is a “green tab” co-equal of the combat unit commanders – for resources, deployment priority, exercise time, and CoCom access.
- S&R force employment is primary focus for this command throughout the fight, not after the fight.
- S&R Command not a ‘one-trick pony’ but a task-organized joint command at the Uex/Uey level, capable of conducting combat ops with limited organic and augmentation forces.
- At UA level, integrated commands are desirable for better mission planning, training, exercising, overall cohesive effort on the ground.




Providing the Future Force with a Stabilization and Reconstruction Capability



The basic building block for early post conflict S&R missions: a modular, integrated Unit of Action optimized for S & R Ops

Proposal: If Experimentation proves sound, create up to eight S&R Groups within Army and USMC, half AC and half RC by 2008



S&R Units of Action


Re-designate existing MP, CA, ENG or Med Brigades as integrated

Modify current battalion TO&E's to focus on integrated S&R missions



A UEx Task-Organized as a JTF for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations under a given OPLAN

(Notional)






Illustrative Scenario for S&R C3 Concept

- CENTCOM drafts OPLAN for combat in a Middle East country; identifies all UEx's required for combat phase.
- CENTCOM planners identify a separate UEx to lead the S&R phase. The UEx becomes the RRC's S&R JTF for this OPLAN
- The designated S&R JTF plans for OPLAN-specific S&R Ops; plans for re-configuration as an S&R JCOM: receiving attached S&R forces and detaching most subordinate combat units.
- During OPLAN exercises, S&R JTF exercises and trains as a cohesive S&R unit
- During lead up to war, S&R JTF integrates its forces into RCC deployment planning
- During Combat phase, Cdr S&R JTF advises RCC on theater S&R force employment
- Post conflict, Cdr, S&R JTF ensures Phase 4 is well initiated, detaches subordinate S&R UA's to Combat UEx's as entire force transitions to Phase 4 and/or counterinsurgency ops
- Cdr, S&R JTF plans for additional S&R forces, coordinates rotations with Combat UEx and serves as RCC special staff for S&R and focal HQ for civil links.
- 15 • Could merge HQ operation with C/JFLCC or RCC over time.



Elaboration of the S&R JTF Headquarters





Elaborating the Civil-Military Action Cell



- Team-based coordination cell for early S&R following combat ops
- Link between military command transitioning to Phase Four and civil agencies moving into area with resources, skills CoCom needs.
- Interagency representative would exercise, deploy with C-MAC and form core.
- Local group reps, NGO/IOs, contractors would be brought into cell as early as they can be identified



S&R Network Concept for JIM Ops



- Need to Share not Need to Know
- One physical network connectivity: protect information not by employing separate networks but by single password entry/multiple levels of security access over single transport layer – joint, interagency, multinational
- Cross domain solutions for email, collaboration
- COTS based solutions
- Joint GIG backbone (GIG-BE, TSAT) extended to interagency, multinational
- Example - Centcom Centrix Multinational Coalition Force & Interagency (MCFI) – 12,00 users; principal C2 net in Iraq (clas/unclas)



Two Deployable S&R Commands Under an Existing Command



PACOM
EUCOM
SOUTHCOM



JFCOM ?
FORSCOM ?





*Two JCOMs =
two deployable
capabilities: one
ready-active, one
reserve*

*Where best to
locate JCOMs to
still be resolved*

Deployed
operationally under a
Theater Combatant
Command or as
Independent JTF

Organized under an
existing Command for
training, equipping,
resourcing





Availability of Forces (Proposed vs. On-Hand)




	Proposed S&R JCOM	Army On-Hand (above divisions)
	<u>AC/RC Bns</u>	<u>AC/RC Bns</u>
Military Police	4/4	12/14
Civil Affairs	4/4	1/28
Construction Engineers	4/4	7/33
Area Medical	4/4	4/6
Psychological Operations	4/4	5/8
Training/Security Assist.	1/1	0/0



Army Forces in Iraq (1 May 03)

Approximate U.S. Army S&R Force Types In-Theater at the End of Major Combat Operations (1 May 2003)

TOTAL: 37,350



Reserve Component as % of Total Force

Military Police 59%

Civil Affairs 98%

Engineers 46%

Medical 35%

PSYOP 98%

- Capabilities were in theater on 1 May, but not organized for new S&R mission.
- AC/RC rebalancing required.



Availability of Forces (Regional and Linguistics Skills)



Army FAO resources by regional specialty are:

Latin America – 189

Europe – 195

South Asia – 35

Eurasia – 184

China – 41

North Africa/Middle East – 140

Northeast Asia – 71

Southeast Asia – 64

Sub-Saharan Africa - 83

Marine Corps. Program is smaller, newer version of Army's program; but designates both FAOs and non-language trained Regional Area Officers (RAOs).

Navy. Program based on identifying/accessing skills and initial qualification of volunteers.

Air Force. Program based on identifying/accessing skills and initial qualification of volunteers. Additional courses available for skill sustainment.



Availability of Forces (Adjustments)



Rebalance AC/RC

- Civil Affairs major shift from RC to AC
- Other candidates: MPs, Engineers, Medical, PSYOP
- Change the AC/RC paradigm to include tailored service contracts

Reorganized Existing Forces

- Composite MP battalion: law and order, investigation, resettlement
- Intelligence: ISR battalion w/cultural focus
- Ordnance: Multi-Service EOD battalion
- More FAOs for Greater Middle East

New Capabilities

- S&R JCOM HQ and Joint S&R Group HQ
- Training & Security Assistance Battalion
- Establish a Civilian Ready Reserve in special skill sets



Army Actions that Respond to Stability Operations Requirements



- Re-balancing AC-RC Mix to improve availability of Stability Operations forces in the Active Component force
- Increasing the numbers of civil affairs, military police, and PSYOP units in the overall (AC and RC) force
- Intensifying the focus on Stability Operations in doctrine development and when harvesting Lessons Learned from current operations
- Investment in Stability Ops capabilities: ASE, Stryker integration, body armor, unit Augmentation Sets (C4, TUAVs, armored HUMMMVs), and IED countermeasures
- Recruiting Arabic speakers into the Ready Reserve
- AWC & TRADOC engaged in defining the need and how to fill it for future operations

NDU offer: work with Army, JFCOM, State to develop interagency/civilian augmentation cell to attach to Joint HQs when designated as Stability Force C2 in OPLANS



Interim Steps toward a full S&R Capability in 7-8 years



- Do now: Stand up a Joint Center for Excellence that develops Lessons Learned and Joint Doctrine for S&R (S&R implementation per status quo)
- 2005: Designate one UA HQ (Bde level S&R Group) & limited forces to conduct S&R C2 and Ops experimentation under JFCOM
- 2005: Organize deployable Interagency/NGO Augmentation Cell for S&R Group HQ
- 2006: Identify one combat HQ (Army or Marine 1-2 star) and forces for S&R in each appropriate Joint Operational Plan
- FYDP 07-11: invest in one S&R JCOM with forces designated
- 2012: Stand up two S&R JCOMs



Adapting the Military Culture (Required skill sets for S&R)



- Warfighting skills in case conflict escalates
- Courage to take risks
- Confidence to delegate authority & need for trust
- Confidence to do things that have never been done before
- Increased decision-making skills
- Adapt or adjust to new environments
- Fairness and evenhandedness to all parties
- ✳ Vision of politico-military environment**
- ✳ Interact with nonmilitary partners & build consensus**
- ✳ Negotiations**
- ✳ Broad intellectual background (sociology, law, etc.)**
- ✳ Interpersonal skills**
- ✳ Understanding historical/cultural contexts**



Technologies for S&R Operations



Security

- Civilian-military communications interoperability
- Network counter-terrorist analysis tools
- Biometrics
- Non-lethal weapons

Infrastructure

- Civil infrastructure simulations (reverse EBO)
- Infrastructure equipment (water purification, electric power)

Human Relations

- Mobile, real-time language translators
- Elite leadership modeling



Linking the Interagency



- Create new interagency structure to support S&R mission.
- Create NSC level “National Interagency Coordination Group (NIACG)” to assure early S&R planning.
- Encourage creation of CoCom Joint Interagency Coordinating Groups (J-10s) to interface with NSC.
- Create new deployable civilian S&R capability.
- Establish C-MAC to embed interagency enhanced capabilities directly into new S&R Force.



Harnessing the International Community

- International participation can relieve the troop and financial burden of the U.S.
- Three initiatives would:
 - Identify niche capabilities among allies worldwide
 - Organize and train an international peacekeeping force
 - Press NATO allies to reorganize S&R forces along the lines suggested for the U.S.

