





CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NATIONAL NEGOTIATING STYLES

Edited by Hans Binnendijk



FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE



CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, established in late 1982 as part of the Foreign Service Institute, aims to enrich traditional Foreign Service training by keeping government officials in many agencies abreast of emerging foreign policy concepts. Its program of conferences, research, diplomatic exercises and simulation, and publication combines new perspectives developed in the private sector with practical experience gained by foreign affairs personnel.

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FOREWORD

Different nations negotiate with different styles. Those styles are shaped by the nation's culture, history, political system, and place in the world. Of course, each international negotiation has its own set of substantive issues and each individual negotiator is distinctive. But a better understanding of each nation's particular style can strengthen the ability of the United States to negotiate a better deal. With this in mind, the Foreign Service Institute is pleased to publish this volume containing assessments of six national negotiating styles.

This project developed from conversations in 1985 with Richard H. Solomon, then head of the Political Science Department of the Rand Corporation. At Rand, Solomon had completed an extensive study of the Chinese negotiating style. (His chapter in this volume is based on that study.) The Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs sought to expand his effort to other countries. Five additional countries were chosen based on their importance to the United States, their geographic distribution, and the distinctiveness of their style. Nationally recognized experts in the affairs of each nation were then asked to prepare a preliminary assessment. In October 1985, the Foreign Service Institute hosted a day-long workshop in which each expert presented preliminary conclusions. The workshop results generated a common approach to each chapter, and final papers were commissioned. Ambassador John W. McDonald provided wise counsel throughout the process. Diane B. Bendahmane, a consultant to the Center, provided valued help by editing the final draft chapters.

This volume provides a profile of each national negotiating style. It reviews each nation's historical and institutional setting, the characteristics of its political culture, the style of the negotiators themselves, and national strategies and tactics. Finally, each author suggests bargaining guidelines for U.S. negotiators.

Solomon finds that the Chinese conduct negotiations in a "linear" manner of discrete stages and in a distinctive (but not unique) style. The most fundamental characteristic of Chinese negotiators, he concludes, is their attempt "to identify foreign offi-

cials who are sympathetic to their cause, to cultivate a sense of friendship and obligation in their official counterparts, and then to pursue their objectives through a variety of stratagems designed to manipulate feelings of friendship, obligation, and guilt" or what Solomon calls, in Chinese terminology, "the games of *guanxi*." The process moves through several stages including opening moves, a period of assessment involving facilitating maneuvers and pressure tactics, and the end game. The Chinese tend to stress at the outset their commitment to abstract principles and will make concessions only at the eleventh hour after they have fully assessed the limits of their interlocutor's flexibility. After protracted exchanges, when a deadlock seems to have been reached, concessions may be made to consummate an agreement. And while the end-game phase may produce a signed agreement, the Chinese negotiator will continue to press for his objective in a post-agreement phase termed the implementation stage, giving negotiations with the Chinese the quality of continuous bargaining in which closure is never fully reached.

Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis describe a traditional Soviet negotiating style that is less subtle and more aggressive than that of the Chinese. The Soviets see negotiations as part of a larger struggle for increased power and influence which can be won if the negotiators are tough enough. Rather than cultivate friends for future manipulation, the Soviets tend to put their counterparts on the defensive right away with confrontational, blunt, or combative tactics. While Chinese hosts structure the negotiating environment to enhance a sense of obligation on the part of their guests, the Soviets often try to wear down their counterparts with tactics such as all-night negotiating sessions. The Soviet negotiator traditionally takes rigid and extreme positions at the outset; and unlike the Chinese, he makes concessions "slice by slice" in Salami-slicing tactics. A quid pro quo is expected for each concession. He seeks generally-worded agreements that give the Kremlin maximum flexibility in implementation.

Nathaniel B. Thayer and Stephen E. Weiss present a Japanese negotiating style that is fundamentally different from both the Chinese and the Soviet model. The Japanese prefer to avoid formal negotiations because negotiations are a form of social conflict, and "every Japanese has been taught at his mother's knee to avoid social conflict." For the Japanese negotiator the development of per-

sonal relations with his counterpart is critical, but the relationship is not established primarily for the purpose of manipulation. Rather, personal relationships are of value to the Japanese negotiator for informal, frank discussions where social conflict is minimal and progress can be made on a pragmatic basis. The Japanese negotiator has neither the aggressively blunt style of the Soviets nor the subtle manipulative style of the Chinese, but he can be extremely rigid because the complex Japanese consensus-building, decision-making process that sets the limits for the negotiation is itself rigid and inflexible. Japanese positions are offered as final solutions, fair to all, which cannot be bargained away. But Thayer and Weiss say that fundamental changes in the Japanese setting—Japan's relationship with the United States, the number of ministries involved in international affairs, and the strengthened Liberal Democratic Party committee system—are all changing in ways which may complicate the Japanese negotiating style and U.S.-Japanese relations.

Michael M. Harrison argues that like the Japanese, the French dislike formal face-to-face discussions, especially on national security matters. This French tendency developed not because the French want to avoid social conflict, but because they want to "avoid situations where concessions might have to be made to stronger states or coalitions of states" and wish to preserve their independence in a situation of declining national power. Protecting their own status and prestige is sometimes best achieved, the French feel, by "rejecting discussions or concessions, or taking a conflictual stand on grounds of principle." Their style can change dramatically depending upon whom they are negotiating with. Traditionally, they rely on highly rational abstract logic and general principles, and their positions are often rigid and legalistic. Like the Japanese, they may not have fall-back positions. Like the Soviets, they can be abrupt and confrontational. Authority in France's Fifth Republic generally flows directly from the president, and though French negotiators are given tactical flexibility, major concessions must be approved by the president.

The Egyptians, according to William B. Quandt, are motivated by pride in their country's past, an acceptance of the need for a strong ruler in the pharaonic mold, and the traditions of a highly developed bureaucracy. Like the French, the Egyptians are suspicious of negotiations because historically their independence has been

threatened by the collusion and intervention of external powers. Quandt argues that, depending upon the situation, Egyptian negotiators will either haggle in the *suq* (bazaar) model or will work through an intermediary in the Bedouin model. A U.S. negotiator must know which situation exists. It is also important for the U.S. negotiator to realize that his Egyptian counterpart may or may not know precisely where his president's bottom line is. Egyptian presidents have proven adept at bold actions designed to set the stage for negotiations and are capable of suddenly changing the Egyptian negotiating position.

The Mexicans, George W. Grayson believes, are strongly influenced by anti-Americanism and bruised dignity that give them a generally defensive negotiating style when dealing with the United States. Bilateral negotiations with the United States, many Mexican officials believe, are a zero-sum game in which they always stand to lose. In formal settings they often respond with rhetoric and lofty principles befitting a country which many Mexican leaders consider to be a repository of moral values. They also respond frequently by manufacturing delays. But when circumstances warrant, Mexico's small pool of world class negotiators can be pragmatic and effective. Ongoing informal discussions on technical issues such as in the Bilateral Energy Consultation Group can also be businesslike and productive. As is the case with France and Egypt, Mexico's negotiators are responsive to a president with immense authority who can personally shift negotiating positions. Also Grayson believes that the implementation of negotiated agreements with Mexico presents a problem because compliance can be slowed or frustrated by the massive bureaucracy.

These assessments of selected national negotiating styles suggest several general guidelines for U.S. negotiators. They are summarized here and discussed in greater detail in various chapters.


- Know your substance and be well prepared because your interlocutor probably will be.
- Have clear objectives and know your bottom line.
- Understand the negotiating style of the country you are dealing with.
- Do not negotiate with yourself.

- Do not stake out extreme positions but be consistent.
- Be patient and use time deadlines sparingly.
- Develop personal relationships with your interlocutor, but be careful not to be manipulated.
- Seek opportunities for informal sessions because they are where most agreements are made.
- Use appropriate protocol because the other side will probably be status conscious.
- Use media pressure carefully because it could backfire.
- Understand the national sensitivities of your interlocutor and do not violate them unless it is unavoidable.
- Assess your interlocutor's flexibility and the obstacles to his accepting your bottom line.
- Know the decision-making process of your counterpart and assess when it may be necessary to circumvent the negotiators.
- Be involved in your own decision-making process because this will probably give you an advantage over your counterpart.
- Pin down details where possible, especially when the other nation has compliance problems.

We hope that this book will lead to further detailed studies on national negotiating styles. U.S. negotiators often deal with counterparts who have decades of substantive and negotiating experience on a given issue, while the U.S. team is relatively new to the issue. By communicating more about each nation's negotiating style, perhaps such studies can help to correct this imbalance.

Hans Binnendijk, Director
Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs
February 1987





CHINA

Friendship and Obligation in Chinese Negotiating Style

Richard H. Solomon

This essay describes the political negotiating style that senior officials of the U.S. government are likely to encounter in dealing with counterparts from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The description is based on interviews with American officials who conducted negotiations with the Chinese during the 1970s in efforts to normalize U.S.-PRC relations and on an analysis of the official negotiating record and related materials, such as Chinese press statements.

The following analysis will give the American negotiator a sense of what many foreigners find to be an esoteric and appealing atmosphere, yet an often trying pattern of manipulations, in formal negotiating encounters with the Chinese. Above all, U.S. officials should draw confidence from the fact that their PRC counterparts

Richard H. Solomon is currently director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. This paper was written while he was head of the Political Science Department at the Rand Corporation; however, the analysis reflects his experiences during the early 1970s as a member of the National Security Council staff and his research on Chinese politics conducted at the University of Michigan between 1966 and 1971.

This paper was originally published by the Rand Corporation under the title *Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior: A Briefing Analysis* (R-3295, December 1985) and is reprinted here by permission.

will conduct negotiations in a relatively predictable manner, one which has been dealt with effectively in the past by other officials of the U.S. government in pursuit of American policy objectives.

The Chinese Setting

The experience of the past decade indicates that the Chinese conduct negotiations in a way that Americans find distinctive in its atmosphere and characteristics, even though individual elements of the process are not unique to the Chinese. PRC negotiators reflect a composite tradition that embodies their own culture and history, the Soviet-Communist influence, and partial adaptation to the diplomatic conventions of the West. The American negotiator will not be exposed to Marxist-Leninist rhetoric or concepts by his Chinese counterpart; yet PRC officials will use ideological formulations in internal documents and in press articles to explain policy positions.

The American official is likely to be most impressed by the "Chineseness" of his first visits to Beijing (Peking)—the self-assured and subtle manner in which officials handle substantive issues, and the cultured ambience created by the hospitality of his hosts, the banquet cuisine, and sightseeing trips to the Great Wall or Forbidden City. These aspects of the negotiating process will be purposefully orchestrated by the Chinese to create a sense of their country's great tradition and future potential—and in partial compensation for its current political and economic weaknesses.

Because the Chinese see politics as a very personalized process, rather than the working of institutions, they are very sensitive to signs of factional leadership conflict. They see their own governmental system as highly vulnerable to such conflict, and in dealings with foreigners they will go to great lengths to stress the unity of their contemporary leadership—even while admitting to the baleful effects on China of such recent periods of political turmoil as the "Cultural Revolution." Thus, the foreign negotiator will find that his Chinese counterparts will try to mask internal political processes from his understanding.

Recent experience has shown that PRC negotiating positions are highly sensitive to the play of political factionalism in Beijing. A strong leader can promote a policy that a collective leadership would be unable to support, or a negotiating position may be

withdrawn or hardened in the course of a negotiation as a result of factional conflict within the leadership. Thus, the U.S. negotiator faces the difficult task of assessing the measure of flexibility of his Chinese counterparts in terms of internal political processes that are—by the intent of his hosts—difficult to estimate. As a general rule, it can be assumed that the more rigid and posturing a Chinese negotiator or the more “irrational” a PRC negotiating position seems to be, the more factional political pressures are influencing the negotiating process.

National Characteristics

The Cultivation and Use of “Friends of China”

Chinese officials are single-minded and highly disciplined in their pursuit of PRC interests; yet as Chinese they are distrustful of impersonal or legalistic negotiations. The most fundamental characteristic of dealings with the Chinese is their attempt to identify foreign officials who are sympathetic to their cause, to cultivate a sense of friendship and obligation in their official counterparts, and then to pursue their objectives through a variety of stratagems designed to manipulate feelings of friendship, obligation, guilt, or dependence. This reflects the workings of a culture that has developed to a high level the management of interpersonal relations (*guanxi*), a society that stresses interdependency rather than individuality, and a political system that sees politics as the interplay between superior and dependent rather than the association of equals.

Thus, the Chinese will go to great lengths to collect information on the opinions and personal preferences of their official counterparts, not just attitudes on political issues but personal likes as to food and music as well. They will then use such information to develop a sense of personal relationship. Dinnertime conversations and sight-seeing banter are viewed by PRC officials as opportunities both to gain such information and to cultivate a mood of “friendship.”

When Chinese officials speak of “friendship” or identify a foreigner as an “old friend,” it should be remembered that in their tradition “friendship” implies obligations as much as good personal relations. Moreover, PRC officials limit their dealings with foreign

“friends” strictly to formal occasions. Contemporary Chinese have highly mixed feelings about foreigners. On the one hand they admire and covet the power and economic progress that they see in the West—which they seek to gain through foreign “friendships.” On the other hand, they resent China’s backwardness, dependence on outsiders, and the feeling that they have been ill-treated in the past by those on whom they have relied for help in modernizing their country. Such resentment has been most evident in their attitudes toward China’s former Soviet allies; yet in other periods of the past century one sees efforts by the Chinese to establish friendly relations with foreign countries and then bitter disappointment as their high hopes (and often unrealistic demands) for support and assistance have not been fully realized.

Commitment to “Principles”

Perhaps because of the highly personalized and, upon occasion, opportunistic quality of their own politics and their ambivalent feelings about dealing with foreigners, the Chinese seek to establish their own ground rules in negotiation by emphasizing their commitment to certain general “principles.” In recent history this has taken the form of a stress on Marxism, the principles of “peaceful coexistence,” or political understandings such as were embodied in the Shanghai Communique signed with the United States in 1972.

Thus, a Chinese official can be expected to initiate a negotiation either by pressing his foreign counterpart to agree to certain general principles or by invoking past agreements of a general nature with the foreigner’s predecessors which he is expected to accept and abide by. A Chinese negotiator will judge the degree of commitment of his foreign counterpart to a relationship with China by his acceptance of relevant principles, and as a negotiation proceeds he will seek to constrain his interlocutor’s room for bargaining maneuver by invoking “principle” in order to critique his counterpart’s position.

Nonetheless, the experience of recent negotiations with the PRC reveals clearly that when Chinese officials want to reach a specific agreement they will set aside their stress on principle and reach a concrete understanding that in fact may have little relation to—or may even seem to contravene—the principles they stressed early in the negotiation.

Negotiating Strategies and Tactics


American officials have described negotiations with the Chinese as a "linear" process of sequential and relatively discrete stages which unfold as the two sides explore issues of common concern. This process is outlined in Figure 1.

In the initial period of *opening moves* a Chinese negotiator will seek to gain his counterpart's commitment to certain general principles favorable to his objectives, while also seeking to build a personal relationship with him.

There will follow an often lengthy and diffuse *period of assessment* in which the Chinese official will seek to draw out his foreign interlocutor, test his intentions and his commitment to a relationship with the PRC, and assess the limits of his political flexibility on matters under discussion. This phase may last for months if not years. For example, the Chinese initiated talks with the United States on normalizing relations at Geneva in 1955. These discussions were moved to Warsaw in 1958 and continued without

Figure 1

PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS: A "LINEAR" PROCESS



progress for fourteen more years, until 1970, when PRC (and U.S.) terms and objectives changed enough to make agreement possible. Full normalization was finally accomplished in late 1978, more than twenty-three years after negotiations on the issue began. In 1981-82 the U.S.-PRC negotiation on American arms sales to Taiwan went on for fourteen months before agreement was reached.

In the assessment phase the "boundaries" of the negotiation may be ill-defined. PRC officials will be evaluating statements of the U.S. government made in contexts other than bilateral exchanges; or they may hold a series of meetings with senior U.S. officials on apparently unrelated topics (through high level visits to Beijing, the United Nations, or by way of ongoing ambassadorial contacts in Washington and Beijing) through which to influence and assess any evolution in the U.S. position.

The Chinese highly value patience as a political virtue, and the "can do" enthusiasm of the American style of problem-solving may be easily misinterpreted by them as impatience. A PRC negotiator will watch for signs of impatience in his foreign counterpart as an indicator of how anxious he is to conclude an arrangement—and thus how likely he is to accede to Chinese terms.

Finally, the Chinese may unexpectedly precipitate *the end-game* phase of a negotiation and seek to rapidly conclude a formal arrangement when they feel they know the limits of their interlocutor's position and where such an arrangement is seen as serving PRC interests. Their initiation of an end game is usually signaled by a shift from discussion of general principles to an evident interest in concrete arrangements. They may present a draft agreement that is very close to their opposite party's final position in order to rapidly conclude a deal.

The Chinese view the political negotiating process as an attempt to reconcile the principles and objectives of the two sides and the testing of their interlocutor's commitment to a relationship with the PRC. They do *not* see it as a highly technical process of haggling over details in which the two sides move to a point of convergence from their original positions through incremental compromises. Indeed, they disparage haggling and can show remarkable flexibility in concrete arrangements once they have decided it is in their interest to conclude an agreement.

Opening Moves

Given their stress on the personal element in politics, the Chinese may go to considerable lengths to establish as a negotiating counterpart an individual whose views and political positions they believe are favorable to them. Thus, in early 1971, they indicated through diplomatic channels a clear preference for National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger as the official they hoped President Richard M. Nixon would send secretly to Beijing. In 1974 they invited Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the PRC, knowing of his critical views of detente. In 1978 they sought to establish National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski as a voice in the normalization negotiations as they found his views more to their liking than those of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance. And in early 1981, they quickly sought to establish Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. as their interlocutor in the Reagan Administration as opposed to National Security Advisor Richard Allen.

If the Chinese have a clear set of priorities for a negotiation, they will press insistently to establish an agenda favorable to their objectives. In 1981, for example, they refused to discuss matters of U.S.-PRC security cooperation until an agreement had been reached on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

PRC officials will seek to establish a favorable framework for realizing their objectives at the outset of a negotiation by pressing their counterparts to agree to "principles" of a very general nature. Then, as a negotiation proceeds, they will challenge positions put forward by the other side as inconsistent with the mutually agreed-upon principles. The Shanghai Communique, signed by President Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai in February 1972, thus became a framework for the subsequent six years of normalization talks; and PRC officials now criticize U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as inconsistent with the principles agreed to in the Shanghai Communique of "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states" and "non-interference in the internal affairs of other states."

The Chinese are meticulous note-takers, and they will throw back at a negotiator his own words or those of his predecessors when they sense any deviation in policy from prior negotiating exchanges which serve their interests. They are also subtle and elliptical in presenting their positions, and are masters in the use of political

symbolism. During Henry Kissinger's first secret trip to Beijing in 1971, Zhou Enlai hinted at conflict within the Chinese leadership by omitting the name of Defense Minister Lin Biao from a list of officials who wanted to thank Kissinger for gifts he had brought to them from the United States. In 1972 Zhou indirectly suggested to President Nixon that he was seriously ill by quoting from a poem by Chairman Mao Zedong which commented on the evanescence of life. (Zhou died of cancer in early 1976.) And in 1973 Mao obliquely indicated to senior U.S. officials that he did not support his wife's political ambitions by telling Kissinger that China's women were too numerous and caused "disasters." They used "ping-pong diplomacy" and the gift of panda bears in the 1971-72 period to express their interest in normalizing relations with the United States. And the Shanghai Communique became a symbol of the normalization process. Chinese negotiators are skillful in using such symbols and agreed-upon principles to constrain their negotiating adversary's room for maneuver.

Period of Assessment

Once a framework for a negotiating relationship has been established, the Chinese will go through an often lengthy period of assessing their counterpart's objectives and positions. They are highly effective in drawing out an interlocutor. Negotiating sessions in Beijing predictably begin with the Chinese official saying, "Our custom is that our guest always speaks first." They will press for full revelation of the foreigner's position before exposing their own. Efforts to draw them out early in a negotiation will produce very general or banal statements. They will not make any substantive statements until they believe they know their interlocutor's position fully.

All conversations with lower level officials are reported "upward" to their superiors and are analyzed in detail by senior leaders. Hence, the U.S. negotiator should assume that a conversation with, let us say, the foreign minister early in a visit to Beijing will have been reported fully to the premier. Hence, positions do not have to be repeated through a series of meetings. Indeed, American negotiators have described official visits to Beijing as an "unfolding dialogue" in which one passes layer by layer into ever higher levels of the PRC leadership, much as one moves ever deeper into the

courtyards of the Forbidden City until the emperor's throne is finally reached. In this way the Chinese gain the initiative in assessing the views of a foreign negotiator and have time to prepare their responses. Thus they protect their senior leaders against ill-informed or confrontational encounters with lower-level foreign officials.

Facilitating Maneuvers

The Chinese unquestionably prefer to negotiate on their own territory as it facilitates their internal communications and decision-making procedures and maximizes their control over the ambience of a negotiation. They will purposefully orchestrate all aspects of the environment—press play, the mood of their officials, banquet toasts, the quality of the cuisine, and sight-seeing excursions—to create a context favorable to their purposes.

When the Chinese wish to develop a relationship with a foreign government, they use a variety of diplomatic and negotiating ploys to facilitate agreement and minimize differences. They may use a trusted intermediary to convey positions to a foreign government in advance of a negotiation in a deniable or face-saving manner and in order to “load” the agenda of their foreign counterpart. Accordingly, they used the Pakistani government in 1971 to communicate their initial positions to the Nixon Administration in advance of Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing. They can show magnanimity when they want to strengthen a relationship, as in 1980 when they offered Secretary of Defense Harold Brown the opportunity to purchase certain rare earth metals which they knew the U.S. government needed.

They can express differences by indirection and subtlety of language to minimize confrontation or draw out their interlocutor with ambiguous yet suggestive formulas. For example, in 1973 the Chinese began to emphasize that normalization had to be completed according to “the Japanese formula”—without spelling out in precise detail what this “formula” entailed. They may resort to stalling tactics to protract a negotiation when premature closure would be unfavorable to their interests or lead to a deadlock. Or they may reach a partial agreement on issues where compromise serves their ends, but explicitly reserve their position on irreconcilable differences for negotiation at a later time in more favorable circumstances. For example, in late 1978 the Chinese agreed to the U.S. formula

for establishing diplomatic relations on all points except continuing American arms sales to Taiwan. On this issue they publicly indicated that—while agreeing to normalize—they could not accept the U.S. position and reserved the intention to negotiate the difference of view at a later date.

Pressure Tactics

Chinese skill in creating a positive ambience for a negotiation is perhaps only matched by the range and variety of the pressure tactics they are known to employ once a relationship has been established. Chinese hospitality is contrasted by their subtle use of the calculated insult, as in 1975 when they accorded a visiting American Communist Party delegation more favored treatment than an official party preparing for President Gerald R. Ford's trip to China at the end of the year. Their meticulous organization of a foreign official's visit makes the occasional use of purposeful unpredictability—as in suddenly cancelling a scheduled meeting without explanation or refusing to confirm a senior U.S. official's call on a counterpart PRC leader until the last minute—all the more unsettling. And their solicitude for the comfort of their guests is countered by their occasional resort to fatiguing late-night negotiating sessions as a way of pressuring and disorienting a foreign official.

Many of the ploys used by the Chinese in the U.S.-PRC negotiations of the past decade seem to imply that the relationship established with the Shanghai Communiqué is in jeopardy, or that the American side is guilty of not living up to its commitments in developing the relationship:

- “You need us; we don't need you!” The Chinese are particularly adept in making their interlocutor appear the supplicant or *demandeur* in a negotiation. They will maneuver a dialogue so that the foreigner seems to be asking for something from China—thus putting him in a defense bargaining position. Conversely, they will go to great lengths to avoid appearing to need a relationship with a foreign government. Thus, in 1971 they tried to make it appear that President Nixon had asked to visit China, when in fact Premier Zhou Enlai had extended him an invitation and there was mutual interest in developing the relationship. And in 1981 the Chinese strongly resisted the argument that they needed American arms for their defense, fearing that the price of a dependent security re-

lationship with the United States would be unrestricted American weapons sales to Taiwan.

- **Beat up on one's friends.** When the Chinese want to pressure a foreign government, they will put the heat on an official who is viewed as sympathetic to the relationship, assuming that a "friend" will work to resolve problems in a way that no unsympathetic official would do. Thus, in 1975 Secretary of State Kissinger was subjected to calculated pressures as the Chinese attempted to move the United States to normalize relations, and in 1980 Vice Presidential candidate George Bush was strongly pressured to bring about a modification of Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan's China policy.

- **Play adversaries against each other.** Over the past decade there have been repeated examples of the PRC seeking to influence their interlocutors in the U.S. government by playing their political opponents against them. When the Chinese were unsure about the Nixon Administration's intentions toward them in 1970, they put out feelers to sympathetic Democratic politicians in Congress. And, as noted earlier, they have tried to play on presumed interpersonal rivalries—Schlesinger versus Kissinger, Brzezinski against Vance, Haig versus Allen.

- **"Your Chinese friends are vulnerable."** There have been several instances in which PRC officials have implied that unless the United States showed flexibility in negotiations, Chinese leaders sympathetic to the relationship with the United States would get into political trouble. This was hinted at regarding Zhou Enlai's standing in 1972 by a PRC ambassador abroad when normalization issues were being discussed. And Deng Xiaoping repeatedly told American visitors in 1981-82 that "the Chinese people" would not support him if the Taiwan arms sales issue were not satisfactorily resolved. Subsequent analysis of these ploys indicates that the Chinese were not bluffing; but it is difficult to assess the validity of such arguments at the time they are made, and such considerations can never be the primary factor in determining U.S. policy.

- **Bad guy-good guy.** While not unique to the Chinese, there is a tendency for lower-level PRC officials to present a negotiating position in a much sharper manner than will a senior leader who may enter a negotiation only late in the day when the inter-

locutor's views have been fully tested. For example, former Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua presented positions much more rigidly than did Premier Zhou, who would directly involve himself in a bargaining situation only when agreement seemed near. And former Foreign Minister Huang Hua played the role of the "heavy" in negotiating the Taiwan arms sales issue, with Deng Xiaoping the senior compromiser.

- **"Kill the chicken to warn the monkey."** A traditional Chinese negotiating ploy is to prove to an adversary one's seriousness of intent by taking some action of limited cost which will make credible a more costly negotiating threat that one wants to avoid. Thus, in early 1981 the PRC downgraded diplomatic relations with the Netherlands government in response to the Dutch sale to Taiwan of two submarines to make credible the threat to downgrade relations with the United States if American arms were sold to Taiwan without prior understanding with the PRC.

- **"You are the guilty party!"** Chinese negotiators will seek to portray themselves as the injured party by identifying faults, weaknesses, failures to perform, or other asserted errors on the part of their interlocutor's government—thus putting their negotiating counterpart on the defensive. In 1975, for example, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly asserted to Kissinger that "the U.S. owes China a debt" on normalization because of the intention expressed by President Nixon in 1972 to establish diplomatic relations by the end of his second term.

- **Word games.** As discussed earlier, Chinese negotiators will use very general agreements in principle or prior commitments of a government to pressure a foreign counterpart on specific issues. They will claim that some action of the interlocutor's government "violates the spirit" of a prior agreement or that one administration is going back on the words of its predecessors. For example, in 1977 the Chinese rejected Secretary of State Vance's proposal for a U.S. governmental presence in Taiwan after normalization by quoting back to him words of his predecessors that such an official presence was not required.

While Chinese negotiators, in contrast to Soviet officials, seek to preserve their credibility by avoiding hollow bluffs and outright lies, they are known to twist the meaning or intent of prior

statements or understandings to serve their purposes. Accordingly, the U.S. negotiator should be forearmed with a full understanding of the negotiating record as a basis for countering sometimes distorted Chinese assertions about prior agreements.

- **Press play.** PRC officials have demonstrated some skill in manipulating the press as a component of the negotiating process. They know that the high level of media attention given American negotiating teams provides them opportunities to build public pressures on an American negotiator. Thus, when journalists accompany a senior official into his first negotiating session with, let us say, Deng Xiaoping, Deng can be expected to make some apparently casual comments within earshot of the press to set the mood for a negotiation.

Deng and other officials have effectively used the “trap of visibility” to raise the concerns of their U.S. interlocutors about the effect on U.S.-Soviet relations or even the appearance of a deterioration in the U.S.-PRC relationship. Through statements to the press, they have raised public anticipations about progress in the relationship to put pressure on a negotiator—who will be concerned that unrealized expectations will be interpreted to mean that he has failed in his mission. And they have shown skill in deflating public pressures on themselves—as, for example, in Deng’s public proclamation of peaceful intent toward Taiwan just before his 1979 visit to Washington.

Chinese negotiators have sought to foreclose certain U.S. negotiating positions by rejecting them publicly prior to a bargaining session. And they have sought to make credible their own “unshakeable” positions through public disclosure in order to play on the assumption of their negotiating counterparts that such visible commitments “lock the Chinese in” because of their concern with maintaining credibility (even though there are many examples of PRC negotiators backing off their “principled” positions).

- **Time pressures.** A major Chinese negotiating tactic is the effort to play time pressures against an interlocutor. A Chinese official will tend to adopt a somewhat passive posture in formal discussions in order to draw out his foreign counterpart and to convey the impression that he is under no pressure to reach agreement. “We are a patient people” is a familiar Chinese self-characterization, and

even when PRC officials are under internal pressures to complete an agreement—as they were in the negotiations on establishing diplomatic relations in 1978—they will observe that, “We are in no hurry, but if the U.S. side is interested in reaching an agreement, we are prepared to listen to your proposals.”

In practice, the Chinese have shown themselves to be vulnerable to the time pressures that are inevitably a part of the political process. The skillful negotiator will estimate the constraints of time operating on his PRC counterparts and structure a negotiation so that he is not trapped against a time deadline.

End Game

Once the Chinese believe they have fully assessed the limits of their interlocutor’s flexibility, they can move rapidly to conclude an agreement if it serves their interests. A PRC negotiator may let a negotiation deadlock and drag on for some time to see if his counterpart will modify his “final” position. A senior leader may then intervene to “cut the knot” of an apparent deadlock.

When the Chinese have decided to reach agreement, they are quite flexible in working out the specific elements of an accord. Analysis of the many normalization agreements reached by the PRC in the 1970s shows striking variation in language on the critical issue of the status of Taiwan. Very few of the foreign negotiating teams met Beijing’s demand for explicit recognition of PRC sovereignty over the island.

If the Chinese decide that agreement does *not* serve their interests, they can abort a negotiation or drag it out over months or even years until changed circumstances make agreement seem possible or desirable. Upon occasion they have hardened their terms late in a negotiation to prevent agreement (due to internal political or bureaucratic resistance, or to test the firmness of their interlocutor’s final position).

Implementation

Many foreign negotiators comment that reaching agreement with the Chinese does not mean the end of negotiation. The process does not have a clear sense of finality about it as PRC officials do not hesitate to reopen issues that their foreign counterparts thought had been resolved. They will seek modifications of formal under-

standings when it serves China's interests. And they seem to view the conclusion of one agreement as the occasion for pressing for new concessions.

At the same time, Chinese officials will vigilantly assess the manner in which a foreign government implements an agreement, viewing compliance as a test of how seriously or "sincerely" the counterpart officials take their relationship with the PRC. They will be quick to find fault, while blithely urging "understanding" of any lapses in performance on their own part.

Guidelines for U.S. Negotiators

The experience of the past decade suggests the following guidelines for successfully conducting negotiations with the Chinese. While many of these points sound simplistic, in practice they have been violated by U.S. officials in their dealings with the PRC.

- **Know the substantive issues cold.** Chinese officials are meticulous in preparing for negotiation sessions, and their staffs are very effective in briefing them on technical issues. They will use any indication of sloppy preparation against an interlocutor.
- **Master the past negotiating record.** PRC officials have full control over the prior negotiating record and will not hesitate to use it to pressure a counterpart.
- **Know your own bottom line.** A clear sense of the objectives of a negotiation will enable a negotiator to avoid being trapped in commitments to vague "agreements in principle" and to resist Chinese efforts to drag out a negotiation. Conversely, incremental compromises will suggest to the Chinese that their interlocutor's final position has not yet been reached.
- **Present your position in a broad framework.** The Chinese seem to find it easier to compromise on specific issues if they have a sense of the broader purposes of their interlocutor in developing a relationship with the PRC. They distrust quick deals but appreciate presentations which suggest seriousness of purpose and an interest in maintaining a relationship with China for the long run.
- **Be patient.** Don't expect quick or easy agreement. A Chinese negotiator will have trouble convincing his superiors that he has fully tested the limits of his counterpart's position if he has not

protracted the discussions. Assume you may be subjected to unexplained delays or various forms of pressure to test your resolve.


- **Avoid time deadlines.** Resist negotiating in circumstances where you must have agreement by a certain date. The Chinese will assume that your anxiety to conclude a deal can be played to their advantage.

- **Minimize media pressures.** PRC negotiators will use public expectations about a negotiation to pressure their interlocutor. Confidential handling of negotiating exchanges, the disciplining of leaks, and minimizing of press exposure will be taken by the Chinese as signs of seriousness of purpose. "Negotiation via the press" will evoke a sharp Chinese response.

- **Understand the PRC political context and the style of your Chinese interlocutor.** Despite the difficulties of assessing the domestic PRC political scene, an evaluation of internal factional pressures and the style of your counterparts will help in understanding Chinese objectives and negotiating flexibility and in "reading" the signals or loaded language of a very different culture and political system.

- **Understand the Chinese meaning of "friendship."** Know that the Chinese expect a lot from their "friends." Resist the flattery of being an "old friend" or the sentimentality that Chinese hospitality easily evokes. Don't promise more than you can deliver; but expect that you will be pressured to honor past commitments. Resist Chinese efforts to shame or play on guilt feelings for presumed errors or shortcomings.

- **Don't try to emulate the Chinese style.** Most American officials find their initial dealings with the Chinese to be elating experiences (especially when compared to negotiating with certain other countries). It is easy to feel you understand the Chinese, and it is natural to want to emulate their subtle and cultured style. Be true to your own style even while you appreciate the way the Chinese "play the game and understand them well enough to read their purposes.



THE SOVIET UNION

The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation

Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis

The position of the United States and the Soviet Union as the world's superpowers has imposed on them a relationship in which their differences are often the subject of negotiations. This fact has rightfully drawn immense attention to the substance of the two sides' negotiating positions but has not fostered nearly as much interest in how they negotiate. This analysis of Soviet negotiating behavior should provide some useful insights for U.S. officials as they formulate negotiating strategies. Given that the issue of overriding importance in U.S.-Soviet negotiations for the last 25 years has been arms limitation, the history of superpower arms talks will be the chief source of information for this essay.

The Soviet Setting: Influences on Negotiating Behavior

The Burden of a Painful History

While there are many historical influences on Soviet society today, three particularly influence negotiations. First, the Russians have been isolated from the West, both culturally and politically. Second, for centuries they have invaded neighboring lands and have

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themselves been invaded. Finally, their sense of inferiority has resulted in a concern for being treated as equals.

The heavy influence of Byzantine Christianity in Russian government, religion, and culture in the Middle Ages served to isolate Russia from Roman-oriented Western Europe. This cultural separation from Europe was reinforced by the geographical remoteness of Russia and its domination by the Mongolian Tatars in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Even after the Moscovite state regained its independence in the fifteenth century, Russia remained practically unaffected by such seminal Western intellectual developments as the Renaissance and the Reformation. Foreigners began to influence the tsarist court in the eighteenth century, but the Russian government was primarily interested in obtaining Western technology (as it is today) and resisted the influence of European culture.¹

The Russian peasantry and even much of the nobility remained isolated from foreigners and their ideas. Indeed, it was not until the nineteenth century that the Russian diplomatic corps became acculturated to the norms of Western diplomatic behavior.² Even so, the absorption of these Western conventions was the exception in a Russia that remained self-consciously apart from many of the intellectual and cultural developments of the West.

A history of violent conflict has also fundamentally affected the Russian outlook on the world. Having no natural frontiers, the early Moscovite state had to fight off the Tatars and Turks to establish a territorial foothold. Later, Russia was repeatedly at war with the Swedish and Polish empires, sometimes losing battles and territory, but gradually managing to expand its domain. In the nineteenth century, the Russians suffered Napoleon's invasion and lost the Crimean War to England and France. After the Bolshevik revolution, armies of Western nations fought on Russian soil to crush the new Soviet regime, and in both world wars German armies invaded, threatening Russian sovereignty and independence.

Naturally this painful experience of centuries of invasion has affected the Russian psyche, resulting in an obsession with security, which in turn induces an extreme habit of secrecy regarding defense matters and a belligerent attitude toward foreign countries. Historian Richard Pipes has pointed out that this bloody history has a different, if related, effect on the Soviet outlook on negotiations.

Pipes notes that early Moscow had to establish its sovereignty by conquering territory and incorporating it into Russia, while Western states were being built by their monarchies' suppression of the feudal nobility and church. He argues that since the Soviets, as did the Russians before them, "consider the status of lands and peoples presently under their control entirely beyond discussion . . . [they] have nothing to lose and always something to gain from negotiations."³ While this analysis may give undue weight to the effect of territorial questions on negotiating technique, it does provide a historical context for what some have suggested is a Soviet view that "what's mine is mine, what's yours is negotiable."

As they began to develop tentative contacts with the West in the sixteenth century, the Russians found trade and political relationships with the West enticing but remained fearful and envious of Western technology and culture. Foreigners living in Moscow were mistrusted and resented by the populace, partly because they were often given special privileges by the tsars to attract their talents. The centuries of isolation from the West, along with anxieties fostered by the belief that they were surrounded by hostile and more advanced states, has given the Russians a kind of inferiority complex and consequently a strong need to be treated as equals. This attitude often compels Russians to try to hide their weaknesses, thus reinforcing their penchant for secrecy. It also affects everything from their concept of "equal security"—a notion which often makes them more equal than others—to their strict interpretation of protocol, exemplified in most negotiations by the appointment of delegation members who are of comparable rank to their negotiating counterparts.

However, Soviet achievement of military parity with the United States in the last decade has hastened a slow growth in Russian confidence in dealing with the West. The fact that the military sphere is really the only one in which the Soviet Union has equalled the West means that it is a vital attribute in the Soviet self-image. The importance of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process to the Soviet Union is that it confirmed this accomplishment and formally demonstrated that the U.S.S.R. was a superpower. Such an acknowledgement from the United States and the world in general was of tremendous psychological significance to the Soviets. Raymond Garthoff, an expert on the Soviet Union and a

delegate to the SALT I talks, suggests that this development has had an important impact on Soviet negotiating behavior. Garthoff says that the Soviet attitude toward negotiations has been changing and that

this change reflects a greater feeling of self-confidence, and the changed "relation of forces" in the world. In this respect, greater equality between the power of the Soviet Union and the United States in recent years has led not to greater intransigence and overbearing Soviet behavior, as many feared, but generally to more responsible and business-like negotiations. Moscow feels less need for defensive posturing and over-compensation for weakness.⁴

Garthoff's characterization of the Soviets' changed attitude accurately describes their behavior in the 1970s. It is less clear that this remains true in the 1980s. The long-standing Soviet anxiety about being treated with respect accounts for the Soviets' belief that the U.S. buildup in military forces, particularly the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and the stated U.S. intention to develop space-based defenses, both demonstrate that the United States no longer accepts strategic equality with the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, Moscow was faced once again with the prospect of being overwhelmed by Western military technology and, as a result, reverted to its defensive and belligerent stance in strategic arms negotiations. More recently, with the rise to power of a confident new generation of Soviet leaders, the Soviet Union has shown more boldness in arms control negotiations. This boldness was evident at the October 1986 Reykjavik summit in the apparent willingness of the Soviets to negotiate away all their SS-20 missiles in Europe and their proposal eventually to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons. Interestingly, this new Soviet approach to nuclear negotiations appears to result in part from both of the tendencies discussed above: a renewed sense of confidence in dealing with the United States and a fear of once again falling way behind in military technology.

Revolutionary Ideology

The Soviets' revolutionary ideology has influenced their negotiating behavior in several distinctive ways. For example, Richard Pipes has described the militaristic nature of V.I. Lenin's

attitude toward politics and how this conceptualization contributed to what Pipes calls the "total" foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which uses all diplomatic, economic, psychological, and military means at its disposal.⁵ Soviet ideology sets the goal of worldwide socialist triumph. Since this goal has not been reached, struggle against capitalist and imperialist exploitation is required to attain it. According to this concept, negotiations are viewed as class struggle by other means.

Another relevant dimension of Soviet ideology is the "general line." An important aspect of the general line is the identification of the major threat to Soviet interests. According to President Reagan's senior arms control adviser Paul Nitze, the major threat has shifted from Soviet social democrats to foreign social democrats to the United States, the latter beginning at the end of World War II.⁶ The United States has remained the major threat since that time. One conclusion to be drawn from these aspects of Soviet ideology is that negotiations are often used as one means of struggle against the chief adversary—the United States.

However, the idea of negotiations as struggle does not rule out reaching agreements with the adversary. The Soviet ideology is flexible enough to allow for temporary relaxation of the offensive when conditions dictate. The concept of "peaceful coexistence" with enemies has traditionally been used in periods when Soviet strength is insufficient to struggle more aggressively. It was initially used by the Soviets immediately upon taking power in 1917, when their country had been seriously weakened by World War I and the revolution. Under peaceful coexistence, negotiations were used, specifically at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks with Germany, to buy time for the anticipated workers' revolution in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Bolsheviks expected to pass the time in these negotiations demonstrating to the masses of the world their defiance of the capitalist powers and their conventions but ultimately had to submit to a highly unfavorable territorial settlement.⁷

An Oligarchical Decision-Making System

The Soviet process for making decisions is basically oligarchical, with the small group of men in the Politburo of the Communist Party making all major decisions for the society. In the areas of defense and arms control, it is generally believed that a great deal

of responsibility devolves onto the Defense Council, a body whose permanent membership probably includes the party general secretary, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, the KGB chairman, and perhaps the chief of the general staff and the Central Committee secretary for ideology.⁸ For any negotiation, a prior decision on a particular agreement by one of these groups is needed before Soviet negotiators will talk seriously. According to Nitze, a subordinate body with representatives from the Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military, and the KGB formulates instructions for the negotiators based on Defense Council or Politburo decisions and coordinates them with other operations related to the relevant arms control issue.⁹ In addition, evidently the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry both now have special arms control divisions.¹⁰

Nothing can happen in the Soviet Union that is opposed by the full Politburo, and thus the party retains ultimate control. However, the Defense Council appears to make most of the arms control negotiating decisions. The views of the Soviet military are very influential in these matters, often controlling. Evidence from the SALT negotiations indicates that the military was usually predominant in determining what kind of limits were acceptable.¹¹ But it appears that growing concern with Western public opinion in the 1980s has given civilian officials greater say in Soviet arms control proposals.¹² The increasing influence of the Foreign Ministry since before SALT, as exemplified by the elevation of then Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the Politburo in 1973, had already begun to weaken the military's grip on arms control policy. Under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, both Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Central Committee Secretary Anatoliy Dobrynin have become top advisers on negotiations with the United States.

The presence of numerous officials who deal with media and propaganda on the Soviet delegation to the November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev summit seems to mark a further strengthening in the role of civilian officials. Among the delegation's members were Vadim Zagladin, the First Deputy Chief of the International Department of the Central Committee (in charge of international propaganda); Leonid Zamyatin, chief spokesman and a Central Committee member who heads media affairs; and Aleksandr Yakovlev, a national

party secretary and head of the Central Committee Propaganda Department.¹³ Zagladin and Zamyatin are reported to be on the Defense Council.¹⁴ Yakovlev is a key player in the sophisticated new Soviet approach to public relations. He and Gannadi Gerasimov, director of the Foreign Ministry's information department and chief Soviet spokesman at the Reykjavik summit, were highly visible members of the Soviet delegation at that meeting. On the other hand, chief of the General Staff, Sergei Akhromeyev, was also a prominent member of the delegation and led the Soviet working group in the critical all-night arms control talks at Reykjavik, suggesting that military influence in such negotiations is still predominant.

Not only the major decisions, but also a great many of the details of negotiating positions are decided upon at the top of the Soviet hierarchy—much more, for example, than is determined by the U.S. National Security Council. This results from the centralized and compartmented nature of the Soviet system and from the habit of secrecy that is so ingrained in the Soviet mind. Soviet leaders want to maximize control and minimize the dissemination of information, particularly on national security.

Finally, given the collective character of the system, individual personalities generally do not single-handedly determine Soviet decision-making, though individuals can affect negotiations in which they are involved. Since Joseph Stalin, no Soviet leader has been a sole dictator, nor has anyone so profoundly influenced Soviet negotiating. The key Soviet leader since Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev preferred that decisions of the Politburo be taken by consensus.¹⁵ Indeed, the oligarchical decision-making process has become instituted sufficiently to prevent any leader from having an overwhelming influence.

On the other hand, Nikita Khrushchev and Brezhnev himself both engaged in enough personal negotiating to have influenced talks with their personalities. Brezhnev, for example, overrode the objection of the military in striking the deal with President Gerald Ford at Vladivostok that provided the basis for the SALT II Treaty. Furthermore, personalities within the oligarchy often clash and have great influence over decisions. One of the key questions in current U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union is the extent to which Mikhail

Gorbachev will be able to impose his personal views, not only on individual negotiations, as in the 1985 and 1986 summits with President Reagan, but also on fundamental policies.

National Characteristics

This historical, ideological, and organizational background has given rise to three Soviet tendencies in negotiating. These tendencies are not unique to the Soviet Union, but they are particularly salient in Soviet negotiating behavior: The use of negotiations as part of a broad effort to maximize Soviet power and influence; a preference for generally-worded agreements, the ambiguity of which can be exploited to Soviet advantage; and a sense that compromise in negotiation reflects weakness.

The relationship between the Soviet Union and its bargaining partner—and sometimes even that between the former and third parties—is the context within which the Soviets approach negotiations and is the overriding consideration in their bargaining behavior. Negotiations are seen by the Soviets as a means to advance their interests in relations with other countries or at times as a means to divide their opponents. Given their isolated and adversarial outlook on the world, Soviet leaders view negotiations as a means of increasing their power and influence even more than most countries. As former National Security Council and State Department official Helmut Sonnenfeldt writes,

For the Soviets, negotiations do not mean simply sitting down and haggling over language at the bargaining table, but rather maneuvering for position and achieving certain adjustments by one means or another, including the threat of force, agitation, and other inducements.¹⁶

The Soviet use of negotiations for broad foreign policy purposes is found both in the early days of the Bolshevik regime and in recent times. The 1922 Genoa Conference on the economic reconstruction of Europe was the first time Soviet negotiators attended a major international conference. There, the Soviets skillfully exploited British and French ostracism of Germany to conclude a separate peace with the latter. The allies had expected that the Soviet desire for reparations from Germany would prevent such an agreement. This bold stroke, in the words of historian Joseph Whelan,

“ended Soviet isolation in Europe . . . and drove an entering wedge into a united European front against Russia.”¹⁷

In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union again sought to use negotiations, in this case those on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), to drive a wedge between its adversaries as well as to halt the U.S. deployment of INF in Western Europe. Moscow repeatedly made public offers designed to attract Western European support in the hope that the United States would relent on its “zero option” proposal or risk seriously damaging U.S.-European relations. In this case, the Soviet Union was not successful, as Atlantic unity was maintained, even though no agreement to stop or limit North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployments was reached.

Soviet preference for generally-worded agreements means that details are usually avoided and, when demanded by the other side, viewed as a tactical question in which maximum advantage is sought. This inclination derives in part from the numerous instances, particularly in early Soviet history, when negotiations were used to cover or compensate for weakness. The Soviets found that, if an agreement were formulated in general terms, they could later adhere to it only in the most advantageous manner.

Thus, in 1933, a solid and meaningful concession—U.S. diplomatic recognition—was granted to the Soviet Union in exchange for a “gentleman’s agreement” to negotiate later on the outstanding issue of Soviet debt and some general promises on religious freedom for Americans in the Soviet Union and the avoidance of subversive activity in the United States.¹⁸ Similarly, in the Yalta agreements during World War II, vague language on the questions of Poland’s future government and the Far East permitted the Soviets later to claim rights not anticipated by the Western powers at the time of the negotiations. The Soviets also strongly displayed this tendency in the early days of the SALT negotiations, though they gradually came to accept the American preference for detail in the SALT II accord.

The Soviets’ tendency to equate compromise in negotiations with weakness have been evidenced by their reluctance to make concessions and their frequent denial that they have conceded when they in fact have done so. Professor Philip Mosely, advisor to several U.S. delegations dealing with the Soviets and a specialist on Russia

pointed out in the 1950s that the word "compromise is not of native Russian origin and carries a negative connotation." Mosely writes that giving up on a demand makes a Soviet negotiator feel

he is losing control of his will and becoming subject to an alien will. Therefore any point which has finally to be abandoned must be given up only after a most terrific struggle. The Soviet negotiator must first prove to himself and his superiors that he is up against an immovable force. Only then is he justified in abandoning a point.¹⁹

According to Soviet emigre scholars Vladimir and Victorina Lefebvre, in the Soviet ethical system, "a weak individual chooses compromise with another individual" while "a person who chooses confrontation with another person has high self-esteem and is respected by others, unlike the one who chooses compromise."²⁰

However, this tendency may have been tempered in recent decades as the Soviets have become more willing to accommodate at least some of the interests of other countries in order to achieve some of their own objectives. They are not always willing to negotiate on a problem, but when they are, they realize they must make concessions in order to make progress. They have, for example, reluctantly accepted limits on their strategic nuclear forces in SALT. And the Soviets have certainly found public relations value in claiming that they were offering reasonable compromises. In their effort to win Western public opinion over to their side in the debate on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, they have begun touting their own willingness to compromise in arms negotiations. Gorbachev's speech immediately after Reykjavik pointed out several areas of Soviet compromise at that meeting:

In order to facilitate . . . agreement, we made a large concession by removing our previous requirement that this nuclear equation would include intermediate American nuclear missiles . . . and the European missiles. We made quite a significant concession by stating that . . . we would not include the British and French weapons.

The only time we were finally able to move forward is when we made another compromise. We accepted the formula of zero rockets in Europe and in the East, we would keep missiles in the East and the United States would keep rockets on its own territory.²¹

The Negotiators

Perhaps the most distinctive, many would say notorious, characteristic of the Soviet negotiator is his almost complete subservience to his instructions from Moscow. This trait results primarily from the aforementioned secrecy and centralization of the Soviet system. Writing in 1951, Philip Mosely said the Soviet "representative" could hardly be called a negotiator but rather more a "mechanical mouthpiece for views and demands formulated centrally in Moscow."²² This apparently slavish role has been modified somewhat since Stalin's day. James Goodby, a former delegate to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, has said that Soviet negotiators still have very little substantive flexibility but now have greater tactical flexibility. Put differently, while negotiating objectives and strategy are determined by the top leadership, negotiators are given latitude to seek the best agreement possible given these decisions.

The willingness of Soviet INF negotiator Yuli Kvitsinsky to explore options with Paul Nitze in the well-known "walk in the woods" without clear instructions may be evidence of a trend toward a somewhat greater degree of autonomy of Soviet negotiators. But the failure of the resulting Nitze-Kvitsinsky proposal to gain approval is a powerful reminder of the handicapped position of Soviet bargaining teams. What is more, U. Alexis Johnson, former head of the U.S. SALT I delegation, has pointed out that Soviet delegations need internal consensus on the most minor of moves. Another SALT participant, Sidney Graybeal, has written that Soviet negotiators are reluctant to ask Moscow for changes in their instructions for fear that this will reflect poorly on their capabilities.²³

As is true at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, the personalities of individual Soviet negotiators are not terribly important in determining negotiating approaches. However, there are differences in the styles of individual negotiators. Another chief SALT negotiator, Paul Warnke, points this out in comparing the Soviets with whom he bargained. Vladimir Semenov, the head Soviet SALT negotiator was renowned for his absolute lack of spontaneity. For example, he relied almost exclusively on prepared texts in negotiating, even on informal occasions. Warnke contrasts Semenov with Lev Medeleovich, another Soviet negotiator with whom he dealt. Medeleovich had

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a much more extemporaneous style. In fact, he even told Warnke in advance how different he was from Semenov.²⁴

Soviet negotiators are very well-staffed in negotiations and have a long institutional memory of the negotiating history and other relevant facts. This includes detailed biographical knowledge of their counterparts. According to Graybeal, "they may be able to tell you more about yourself than you have told them."²⁵ Jacob Beam, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, agrees that the Soviets come to the negotiating table well prepared.²⁶ Furthermore, Soviet negotiators are highly professional and knowledgeable in their areas of specialty. Helmut Sonnenfeldt says that they are as well-trained as diplomats of other countries and more specialized, but the compartmentalizing of information in their political system sometimes leaves them without a broad understanding of the underlying considerations and strategy behind their instructions.²⁷

Finally, there is a great deal of continuity in Soviet negotiating personnel, a factor contributing to their excellent preparation and negotiating memories. Andrei Gromyko's service for nearly thirty years as foreign minister and involvement in virtually all important Soviet international negotiations during that period seem to set the tone for continuity in Soviet diplomacy. Former Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoliy Dobrynin, was in this position nearly as long. He has played a major role in U.S.-Soviet negotiations, particularly SALT, since the 1960s and continues to do so as a Central Committee secretary. Continuity is also a notable feature at the level of the negotiating delegation. For example, the Soviets had one head negotiator, Vladimir Semenov, throughout much of the SALT negotiations, during which the United States had four chief negotiators. Victor Karpov, the last head of their SALT delegation and chief of their strategic arms delegation in the 1980s, was Semenov's deputy in SALT I and II. Delegation staff personnel are generally equally seasoned.

Negotiating Strategy and Tactics

Promoting a Broad Range of Interests

Whatever the Soviets are seeking from a negotiation, it is fairly certain that they will have developed clear goals that are coordinated with overall national objectives and with other policies.

A general objective, as we have seen, is to maximize the Soviet position vis-a-vis opponents and to divide them from their allies. In arms negotiations, it is widely believed that the Soviets develop long-range defense programs first and then devise a negotiating strategy which supports these programs. If that is the case, it would account for the virtual absence of the concept of using future weapons systems as "bargaining chips."

As pointed out above, negotiations are one of many tools used by the U.S.S.R. in the international competition with the West. The concept of "peaceful coexistence" underpins Soviet foreign policy and provides a rationale for the absence of armed conflict in the socialist struggle with capitalist countries. Negotiations are one component of this struggle or competition; they sometimes promote and advance interests that may not even be directly related to the subject matter of a specific negotiation. Indeed, the basic approach to negotiations places a high value on promoting a broad range of political interests, and not solely on arriving at solutions to "complex technical problems of establishing force levels and weapons characteristic by international agreement."²⁸

Given this view, the Soviets may not always seek an agreement from negotiations; to the contrary, they may only wish that some sort of dialogue be maintained. As Helmut Sonnenfeldt remarks, the Soviets "have often been prepared to engage in endless talk and negotiations without conclusion and still attempt to promote their interests through that process."²⁹ A classic example is the 1917-18 Brest-Litovsk peace conference referred to above.

Another element in Soviet negotiating strategy is the aforementioned use of generally-worded, rather than detailed, agreements. This is not to say that the Soviets will always shun an elaborate technical proposal (cf., SALT II). But, the "general formulation" approach is an integral part of their negotiating strategy primarily designed to give them ample latitude for interpreting an agreement later. This penchant for liberally interpreting treaty language has, throughout the history of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy, raised major questions about the credibility of Soviet compliance.

While Moscow usually observes the letter of agreement (and certainly wants to be perceived as doing so), the United States cannot expect it to honor the "spirit" of an agreement. For example

unilateral statements made by the United States at the conclusion of a negotiation clearly should not be relied on to capture an understanding that the two sides were incapable of or unwilling to resolve in the body of the treaty (cf., the U.S. unilateral statement on "heavy" ICBMs in SALT I). A related objective of Soviet negotiating strategy is to reveal as little information on plans and forces as possible and to minimize the intrusiveness of verification provisions.

Finally, broadly interpreting an agreement can be used for propaganda purposes as well, the general intention of which is—as historian Gordon Craig wryly puts it—"to keep the image of a virtuous U.S.S.R. contending with cynical and unscrupulous adversaries before the world audience."³⁰

Careful Preparation

Soviet negotiating behavior reveals that delegations prepare very carefully for negotiations. Negotiators generally carry instructions with clear objectives. In any negotiation they can be expected to come prepared with a "game plan" that outlines the objectives, bargaining positions, negotiating strategies, and likely U.S. responses.³¹ In arms control negotiations, this plan will certainly have been approved at the highest levels of government.

In addition, negotiators are well-versed in the subject matter. This reflects the seriousness of the Soviet approach to negotiations. It also highlights the Soviet stress on continuity of personnel and substantive consistency. Despite these factors there was a much-observed tendency in SALT I for the civilian members of the Soviet delegation to be insufficiently informed of many of the details concerning military forces. Indeed, in SALT I, Soviet military officials were reluctant to reveal details of Russian military secrecy to the civilians on their own delegation.³² Although compartmentalizing of information still occurs, the practice has been less pronounced in recent negotiations, such as START.

Manipulating the Environment

The Soviets also show a strong concern for the setting of negotiations. They are extremely conscious of protocol and are sensitive to any surprise changes in the negotiating agenda or venue.³³ In some cases, especially when negotiations are held in Moscow, they will seek to manipulate the environment to their advantage by

wearing down the opponent with a number of tactics. One is to conduct long sessions held at times and places convenient only to themselves or unpleasant to the opponent. This practice is particularly evident in commercial negotiations with unofficial guests. Stalin even used these tactics with official emissaries to the Soviet Union, sometimes employing late-night negotiating sessions as a means to exhaust the adversary.³⁴ Similarly, at a 1973 meeting at President Nixon's home in San Clemente, California, Brezhnev requested a late-night conference to discuss the Middle East, an approach that Nixon later called "shock tactics" designed to put him off-balance and make him more susceptible to granting concessions.³⁵

The Brezhnev-Nixon summit meeting, held in Moscow in May 1972, is a good example of the Soviets' applying the "home court" advantage. In their own capital, they were better able to control the agenda—which they changed frequently—and the setting for the talks. They occasionally denied the Americans access to communications or other routine administrative support. They made full use of expert and advisory personnel, while the U.S. delegation used trans-Atlantic communications (sometimes on open lines) to consult technical experts in Washington. Because of a seven-hour time difference between the two capitals, this necessitated virtually around-the-clock work by National Security Council staffers.* The Americans assumed they were subject to electronic eavesdropping during the summit as well.³⁶

Bargaining Tactics

Negotiators hew closely to instructions from Moscow. The historical record shows they are required to check with superiors before exploring alternatives that might emerge from the natural give and take of bargaining. Ambassador Jonathan Dean speculates that the difficulty of getting instructions from Moscow may be another reason why the Soviets prefer a general formulation approach to negotiations; details can be filled in later by subsequent dis-

*Nixon and Kissinger required the U.S. SALT delegation to remain in Helsinki until the end of the summit and informed the negotiators in Helsinki only after decisions on the SALT treaty were agreed to by the principals in Moscow.

cussion.³⁷ Of course, convincing the opponent that the delegate lacks flexibility and must observe his instructions also may be used as a method of advancing the Soviet position in negotiations. Whatever the source, Soviet rigidity can often increase delays and tends to frustrate Americans.

Frustration can also be induced by other aspects of Soviet negotiating style. Soviet negotiators have frequently been called "confrontational," "blunt," or "combative." Veteran U.S. diplomat Jacob Beam, drawing on his experiences, states that the Soviets "antagonize you right away when they start out; they try to put you on the defensive right away."³⁸ One participant at the 1943 Teheran Conference recalled that when points were advanced that Stalin perceived to be detrimental to Soviet interests, the Soviet leader would be "brutally blunt to the point of rudeness."³⁹ Khrushchev demonstrated similar behavior.

This bluntness is often accompanied by stubbornness, which manifests itself in several ways. One is a penchant for redundancy. The Soviets are not at all reluctant to repeat exactly the same phraseology throughout a negotiation. Another manifestation of Soviet stubbornness is the unwillingness to make concessions. For example, in the SALT I talks the Soviets were extremely reluctant to provide even the most basic information, such as designations of weapons systems, preferring instead to work with U.S. intelligence data on and designations of Soviet systems. This reluctance to discuss military details with the adversary is not altogether surprising given the Soviet concern for secrecy, but from an American view, it appears as an impediment to concluding an arms control agreement.

Indeed, the Soviets seek to place the onus of compromise on the other side. They use several tactics in this regard. One is to open with an extreme position and stick to it stubbornly. In doing so, they hope to draw out the other side's position, possibly to place the burden on it to make the first proposal to which they can then react. This tactic also allows the Soviets to gain gratitude and concessions from the opponent when they retreat from their initial, extreme position. This process is sometimes called "salami-slicing." After staking out an extreme position from that of their opponent, the Soviets will move toward a point of accommodation, making concessions slice by slice, one after another, gradually and reluctantly. By making concessions grudgingly, they seek to magnify the impor-

tance of the concessions and obtain more significant concessions from the other side.

Another tactic is to keep a "scorecard" on concessions—urging the opponent to make as many as they have, regardless of substance. They will also sometimes try to trade small concessions for large ones. In sum, the Soviets will make concessions, but they do so grudgingly and deliberately, using all pressures at their disposal to extract as much as possible from the other side.

Such pressures include attempting to use Western media, public opinion, or other diplomatic channels to influence negotiations, as was the case in the campaign against INF in the early 1980s. This tactic is also being used in the current strategic defense negotiations, where chief Soviet negotiator Victor Karpov has been much more concerned with openness since Gorbachev came to power. The Soviets have attempted to sway Western opinion in these talks, especially with the argument that they are not pursuing strategic defense technologies comparable to some being pursued in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program,⁴⁰ this notwithstanding that their extensive programs for many years reveal quite a different picture.

Another pressure tactic involves attempts to establish personal relationships with U.S. negotiators, probing for flexibility or for a "more sympathetic" U.S. representative. Yet the Soviets, because of their traditions and conventions—for example, they include KGB personnel as "watchdogs" in all forums—are less skilled at establishing and manipulating interpersonal relationships in diplomatic settings than are the Chinese, for example.⁴¹

Yet another tactic is the Soviet use of time. On one hand, they can be very patient in negotiations if it suits their purposes. On the other, they will put pressure on the United States with deadlines (e.g., the nuclear test ban moratorium in 1985–86), or accuse U.S. negotiators of being dilatory. (Charges of dilatory tactics are often made by both sides. The American emphasis on details sometimes appears dilatory to the Soviets; the Soviet emphasis on general language or ideological polemics can appear equally dilatory to Americans.) In short, the Soviets will use time to their best advantage, as will any good negotiator.

The Soviets will also use dramatic gestures if necessary, such as walking out of negotiations as they did in the START and INF

talks in 1983. And, while the practice is infrequent, they have been known to use intermediaries. In the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets used an American journalist to probe the U.S. negotiating position and to pass information to U.S. leaders. In multilateral forums, such as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, the Soviets will occasionally use one of their allies to make or reinforce a point.

Another tactic, extensively used in SALT I, is the "back channel," or secret, away-from-the-table negotiation at high levels. With the United States, this tactic has often involved contacts through the Soviet embassy in Washington. In SALT I, information passing through this channel was facilitated by Anatoliy Dobrynin, the well-connected veteran former Soviet ambassador. Dobrynin's high-level access as ambassador was an important asset for Soviet diplomacy. However, since he left his post in early 1986 for a leading party position in Moscow, the Soviet embassy is likely to assume a somewhat diminished role.

By contrast, the U.S. embassy in Moscow has played much less of a role. This results not only from Soviet resistance to using this channel, but equally from lack of U.S. determination to make its Moscow embassy an important player in negotiations. One reason the United States has kept its embassy from playing a greater role is that U.S. officials in Washington, particularly in the SALT era, have found this to be a means of maintaining closer control over the negotiating process.

Guidelines for U.S. Negotiators

Formulating and Pursuing Clear Objectives

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from Soviet negotiating behavior is that, if the United States is serious about reaching agreements with the U.S.S.R., it must work to formulate clear objectives and be consistent and persistent in pursuing those objectives. The Soviets will do just that, and the United States will operate at a disadvantage unless U.S. negotiators are clear and firm about U.S. objectives. This task is not an easy one, given the dynamics of the U.S. political process. Shifts in public opinion place pressures on U.S. leaders to move negotiations in one direction or another, often through a Congress which is increasingly active in U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

Furthermore, negotiating objectives and strategies change from administration to administration, with newly-elected leaders wishing to place their own stamp on policy. In most cases, a new administration will want to make wholesale changes in bureaucratic personnel and negotiating teams, a factor that can contribute to delays in policy formulation and leave U.S. negotiators at a disadvantage. Finally, U.S. allies have a significant influence on the U.S. position in negotiations with the U.S.S.R. that affect their interests. Often those allies disagree with U.S. policy. Soviet allies, by contrast, have far less influence on Moscow.

These problems in formulating clear negotiating objectives can be ameliorated somewhat. First, U.S. leaders must be reminded of their responsibility to avoid inflated rhetoric which arouses unrealistic public expectations for U.S.-Soviet negotiations. In this connection, political leaders, other government officials, and private experts have a responsibility to ensure that the public is kept well-informed on national security issues, particularly on U.S.-Soviet relations. Second, Congress must always be closely consulted on such negotiations, as must U.S. allies when their interests are involved. Such consultation already occurs, but it must be even more carefully attended to now that Congress and the allies are more active in this area. Both of these players may at some point have to be given a direct role in certain negotiations (e.g., Congress on strategic arms; the allies on INF). Finally, the negotiations must have strong support from top levels of the executive branch. The attentive interest of the President and active involvement of senior officials, such as the secretary of state, are essential.

The problem of formulating negotiating objectives also raises the question of how much negotiating room to build into initial positions. Raymond Garthoff offers a rule of thumb: Initial negotiating positions should contain "not so much [bargaining room] as to mislead [the Soviets] on a possible outcome, but not so little as not to allow tradeoffs and compromise." Garthoff further advises that using ambiguity or general formulations to cover bureaucratic differences in initial positions is not constructive.⁴² U.S. negotiating positions should also be realistic enough to avoid accusations of bad faith or lack of seriousness, particularly by Congress and the allies.

Ultimately, maintaining clear and consistent negotiating objectives presents a dilemma. Our political process is fluid; over

time new people with different outlooks on how to guide and shape our relationship with the Soviet Union are brought into the government; yet the U.S.-Soviet relationship is in many ways a static one, with progress in resolving the many fundamental differences slow and those items that are subject to negotiation falling between narrow boundaries. The Soviet *realpolitik* tradition is disposed to manage relationships with adversaries and to maintain consistency in policy; the American tradition is more disposed to innovate and seek new solutions where old ones appear to have failed. While the American genius for innovation has served us well in many fields, clarity, consistency, and patience are likely to prove more fruitful in negotiating with the Soviet Union.

Dealing with Soviet Unwillingness to Compromise

What implications for U.S. policy can be drawn directly from Soviet behavior? First, the Soviet tendency to view negotiation as struggle and compromise as weakness has several important lessons for the United States. It is important to remember that the Soviets will conclude an agreement only when it serves their interests to do so. The United States must make sure to do the same. This point may be an obvious one, but, with both sides wishing to appear beneficent in the eyes of the world, this basic question of self-interest often gets lost in the rhetoric, particularly on arms control. The reality is that neither side needs a written accord per se to provide for its security. Only when there is an advantage for both (an "expanding sum" situation in game theory terminology), should they conclude an agreement. The different perceptions and ethnocentric tendencies of the participants make arriving at an accord a formidable challenge.⁴³

At the bargaining table, we should be prepared to make concessions when the Soviets are. But if they are not prepared to compromise, as they often are not, we must avoid what some observers have characterized as "negotiating with ourselves." In other words, the United States takes the initiative for offering proposals while the Soviets respond but make no attempts to offer constructive counterproposals.⁴⁴ As the above discussion of Soviet bargaining strategy suggests, the Soviets will seek to "pocket" any concessions made by the United States in the expectation of receiving reciprocity and to move on from there without giving anything up.

The Lefebvres have offered a prescription for dealing with

Soviet unwillingness to compromise. They recommend that, since Soviet leaders see compromise as weakness, the United States should create the conditions in which getting them to agree to something we want is not perceived by the Soviets as compromise. In their words, "the politics of official negotiations has to be replaced with the politics of 'silent' coordinations using unofficial contacts."⁴⁵ There is nothing new to diplomacy about this idea, but the special Soviet difficulty with making concessions indicates that quiet diplomacy may be particularly effective in dealing with the Soviet Union.

A related implication for U.S. policy is that the United States must work hard to keep the details of its negotiating positions and intelligence information secret to show its seriousness as a negotiating partner. Leaks upset the atmosphere of confidentiality that is so crucial to productive bargaining. Yet this requirement will have to be balanced with the need to report to Congress, the allies, and the Western public in general. With their closed society the Soviets have something of a negotiating advantage over the United States in this regard.

Whether negotiations are conducted formally or informally, the United States must be patient but persistent in dealing with the Soviets. U.S. negotiators should not expect quick results, as the Soviets will be cautious and deliberate. If Soviet negotiators procrastinate excessively—and this will require careful assessment by senior U.S. officials—it may be necessary, as SALT II negotiator Paul Warnke puts it, to seek to advance the negotiations by "driving the Soviets back to Moscow" to obtain new instructions and expedite the process.⁴⁶

In this connection, setting deadlines can be useful in moving negotiations forward and forcing the Soviets to make decisions. They made numerous concessions, for example, in the closing weeks of the SALT II talks.⁴⁷ But the United States needs to be careful not to put itself under pressure. Overly optimistic predictions about what it can achieve or the pace of progress, particularly as summits approach, can work to its disadvantage.

Pinning Down the Details

Another lesson can be drawn from the Soviet tendency to seek generally-worded accords. As we have seen, the history of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy contains ample evidence of the Soviets'

exploiting such agreements. It is imperative to pin the Soviets down on details, particularly on issues where details will be important to establishing future compliance. An accurate negotiating record and final agreement are thus essential from the U.S. point of view. As a result, it is incumbent on U.S. delegations to take great care in assembling both the record and the agreement, a step that could help avoid—though probably not eliminate—later compliance ambiguities. Failure to preserve a record or to insist on as much detail as possible in the final accord leaves it open to reinterpretation later.

Being Sensitive to the Soviet Desire to be Treated as an Equal

As suggested here, it is important to be firm with the Soviets; however, the United States should not be insensitive to their desire to be treated as equals. Substantively, this requires that the United States not expect to gain unilateral advantage. The Soviets may try to do this themselves, and the United States must simply resist such efforts but must also avoid conduct that offends their sensibilities. Herbert York describes how an American attempt to insist that seismic stations for monitoring a comprehensive test ban be produced in the United States, after earlier telling them this was not a requirement, led the Soviets to react angrily that they were being treated as a “sixth-rate Arab nation.”⁴⁸

Using the Media

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, there is an even stronger emphasis on and greater sophistication in using the media to strengthen Soviet bargaining positions by obtaining public support, particularly from Western Europe. The unsteady policies of the Kremlin during the leadership succession in the early 1980s lulled the United States into believing that the bumbling Soviets could never outdo it in handling the media and public opinion. The INF “zero option” was considered a public relations coup for the United States in Western Europe, at least in its first year, while the Soviet handling of INF was seen as ham-handed.

But now that Gorbachev, himself highly skilled in the use of the Western media, and other younger, more cosmopolitan leaders are ascendant, the United States can no longer assume an advan-

tage in this arena. The Soviet arms control proposals announced in January 1986 and then offered at the Reykjavik summit are only the most recent of initiatives that the Soviets have taken under Gorbachev. The comprehensiveness and drama of these proposals, combined with some serious movement in substantive Soviet positions, indicates that Moscow is now an adversary to be reckoned with not only as a negotiating partner, but also in terms of public relations.

The Role of U.S. Negotiators

A final set of implications has to do with the American negotiators themselves. First, senior negotiators should not be excluded from the policy formulation process, for they will need to understand the rationale behind their negotiating positions. Also, their experience will enable them to contribute a unique perspective to the policy formulation process. Back-channel negotiations can be useful in the course of a negotiation but must be employed carefully so as not to undercut U.S. negotiators at the table by sending conflicting signals to the other party.

Second, working toward agreement might be aided by informal soundings between delegation members, although disagreement exists among former negotiators as to the wisdom and benefits of such contacts. If they are made, they should normally be conducted below the head-of-delegation level. Informal exploration by chief delegates can create misperceptions that official positions are being offered. Lower-ranking U.S. delegates engaging in such informal contacts should always express in the strongest manner possible the exploratory nature of the conversation, lest the remarks be misconstrued by the Soviets and perhaps convey an impression of confusion in the U.S. position.

Finally, preserving an accurate record is important not only for purposes of Soviet compliance, but also for offering a wealth of insight for future negotiators who may wish to gain an understanding of how the Soviets conduct themselves in negotiations. Making complete records available to negotiators is a small, but meaningful, step that the executive branch can take to compensate for the general lack of continuity in U.S. negotiating personnel. Another small step with a high pay-off would be, as suggested by Ambassador Edward Rowny, to offer more rigorous training in Russian language and culture to U.S. negotiators, particularly

junior officers who could apply this training over a prolonged period. Such training might also include simulation and gaming techniques to gain better insight into negotiating dynamics.

* * * *

Ultimately, many of the lessons for U.S. negotiators dealing with the Soviet Union are similar to those for dealing with other countries—keep your interests firmly in mind, organize for formulating clear objectives, be patient but persistent, work to ensure the other side's compliance. The main differences in negotiating with the Soviets have to do with their somewhat unique history of isolation and conflict and with our current common status as the world's two superpowers. The latter difference requires the United States to seek to resolve or at least to mitigate its competition with the Soviet Union through negotiations on a continuing basis. The former means that America must confront the Soviet Union's effort to expand its power and influence, which is increasingly focused on negotiations, but be able and willing to accept mutually beneficial agreements.

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
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JAPAN

The Changing Logic of a Former Minor Power

Nathaniel B. Thayer and Stephen E. Weiss

Tradition and change characterize Japanese national negotiating style. Japanese negotiators come from a culture that prizes quiet accommodation, emphasizes personal obligations, and avoids open social conflict. For most of the past four decades they have represented a nation which saw military power as not serving its foreign policy interests and which was quite happy to let other nations take the initiatives in the councils of the world. However, this context is changing. Japanese negotiators are developing a more international negotiating style at a time when their people show a willingness to be more active in world affairs.

It could be said that Japan and the United States have been involved in a continuous negotiating session since the early 1970s when U.S. and Japanese interests began to diverge. The issues being negotiated concern Japan's defense, its trade policies, and its role in the free world. No one says that the negotiations have been concluded satisfactorily, for what the negotiators are really talking about is beyond the competence of negotiators—the change in the national strength of the two countries.

The United States and Japan are number one and number two among the free world economies. Both nations recognize that

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they will play the lead roles in creating a world economy. Much of what passes for negotiations between their officials is not the accommodation of two national views but rather the joint exploration of where their mutual interests lie.

The Japanese Setting

Changes in the U.S.-Japan Relationship

Classic international relations theory states that nations try to aggrandize their power. That may yet prove to be true of Japan in the long run. But that theory does not explain Japan's behavior over the forty years since the end of World War II. Japan has continued to regard itself as a minor power, even though other nations have promoted it to major status.

The Japanese word, *amae*, describes a social relationship present in the West, since it can be explained to Westerners, but no single word can describe it. If a subordinate offers total loyalty to a superior, the subordinate can presume upon the superior to take care of his, the subordinate's, welfare. Furthermore, if the subordinate is weak, the superior is expected to use his strength on the subordinate's behalf. Finally, and here comes the psychological twist, the weaker the subordinate, the closer the relationship to the superior and the more the subordinate can presume upon the relationship. The weaker the subordinate, the greater the obligation of the superior. The mother defends her child more fiercely when it is a babe in arms than when it is a teenager. It is this relationship—the *amae* relationship—that the Japanese have projected on their relationship with the United States.

Japan's dealings with the oil-producing countries of the Mideast is an example of how this relationship worked. Japan's economy relies heavily on oil, which Japan has had to import, largely from the Mideast. Yet, for many years Japan did not conduct an active diplomacy among the oil-producing nations of the Mideast. Instead it relied on the United States to undertake that diplomacy for it. In the early 1970s, the Arab states made it clear that they were prepared to use oil to challenge the United States and its allies. The Arabs singled out Japan as a target state. Nakasone Yasuhiro, then minister of international trade and industry, urged that Japan establish ties with the Arab states to work out their

differences, but Foreign Ministry officials opposed him. Their argument was that if Japan were to establish an independent diplomacy, the United States would be free of the onus of looking out for Japan.

Accepting this subordinate status did not free Japan of responsibility. To the contrary, Japan believed itself obliged to accept the foreign policies of the United States without question. During a sabbatical at Harvard, Hiroshi Kitamura, a Japanese diplomat, wrote that accepting subordinate status to the United States meant that the Japanese would have to put up with American condescension and that the Japanese government would not be able to reject a U.S. request. That price the Japanese were willing to pay.

For the three decades after World War II, the United States fulfilled the Japanese idea of how a major power should act. Expecting retribution for the war, the Japanese instead got assistance in rebuilding their nation. In 1960, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee spent only two hours in hearings before accepting the treaty responsibility of defending Japan. The United States tolerated the erection of trade barriers behind which the Japanese rebuilt their industry. Later, the Americans hewed to principles of free trade even though Japanese exports were doing damage to American industry. Most important, the United States did not restrict Japanese access to its treasure house of technology.

This age of magnanimity could not last forever. Its approaching end was signalled in the 1970s by an American assault on Japanese "fairness." The shift was brought about largely by economics. While the United States and Japan had shared a common long-range goal of creating a new democratic Japan after the war, by the mid-1960s Japan had rebuilt its national strength enough so that some Americans accused it of being a "free rider." The assumption was that Japan and the United States were going in the same direction—their interests were identical—but that Japan was not shouldering sufficient responsibility. By the late 1970s, with the tremendous economic growth of Japan and the pressure that put on the United States, the assumption that U.S. and Japanese interests were identical was challenged. Japan was accused of refusing to "burden-share." It would not pick up any part of the responsibility that the United States had assumed to maintain a world at peace. The Japanese would not even put forward funds sufficient to maintain their own defense. The age of magnanimity was over when the

Americans began talking about government action to force Japan into assuming international responsibility.

The Japanese were not ready for the assault on them that took place in the first years of the Reagan Administration, though grievances had continued to pile up during the Carter years. All of a sudden the Japanese were charged with disrupting the American market and told that the disruption could be tolerated only if Americans were allowed full access to the Japanese market. Providing that access meant fundamental reform: Japanese consumers would have to change their buying habits; Japanese merchants would have to change the distribution system. More than 300 pieces of legislation that would have damaged Japanese interests were introduced in Congress. On two occasions, the Senate and the House passed resolutions critical of Japan.

Polls showed that many Japanese recognized that there was substance to the American arguments; Japan has atavistic laws, standards, and procedures not proper to a society that preaches free trade. But all Japanese were in accord that the American assault on Japan was not the act of a confident, major power. America was beginning to slip.

The assault on Japan has continued for six years. It has made modest progress in doing away with trade barriers, though there has not been and there will not be any radical reordering of Japanese society or business practices. What the assault on Japan has almost completely eliminated is *amae* as a concept in Japanese-American relations.

Over the past six years, the Japanese have been rethinking their role in the world. They have concluded that they must be more active. A report of discussions held from September 1985 to April 1986 gives a rough idea of how the Japanese see their world role:

In managing the world economic system from now on, each of the advanced nations of the West will have to actively assume a share of the burden . . . , making decisions on various issues through consultation and adjustment of interests and opinions. Naturally with its overall strength, the United States will continue to play the leading role in the collective management system. . . . Today, Japan's economy compares favorably with that of any other nation, and it accounts for 10 percent of the world's GNP; at least economically speaking, Japan's impact

on the world, on both supply and demand sides, is considerable. In these respects alone, Japan can no longer afford to follow the logic of a "minor power."¹

This quotation suggests that the Japanese are no longer willing to accept American condescension, though they will not make a big issue of rejecting it. Further, the Japanese may be prepared to say no to the Americans, though that will never be done in a formal negotiating session. How will Japan go about consulting and adjusting interests and opinions? The quotation doesn't say. We suspect, though, the Japanese will consult and adjust in the future much the same way that the Japanese negotiate today.

Bureaucratic Developments

Japan's first constitution was the 1889 Meiji constitution. Reflecting conservative European thought, this constitution claimed all authority for the emperor. Ministers of state were responsible directly to him in exercising this authority. There was no encouragement for the ministries to work together—dissonance was constitutionally sanctioned and that tradition continues today. In the closing days of World War II, the Americans decided not to rule Japan directly but rather to rule indirectly, through the existing instruments of Japan's government. Indirect government required a strong bureaucracy. Hence, although the Americans moved to reform all other elements of Japanese government and society, they did not reform the bureaucracy.

Rivalry existed among the ministries for U.S. approval. Although the American occupation of Japan was over in 1952, Japan's dependence on the United States continued. In part, the dependence was psychological. Japanese voters still had little faith in their new government. Since the Americans were still seen as committed to the reconstruction of Japan, Japanese politicians found it helpful to claim they had American backing for a policy and Japanese bureaucrats soon learned that they had a better chance of having their ministry's position adopted by the Japanese politicians if they could claim American support.

In the United States, after Japan regained its sovereignty, the State Department claimed authority to conduct relations with Japan. Though other departments in Washington have regularly

challenged that authority, each president has upheld it. Ironically, it was developments within the State Department itself that broke its monopoly over dealing with Japan.

There has been a continuing debate within the Department of State about whether Foreign Service officers should be generalists—fitted for service anywhere in the globe—or specialists—possessing knowledge of a specific national culture. In the early seventies, Henry Kissinger and others stressed the need for foreign policy generalists rather than area specialists. In practical terms, what that meant was that young officers were unwilling to put in the years necessary to master difficult languages such as Japanese. Other officers came to understand that lengthy service in Japan would not increase chances of promotion to the higher ranks in the service. Despite these drawbacks, officers continued to be fascinated by Japan, continued to see the need for special understanding of the Japanese culture. But they were few in number. The State Department lost its claim to special, expert knowledge. At the same time, U.S.-Japanese relations began to focus on economic issues, while the State Department's emphasis was on political relations. No longer was there a reason why State should have a monopoly on relations with Japan.

Once State's monopoly over dealing with Japan was broken, there was no reason for the Japanese Foreign Ministry to maintain its monopoly over dealing with the United States, and relations between the Japanese and the United States' governments became decentralized. Each of the Japanese ministries began its own independent relations with the committees of the Congress and the departments of the executive branch. Each economic ministry claimed and got a desk in the Japanese embassy in Washington, dispatched frequent missions to Washington "to gather information," and established offices outside the embassy to conduct its business. Parallel to these developments in the Japanese government, Japanese business and trade associations and large businesses have established offices in Washington to look out for their particular interests.

A case may be made for economic ministries' establishing independent offices to gather information, since such a task is beyond the competence and interest of the foreign ministry. However, the officials in the ministry outposts go further: they represent their

ministry's positions and negotiate on its behalf. That causes trouble. First, American officials find it difficult to distinguish between a ministry's position and the Japanese government's position. Second, most difficulties between Japan and the United States span the jurisdiction of several ministries. A Japanese official is slow to compromise the position of his ministry but quick to compromise the position of other Japanese ministries. The representative of a ministry may have the power to negotiate on that ministry's behalf but he certainly does not have the authority to negotiate on behalf of the other concerned ministries. Historically, the Japanese have always had difficulty compromising their initial positions. Now that difficulty is compounded. And third, Japanese officials in Washington try—often successfully—to enlist the support of a U.S. department on their ministry's behalf in intra-ministerial fights in Tokyo. There have been more than a few cases where one Japanese ministry has seemed to have the support of an American department to oppose another Japanese ministry which has seemed to have the support of another American department. Neither American department knew what was being said in its name. In sum, the Japanese had absconded with the right of the various departments to pick and choose their fights.

The overwhelming flaw with decentralized diplomacy is that no ministry in Tokyo and no department in Washington is obliged to submit its problem to a review within its own government before proceeding to the other nation to negotiate on that problem. The result: no problem is recognized as being more important than any other problem; each problem is negotiated without regard to the overall relationship.

The Impact of Politics

In 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came into existence. In the many elections that have come and gone since 1955, the LDP has maintained itself in the Diet (the national assembly) as the majority party. The only real challenge to the party's rule came in the election of 1958, when the largest opposition party, the Socialist Party, ran enough candidates to take over the government. In July 1986, in an election for both the House of Councillors and the House of Representatives, the two bodies in the Diet, the LDP received more legislative seats than it ever had before.

It is safe to say that the LDP will continue to rule for the foreseeable future.

When the party first became the majority party, the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), the policy arm of the LDP, devoted its time mainly to devising electoral and debating strategies for the party. As it became clear that the LDP was going to remain the ruling party, the PARC took a more active interest in the formation of government policy, and government officials responded to that interest. Also, special interest groups were able, by virtue of their contributions to the LDP, to secure the assistance of the PARC in promoting legislation beneficial to them.

The PARC was originally composed of sixteen committees, one for each ministry. As the years passed, the number of committees and subcommittees proliferated. Special committees and commissions were set up to handle a host of problems or to respond to the needs of special interest groups. Today, there are well over a hundred of these committees, some constituted with just one member, three constituted with over a hundred members.

Every LDP legislator has to serve on at least one of the committees; generally, he wants to serve on several. Almost every Dietman has found it prudent to be recorded as a member of the farm, small business, and tax committees. Hierarchies based on seniority have emerged to handle the affairs of the committees, but they do not always reflect the real power relationships.

Initially, the workings of these committees were quite private. Outsiders were not allowed in, and newsmen were not invited to cover the deliberations. That has changed somewhat as the politicians have come to understand that a demonstration of their power on these committees bettered their chances of winning elections. Still, the public does not always know what is privately decided within the PARC committees.

The role of the prime minister is affected by the PARC committees. Sometimes the committees usurp his authority. The constitution gives the prime minister the authority to run the government, which he exercises through the cabinet. In theory, then, each bureaucrat is responsible to him through the chain of command. In actuality, however, prime ministers change every two years, and, with one exception, no postwar prime minister has served more than once. Therefore, government officials are faced

with an impossible task. Constitutionally, they are responsible to the prime minister and should serve him, but political reality requires them to do what the leaders of the committees suggest. And it should be noted that even though the prime minister, as the LDP president, has the formal authority to appoint men to the committees, tradition dictates that he leave the task to the secretary-general of the party. The secretary-general must follow the rules of seniority and, in key appointments, consult with the leaders of the five factions which divide the party. Thus the prime minister's authority is really less than it seems to be.

In recent years, the prime minister has come to be regarded as the spokesman for international concerns. That has often brought him into conflict with the PARC; often the clash has come over foreign economic policy. Each prime minister has had to jerry-build institutions or procedures to get around the PARC. Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, for example, created a super-cabinet whose deliberations and decisions were supposed to supplant deliberations and decisions of the PARC committees. They failed to do so. Prime Ministers Miki Takeo, Ohira Masayoshi, and Nakasone Yasuhiro have resorted to public commissions of distinguished citizens to make recommendations that are at variance with what the PARC committees dictate. On several occasions these commissions have succeeded, though the PARC committees find ways to wash away their recommendations over time. The most successful prime minister has been Nakasone, who rarely makes a move without careful explanation to the public. His high ratings in the polls have caused the PARC committees to step back, but even Prime Minister Nakasone loses to the PARC committees when they choose to exert their authority.

The PARC committees clearly have an affect on negotiations. Japanese negotiators may not physically report to the committees—though that is not unusual—but the committees hand down what the negotiation position is to be. More precisely put, the negotiators are given their positions by superiors within the ministries, who know what the committees will accept. If several committees claim jurisdiction over an issue, negotiators are hard put to receive coherent instructions, and the dynamics of the committees interacting with each other means that negotiating positions may change.

Japanese politicians themselves often go to the United States to negotiate. It is frequently not clear for whom they speak. In such instances negotiators from the ministries are reduced to serving the needs of the politicians.

National Characteristics

Avoiding Social Conflict

If there is a cultural key to understanding Japanese negotiating behavior it is that negotiating is social conflict and every Japanese has been taught at his mother's knee to avoid social conflict. The last thing in the world a Japanese wants to do is to negotiate at a formal negotiating session. What he wants most to do is to use the formal negotiating session as an occasion to announce agreement reached elsewhere. Hence, the Japanese commonly use a number of stratagems to void formal negotiation.

For example, the Japanese are famous for their fact gathering. Many Americans spend many hours going over "facts" with a Japanese negotiator, ostensibly for negotiations to be held later. The Japanese goes into immense detail. He may ask the same question, slightly rephrased, many times. He may come back, again and again, to repeat the process. What is going on? In the guise of fact-finding, the Japanese is trying to determine the elements that will shape the American position so that he can encompass the American position within his own position. Even though the Japanese may not yet have a formal position, he is negotiating, as much with himself as with the American.

Not so well-known is the Japanese penchant for post-negotiation negotiations. Americans see negotiations as having a beginning and an end. Along the way are gates to unlatch and pass through, fences to clamber over, and streams to wade. But one does progress; one does not surmount the same obstacle twice. Japanese are less structured and less directional in their thinking. They are interested in protecting relationships. So long as they are able to do that, negotiations keep on; and the same stream may be waded several times.

While formal negotiations are in session, a Japanese negotiator may offer a new position. But he will offer that new position in the cloakroom, not over the green-baize-covered table. He will be

diffident in making the proposal so that it can easily be rejected. Normally his new proposal is a major revision of his last position; it is an attempt to satisfy the concerns of all parties to the negotiation. His diffidence and willingness to accept rejection should not suggest that he will shortly put forward another position. The proffered solution is always regarded as a final solution, not an interim solution from which he will retreat at a later stage.

If a Japanese negotiator does not want to negotiate at a formal negotiating session, what does he want to do? Through elaborate ritual, he tries to be cordial and avoid confrontation. He celebrates mutual ties, mutual interests. He sets forth the reasons why the parties want to reach agreement.

Japanese negotiators avoid negotiations because the art of understanding, empathizing, satisfying the concerns of others—all the while pursuing one's own interest—is regarded in Japanese society as a major political virtue. It even has a name. It's called *haragei*—the art of the belly. Hagglng is to be left to merchants, who are at the bottom of the traditional social order.

Haragei includes the use of euphemism, vagueness, and silence and the avoidance of public disagreement, assertiveness, and legalism. When interviewed about the U.S.-Japan aviation negotiations in 1985, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Franklin Willis commented, "With the Japanese, you have to listen to every word. They say something between the words."²

During the textile dispute in 1970, for example, then Prime Minister Sato Eisaku announced to the Japanese press that his negotiations with President Nixon would be "three parts talk and seven parts *haragei*."³ Nixon asked for Sato's assistance in restricting the export of Japanese textiles to the United States. Sato replied, "*Zensho itashimasu*" ("I will do my best"). Nixon thought he had a promise of Sato's assistance. Some tellers of this tale say that the interpreter, a Japanese, translated *zensho* simply as yes. That is credible, particularly if the interpreter was not from the political world. Among politicians, *zensho* is a word to bring a petition to an end. Its meaning is vague. It is used at the same place in a conversation where an American official would say, "I will look into the matter." Since both men were heads of government, both men were supposed to have plenty of *haragei*—or so Sato thought. He was relying on Nixon's *haragei* to understand that he, Sato, would work to fulfill

the President's wish but there were limits beyond which he did not want to go. Apparently, Nixon's *haragei* was insufficient for the task, since he made it clear that he was most unhappy when Sato failed to get a textile restriction.

Developing a Relationship

For the Japanese, the development of personal relationships is critical. In the words of one Japanese, "You [foreigners] negotiate a contract, we negotiate a relationship."⁴ Another observer has asserted that the "first order of business in Japan is the establishment of a personal relationship between the parties which will allow them to speak frankly and to give and receive favors."⁵

Relationships are built on shared values and experiences which serve as a common foundation for the Japanese. So does nationwide ethnic homogeneity. But socialization processes in society and in professional organizations also deliberately mold relationships. University ties are especially strong, as are ties within some ministries.

Japanese negotiating style has been described as *awase* (to combine or adjust one thing to another). Instead of directly addressing issues, openly stating proposals and counterproposals, and generally relying on exact concepts and standardized meanings—features of an *erabi* (to select) culture such as the United States—*awase* style entails inferring the positions of the parties, assuming approximate meanings, and adjusting to the situation.⁶ This style emphasizes proper form and process, even over the substance of decisions and explains the Japanese preference for informal explorations and agreements behind-the-scenes prior to formal sessions.

Negotiations with foreigners may be viewed and conducted somewhat differently, but the quality of the relationship between the negotiators on both sides and their personal attributes still seem to be extremely important. One such attribute is sincerity of intention. A managing director of the KEIDANREN (the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations) stated during a recent lecture in New York City, "Japan places emphasis on good intentions more than anything else." Emotional sensitivity is also valued. The Japanese may initially use go-betweens; they may give gifts and entertain extensively to get to know the negotiator as a person. Gift giving is a highly developed art in Japan. American officials who

might try it should know that in Japan gifts are distinguished not by how expensive they are, but by how appropriate they are.

Once established, these relationships often endure. In a 1978 speech, an American corporate counsel recounted a meeting with a Japanese firm at which his companion, the young new president of the American corporation, announced the retirement of his 60-year-old research director. The news evidently shocked the Japanese, and for several years thereafter, they still communicated first with the retired director regarding important requests and announcements.

There seems to be a paradox, however, in the Japanese view of human interaction, as suggested by the title of the controversial book *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*.⁷ In his book on Japanese negotiating style, Michael Blaker also refers to a double bind between harmonious cooperation and the warrior ethic.⁸ (Young government officials are expected to be fierce *samurai*; older government officials are expected to keep their *samurai* under control and search out the solution satisfactory to all parties.) Japanese attentiveness to personal relationships comes across impressively to Americans, and yet, there is a warrior ethic embodied by "the hero . . . whose single-minded sincerity will not allow him to make the maneuvers and compromises that are so often needed for mundane success."⁹ Competitiveness clearly exists toward opposing groups. Moreover, it is by this warrior ethic that the Japanese have traditionally evaluated their government negotiators.

Communication Patterns

As an interactive process, negotiation involves communication, and Japanese communication norms and practices differ sharply from those of American negotiators. Appropriateness is a paramount Japanese concern. Japanese always say what is appropriate for the occasion, but they do not expect to be held strictly to account for their words. For example, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko, in a speech before the Washington Press Club, talked about a thousand-mile defense of the sea lanes surrounding Japan. Traditional and ethnocentric in his outlook, Suzuki was trying to be responsive to his audience. However, neither he nor any of the officials accompanying him was prepared for the reaction of the Pentagon officials, who heralded his words as a new strategic doc-

trine. Suzuki was out of office before the Japanese had figured out a way to interpret this commitment into insignificance.

The Japanese take perverse pride in proclaiming their language to be the world's most imprecise. They may also be saying that they believe the Japanese language to be the world's most flexible language—their meaning is not clear. At a Japanese wedding banquet, for example, a speaker may use many words to create a good mood but say absolutely nothing. In negotiations, Japanese may say just a few words and expect them to carry a complex message. More often than not, Japanese communication is "high context."¹⁰ Information comes not through the words but from the social context in which the words are uttered, from an understanding of what the speaker should be saying in contrast to what he is actually saying.

The Japanese like to talk about *tatemae* and *honne*. This concept is not difficult for Americans. *Honne* is what one does. *Tatemae* is what one says. *Honne* is what one really thinks. *Tatemae* is what one says one thinks. The two words are part of any Japanese negotiator's lexicon, just as *principle* and *practice* are part of any U.S. negotiator's lexicon. The difficulty in Japan is that behind every *honne* is another *tatemae* and *honne*.

Japanese verbal responses to requests may be troublesome for foreigners. A Japanese may say "it is difficult" ("*muzukashii*") to convey a rejection or refusal or "it can't be helped" ("*sho ga nai*") to tell the listener that he will not stop an event about to take place. A Japanese may use the phrase, "I will seriously consider it" ("*kento shimasu*") and "I will do my best" ("*zensho shimasu*"), when he isn't sure how he wants to respond. One Japanese has even gone so far as to say "never take [mere] yes for an answer."¹¹ For a veritably positive response, a Japanese will usually say "I agree" and proceed to elaborate. When a Japanese says that he will "seriously consider" something he means that he will take the thought along to consider with his colleagues in a different forum. This often means, in addition, that it will be a long time before an answer is forthcoming.

Japanese prefer exposition to argument. Their first statements are generally vague and inconclusive and serve only to introduce the matters about which they would like to talk in greater detail later. For a Westerner, Japanese discourse may initially appear circular and not logical. The discourse will become more straightforward and the ideas linked as the talks advance.

Is a grunt a part of the spoken language? Fat tomes could be written about the meaning of the Japanese grunt. Generally, it signifies approval, as may be seen in a television interview of a sumo wrestler. The interviewer rattles on, telling the sumo wrestler how he won the match and pausing occasionally to let the sumo wrestler grunt. A grunt means the sumo wrestler accepts the interviewer's analysis. No grunt and the interviewer must revise his analysis. The interviewer is talkative. The sumo wrestler is articulate.

The Japanese have a vast and subtle body language. A slight cocking of the head indicates disagreement. The comedian John Belushi has made the Japanese hiss integral to American comedy, but only on rare occasions will the seasoned Japanese negotiator audibly suck in air or exhale a *saa* to let his counterparts know he is no longer traveling down the same road with them. American writers have tried hard—perhaps too hard—to describe the emotion that brings forth a Japanese smile. A Japanese smile means that the person is actively listening; body tension will show whether he is happy, angry, or embarrassed. Some Japanese listen better with closed eyes; the American negotiator should not assume that his Japanese counterpart is napping (though he may be). On a negotiating team, most Japanese faces will be deadpan—that is normal. But too straight a face indicates disapproval.

These communication norms and practices, together with the generally reserved, self-controlled image that the Japanese project, are part of the social context and can best be understood in relation to the value attached to interpersonal harmony and other, previously described features of negotiation and relationships.

As mentioned earlier, officials from almost all ministries now find themselves in international negotiations. Those ministries which are new to the game—police, agriculture, construction—act in international negotiations as they are used to acting domestically. They tend to be high-handed, inflexible, and not at all used to having their judgments questioned. In contrast, officials from the Foreign Ministry or the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, or other ministries experienced in international negotiation, are totally acculturated and are likely to have studied abroad.

Backing into a Decision

“Do Japanese ever do more than drift into a decision?” One of the authors of this paper put that question to Ohira Masayoshi in

a private dinner more than a decade ago. Ohira had already served as foreign minister, was then serving as PARC chairman, and would go on to become prime minister. His rejoinder: "Drift allows informal processes to work."

Here we present two ways—one informal, one formal—that Japanese might employ to reach a negotiating position.

Nemawashi is a horticultural term. It describes a gardener digging a trench around a tree and tying off the roots before moving the tree. In the political world, *nemawashi* describes a politician consulting with other, key politicians to secure their assent to a decision before any formal meeting is held to make that decision. *Nemawashi* is an informal, one-on-one process that avoids hierarchy. It is totally verbal, with no resulting document, and it lacks precision.

A formal way of making decisions in the ministries is the *ringi* system (*ringisei*). A Japanese ministry has three tiers: the first level is the section (*ka*); above the section is the division (*bu*); and above the division is the bureau (*kyoku*). Sitting on top of this pyramid is the administrative vice-minister (*jikan*). A policy initiative may come from almost anywhere but will go nowhere until it is blessed by the administrative vice-minister, whereupon it will be fleshed out and written down at the section level, under the guidance of the section chief. He will send it to the division whose head will put his stamp on the cover sheet and send it on to the bureau if he agrees. If he does not agree, he will remand the document to the section to be rewritten. After the document has worked its way around (*ringi* means circular) one ministry, it will be sent to the next concerned ministry, where it will undergo the same process, and then on to a third ministry. Any disagreement anywhere and the document goes back to its originating office to be rewritten. Heads at each bureaucratic level in the originating ministry indulge in lots of *nemawashi* with their counterparts in other ministries to smooth the way for the initiative.¹²

The advantage of the *ringi* system is that it informs everyone and prevents later open opposition. Its disadvantage is that it disperses responsibility, discourages leadership, and requires minor matters be given major attention.

Both the *ringi* system and the *nemawashi* process consume much time and induce fuzzy—but nonetheless hard-to-revise—con-

clusions. Yet, despite apparent rigidity, both systems are easily manipulated, as Ohira's answer indicates.

Americans, for example, could do a little pre-negotiating *nemawashi* themselves. It would soften up those politicians who make the final decisions but rarely appear at the negotiating table. Americans could get their views reflected in a *ringi* document if they struck early and low enough in the bureaucracy. Americans would not have to go to an originating ministry to get a *ringi* document revised.

Adaptability

The cultural elements of a negotiating style pose several difficult but important questions. Given the complexity of culture, ~~have we identified the most pragmatically significant features?~~ Are the patterns we have described above always true or only sometimes true? Some observers suggest that there are regional differences in behavior. The man from Osaka speaks more openly and acts with less reserve than the man from Tokyo; the man from Kagoshima is blunt and fierce. To what extent do relevant cultural features change, and how quickly? The president of a biochemical laboratory in Japan was quoted as saying, "If the person is over 40 years old, I tell him he should do something because it is first good for Japan, good for the company, good for his family, and finally, good for him. If the person is under 40, I tell him he should do it because first it is good for him, good for his family, good for the company, and finally good for Japan." ¹³

Generational conflicts seem stronger in Japan than elsewhere. Younger Japanese dress differently, talk differently, and respond differently to Americans than their elders, particularly those elders who lived through the war and the occupation and who saw Americans at their fiercest and most compassionate. On the other hand, repeated government surveys show that Japanese of all ages prefer a Japanese garden to a Western garden. How much about a culture can truly be appreciated by an outsider? In the 1981 survey of Japanese national character, 76 percent of the respondents said they saw no reason why foreigners should not be able to understand Japanese art and culture. But do they?

A more pertinent question is the extent to which the Japanese can and do negotiate with Americans in ways different from

those they use with their compatriots, for it is true that the Japanese distinguish *uchi* (fellow insiders of groups such as the family, school, or company) from *soto* (outsiders). In short, it is a question of adaptability.

Japan has a well-known attentiveness to the ways of others that goes back to the influx of Chinese ideas and practices centuries ago. Western ideas were also explored and sometimes adopted, or adapted, but there was always an attempt to maintain a unique Japanese spirit. In its diplomacy in the late nineteenth century, for example, Japan clearly moved from Oriental to Western methods and verbal symbols. More recently, a manager in a Japanese general trading company stated that when in the United States, the Japanese "of course" negotiate U.S.-style.

A fundamental, cultural willingness to adapt seems to exist. The success of these efforts to adapt is another matter. Japanese negotiators are likely to try to make adjustments, and that complicates perceptions and images of Japanese negotiating style.

The Negotiators

Selection, Expertise, and Support

The highest calling for a Japanese youth still is to become a government official. In a recent year, 488 of the 1,102 successful applicants to Japanese officialdom came from Tokyo University, a school accorded great prestige in part because of the difficulty of its entrance examination. Another 211 came from Kyoto University, also top-ranked, also difficult to enter. Two-thirds of the applicants (both universities) came from the law department; one-third came from the economics department. These figures would not be unusual for any post-war year. The Japanese bureaucracy is kept small. Bureaucrats are chosen for their educational attainment in a prescribed course of study. They have extraordinary elan and a sense of solidarity that should not be obscured by the dust kicked up in fights between the ministries.

Each young official will rise through the tiers of his ministry at about the same speed as his colleagues rise through the tiers in their ministries. *Nemawashi*, then, turns out to be a meeting between classmates.

At age 55 or 56, each official will resign from his ministry

(the Japanese expression is "leave heaven") to pursue a second career. Some run for elective office; others become an adviser to a major corporation. That prospect cements ties between bureaucrats, businessmen, and politicians.

Generally rather large by U.S. standards, a Japanese negotiating team is composed largely of middle-level officials appointed because of their technical and substantive expertise. Often, these individuals are division heads in their mid-forties. The official chief negotiator is usually a senior man with sufficient status to serve as a symbolic representative of the domestic consensus. He may know and say little about the subject matter, though, and defer to the specialists on the team.¹⁴

In spite of their technical or substantive expertise, Japanese government representatives often lack tactical negotiating skills. Some American businessmen contend that Japanese in large multinational companies negotiate ably in the Western tradition. But negotiating skills in a real setting are generally difficult to assess systematically.

Support for government negotiators is broad and deep. The team itself may have 15 to 20 members, who are supported by 15 to 20 staff. Their advance preparation is the envy of other governments.

The work of other domestic groups should not be overlooked.

Range of Authority

In the recent aviation negotiations, Japan Air Lines exerted pressure for the government to hold to its position. Similarly, Toyota pressured and limited the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) during initial bilateral talks on auto export restraints, as Nippon Telegraph and Telephone did with the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications during initial talks on government procurement policies. Even the prime minister's authority seems limited. Prime Minister Nakasone signaled as much in telecommunication negotiations in March 1986, when he responded to U.S. requests with the promise to use "my best possible efforts." Unlike President Nixon with Prime Minister Sato, President Reagan decided not to press Prime Minister Nakasone any further for the time being.

Individual Styles

Many foreign observers have underscored the similarities in the actions of individual Japanese negotiators. A strong team presence and negotiating position and the cultural imperative of consensus-building, among other factors, make for homogeneity. But there are differences worth noting.

It has already been mentioned that representatives of different ministries often exhibit different negotiating styles as well as different interests. Foreign Affairs and MITI officials tend to be rather direct and straightforward, for example, whereas Health and Welfare officials, who clearly have less experience with U.S. negotiators, show some difficulty in communicating with Americans. Some have also observed that negotiating styles differ by industry and by region. Naturally, one can point to different personalities and dispositions.

All in all, what shines through here is the technical expertise of individual negotiators in groups that have limited authority to bargain. Differences in individual styles and interests should not be assumed away, however. In coming years, they are likely to become more pronounced.

Negotiating Strategies and Tactics

Negotiating style can be treated as a composite of two kinds of behaviors. One is sheer bargaining—the exchange of proposals and counterproposals for settling particular issues—that occurs within the broad process of negotiation. The second is other interactions among negotiators. The first is negotiating techniques—the magnitude and timing of concessions, for example—and the second involves developing rapport and trust and general patterns of communication. Both kinds of behavior deserve attention. U.S. and Japanese negotiators tend to differ in their relative emphases on the two and in their conduct in each area. Table 1 shows the basic differences between U.S. and Japanese negotiating behavior.

The “Probe, Push, Panic” Style

In a detailed study of Japanese bargaining with the United States and other governments, Michael Blaker has argued that the Japanese government has “the simplest sort of [bargaining]

Table 1

DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR BETWEEN JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

UNITED STATES STYLE	JAPANESE STYLE
Establishing a first position is almost a public process with executive agencies, Congress, and interest groups involved— each fighting to have its interests recognized. No particular attempt is made to exclude the Japanese from this process.	Formulating a position is an internal process with an active attempt to keep Americans out of the process. Japanese spend much time reaching consensus among themselves.
The first position is sometimes overstated to allow for retreat. Economic positions are often cast in harsh, challenging language.	The first position is rarely overstated, though sometimes fuzzy. Japanese like to regard their position as reasonable for both sides.
Final formulation of the first position is hidden. Revelation made at first negotiating session.	The Japanese position is usually leaked to some American before it is formally revealed.
Americans respond to newsmen on an "if-asked" basis. There is an adversarial relationship between officials and reporters. Officials favor the domestic press only slightly over the foreign press.	Japanese officials initiate encounters with the press. They expect, and often get, editorial sympathy from the domestic press, at least in foreign economic negotiations. Officials isolate foreign press from domestic press.
Americans try to maintain secrecy over the course of the negotiations until the end of a negotiating session.	Japanese usually reveal the tenor and substance of the negotiations and sometimes the details as the negotiations go along.

(continued)

Table 1: Negotiating Behavior, Continued

UNITED STATES STYLE	JAPANESE STYLE
Americans like to establish a principle and then search out a solution based on that principle.	Japanese like to talk about practical solutions, resolving matters case-by-case. They allow the solution to precede the principle.
The American tendency is to compromise too soon, particularly if Japanese negotiators recognize the American principle.	Japanese find compromise difficult. They often create a fictive principle or offer meaningless concessions.
Americans place great value on winning an argument.	Japanese try to stress areas of agreement.
Americans are adversarial.	Japanese try to avoid contention.
Americans cast negotiations in terms of victory/defeat.	Japanese negotiate to avoid failure.
Americans tend to conduct their business in the negotiating hall, though they are aware that activities outside can be important.	Japanese would like to conduct real negotiations away from the formal negotiating hall, using formal session to announce agreements reached elsewhere.
Americans see the negotiated solution as final and implementation naturally flowing therefrom.	Japanese see the negotiated solution as one more stage and implementation as a subject for further negotiation.

Note: The description of the American style was derived in part from a document prepared by an anonymous Japanese diplomat that circulated in Tokyo when Michael Blaker's book, *Japanese International Negotiating Style*, was published in 1977.

strategy—know what you want and push until you get it.” The Japanese game plan, as he sees it, involves three stages:

first, to probe carefully opposing thinking in order to gauge what is obtainable and to set manageable goals; *second*, to harness all available bargaining resources to force through these apparently realizable conditions; and *finally*, to continue to press for these demands even when their fortunes have soured and at the risk of terminating negotiations.¹⁵

Or in their barest form: “probe, push, panic.”

While this fairly simple model has been criticized by several scholars, it does describe many aspects of the Japanese style or pattern of negotiation, if not their “game plan.”

Opening Moves

The Japanese do not deliberate extensively over their bargaining tactics or plan what concessions they might make. Blaker observed that once into international bargaining, Japanese negotiators often find themselves with no contingency or fallback plans, few officially authorized concessions, and an absence of clear policies on some questions. Even at the outset, the Japanese sometimes wait for U.S. negotiators to present a first proposal.

However, when the Japanese do present a first proposal, it is carefully drafted and reasonable. It reflects the Japanese predilection for well-informed, “best” solutions and the solidarity (and obligation) arising from domestic consensus-building. When the Japanese government negotiators have made their initial proposal, they are in effect not initiating bargaining but presenting its results. Internal activities have been arduous and protracted, and negotiators are held strictly accountable to their constituents.

Making Concessions

Americans tend to engage in systematic concession-making, starting with high initial demands and then making step-by-step concessions to converge on mutually agreeable terms.¹⁶ Americans always reciprocate when the other side makes a concession, no matter how small it is, even in experimental bargaining with the Japanese.

That has not held true for Japanese negotiators who do not appear to favor programmatic concessions. Instead, they call for

consideration of their situation and reiterate their initial position. Japanese negotiators may have little leeway to do otherwise, because of the difficulty they have had in reaching a consensus within their own ranks. Japanese negotiators thus often concentrate on searching for just the right method to satisfy both parties' original objectives.

In the same vein, the Japanese are reluctant to press points via debate and other aggressive, verbal means. Because they spend more time listening than verbally assaulting or counterattacking the other side's positions, the Japanese have often appeared impervious to counterarguments, at least while at the negotiating table. By the same token, when the other side has come across too aggressively, Japanese negotiators have simply withdrawn from the negotiations.

When the Japanese do make concessions, they often jump to an appropriate position rather than inch toward it. They also often make the concession before a public impression is created that their government relented to foreign pressure. In any event, the concessions can be made only after a new consensus is reached.

End Game

Most bargaining reaches a point when the parties must either agree or break off, what Blaker called the "panic" stage. Generally, Japanese negotiators respond by continuing to press for understanding of their situation and by attributing the failure to reach an agreement to misunderstanding.

They cannot appeal to their own public by charging the other nation's negotiators with intransigence; Japanese political mores require the Japanese negotiators to be far-thinking and clever enough to come up with solutions acceptable to both parties. Japanese negotiators will often give way on a minor matter, even to promise something impossible to carry out, to maintain an amiable parting. Blaker offers many pre-war instances in which Japanese negotiators made unsanctioned commitments, initiated unauthorized conversations, and interposed themselves between their government and the opposing negotiators. There have been fewer instances since the war. In no instance has the Japanese government fulfilled the independent commitments of its negotiators.

On several occasions, American negotiators have found ways to have the negotiations taken away from the Japanese negotiators and elevated to the political level: to the prime minister's level.

Sometimes the prime minister has resolved the issue to the American negotiators' satisfaction. Sometimes, he has written to the President, and the issue has been restudied in the United States to the American negotiators' detriment. Most often, the prime minister has extended a promise which lower Japanese officials have implemented most perfunctorily.

Both Japanese and American negotiators have found it advantageous to work against self-imposed deadlines—an impending passage of damaging legislation, a summit meeting of industrial democracies, a head of government visit. These deadlines can often speed up the processes of government and result in the early resolution of a problem.

Guidelines for U.S. Negotiators

U.S. negotiators must be aware of both the traditional Japanese negotiating style and the changing U.S.-Japanese context in which it is applied. The following suggestions are offered.

- **Be well prepared.** The American negotiator should be aware that his Japanese counterpart has made an independent study of the problem at hand and thinks he knows what the American negotiator should be saying. The Japanese negotiator will open negotiations by asking questions so that he can hear the American say his piece. If the American does not say what the Japanese imagined he would say, then the Japanese negotiator will ask questions until he understands why not. A Japanese negotiator will make no attempt to resolve any issue until he is sure that both he and the American negotiator agree completely on what the problem is.

American negotiators should work from American data rather than Japanese data. For example, the Americans did not keep very good records of the costs of the American occupation of Japan. American negotiators, then, had to use the Japanese records when it came time to calculate the Japanese bill. They had to accept Japanese judgments over what was and what was not an occupation cost.

The American negotiator should be prepared to question Japanese data. Often Japanese negotiators have not gathered the data themselves but have gotten the data from some Japanese trade association or some other interest group. The data will rarely be incorrect, but it may be selective, and certainly will be self-serving

The American negotiator should be aware that there are collections of Japanese data which may reach conclusions that differ from what the Japanese negotiators are saying. American negotiators often deal with negotiators from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). This ministry does not worry much about industry concentration. In fact it favors industry concentration; MITI officials can deal with a small group of industrialists more easily than with a large group of industrialists. Japan also has a fair trade commission, whose principal task is to worry about industrial oligopolies and monopolies. Its reports are of high quality and often describe conditions antithetical to American business interests. American negotiators should open no economic negotiations of any consequence until they have made a survey of Japanese scholarly economic literature.

- **Patience is required.** The Japanese have a proverb which defines patience as sitting on a rock for three years. Negotiations over the entry of American tobacco into Japan have already taken over six years. The Japanese have another proverb which pictures patience as a restless spirit in a bag that is gathered at the top and tied with a string. From time to time, American negotiators should loosen the string, particularly during negotiations in which they are asking and the Japanese are holding fast. Japanese need time to reach a consensus, but the easiest consensus to reach is to stall.

- **Know the Japanese language.** Knowledge of the Japanese language and Japanese non-verbal communications is important to successful negotiations, even though government-to-government negotiations take place in English or French. Since the Japanese negotiators will have to explain the American position to other Japanese, a Japanese speaker on the American team can help immensely by shaping the American arguments in language that the Japanese will find easy to understand and accept. For example, Americans like to talk about fair-play, a word that does not translate readily into Japanese.

Often the Japanese prefer to speak in their own language in the informal negotiations that take place away from the formal negotiating table. What is really bothering them becomes clear at these sessions rather than at the formal sessions where English is used.

The day is coming when American negotiators will have to make their presentations to the politicians who make the ultimate decisions. These men do not understand English, and it will be hard for the Americans to be persuasive through an interpreter.

- **Identify key decision-makers.** Early in the process, the most influential groups and individuals in Japan's policymaking process on the issues to be discussed should be identified. Attempts to influence domestic positions through these key decision-makers should be quietly undertaken early, before a consensus has developed. Visiting Japanese politicians should not be dismissed. They are potentially part of the solution.

- **Maintain firm, substantively consistent positions.** Researchers have found that a "firm but conciliatory" approach works best with the Japanese. Be firm about your interests but flexible as to means of satisfying them.¹⁷ In Tokyo, to criticize your opposing negotiator is to criticize yourself; to criticize yourself is to criticize your opposing negotiator.

- **Developing a relationship is important.** U.S. negotiators can gain by paying attention to protocol and conduct considered appropriate by the Japanese. The sincerity of one's intentions are appreciated. The effort to establish personal relationships may take a long time, but it is worthwhile.

- **Threats don't work.** At best, the U.S. negotiators will strike a whipping boy (the Japanese negotiator). Some Japanese politicians welcome threats since they bring the special interest groups huddling around them.

- **Trade-offs are hard.** To give a little on one issue (involving agriculture, for example) to get a little on another (involving manufacturing) means that the Japanese negotiator must go back for instructions to at least two ministries, and officials in the ministries must go to the concerned PARC committees. Soon all participants will be at loggerheads.

- **Escalating issues works only in unusual circumstances.** Often, American negotiators attempt to force the prime minister to agree to handle the issue himself. That tactic is successful only if the issue is of sufficient magnitude that the prime minister can invoke public interest and support, the only weapons he can wield to change a PARC committee's decision.

- **Give-and-take** is the best negotiating ploy. Each PARC committee must be given something if it is asked to give up something. Since the good will of the United States has palpable value, the gift need not always be equivalent to what is to be taken away. The committees must have something to carry back to their constituents.

- **Make greater use of the U.S. embassy in Japan and its officers.** The importance of establishing strong relationships with Japanese counterparts is mentioned above. This takes time and effort and can most likely be done with someone in the American embassy in Tokyo, someone with whom the Japanese have worked daily over the years. The Japanese will put on a wonderful show for the American negotiator who flies in from Washington, but no differences will be resolved because the Japanese negotiators have already called the airport and learned when he is scheduled to depart.

Currently American differences with Japan result from a vicious circle in which we are caught: The more important the issue, the higher ranking the delegate dispatched from Washington to resolve it. The higher ranking the delegate, the less likely that he will know anything about Japan. The less he knows about Japan, the harder it is to resolve the issue. The longer it takes to resolve the issue, the more importance it seems to take on. Greater use of embassy officers might help to break the circle.


These are only the most important recommendations. As the discussion of bargaining moves, cultural elements, and individual negotiators implied, U.S. negotiators should avoid static images of Japanese behavior. Ways exist effectively to negotiate agreements between representatives of the United States and Japan, and there is a record of these having been successfully employed with repeated success since World War II.

NOTES

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FRANCE

*The Diplomacy of a Self-Assured
Middle Power*

Michael M. Harrison

France is the oldest ally of the United States and one of the most important in the Western world. It is also probably the most contentious and least understood nation with which this country has had continuous and essentially friendly relations throughout its history. The modern conflictual relationship is rooted in wartime discord between Washington and Charles de Gaulle, which continued through the period of the Fourth Republic until it escalated into the dramatic clashes between Paris and Washington that characterized de Gaulle's tenure as president of the Fifth Republic. Although French-American relations improved toward the end of de Gaulle's time in office and, after notable oscillations under his successors, assumed an unusually friendly nature during the presidency of François Mitterrand, France is still widely considered potentially the most troublesome of principal U.S. allies.

The conditional nature of the French-American alliance and the strong likelihood of conflict breaking out in this relationship stem mainly from divergent national interests that determine French and American approaches to foreign policy and diplomacy.¹ A secondary but nevertheless important cause of tensions between France

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and the United States are some of the peculiarities of a French "style" in diplomatic behavior that exacerbates conflicts based on different interests and policies. As one of Europe's oldest states with an ancient diplomatic tradition, France and its statesmen have had centuries to cultivate a style of diplomacy and negotiating behavior that reflects national elite cultural values and can serve as a bulwark against the vagaries of domestic as well as international politics. At times, as with de Gaulle, style achieves such an unusual symbiosis with substance that it becomes a major feature of foreign policy and a weapon against both internal decay and foreign adversaries. The Gaullist style and era represent a watershed in French diplomacy, creating a synthesis of pre-existing stylistic elements and setting a standard for the future. Despite a necessary adaptation to reduced ambitions and a less heroic profile in international relations, France therefore retains a distinctive foreign policy behavior that constitutes an enduring challenge to the skill and patience of its interlocutors.

The French Setting: The Evolution of French-American Relations

The volatile mixture of amity and enmity in the twentieth century French-American relationship can be traced to many factors, but at the root of the dilemma is the declining international power of France and the rise of the United States to a position of dominance and temporary hegemony within the West. This has made the Anglo-Saxon state an inevitable object of resentment on the part of a country that has resisted both its loss of status in international politics and a global system dominated by other, more powerful, and often arrogant states, especially the United States in the West. Much of the style and substance of French diplomacy can be traced either to frustration caused by national decay and decline on the part of a former great power, or to a reaction against subordination as France has attempted to manipulate its dwindling resources to block the moves of dominant states. In many instances the United States has occupied a special position as a target of French diplomacy, primarily because of the lack of rapport between a dominant power and a dissatisfied dependent one. The key to understanding modern French diplomacy, then, is to be found, first, in the legacy

of national decline and political decay that characterized France after 1870 and especially after World War II; and, second, in the post-1958 Gaullist reaction to this syndrome of domestic immobilism and international weakness.

Although France's decline from great power status dates back to the country's defeat by Prussia in 1870, itself a result of accumulating political, economic, and demographic weaknesses, the sense of decay and frustration at failed attempts to reverse the process became predominant after the Pyrrhic victory that left France morally and economically exhausted in the wake of World War I. Between the two world wars, the immobilist and unstable political system of the Third Republic proved unable to cope with the dual challenge of internal political polarization between right and left and an international system in which a weak and vulnerable France found itself increasingly dependent on the Anglo-Saxon powers in its losing struggle to retain preeminence over a vigorous Germany. At crucial moments when France's international position depended on astute diplomacy, its capricious political system produced statesmen of limited vision or outright incompetence. France was "unable to compensate for an inherently weak substantive position with diplomatic skill and coordination" so that the events of the mid-1920s were the decisive stage in a process marking "the end of French predominance in Europe."² By the 1930s, the political system of the Third Republic was unravelling under the pressure of an economic crisis and conflicts between left and right that were only temporarily abated during the short-lived Popular Front government of 1936. The Third Republic collapsed in 1940 because of moral exhaustion and an unmanageable political system that had accelerated France's international decline and put no serious obstacles in the way of Germany's drive for continental supremacy.

During World War II, the Vichy regime of Marshall Philippe Pétain accepted subordination in a German-dominated Europe but tried unsuccessfully to achieve recognition as a privileged junior partner of the Third Reich, while de Gaulle's Free French doggedly insisted on securing allied recognition as an equal partner in the postwar international system. With a policy "inspired by sentiment as much as by reason," de Gaulle brilliantly wielded a diplomacy based on the contention that "France cannot be France without greatness"³ and was therefore entitled to independence and superior

rank among the victorious allies. De Gaulle temporarily achieved his goals, but after 1945 the full emergence of a bipolar system dominated by two superpowers and the weakness of Fourth Republic politics and diplomacy put France back on the path of decline and subordination.

With the exception of Pierre Mendès-France's brief term as both prime minister and foreign minister during 1954–1955, the Fourth Republic's foreign policy consisted mostly of reacting to the demands of other states, often stalling as long as possible in order to salvage appearances, but usually caving in because of an inability to negotiate a compromise acceptable to both France and its partners. According to Alfred Grosser, the Fourth Republic's diplomacy was characterized by a "refusal to adapt to the modern world" so that French leaders reacted to their sense of unwarranted dependence by cultivating a "nationalism of resentment" expressed in outbursts of passionate defiance and refusals to accommodate the policies of stronger partners.⁴ Obstruction was raised to an art by French leaders and, except in European economic affairs, the immobilist political system was unable to produce positive and creative foreign policy initiatives; instead, it resisted the demands of others by resorting to what Raymond Aron termed "the blackmail of the weak."⁵ This failure of style as well as substance alienated France's Western partners and eroded the domestic legitimacy of the republic. The Fourth Republic, like the Third, collapsed largely because of foreign policy problems, particularly the inability to deal with the Algerian issue.

The alternative for France in May 1958 was to turn to a figure from outside normal politics, the man who had incarnated French honor during World War II and who represented an alternative political system as well as a foreign policy based on action rather than reaction, on grandeur rather than resentment and humiliation. De Gaulle brought a radically different style to French foreign policy during his eleven years in power. It was based largely on a pragmatic accommodation to the realities of reduced French power, but it also manipulated claims to leadership and respect as a way to disguise that accommodation. The style further enhanced French international influence by tailoring French diplomacy to reflect the charisma of de Gaulle himself. Gaullist diplomacy proved to be the most successful modern variation on French styles for several reasons.

First, de Gaulle personified certain cultural and behavioral traits that enlisted respect and support from the French, who could see aspects of themselves, their behavior and values, in a leader and a diplomatic style that commanded the attention and the respect, if not the admiration, of other states. Second, Gaullist diplomacy succeeded because de Gaulle was able to create a stable, presidential-centered political system that based its legitimacy primarily on an executive who could accept responsibility, ensure coherent actions, and give clear direction to a talented elite of diplomats and bureaucrats who had long suffered under the vagaries of the Third and Fourth Republics. To a certain extent, the style compensated for and even disguised failings in foreign policy and was such a success in restoring a sense of pride that it has guided and constrained all of the general's successors. Indeed, because the actual policies pursued after de Gaulle have naturally evolved to suit changing national and international circumstances, the Gaullist style has become a crucial element linking successive presidents to the heroic myth of the regime's founder, so that French diplomatic behavior under the Fifth Republic is perhaps one of the most remarkably distinctive and consistent in the world.

French National Character

A nation's foreign policy is the result of many complex factors that combine to produce conceptions of national interest and serve as the guidelines for both the substance of policy as well as the form of political-diplomatic behavior, or style. National interests change slowly over time but probably shift more rapidly than the national character that shapes the style and produces the statesmen who embody various combinations of a shared cultural value system. Thus, the classic paradigm of the French political personality described here still has significant validity. In the case of the French, this is perhaps no longer because they conform to Alexis de Tocqueville's description of "a people so unalterable in its political instincts,"⁶ but because of a lag between economic and social modernization, on the one hand, and changes in cultural and political values, on the other. As Stanley Hoffmann observed in the early 1960s, in France "the traditional style of authority has proved to be singularly resilient."⁷ Experts are convinced that by the 1980s, modernization is changing the patterns described here, so that

French society is at an uncertain (perhaps precarious) stage of transition from the classic model to a more modern, pragmatic, and perhaps less distinctive national political culture. Nevertheless, the elites who direct French foreign policy are still educated in a system dominated by traditional values and standards of behavior, so that in this domain change will probably be especially slow and incomplete.

The Cherished Independence of the Individual

The classic French personality analyzed by sociologists such as Michel Crozier and political scientists like Stanley Hoffmann represents a style of authority and interpersonal relationships dominated by a "dislike of face-to-face discussions leading to compromises through participation of all parties involved in a problem."⁸ The purpose served by this social pattern is to preserve the autonomy of the individual, who values independence and resists the compromises that would be required by constant interaction with others. It also frees the French from the awkward necessity of adopting the role of a *demandeur*, which is associated with subordination and the loss of a cherished independence of the individual. For France as a whole, especially during the Third and Fourth Republics, this behavior pattern produced a kind of "stalemate society" characterized by widespread resistance to change by social groups. The French refused to endanger their acquired positions by bargaining with new or deprived social forces, although everyone retained a penchant to protest actively and resist any threat to the status quo.⁹ This pattern of behavior is the source of the common judgment that France is an inherently conservative country in both domestic and external behavior. Donald C. McKay's important study of French-American relations found in the French an "inveterate caution, reflection again of their essential conservatism."¹⁰ Writing on the same themes at the end of the 1960s, Crane Brinton still found the French unwilling to take risks and cited their reputation for "caution, conservatism, reluctance to venture into the unknown, the untried."¹¹ In institutional terms, this pattern tends to produce fairly rigid, hierarchically-based systems in which authority is exercised from a comfortable distance and is kept abstract, impersonal, and aloof. Thus, everyone is constrained by elaborate rules, precedents, legal procedures, and self-imposed inhibitions that also inhibit change

and accommodation.¹² One result of this trait is that the French have developed perhaps an excessive respect for legal documents and concepts, while their system of statute law encourages a lack of flexibility because of its emphasis on "the sanctity of the written contract."¹³

Devotion to Principle

Another important characteristic ascribed to the French is their penchant for relying on highly rational abstract logic and general principles as they analyze and attempt to resolve problems and conflicts. A close observer such as André Siegfried admitted that a Frenchman might demonstrate an excessive devotion to principle, revering it "to such an extent that he occasionally becomes its slave, attaining in the name of that principle and its logic such fanaticism that he loses his judgment and his critical sense."¹⁴ On the other hand, the French have also been justly proud of their ability to understand and grasp general intellectual and philosophical principles. Siegfried also claimed for his nation "an extraordinary capacity for analysis, the power to perceive at once the principle implicated in a problem" which results in the power to "grasp the nicest distinctions, foresee the remotest consequences, penetrate a question to its core." According to the same author, this gives the French an unusual ability to universalize problems and, by using their "intellectual radiance," to understand how such problems apply to others, and to conceive solutions with a certain disinterestedness and idealism.¹⁵ Many other observers have noted, however, that these admirable intellectual traits present some inconveniences. Because of an excessive reliance on principles, the French often lean towards a "preference for concept over facts," a tendency to argue "about principles not about interests,"¹⁶ and a fascination with grandiose, elegant schemes rather than feasible projects. Thus, the French can often seem especially stubborn and blind to what others see as reality, in part because of a Frenchman's dependence on a formal logic which "often suppresses those components of the situation that do not fit his theory."¹⁷

The abstract French personality suggested by this portrait is not one that lends itself easily to negotiation, bargaining, and compromise. Until very recently, perhaps, the French have seemed to prefer to resolve internal social and political conflicts by ignoring

them or allowing stalemates to persist; by blocking negotiated solutions if they may threaten the status quo; by depending upon a distant and impersonal authority such as the state to impose a solution on conflicting parties; or by letting a crisis develop so that problems are resolved through outright conflict or resort to an external "heroic leader" temporarily called in to impose a solution.¹⁸ Because negotiation and compromise endanger the independence and self-identity of the individual, the French often seem to find a conflictual approach and imposed solutions "far more acceptable than the humdrum of laborious bargaining."¹⁹

The absence of important domestic practices or even conceptions of liberal, pluralist bargaining means that the French consider negotiation an unfortunate necessity in the domain of international relations. It is "a symptom of a certain state, rather anarchic," of a highly imperfect international society which may have to turn to such a "remedy for disorder" when authoritarian or unilaterally-imposed solutions fail or cannot be applied.²⁰ Negotiation is therefore quite far down the list of preferred French methods for dealing with problems and conflicts either domestically or internationally. When the French do engage in negotiations, it is with much reluctance and skepticism about both the process itself and the virtue of compromise as a method of resolving the conflicts between parties. The psychological resistance to compromise is reinforced by a certain sense of intellectual and logical superiority, which can produce a conviction that the individual, group, or (French) national position is more likely to be logically correct and that compromise is irrational on grounds of principle.

Influence of the "Grandes Ecoles"

Although social and political modernization is slowly eroding the integrity of this model of French behavior, the cultural values and patterns described here continue to be prominent features of the French education system. They seem especially relevant to an elite selection and training process that changes less rapidly than other parts of French society. Well into the Fifth Republic, it could still be said that the French school system "tends to produce autonomous, independent, and critical individuals rather than participatory and responsible citizens," while the product of such an education is "an individual endowed with general principles un-

tested by practical experience, with little or no ability to participate in teamwork.”²¹

At the higher levels of society, top administrators and diplomats come from upper middle class society and are carefully selected and trained to reflect traditional knowledge and culture in the form of the bourgeois value system described above.²² France’s famous system of state-run “*grandes écoles*” are the vehicles for producing these elites. Since 1945, the French diplomatic corps has been recruited from the highly elitist *Ecole Nationale d’Administration* (ENA). A kind of professional graduate school, ENA sends its graduates into the *grands corps* of the French administrative apparatus. The diplomatic corps of the Quai d’Orsay (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is usually a third- or fourth-ranking choice of the “*énarques*.” By the early 1960s, one-half of the Quai d’Orsay’s diplomatic service had graduated from ENA and by now the school has provided the vast majority of this corps.²³

This group of technocrats receives a remarkable training that combines a utilitarian, anti-intellectual content with a style that reinforces classic French cultural values and behavior patterns. At ENA, students are taught by bureaucrats, usually not by academics, and there is a heavy emphasis on the mimicry of the social and verbal style of the professors, right down to “the vocabulary, sentences, and patterns of thought.”²⁴ As a result, the “central value system” of the French upper middle classes is reinforced and passed on through a “painstaking transference of knowledge and values.”²⁵ Although students receive a general economic, administrative, and even international affairs background suitable for entry into most of the *grands corps*, a “cult of amateurism” in the educational process aims mainly at refining “the ability to synthesize, to adopt global views and to make global decisions considered to be the hallmark of the elite.”²⁶ Intellectual, philosophical, and verbal virtuosity is perhaps the most important result of an ENA training, which stresses the manipulation of general principles, logic, analytical skills, and oral (often confrontational) forms of expression. Future French negotiators who emerge from this background, therefore, constitute an unusually homogeneous group, conscious of its own ostensible superiority, “who charm you, but with whom . . . dialogue is difficult.”²⁷ They have great competence to organize and loyally defend a principle or position but may be rather disinclined and less able to bargain and

negotiate—especially in international affairs, where France's influence is problematic anyway and where national style may sometimes hamper a French negotiator rather than bolster his authority and prowess, as it has done at home.

National Strategies and Tactics: The Power-Politics Tradition

Grandeur

According to Harold Nicolson, there are two main currents of diplomacy. One is closely tied to the commercial middle class (and democratic-pluralist) practices of compromise, conciliation, even appeasement, while another is closer to ancient European traditions of power politics, national prestige, and preoccupation with status.²⁸ Although any state may and does use both approaches depending on the circumstances and the issue, French diplomacy has clearly been in the power politics tradition. France was long renowned for a preoccupation with the exercise of military power, which François de Callières noted came too often at the expense of diplomacy,²⁹ while Alexis de Tocqueville in the nineteenth century still felt that the French excelled “only in war.”³⁰ A famous essay by diplomat Jules Cambon ascribed this preoccupation with military power to France's historical lack of security on its northern and eastern frontiers.³¹ Until France's decline accelerated after the loss of the Franco-Prussian War, French diplomacy was also reputed for what Jean-Baptiste Duroselle later called a taste for glory, or grandeur, while Montesquieu before him had noted “this general passion which the French nation has for glory.”³²

This grandiose, ambitious diplomatic style, associated with great powers, was retained by a declining France and remains evident in France's taste for grand designs that try to assemble collective support for French-led schemes and thereby enhance the prestige and influence of France. To skeptical and excessively pragmatic Anglo-Saxon observers, “the pursuit of *grandes entreprises* becomes an act born of insecurity” as a weakened France attempts to justify its claims to prestige.³³ On the other hand, an ability to conceive of grand designs such as the Common Market and de Gaulle's confederal Europe in a pluralist international system is clearly more than pretension. It testifies to the enduring intellectual genius of a nation

that can compensate for declining concrete power with original and compelling ideas that continue to lend credence to the notion that France can be a pace-setter for the world.

Although French diplomacy in the era of national decline has attempted to use some devices of the classical tradition of grandeur in order to create an impression of reviving power and influence, until the Fifth Republic the prevailing tone of foreign policy was an inherent conservatism and even rigidity as France resisted change out of fear of triggering further loss of power.

De Gaulle's Transformation of French Diplomatic Style

Charles de Gaulle's seminal influence on modern French diplomatic style was due to his extraordinary ability to exercise a charismatic leadership that combined some classic French personality traits with a foreign policy that was pragmatic and successful in many respects, yet still met the distinctive goal and behavior orientations of the French. In politics and diplomacy, de Gaulle's public personality was such a carefully crafted work of art that the individual was virtually subsumed in a statesman who was in many ways an archetypal Frenchman, "a synthesizer of French tradition"³⁴ able to gather domestic support and establish a certain model of diplomatic behavior because he could "manipulate existing cultural trends in such a way as to create new perceptions of existing symbols." During de Gaulle's tenure in office, then, French diplomatic style was transformed so that "France in international relations behaved like de Gaulle writ large."³⁵

Gaullist values of leadership and diplomacy are too subtle and complex to be examined in detail here, but they represent a mixture of characteristic French intransigence in the defense of national interests with an idealization of action based on instinct and a mastery of tactics rather than the excessive rational calculation that de Gaulle felt had stymied France for so long. Stubborn resistance to compromise in international relations is justified in de Gaulle's war memoirs as a defense against France's weakness and possible further decline in a hostile world.³⁶ The remedy that de Gaulle proposed for France's diplomatic ills was based on his own prescription for leadership by the "man of action," who "scarcely imagines himself without a strong dose of egotism, pride, firmness, and cunning."³⁷ Under this guideline, success is not judged by actual,

short-term accomplishments, but by the very act of striving to leave an impression on the country and the world, because, for nations as for great men, "their fame is subsequently measured less by the utility of their endeavor than by its dimensions."³⁸ This formula became a hallmark of Gaullist diplomacy, so that a certain style of behavior was elevated to a principle of statecraft and, as Stanley Hoffmann observed, "personal intransigence became France's intractability."³⁹

De Gaulle's conception of international relations and diplomacy was a classical, power-oriented, and state-centric one. In this arena of conflict where the formal aspects of state-to-state relations dominate, the sovereignty of all players is a major principle to be defended, especially since it is a bulwark against the demands and institutions of superpowers inclined to exercise systemic hegemony. Diplomacy is, then, "a very old game, a ritual," in which each state tries "to maneuver for advantage against the other players."⁴⁰ The independence of France was de Gaulle's principal value in foreign policy, defined not as an impossible autonomy or autarky, but as freedom from excessive subordination to the will of other states so that France could decide to cooperate or not according to the dictates of its own interests.

Avoiding Negotiations

What are the instruments of state power and diplomacy from this perspective?⁴¹ Steeped in the history of European conflicts and preoccupied with the fate of a nation that had fought three major wars in seventy-five years and had twice been occupied, de Gaulle believed that force and military power remained the determinants of international security and rank, the essential vehicles for protecting and advancing the interests of states. This principle was still valid in an age of nuclear deterrence, so that the creation of the French nuclear force constituted the general's major effort to give his country an indispensable modern means of security and diplomatic influence. In the realm of diplomacy itself, bargaining and negotiation are not preferred instruments of statecraft, partly on grounds of general principle, but also because a weak, structurally dependent state such as France puts too much at risk if it engages in a process in which mutual concessions are an expected outcome of established procedures. As Hoffmann observed, de Gaulle "avoided negotiations

whenever possible" because "they are usually too costly when one was weak, and often unnecessary when one was strong."⁴² Negotiations are useful primarily when there are pre-existing agreements based on a well-defined community of interest, as in the European Economic Community (EEC), though even in such cases there is no obligation for a state to bargain incessantly and compromise key interests.

In all negotiations, once positions are established and when agreement appears impossible, it is better to break off discussions and refuse compromises rather than allow interminable discussion that only obscures conflicts of basic interests. Gaullist France, then, did not accept the more flexible, compromise-oriented Anglo-Saxon theories of negotiation and mediation, since the guiding principles in Paris were to negotiate only when one has a reasonable chance of winning, to use other instruments of diplomacy whenever possible, and if negotiations are failing to secure preferred results, to break them off because no agreement is preferable to endless debate or cosmetic outcomes. As former Foreign Minister Maurice-Jacques Couve de Murville once remarked, "One does not negotiate in order to conclude something, but to ensure the triumph of the interests in one's charge."⁴³ This Gaullist approach, exercised so often in Community as well as Atlantic affairs, was a major innovation over the stalling tactics of the Fourth Republic.

Whereas face-saving for most nations means at least a cosmetic accord, France and French negotiators often seem to conform to André Malraux's dictum about de Gaulle: "Refusal is the supreme value." The French have a strong sense that their own status and prestige is constantly at stake in any negotiation, and it often can be protected best by rejecting discussion or concessions, or taking a conflictual stand on grounds of principle.

A frequent refusal to discuss or negotiate is based on the principles of sovereignty and independence that allow a middle power to avoid situations where concessions might have to be made to stronger states or coalitions of states. When the French do engage in negotiations, this characteristic penchant to argue from the basis of abstract principles, supported by somewhat elaborate rhetoric, is very visible and exasperates many interlocutors. Depending on the context of a negotiation, this approach can range from wielding the universal "rights of man" in defense of a particular French interest

to a reassertion of sovereignty as a way of avoiding discussions or agreements that might touch on internal French affairs. This appears to be the French equivalent of the American use of the federal system or Congress as devices to constrain or exclude the discussion of certain matters. In the case of France, however, outsiders agree that a great deal of time in Western forums has to be spent getting around an extreme sensitivity about sovereignty.

This kind of French approach is one reason why France has a reputation for stubbornness and inflexibility among Western states. It is an ingrained cultural-behavioral value, but it seems that the French are adept at consciously manipulating their reputation for rigidity, along with their reliance on abstract and highly philosophical rhetoric, as devices to stall a negotiation and wear out their partners, especially Anglo-Saxons who often seem more at home with pragmatic give-and-take on the substance rather than the principles involved in an issue. For the French, rhetorical and tactical skills are often employed to achieve a kind of "negotiation dominance," rather than relying on the manipulation of information on the substance itself. The French style is to use a "diplomacy of the verb," or rhetoric guided by logic, which sometimes allows them to evade or hamper agreement, but may also permit them to perceive more fundamental principles and long-range issues involved in a given matter.

No Fallback Position in Negotiations

In terms of the actual bargaining process itself, the French seem to employ a number of related tactics that distinguish them from American or most Western negotiators. For example, whereas U.S. teams usually develop an opening position with a number of intermediate fall-back stages before reaching the bottom line, the French typically come to a negotiation with an elaborate, well-prepared opening position but have few, if any, intermediate fall-backs before their minimum bargaining point is reached. To American negotiators, the French seem to be inflexible because they cannot or will not compromise their maximalist proposal and hence end up having to "cave in" and accept a worse deal than they could have made. It makes some difference if the French are on the offensive, actively seeking an agreement. Then they are more likely to have compromises ready. However, if they are on the defensive,

coping with demands of others, they tend to be more rigid. For their part, the French acknowledge that they often enter negotiations with no fall-back position and assert that this is usually because their basic policy is a carefully-created and correct one which they can defend better if they do not have preconceived concessions in mind. Their advantage in this situation, it is claimed, is that a certain virtuosity allows them to work with the dynamics of a particular bargaining situation and develop alternatives in the course of the negotiation itself.

Manipulating the Symbols of Power

Gaullist foreign policy style often seemed to seek—or certainly not to avoid—confrontations over issues where France had a veto power, could impose conditions, or could determine the outcome without resorting to a framework of direct negotiation and compromise. This was in part due to the conviction that France was most itself when engaged in a struggle, or, as the motto to *Le Fil de L'épée* put it, "To be great is to sustain a great quarrel." In order to win these quarrels, or conflicts, and to reinforce France's self-esteem, Gaullist diplomatic style was tailored to permit the maximum exercise of de Gaulle's personal talents in the service of his national vision. Thus, French diplomacy in the Fifth Republic relied on the manipulation of symbols and a strong sense of theater, all exercised with a certain aloofness from the fray of the diplomatic arena itself, as de Gaulle compensated for a lack of genuine power with a masterful ability to work with symbols of power and create situations in which France could only triumph, or at least appear to triumph. By an astute sense of timing, France was able to control the process of diplomatic exchanges and, by revealing its goals only in stages, could keep others off balance or unaware of the ultimate purpose of its tactics.

De Gaulle was frequently willing to use a variety of special "anti-bargaining" tactics to achieve a foreign policy goal. Both unilateralism and the ultimatum are diplomatic weapons with good Gaullist credentials that have been employed to avoid negotiations, or in the course of them, to dictate terms of agreement or non-agreement, as in EEC and NATO affairs. The Gaullist style in diplomacy is necessarily one in which there are high risks in terms of reputation, because of the scale of French ambition and the high

diplomatic stakes of such conspicuous maneuvers. With little concrete power, de Gaulle used rhetoric, ideas, and a distinctive style to establish a certain dominance over Western diplomacy for a decade. He carefully chose his confrontations so that the practical risks were usually at a minimum. However, for a country whose power and influence greatly depend on prestige and status, each diplomatic confrontation is potentially costly in international as well as domestic terms. De Gaulle's successors have been less daring than the regime's founder, but they have at times engaged in high-profile confrontation and negotiation. Georges Pompidou and his foreign minister, Michel Jobert, took on the United States over the "Year of Europe" during 1983, and adroitly manipulated the Middle East War and energy crisis to scuttle U.S. efforts to gain a veto over European political and economic decisions. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was less confrontational in his foreign policy, but felt compelled to take the risk of meeting Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Warsaw in 1979 in an effort to mediate an end to the Afghanistan intervention. This ill-conceived grand gesture damaged his reputation both at home and abroad.

The essence of Gaullist diplomacy is a formal public insistence on the rigid adherence to principles and an unwillingness to bargain over issues where such principles or significant national interests seem to be at stake. This is a diplomacy where style, in the service of a grand design, is in fact an integral part of policy itself since "the style could hardly be imagined on behalf of a less ambitious policy."⁴⁴ It is a style in which the normal give and take of diplomatic exchanges is minimized in favor of grand gestures that establish crucial principles which cannot be openly compromised or bargained away because France would ostensibly rather be right than give in for the sake of immediate results or to establish a temporary, superficial, and deceptive harmony. Although this is a seemingly uncompromising approach to foreign policy, another prominent feature of Gaullist diplomacy was that beneath the apparent rigidity was a surprising pragmatism that allowed France and its partners to work together despite disagreements on principles. The flexibility of French foreign policy has increased since de Gaulle's time, so that contemporary French diplomacy is a tempered Gaullism that gives France a stable foundation in a somewhat idiosyncratic national style of behavior, yet allows the French nation to

meet an intensified need for accommodation and cooperation with other states. Contemporary French negotiating behavior can be understood as a blend of the classical Gaullist approach and a "modern," or pragmatic, diplomatic style.

The Negotiators

The "Presidentialization" of Foreign Policy

The main feature of foreign policy behavior under the Fifth Republic has been the close presidential control and management of relations with other countries. Article fifty-two of the constitution specifically gives the president authority over the negotiation of treaties, but the practice has been that foreign (and defense) policy as a whole is a "reserved domain" subject to presidential prerogatives. This is because the role and image of France's Gaullist presidency is largely defined by the incumbent's foreign policy activities, which have usually been free of important domestic parliamentary or political constraints.* The effect of usually unfettered presidential authority in this domain has been to ensure greater foreign policy continuity and cohesion over the length of presidential terms, as well as a more self-assured activism abroad on the part of what is "probably the most powerful executive in the western world."⁴⁵

The president has several bureaucratic devices available to assert his prerogatives over foreign policy, such as the use of "restricted councils," or limited membership cabinet sessions. The rather small professional staff at the Elysée itself both advises the president on foreign policy and can be used as personal emissaries or negotiators.⁴⁶ Presidential advisers are usually technocrats temporarily "detached" from their bureaucratic corps. Many have studied at ENA, and a fair number have come from the Quai d'Orsay itself. François Mitterrand innovated somewhat by having the ubiquitous Jacques Attali (graduate of both ENA and the *Ecole Polytechnique*) serve as an all-round idea man, while a professional diploma

*The co-management of foreign policy by a center-right prime minister (Jacques Chirac) and the Socialist President Mitterrand since March 1986 will almost certainly prove to be an aberration. The situation is likely to revert to presidential domination once this office and the government again reflect similar political majorities.

(Hubert Vedrine) managed foreign policy with the advice of Régis Debray (third world affairs), Guy Penne (Africa), and Christian Sautter (international economics). Apart from special advisers, the general secretary, or chief of the Elysée staff, has often played a major role on behalf of the president in diplomatic negotiations. The president's interest and direct involvement in a foreign policy negotiation will differ according to the issue and the political circumstances. African affairs, however, have almost always been carefully controlled from the Elysée, where each president has had a special adviser on Africa to ensure that his prerogatives are respected.

The "presidentialization" of foreign policy under the Fifth Republic has rectified the problems of incoherence and immobilism that characterized the Fourth Republic. Looking back on his accomplishment, de Gaulle could assert that he had fulfilled his goal of creating the impression abroad of "a strong, homogeneous, and self-confident regime in office and at work in Paris." He, like his successors, was therefore able to ensure that one foreign policy line emanated from Paris, while France's ambassadors were meant to be "the representatives of a country that was not afraid to assert itself, asked nothing of anybody and never contradicted itself."⁴⁷ A sometimes less satisfactory result of this centralized control over diplomacy is that French foreign policy is not only very personal, it is often excessively personalized. As a rule, French diplomatic style as well as policy priorities will vary from president to president according to personality, although the Gaullist model establishes a framework that constrains all holders of the office.

While de Gaulle himself was in office, France's diplomatic and negotiating behavior reflected the style already discussed. De Gaulle established the principle of presidential control from the onset, and by preference used personal, bilateral, often secret diplomacy in combination with his celebrated public and symbolic tactics. He could intervene directly in multilateral negotiations when a major interest or principle was at stake, as in the case of the Fouchet negotiations over remodeling the European Economic Community. Famous Gaullist tactics established during this period include the unilateral veto over a negotiation outcome (British entry into the EEC), the "empty chair" or boycott approach until others succumb (the 1965 EEC crisis over majority voting), and the unilateral, non-negotiable decision (the 1966 NATO withdrawal).

These major crises in European and Atlantic relations established certain prototypes of Gaullist approaches to negotiations under circumstances in which key principles were at stake and where France could unilaterally or decisively shape a policy outcome. One of the major negotiations of the Fifth Republic was in the rigid style associated with de Gaulle—the 1966 withdrawal from NATO in which the only negotiable aspect of French policy was the precise timing and conditions of allied compliance. Although this kind of highly visible, non-compromising style on an issue of national sovereignty and security was typical of Gaullist diplomacy, so was the subsequent pragmatism that allowed France and the others to continue cooperating on political and even military matters.

On less visible issues or where French desires could not be determinative, Gaullist style was more obviously pragmatic and accommodating. On most Common Market economic issues, for example, de Gaulle left the details in the hands of diplomats and did not let his own prestige become an issue in negotiations where French interest required that bargains be struck. On the most important international negotiation that did involve presidential authority, the Algerian affair, de Gaulle's approach combined a concern for protecting certain principles and French prestige with a pragmatic accommodation to reality. The general's main goal was to safeguard the appearance that France was in control of the situation and voluntarily granting Algeria self-determination, eventually independence, while he carefully nurtured French public opinion and the army to the point where independence was an acceptable outcome. Although de Gaulle could not control the outcome of the negotiations—full autonomy for Algeria—he was successful in enforcing the principle of a free French grant of independence contingent on the democratic consent, in referenda, of both the French and Algerian people.

General de Gaulle's three successors—Georges Pompidou, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and François Mitterrand—have taken the Gaullist approach, stressing a strong defense of French independence and prerogatives, and adapted it to suit their personalities and circumstances. Pompidou was more concerned with economic affairs than security matters and tended to be more accommodating than his predecessor on issues such as British entry into the Common Market, although he remained obstreperous in Atlantic affairs. The

only conscious attempt to change the style of presidential foreign policy in Fifth Republic France came during the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing. Parallel to his desire to de-polarize domestic politics, on June 20, 1974, Giscard announced that "cooperation, flexibility, and liberal attitudes" would be the hallmarks of France's European policy.⁴⁸ Giscard soon modified France's adherence to a rigid unanimity rule in the EEC Council of Ministers, and was rewarded with Community agreement to institutionalize the thrice-annual summit meetings of EEC leaders.

Giscard's presidency initially represented an effort to humanize the office of the president, making him a more informal and accessible figure at home rather than rigid and aloof. In foreign affairs, this approach complemented Giscard's skepticism towards the Gaullist tradition of combining obstreperousness with an ambitious or grand project for France, even though Giscard's version of grandeur, "*mondialisme*," was often indistinguishable from the Gaullist concept. The most interesting lesson of the Giscard presidency in this respect is its failure in both domestic and foreign affairs. In the end Giscard d'Estaing was isolated and unpopular, as well as personally "more pessimistic, more mistrustful, more skeptical and more conservative."⁴⁹ Whatever François Mitterrand's problems as president, he has not made Giscard's mistake of attempting to alter the Gaullist style of presidential authority and high ambition in foreign affairs. Indeed, Mitterrand has been rather adept at sustaining a kind of left-Gaullist image while presiding over an unusually accommodating period in Fifth Republic foreign policy. Mitterrand has therefore been more successful than Giscard because he has retained key elements of the Gaullist style of aloofness and symbolic concern for France's rank and ambitions, all the while practicing a more conciliatory and constructive approach on many European and Atlantic issues.

Under Mitterrand, French diplomacy is still marked by a propensity for dramatic, high profile ventures that is unmatched in the West except by the United States and perhaps Britain under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.⁵⁰ Mitterrand has had successes such as the daring Bundestag speech lecturing the Germans on their defense responsibilities in NATO; he has also had unhappy episodes such as the Beirut multilateral force commitment and the disaster of the French-Libyan agreement on Chad, inexplicably sealed by a

publicized Mitterrand-Moammar Gadhafi summit meeting on Cyprus. Whereas in the 1960s de Gaulle's greatest diplomatic adventures were in the arena of inter-allied and EEC diplomacy, today the relative de-dramatization of French policies within the West means that the most significant risks are undertaken in the Mediterranean and in Africa, often considered a special domain of French responsibility. Nevertheless, on any issue and at any time, French leaders are capable of rekindling the Gaullist tactic of "surprise diplomacy" to obtain maximum effect and prove that French foreign policy can still demonstrate a bit of flair.

The "presidentialization" of French diplomacy under the Fifth Republic has meant that the most important personal ties and initiatives take place at the presidential level. In European affairs, de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer established the tradition that French and German leaders enjoy a kind of special relationship that sets the standard for bilateral relations at all levels and on most issues. Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt revived this pattern of personal diplomacy and it has remained a feature of relations between Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl. De Gaulle and Adenauer used their direct ties to break through bureaucratic inertia and negotiate links such as the 1963 Franco-German treaty that now provides the framework for regular meetings and negotiations. Giscard launched the European Monetary System in a private meeting with Schmidt at Rambouillet in April 1978, and the two cooperated in nudging other European leaders towards an accord by December of that year. Mitterrand and Kohl have used their bilateral "special relationship" to revive and expand French-German security cooperation. On many matters, the president himself may not become so directly involved, but the Elysée can still be used informally to overcome obstacles to an agreement. One of the most important examples of this came during the negotiations over British entry into the EEC under Pompidou's presidency, when secret and non-committal discussions bypassed normal diplomatic channels and produced a bargain based on mutual concessions, thereby permitting the principal talks to move ahead to a successful conclusion.⁵¹

As this example suggests, the French can be flexible in their approach to a negotiation if they are determined to strike a bargain. Because of a preoccupation with public status and salvaging the

appearance of sovereignty, private and unofficial discussions can often be advantageous in dealing with Paris since all parties can minimize political-cultural hurdles to agreement.

French Negotiating Delegations

In general, their rigidity has not prevented the French from acquiring a widespread reputation as both able and at times flexible negotiators. This extends throughout the French diplomatic corps and upper administrative services. American diplomats are rightly impressed by the intellectual quality and training of French diplomats and civil servants, who normally bring a high level of technical expertise and preparation to a negotiation. In some cases, perhaps, the French may be tempted to rely more on their rhetorical and analytical skills, or virtuosity, rather than on careful preparation, and they may be better in the formal presentation and debate than at informal give-and-take and the actual bargaining process. Senior delegates are usually well briefed, although in less prestigious or ad hoc negotiations the Quai may send chief delegates who have been languishing in the reserve of the diplomatic corps and are not first-rate.

One issue of traditional sensitivity to France has been the use of the French language in diplomacy, both as a symbol of the country's cultural standing and as an instrument of logic and rhetoric, giving the French negotiator an advantage in discussions. The eclipse of French as the standard vehicle for international communications and the inexorable rise of English to preeminence has been resisted by Paris and every effort is made to retain the equality of French as a medium of expression in diplomatic forums. French negotiators are under permanent instruction to use French on formal diplomatic occasions and during meetings. This sometimes becomes a stalling device, since English is now the common language of Western exchanges (especially in economic discussions). Nevertheless, the French can and do insist that the full translation process be employed. This was apparently a tactic also employed by de Gaulle. Richard Nixon reports that the general "recognized that there was a tactical advantage to conducting his half of the conversation in French. By waiting for the translations of my statements and questions, he doubled the time he had to contemplate his responses. He obviously had this in mind because he listened just as

carefully to my original statements as to the translations.”⁵² Because of the prevalence of English today, a French diplomat is likely to know English and find this an advantage in informal negotiations in the West, where a lack of English handicaps delegates in the informal conversations in which business may be conducted. In general, French diplomats seem to be more flexible on the language issue than in the past and at some East-West forums now deliberately use English in informal discussions because it tends to leave the Russians as the only delegates hampered by the need to rely on translations.

As in any Western country, French delegations can be either harmonious or divided—the histories of various negotiations provide evidence of both kinds. Conflicts have often been visible because of different political perspectives—evident between arch-Gaullists and pro-Europeans during the British EEC accession talks and more recently between the French version of hawks and doves at the Madrid Review Conference. Usually, however, French delegations are careful to keep their internal discord hidden from others and are certainly more cohesive than the often-divided American groups. Their discipline is such that they can usually keep secrets and, like the French government as a whole, are less susceptible to leaks than most Western powers, especially the United States. The hierarchical French foreign policymaking process under presidential authority and a rather homogeneous Quai diplomatic corps seem to ensure a strong coherence of purpose in a delegation. This is true even when other ministries are involved in a negotiation. A paradoxical advantage of this situation is that greater French cohesion of purpose often allows the French more flexibility as individuals or as a team. At least French diplomats feel they have more freedom to operate within their instructions; they are generally less bound by tight written guidelines or the kind of complicated inter-agency agreements that can tie up an American delegation.

A looser bureaucratic control over French delegations means that individual personalities sometimes assert themselves and may affect the atmosphere of discussions. Perhaps the only safe generalization that can be made about the personalities of French diplomats is that there are two broad categories noted by observers. One is the formal, austere, intellectual, “Gaullist” type who may be difficult to deal with, even though such a figure cannot approach the

effect of the prototype, General de Gaulle, who impressed Nixon with "a discipline that extended itself beyond the man, a presence that commanded silence and invited deference." The other type is informal, makes an effort to be charming and even something of a bon vivant, and is perhaps more adept at seducing Americans and other foreigners susceptible to this kind of approach. There is no real generational distinction in this regard, since young French diplomats can be as "Gaullist" in style as a senior figure, and many distinguished French statesmen have a warmth and sophisticated charm that should not be confused with excessive flexibility in terms of defending their national interests.

Guidelines for U.S. Negotiators

French-American Relations—A Special Category among Western Allies

The French are considered the most difficult partner to deal with in the West. They alone among the leading states in the Atlantic system have a conception of national interest and a pattern of diplomacy that violates many of the expectations of friendly, accommodating behavior among allies. French foreign policy and diplomacy have gradually become more pragmatic and flexible since the Gaullist era and, by the mid-1980s, are an unpredictable melange of pragmatism and Gaullism. This change is due to a reduced scale of ambition in the world and to France's growing reconciliation to the European, Atlantic, and East-West status quo that makes Paris more conciliatory within Western diplomacy while adopting a firmer line on East-West issues. In European Community affairs, in particular, French behavior is now remarkable for its "community spirit" so that the confrontational tactics of the past seem unlikely to be revived. There is, indeed, a range of French diplomatic styles that vary with the issue, the participants, and the forum—very congenial within the privileged Franco-German partnership; community-minded in the EEC except when dealing with the British anti-EEC spirit; still quite independent and sovereignty-minded on defense and security matters; more clearly adversarial and "Western" when dealing with the East than during de Gaulle's time; somewhat patronizing when engaged in African affairs; defensive and sensitive to perceived inferiority on international economic

issues; and, finally, a complex mixture of wary friendliness and reflexive suspicion, even confrontation, in relations with the United States.

Postwar French foreign policy has probably been most contentious when dealing with the United States, largely because of a resented dependence on a sometimes arrogant or thoughtless superpower. Independence has often been defined essentially in terms of resistance to the United States, an attitude that creates many difficulties in bilateral relations. In the long run, however, its acquisition of a kind of special semi-autonomous status within the Atlantic system has meant that France has not necessarily had to adopt positions of principled intransigence in dealing with the United States, partly because French views and interests are treated with greater deference in Washington and partly because French perspectives are now shared by a Western Europe that seems increasingly "Gaullist" in substance if not in style. Paradoxically, one great accomplishment of Gaullist diplomacy was to lay the foundation for a more mature French-American partnership based on mutual respect rather than resentment and bitterness. Apart from the personalities and politics of particular French and American leaders or governments, it is this respect between a dominant power and a self-assured middle power that is now the basis for relatively good relations between these two countries. The significance of this development is that France no longer seeks or is particularly enthusiastic about occasions for opposing the United States. On the other hand, France remains unique within the West as the only major ally inherently willing to oppose and even antagonize Washington when conflicts of interest and policy warrant such an attitude. It is no longer a case of defiance in principle, as it seemed to be during the Gaullist era, but one of principled defiance when necessary. In this sense, it seems that French-American relations will remain a special category among Western allies.

Focussing on the Substance Beneath the Style

How then can American diplomats hope to deal successfully with France? To the extent that divergent interests and policy aims are at the root of most bilateral conflicts, perhaps the best advice would be for Washington's representatives to take French aims seriously and not let a cultural style impede attempts to understand and

cope with genuine differences in perspective and policy. Americans are understandably annoyed by certain Gaullist traits in French diplomacy, but every effort should be made to understand the substantive disagreements that lurk beneath the style. Such an approach entails greater efforts to understand French intellectual principles and their philosophical approach, so that concrete issues may at least be discussed in similar terms of reference. A common complaint from French diplomats is that Americans are not willing to discuss and debate the ideas and concepts that the French feel may be at stake in a negotiation.

Americans should also be sensitive to the sense of pride and independence that remains a hallmark of French diplomacy and shapes the behavior of individual diplomats. U.S. representatives would do well to avoid either being intimidated by a behavioral style that can verge on arrogance or overreacting to it and thereby escalating conflicts unnecessarily. Instead, one approach could be that adopted by Nixon towards de Gaulle—to offer a certain respect, even deference, to the attitudes and views of a great nation and culture and avoid letting symbolic issues get in the way of the essential interests that unite France and the United States.⁵³ Because the French do have a certain consistency, even predictability, in their foreign policy style, a negotiator is seldom faced with great surprises and should be able to prepare an approach that can work with rather than against this national character. For example, because the French often prefer discrete, personal, bilateral arrangements or discussions to open and multilateral diplomacy, prior and privileged consultations may be useful in handling sensitive issues. On the other hand, because the French can be less adept than other allies at working in multilateral settings, on occasion these forums should offer the United States an advantage over the French. It is also useful to recall that France's inflexible style often masks a tendency to arrive at discrete pragmatic accommodations at later stages of considering an issue, so during conflicts with Paris a negotiator should be careful to leave room for subsequent arrangements of this kind.

Most experienced American diplomats agree that patience and a minimum sensitivity to French stylistic peculiarities will yield the best results in dealing with this country. Curiously enough, the U.S. president who may have best understood this was Lyndon Johnson. During the NATO crisis of 1966, he tempered the vin-

dictiveness of State Department officials because he felt "that the only way to deal with de Gaulle's fervent nationalism was by restraint and patience." Rather than imitate French tactics, Johnson sought to avoid actions that "would only have further enflamed French nationalism and offended French pride." Johnson decided that French and American interests were too close in the long run to indulge in a pale imitation of Gaullist tactics and risk destroying "a friendship firmly rooted in history," so he essentially tried to accommodate Paris while salvaging the core of the relationship for the future.⁵⁴ Because de Gaulle and his successors have held essentially similar views about the value of the relationship to both countries, a policy of restraint, respect, and even a certain distance has helped create a more stable partnership that is crucial to both countries.

NOTES


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EGYPT

A Strong Sense of National Identity

William B. Quandt

Egypt has come into its own as a major actor in international politics during the past thirty years. But Egypt is also the inheritor of an ancient civilization, of an imperial past of its own, and of a more recent period of British domination. One almost needs to be an archeologist to sift through the many layers of Egypt's rich history in order to discover those experiences and continuities that still affect the way in which Egyptian leaders deal with the world around them.

The Egyptian Setting

Egyptians from all backgrounds show intense pride in their country's past. They speak of many thousands of years of continuous recorded history, of Egypt as the cradle of civilization. The key to this unique historical experience has been the agriculture-based society that grew up along the fertile banks of the Nile River. Its distinctive features have been a strong central government, whose existence has often been justified by the need for control over the distribution of the waters of the Nile, and a vast government bureaucracy designed to ensure that the orders of the ruler were transmitted throughout the country.

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These three elements—a sense of national pride and historical continuity, acceptance of the need for a strong ruler, and a highly developed bureaucratic tradition—are essential for understanding the politics of Egypt today, including the way in which Egypt deals with the outside world. Egypt's foreign policy and its conduct of negotiations with its neighbors and with powers outside the region are reflections of a political culture that is distinctive in the Middle East.

The Pharaonic Tradition

Most other Arab countries are less sure of their national identity than is Egypt. Most other Arab regimes have been weak, have suffered from instability, and have found the task of creating political institutions a formidable challenge. Most Arab countries have comparatively short histories as independent states, and their bureaucracies have developed only in recent times, often as pale imitations of former colonial powers. Not so in Egypt. There, an indigenous tradition, rooted in Pharaonic times and developed to meet modern needs by Muhammed Ali Pasha in the nineteenth century, can be drawn upon as Egypt seeks to demonstrate its capacity for leadership in the Middle East.

Egypt is not a particularly easy country for its neighbors or for the rest of the world to understand. The distinctive elements of its past mean that Egypt is often prepared to act strongly and independently in pursuit of its national self-interest. It is less bound than other Arab countries by the need to operate within an Arab or Islamic consensus. It is perfectly natural for Egyptians, with their strong sense of nationalism, to put their own interests first and foremost. At the same time Egypt is part of the Arab world, and its population is predominantly Muslim. Therefore, the themes of pan-Arabism and Islamic solidarity will often compete with Egyptian nationalism in the formation of the country's foreign policy. Which theme will be strongest at any given moment is always difficult to know.

Another element of uncertainty in dealing with Egypt stems from the nature of its leadership. In modern times, Egypt's rulers have had immense authority to set the direction of Egypt's foreign policy. A strong personality like President Gamal Abdel Nasser was able to lead his country into a series of adventures, including a bid

for leadership of the Arab world, confrontation with the state of Israel, and alignment with the Soviet Union. Nasser's successor President Anwar el-Sadat, had little following in the Arab world but his authority within Egypt was such that he was able, in a period of several years, to move toward peace with Israel and alignment with the United States.

The Bureaucratic Tradition

Outsiders often find Egypt difficult to deal with because of the heavy weight of the bureaucratic tradition. It sometimes seems as if bureaucracy in Egypt exists primarily to serve as a counterweight to the strong leader. A Nasser or a Sadat may seek to change the country in fundamental ways, including its foreign policy, but the bureaucracy will always be there as a potential check on the real change that takes place. Of course, much will depend on how deeply involved in an issue the president chooses to be. The less the leader's direct interest, the greater the scope for the bureaucracy to set the policy line.

Bureaucracies by their nature prefer continuity, predictability, and routine. At worst, they sabotage efforts at change, they resist all initiatives, and they seek to perpetuate their own influence regardless of who may be in ostensible positions of power. For non-Egyptians, this causes confusion because the promises of statesmen are often ignored by the self-perpetuating bureaucracy. Bold initiatives may be announced and then nothing will happen. Grandiose development schemes may be proposed, but life goes on unchanged after the bureaucracy has translated these programs into budgets and regulations. Soviet experts, followed by their American counterparts, may seek to transform the Egyptian economy, but in the end it is the Egyptian bureaucrats who seem to win out.

Egypt, then, can be said to operate in its foreign policy under the shadow of two great traditions: first there is the Pharaonic tradition, which allows a strong leader to act without consulting anyone; second is the bureaucratic tradition which insures that any policy, before being implemented, will be tempered, adjusted, modified, and placed back within a pattern of continuity and predictability. The leader can act, and he can certainly promise to act, and bold decisions can readily be made in the Egyptian context. Sharp changes in policy can therefore take place. But at some

point the bureaucracy will be called upon to translate the policies into practice, and it is there that the swing of the pendulum is modulated.

For outsiders, there is a cautionary note in all of this. It is relatively easy to get promises of action from Egyptian leaders, who seem to be independent of the need for consultation or coordination with others in the government. But one cannot rely on words alone, and even the strongest of Egyptian leaders will eventually have to pay attention on occasions to the views of those in the foreign ministry, in the economic ministries, and especially to those in the armed forces. In practice, this means that over any period of time the tendency in Egyptian foreign policy will usually be away from extremes, even though there may be moments when the will of the leader alone seems to be moving the country into uncharted paths. Some of this pattern can be detected by reviewing events of the past three decades.

Egypt's Recent History

Egypt's modern history begins in 1952, at least in terms of Egypt's ability to set its own foreign policy agenda and to negotiate with other governments on an essentially equal footing. It was in that year that the Egyptian revolution succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy and began the process of removing the heavy hand of British influence from Egypt's foreign relations.

In succeeding years, the Egyptian leader, whether it was Nasser or Sadat, was identified with a number of dramatic decisions in foreign policy which seemed to move the country in new directions. There was the Suez Crisis of 1956, prompted by Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. There was the union with Syria in 1958, bringing into existence the United Arab Republic, which lasted a mere three years before its dissolution. There was the June 1967 war with Israel, which set the stage for a new era in Middle East politics. Under Nasser's successor, there was the 1973 war with Israel, which helped to restore a degree of pride to the Egyptians and made it possible for Sadat to enter into peace negotiations with Israel. Finally, under Sadat's leadership, Egypt brought to a conclusion the process of formal reconciliation with Israel, signing the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and a peace treaty in March 1979.

In the course of these dramatic events, the Egyptian leader was sometimes criticized, occasionally challenged, but never was there a massive alienation from either Nasser or Sadat on the part of the elite or the masses. When Pharaoh spoke, that seemed to settle the matter. This was true both when Egypt turned toward the Soviet Union for support in the mid-1950s and when it began to move closer to the United States in the mid-1970s.

The Two Aims of Egyptian Foreign Policy

To understand Egyptian foreign policy, and therefore the environment in which negotiations take place, one must recognize that foreign policy is in part theater. Every Egyptian leader has felt intense frustration in dealing with the internal affairs of the country. The problems of overpopulation, limited resources, deteriorating cities and economic infrastructure have often appeared to be insoluble. Confronted with these grim prospects, Egyptian leaders seem to think of foreign policy in two ways. First, foreign policy can help Egypt to gain access to resources that will ultimately be beneficial for the country's economic development. This may mean alignment with the Soviet Union, cooperation with the oil-rich Arab countries, or better relations with the United States. But the hope in each case is that the relationship with the foreign power will ultimately yield tangible benefits for the Egyptian economy and society.

The second purpose of Egyptian foreign policy, in light of the gloomy domestic situation, is to provide ordinary Egyptians with a sense of pride in their country. When Egypt is seen as playing a role of leadership in the Arab world, this presumably helps enhance the legitimacy of the regime and provides some sense of well-being to the average Egyptian, even though his daily life may not be measurably improved.

On occasions, foreign policy crises help to avert attention from internal problems. It is hard to demonstrate that any Egyptian political leader has consciously instigated foreign policy adventures as a way of shifting attention to the international arena, but certainly all political leaders, not only in Egypt, are aware that external crises can help to tap the reservoirs of nationalism and to rally people around their government.

While public opinion in Egypt is certainly not articulated in

the same ways as in the West, the feelings of the masses of Egyptians are an element in the minds of Egyptian leaders as they conduct their foreign policy and engage in negotiations. Domestic public opinion is sensitive to certain themes—at times the themes of pan-Arabism, at other times Egyptian nationalism, and often to the undercurrent of Islamic sentiment as well. It is relatively easy for an Egyptian leader, in the appropriate circumstances, to rally public opinion against the former colonial powers, the United States, or the Soviet Union. The large powers which have historically dominated parts of the Middle East—including Egypt—are likely to be the special targets of Egyptian opinion when it is mobilized by a charismatic leader. Israel, too, is an attractive target. However, it is not so easy to inflame public opinion about the misdeeds of other Arab regimes or Muslim countries.

When foreign policy is viewed from this perspective—as a means to gain access to resources and to mobilize domestic political support for the regime—it becomes clear that much of what passes for foreign policy is really a reflection of internal Egyptian requirements. President Nasser used to say that he never initiated policies, he simply reacted to events. This was certainly an exaggeration, but to a substantial degree Egypt, in its foreign relations and in its negotiating behavior, has been reacting to events that are beyond its control. Some of those events are domestic in origin, while others grow out of the regional and broader international contexts.

A Propensity to Take Risks

Nonetheless, Egyptian leaders have also shown themselves capable of sudden, often bold, moves in the regional and international environment. It is this that sets them apart from most other leaders in the region. Innovation in foreign policy, a propensity to take risks, has marked Egyptian foreign policy behavior. Examples of such cases are Suez, the 1973 war, and President Sadat's surprising visit in November 1977 to Jerusalem. None of these, strictly speaking, can be simply termed reactions to either domestic or regional events. They show the other side of Egyptian policy, namely the capacity of the leader to break out of the normal mode and to surprise his colleagues and the world with his decisions.

No clear dividing line can be drawn between the broad arena of Egyptian foreign policy and the narrowly defined process of

negotiations. Many of the bold initiatives taken by Egyptian leaders were designed to set the stage for negotiations. In the case of the 1973 war, Sadat was trying to change the strategic balance, restore Egyptian pride, and engage the United States. Once these ambitious goals had been essentially achieved, he was prepared to begin negotiations with Israel through the mediation of the United States.

Similarly, Sadat's decision to go to Jerusalem was aimed largely at Israeli public opinion. Sadat seemed to be convinced that no progress in negotiations could be made until the "psychological barrier," as he called it, that divided Egypt and Israel was lowered. His trip to Jerusalem did, in fact, help to change Israeli public opinion, as well as American. Once Sadat was convinced that the atmosphere had changed, he was prepared to resume negotiations with Israel, although the process proved to be much more difficult and time consuming than he had anticipated.

What is missing in this portrait of Egyptian foreign policy and negotiating styles is a sense of long-term strategy, with persistent, steady steps designed to achieve well-defined results. Since Egyptian foreign policy tends to be made by the president of the country, it has a somewhat quixotic and personalistic side to it. Leaders need not consult with their colleagues before setting out on new courses, and, when they do, it is often a very informal process. Personal relations with the leader will always count for more than institutional affiliation. Unwelcome advice is rarely offered and is poorly received. Frequent reshuffling of cabinets prevents strong individuals with institutional bases of support from emerging. The president and his clique of the moment are all important. This means that negotiators are not kept informed of what their leader is thinking. It is not uncommon that lengthy negotiations with some part of the bureaucracy will be preempted by a sudden move on the part of the leader.

The National Character: The Weight of History

Egyptian leaders who represent their country in negotiations are products of a society in which certain historical memories combine to create something approximating a specific Egyptian pattern. Egyptians, with their strong sense of national pride, have identified a series of events in their recent past that serve as guideposts in the conduct of their foreign policy.

The Memory of British Control

One of the most vivid memories, or historical lessons, stems from the period of British control over Egypt, a period that lasted from the late nineteenth century up until the mid-1950s. British rule over Egypt fell into a typical colonial pattern, although some Egyptian institutions were allowed a degree of autonomy. The period of British rule is associated with loss of control over the economy, with foreign bases, with frequent interference in internal political affairs, and with virtually complete control over Egypt's foreign policy. At times, the Egyptian monarchy was viewed as a handmaiden of the British, and this was one of the reasons that it lost legitimacy during the early part of this century.

The memory lives on that foreign rule was humiliating for Egypt, was disastrous for its economy, and resulted in national subjugation as symbolized by foreign bases on Egyptian soil. These memories show up today whenever discussions arise over the possibility of establishing foreign bases in Egypt. The Soviets were insensitive to this concern in the late 1960s and early 1970s and paid dearly for their mistake. In the late 1970s Americans ran into the same adamant refusal of the Egyptians to consider any form of American base rights that might be seen as limiting Egyptian sovereignty.

Another memory associated with this period involves intervention in the Egyptian economy. The British occupation of Egypt, after all, began ostensibly in order to reform the economy so that late-nineteenth century European creditors could be repaid. Today, when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the State Department seem to be telling the Egyptians how to run their economy so that they will be able to pay off their vast foreign debts, these historical memories come back to the surface quite readily. Above all, these past experiences make Egyptians suspicious of large foreign powers, whether they be European, American, or Soviet.

The Fear of Another "Suez"

A second, and more recent, historical memory stems from the dramatic events of 1956, generally called the Suez Crisis. As the Egyptians typically describe this period, President Nasser was seeking to shake off British control of the country and had nearly completed negotiations to close the large British military base at

Suez. The Americans had hinted that economic assistance would be made available to Egypt in the form of financing for construction of a high dam at Aswan if only Egypt would be cooperative in the search for a settlement of the conflict with Israel and would reach an equitable settlement with the British. By early 1956, the Americans were disillusioned with the Nasser regime, particularly in light of the growing military relationship between Cairo and Moscow. In addition, secret talks with Israel came to an end, and shortly thereafter the Americans withdrew their offer to help finance the high dam at Aswan. Nasser reacted sharply in the summer of 1956 by announcing that he would nationalize the Suez Canal and use its revenues for Egypt's internal development.

Over the next several months, the British, the French, and the Israelis, largely behind the back of the American government, came together with a plan to topple Nasser from power. The result was an Israeli strike in Sinai in late October 1956, which had the prior approval of both Britain and France, although these two countries sought to present themselves as intermediaries, offering to intervene only to protect the Suez Canal from the effects of the conflict between Israel and Egypt. This was a transparent ploy to dissociate England and France from the Israeli attack, but the Egyptians immediately saw that they were the victims of a "tripartite aggression." Ever since 1956, Egyptians have lived with the fear that external powers would collude against them to intervene in their internal affairs. Israel was widely viewed in subsequent years as collaborating with Western powers to keep Egypt weak and off-balance. This memory of collusion and intervention and of a preemptive Israeli attack is still vivid in the memories of many Egyptians, and it was the Suez Crisis that brought Nasser to the peak of his popularity in the Arab World.

The 1967 War—A Sense of Entrapment

The June 1967 war left a more complicated legacy in the minds of Egyptians. Many will now acknowledge that Egypt made mistakes in the handling of the crisis that eventually led to the June 1967 war. But even strong critics of President Nasser believe that there was an element of entrapment. Some might point the finger at the Soviet Union, which apparently passed false information to the Egyptians concerning Israel's plans to mobilize. Others would

point to the Americans, who apparently promised the Egyptians that Israel would not attack for some period of time. A few might blame the United Nations for responding to President Nasser's request for a withdrawal of U.N. forces in a manner and on a scale which had not been envisaged in previous discussions.

Finally, there is the all-pervasive view that the Israelis were seeking an opportunity to strike Egypt and were clever enough to lure Nasser into their trap. So the fear of entrapment—the sense that Egypt is weak and can be manipulated by outside forces who are strong and clever—is still part of the recent historical memory. It is consistent with a theme in the culture that tends to believe in conspiracies and which places little value on ostensible facts and seeks instead to look at the real forces at work behind the scenes. The combination of these beliefs, that Egypt was the victim of collusion in 1956 and of entrapment in 1967, tends to reinforce the culture of conspiracy that pervades thinking about foreign policy and negotiations in Egypt, as it does in much of the Arab world.

The 1973 October War—Honor Restored

Offsetting the legacies of Suez and the 1967 war was the October 1973 confrontation with Israel. This is widely seen by Egyptians as a conflict that was forced upon Egypt in order to remind the world that the Middle East problem needed urgent attention. This was not a war that Egypt fought for conquest. Rather it was a war designed to change political perceptions. In the process, Egypt restored its national honor by regaining some of its territory and by avoiding defeat.

The sense that the 1973 war restored Egypt's honor had a powerful impact on its capacity to enter into negotiations with Israel. By declaring victory in 1973, despite the near defeat on the ground, President Sadat was able to convince his countrymen that the next phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be fought out by diplomacy. And over the next six years, Sadat became the leading champion in Egypt and in the Arab world of relying on the United States to promote an honorable peace settlement with Israel.

This concept of honor is deep in Arab culture, and one should not underestimate how important it was for the Egyptian political leadership to be able to claim credibly that honor had been restored before negotiations were undertaken. Had the 1973 war

ended differently, had the Egyptian Third Army been humiliated, it is hard to imagine that Sadat would have easily engaged in negotiations with Israel leading ultimately to a peace settlement. Honor is still a strong theme in Egyptian thinking about the conflict with Israel. Egyptians will frequently argue that the Palestinians and the Jordanians and the Syrians cannot easily negotiate if they are constantly being humiliated, if they are always reminded of their weakness. In the aftermath of the Camp David negotiations, the Egyptians were persistent in arguing with the Israelis that they should make some gesture in the direction of the Palestinians that would allow their adversaries to regain some self-esteem. Only then, the Egyptians argued, could the Palestinians and other Arabs accept Israel's existence as a fact and enter into peace negotiations.

A Cold Peace with Israel

The most recent historical memory for the Egyptians is an ambivalent one, and that is the legacy of Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Here Egyptians are torn between different elements of their own identity. In Egyptian national terms, the peace treaty with Israel was acceptable and necessary. Egyptian land was recovered, Egyptian resources came back under control of the government, and Egypt was spared from the threat of further wars with Israel. But Egypt's identification with the broader Arab and Islamic world leads to a feeling of ambivalence about the results of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Egyptians are sensitive to the charge that they made a separate peace with Israel that sold out the interests of the Palestinians. They are angry that Israel seemed to become more aggressive in its dealings with other Arab countries after the peace treaty with Egypt. This made it difficult for Egypt to claim that its peace with Israel had a moderating effect on Israel's behavior toward others in the region.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was a particular point of contention, and Egypt felt obliged to demonstrate its unhappiness with that war by withdrawing its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Egyptians seem to feel ambivalent about Sadat's major foreign policy achievement. Few would want to see Egypt return to belligerency with Israel, but many feel that the peace that has been achieved is not the peace that they had hoped for. As a result, Egypt has not paid much heed to some of the provisions of the peace

treaty that envisaged normal relations between Egypt and Israel in the spheres of trade, tourism, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Egyptians may feel that peace serves their interests, but they are willing to live with a cold peace rather than make the effort necessary to improve relations with Israel while Israel continues to be in a state of confrontation with its other Arab neighbors. Although the dispute over Taba, a small speck of land in Sinai, was ultimately resolved through negotiation, the process took several years and could only be settled in the end by a summit meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Even then, the United States had to weigh in with considerable pressure to get the Egyptians to modify their position.

The Negotiators: The Role of the Foreign Ministry Professionals

In addition to concentrating on the role of leaders and their typical styles of conducting negotiations, one must also look at the role of the foreign ministry professionals in Egypt. Egypt, unlike other Arab countries, has a very large and professional foreign ministry. There are Egyptian diplomats who have acquired great experience representing their country, and their views are taken seriously in the shaping and conduct of foreign policy. There is a bureaucracy which has kept a record of Egypt's past involvement in regional and international affairs. There are dozens of well-trained lawyers, both in the French and Anglo-American traditions, who can draft endless proposals and options for the foreign ministry to consider. This is a paper-heavy bureaucracy, where lengthy proposals can be generated with no difficulty.

The problem with the foreign ministry has typically been two-fold. Because of the extraordinary power of the Egyptian president, it is never clear to those who deal with Egyptians what role they should ascribe to the foreign ministry and its officials. On many occasions, it was apparent that Nasser and Sadat paid little attention to the professional bureaucrats. They did not always keep them informed, certainly not when they were considering bold initiatives. Nonetheless, at some point, the foreign ministry officials would inevitably become involved, whether in drafting agreements or in

carrying out some phase of negotiations, so they could not be entirely ignored by foreigners, even if they often seemed to lack the confidence of their own leaders.

Because of the ambiguous status of the foreign policy professionals in Egypt, foreigners have often been tempted to develop back-channel relations with the presidency, and this has sometimes been encouraged by the Egyptians themselves. Private emissaries, sometimes from the intelligence services, sometimes from the private sector, have frequently handled the most sensitive business for the Egyptian president, leaving the foreign ministry essentially in the dark. For outsiders, it is often difficult to know precisely with whom they should be dealing on which issues. Who is in the picture, and who is out? Who is in favor, and who is no longer among the chosen? A great deal of time must be devoted to answering these questions, and the Cairo gossip mills are filled with reports of who is up and who is down, of who has access to the president and who does not. The coterie around the president is likely to be much more important than the officials in the foreign ministry. Not surprisingly, Sadat, who tended to ignore his ministers, was faced with resignations by two of his foreign ministers. For a foreigner seeking to negotiate with the Egyptians, it is often hard to reach the president, and even harder to know who else is worth talking to.

Negotiating Strategies and Tactics

In trying to assess the ingredients that go into shaping a distinctive Egyptian negotiating style, one must always ask how much stems from the personalities of the specific individuals who have been in charge of Egypt's political life, and how much is more characteristically Egyptian. Strategies in foreign policy often seem to be set by the man at the top, but negotiating tactics reflect deeper cultural themes.

In modern times, Egypt has been governed by only three men, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar el-Sadat, and now Hosni Mubarak. Of the three, Nasser certainly fit the model of a charismatic leader, able to appeal to the masses, a larger than life-size figure who evoked a strong response from the Egyptian public, as well as in the wider Arab world. Sadat had little of the same appeal

either in Egypt or in the Arab world, but he was nonetheless a strong leader when it came to foreign policy.

Mubarak, who came to power after Sadat's assassination in October 1981, has not yet left a distinctive mark on Egypt's foreign policy. He has pursued a cautious approach to decisions, moving slowly, taking few risks, gradually modifying some of the positions that Sadat had taken, but not breaking entirely with the Sadat legacy. It may be a matter of personality, or style, or political circumstances, but Mubarak seems to play the role of president quite differently from the way in which Nasser or Sadat did.

Regardless of who has been president of Egypt, however, there are two strong and sometimes competing models of how best to negotiate. The man at the top may set the strategic policy, but the way it is reflected in the conduct of diplomacy and negotiations may have more to do with traditions that grow out of centuries of experience. Simply stated, the two dominant modes of negotiating can be described as the *suq* model, marked by the bargaining and haggling typical of the marketplace; and the tribal model, reflecting the way in which Bedouin tribes historically resolved their disputes through a combination of posturing, ritualized confrontation, lofty rhetoric, mediation, and face-saving arrangements that would allow both parties to save honor.

The Suq Model of Negotiation

The *suq* model is familiar to anyone with a passing acquaintance with the Middle East. To some extent, it is a stereotype, but like many stereotypes it contains elements of truth. In the marketplace, elaborate rituals surround transactions. No one expects to enter the marketplace with a fixed price in mind to make a straightforward financial transaction. Instead, there should be a preliminary period of discussing issues that go well beyond the transaction that is contemplated. This involves a ritual of establishing a personal relationship. Once that has been accomplished, often after endless cups of coffee and tea, the actual bargaining can begin. The seller will start with a much higher price than he expects to achieve, and part of the game is to work toward a compromise position. Both parties probably know how much of a compromise is acceptable to them at the outset, but neither wants to reveal his final position too

soon. Typically, haggling will go on for some time, both parties may threaten to break off the process, both will engage in a whole series of maneuvers to find out the real bottom line of the other party, and in the end a deal is likely to be struck that will allow both parties to feel satisfaction. Alternatively, the process may seem to drag on indefinitely, a sign that the Egyptian side is not ready for a deal but does not want to bear the onus for breaking off negotiations. This happened when the United States was negotiating for access to a base at Ras Banas. The Egyptians did not want to meet the American conditions but also were reluctant to offend their new benefactor by saying so bluntly. The negotiations ended only when the American side forced the issue.

Those who engage in negotiations along these lines can be expected to start with opening positions that are quite far from the positions that they expect to accept when the negotiations have reached an end. Since the haggling can be somewhat undignified, the leader himself may stay out of the direct line of bargaining, leaving it to foreign ministers or other officials to start the process. But it is important to bear in mind that the asking price is not the same as the final price of settlement and that there is an expectation that the process will go on for some time, during which a personal relationship will be established. At the end of the process, both sides should feel good about the transaction because they will presumably wish to do business on some future occasion. The final moves toward agreement will probably be made at the highest level and will be made to appear as significant concessions. These should be reciprocated.

Americans are often impatient with this model of negotiations. They feel that time is wasted in the preliminaries; they do not appreciate the fine art of haggling. They see insincerity on the part of the party who begins negotiations by asking for something which is clearly unrealistic. Americans tend toward greater legalism and rely more heavily on written documents than is desirable according to the *suq* model. Nonetheless, American diplomats who have worked in the Middle East over a prolonged period have come to learn to accept the inevitability of negotiating along these lines on some occasions. However, they rarely do so with great skill, and their unwillingness to play the game is often frustrating for their Egyptian and other Arab counterparts.

The Bedouin Model

A second model which sometimes characterizes Egyptian negotiations could be described as the tribal or Bedouin approach to matters including honor. When tribes have fought and blood has been shed, it is inappropriate to bring the parties together directly in order to achieve a reconciliation. According to this model, an intermediary needs to be found who can gain the trust of both sides and can help bring them toward some form of reconciliation. The honor of both parties must be kept uppermost in the mind of the intermediary. Face-saving is more important than the details of the reconciliation. Hagglng, or the model of the suq, is entirely inappropriate. Instead, gestures of generosity are relied upon to change the atmosphere in the negotiations, and it is the job of the intermediary to be sure that if such gestures are made, they will be reciprocated.

The point in this style of negotiation is to let the intermediary explore positions carefully before either party is required to make any clear commitment. Once the intermediary has done his job, the parties to the conflict will be expected to come together, to make the agreed-upon moves, perhaps accompanied by flowery language and generous offers, and thereby to declare the conflict to be resolved. The intermediary in such cases can expect to be well rewarded. This is not a common pattern of state-to-state negotiations, but there are some elements of the Arab-Israeli negotiations, and particularly in Sadat's approach to the conflict, which reflect this style of thinking.

Guidelines for U.S. Negotiators

From this analysis, one can detect several broad themes in Egyptian foreign policy which almost certainly will be reflected in any negotiations that Egypt engages in. First, Egypt is very sensitive about its national independence. Anything that appears to infringe upon Egypt's sovereignty, or which could be construed as interference in Egypt's internal affairs, will be strongly resisted. Egyptians are sensitive about these matters and will cling to the symbolism of nonalignment, even when in fact they are prepared to cooperate quite closely with one or another of the world's major

powers. No outside power, including the United States, should expect that Egypt will allow its sovereignty or self-esteem to be infringed upon willingly.

The second characteristic of Egypt's foreign policy is its search for a role that goes beyond merely reflecting or protecting its own interests as defined in narrow terms. Egyptians, by and large, see for their country a significant role in the Middle East, in the Arab world, in the Islamic world, in Africa, and in the Third World. They were proud of the fact that their country, along with India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and China, was instrumental in forging the nonaligned movement. They take pride in the fact that Egypt counts for something in world affairs. They are reluctant to see Egypt reduced to the stature of just another overpopulated, impoverished Third-World country. They fear that if they have no larger role in the region, they will not be accorded the respect and the assistance to which they feel entitled.

All of this means that the Egyptians will be difficult for outsiders to deal with in negotiations. Their pride and their sense of nationalism make them extremely sensitive to how they are treated by powerful foreign countries. The recent historical experience of the country inclines Egyptians to the view that they are the target of pressures and collusion. The culture in which they live is one where conspiracy is never far from the minds of the sophisticated political elite. This places a special premium on developing good personal relations in a negotiation with one's Egyptian counterpart. Friendship, sincerity, good humor, and hospitality are greatly appreciated. Sarcasm, rudeness, and impatience are sure to bring out the worst suspicions on the Egyptian side.

In addition, Egypt conducts negotiations on a number of different levels. One may encounter the extremely legalistic, sometimes rigid, approach of the foreign ministry professionals. On this level, there may seem to be a posture of obstructionism in the name of international legal norms. It is often hard to know whether documents that have been drafted by the foreign policy professionals are meant to be taken seriously, particularly when the political leadership seems to show little interest in them. Letters that arrive in the name of the Egyptian president are inevitably analyzed to determine if they seem to reflect his real views or those of the foreign

ministry professionals who probably drafted them. If the latter, there is a tendency to discount the views, even when they are perhaps reflective of the views of the man in charge.

In dealing with the Egyptian president, foreigners may find themselves surprised by the speed with which positions may change. An Egyptian president is not obliged to consult widely or to operate within a clear consensus and can therefore shift positions quickly, provided that he can explain to his people that he is doing so in pursuit of Egypt's larger national interests. If he can hold out the promise of restoring Egypt's pride, or of solving Egypt's chronic economic problems, he will be supported in his foreign policy initiative. As a result, summit meetings can pay off. Decisions can be made. Indeed, sometimes only a summit will serve to bring negotiations to a successful end, as in the Camp David Accords.


Americans dealing with Egypt will also have to know when they are engaged in a typical bargaining process, with all of the unfamiliar characteristics of haggling in the suq, and when they are dealing with matters of honor that are not so susceptible to traditional bargaining. If these distinctions can be understood, then negotiators have a reasonable chance of reaching agreements with their Egyptian counterparts whenever substantive interests overlap. Egypt's record of compliance with agreements that it has entered into has been reasonably good.

The process, then, of negotiating with the Egyptians, is likely to be difficult, but Egypt is a nation-state with a sense of history and continuity. Therefore, agreements entered into are viewed as serious matters, and leaders who make a commitment are likely to be able to count on the support of the Egyptian elite and the Egyptian population at large.

This means that Egypt can be an important actor in regional affairs and is capable of conducting a comparatively complex and sophisticated foreign policy. But for Americans who entertain great hopes of forging an American-Egyptian alliance, for example, there are many reasons for caution and doubt. First and foremost, Egypt is still suspicious of sustained involvement with powerful outside countries. Its recent experience has been negative in that regard, and all major outside powers are considered suspicious. To Americans, this may be reassuring, in that it puts some limits on how far Egypt is ever likely to go in rebuilding its ties with the Soviet Union. But

at the same time, it suggests that U.S.-Egyptian relations in the years ahead will be difficult.

If this is so, skillful negotiators on both sides can help to limit the damage that will be done to the relationship, but in the end it will be the substance of policies more than the style of the negotiators that will determine the course of U.S.-Egyptian relations. Diplomacy and the art of negotiations, after all, are means toward an end, not substitutes for strategic planning or an understanding of national interests. Skillful negotiators are needed, but they are not a substitute for skillful policymakers.



MEXICO

A Love-Hate Relationship with North America

George W. Grayson

The Mexican Setting

Anti-Americanism

On the spot where the Aztecs once offered throbbing human hearts to appease left-handed Hummingbird, their war god, the Mexican government opened a National Museum of Interventions in September 1981. The facility's seventeen rooms, joined by red-tiled corridors, contain photographs, documents, and memorabilia revealing the slights, indignities, incursions, forays, invasions, and occupations suffered by Mexico at the hands of foreigners since the country declared its independence in 1810.

The Spanish ruled Mexico for 300 years, and Napoleon III dispatched French troops who occupied the nation for five years in the mid-nineteenth century. Yet, the unmistakable focus of the museum is on North American activities in a manner termed "a blend of anti-Americanism and bruised dignity."¹

The first room prominently displays the Monroe Doctrine, as well as comments of José Manuel Zozaya, Mexico's first ambassador to Washington. "The arrogance of those republicans does not

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allow them to see us as equals but as inferiors. With time they will become our sworn enemies," the envoy observed. Maps and commentaries describe "Jefferson's expansionism" and the U.S. determination to conquer the west "at Mexico's expense." Cartoons and engravings recall the 1847 occupation of Mexico by the U.S. Army, led by General Winfield Scott.

The war has long receded in the memory of Americans, whose attention is riveted on the present and future. For Mexicans, an indelible scar of "virulent, almost pathological Yankeephobia"² remains from the wound of defeat and humiliation produced by what is officially known as "the war of the North American invasion."³ Resentment in the Deep South toward the military phase of Reconstruction provides the closest American analogy to the bitterness so deeply etched on the Mexicans' psyche. For Mexicans, however, occupation was followed by the permanent loss of land to a foreign country that had aided and abetted the hostilities. To add insult to injury, the lost territory encompassed Sutter's Fort in California where, one year after the war's conclusion, prospectors discovered the gold that would help finance the U.S. industrial revolution.

"U.S. meddling" in the Mexican revolution commands a great deal of space in the museum. Fading brown photographs depict U.S. Marines seizing the gulf port of Veracruz in 1914. And other exhibits turn Pancho Villa, a feared and despised marauder, into a revolutionary hero because of General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing's punitive expedition to capture him.

This is "not a place to stress our losses," stated Gaston García Cantú, director of the National Institute of Anthropology and History and the moving force behind the museum. "No country can afford to lose its historic memory. People must understand what happened and why." Many Mexican intellectuals believe that the museum is especially appropriate at this time because of renewed U.S. military intervention in the Caribbean basin.⁴

As revealed by the museum, anti-Americanism in Mexico predates that in any other developing nation. It became evident when the United States annexed Texas; was exacerbated by the Mexican-American war; manifested itself during the revolutionary upheaval early in this century; increased in response to the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938; reappeared when Washington applied diplomatic, economic, and political pressures on Fidel Castro's regime; and intensified in the 1970s, following both the dis-

covery of rich oil and natural gas deposits in southeastern Mexico and militant U.S. opposition to revolutionary movements in Central America and the Caribbean. According to historian Stanley R. Ross, Mexicans perceive their relationship with the United States as one shaped by "armed conflict, military invasion, and economic and cultural penetration."⁵

This perception produces a love-hate relationship between the United States and Mexico. Mexican leaders admire the economic development, high standard of living, and political stability of their northern neighbor. Yet, as evidenced in exhibits dominating the National Museum of Interventions, they deplore U.S. involvement in their affairs. This legacy of interference often sparks Mexican accusations that either U.S. government entities such as the Central Intelligence Agency or U.S.-based multinational corporations are responsible for the ills that befall their country.

Seldom is evidence considered a necessary prerequisite to level such charges against "ubiquitous" and "omnipotent" presumed agents of intervention. For instance, in mid-1980 Mexican officials and newspapers had a field day accusing the United States of stealing rain by diverting hurricanes from Mexico's shores. The villain was the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, whose hurricane-hunter aircraft had allegedly intercepted a storm named "Ignacio" off Mexico's Pacific coast in October, 1979, thereby contributing to the country's worst drought in two decades.* Mexican observers, including the director of the country's National Meteorological Service, apparently believed that Yankee ingenuity was so great that Uncle Sam could bend Mother Nature to his will.⁶

National Defensiveness

The putative power of the United States inspires a defensive attitude among Mexicans who find themselves across the negotiating table from Americans. "How will these intrepid gringos next

* The U.S. embassy claimed that flights into the storm, which had been authorized by the Mexican government, were made only to record Ignacio's temperature and other vital signs. Without contradicting this explanation, Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda barred U.S. hurricane-hunters from Mexico's airstrips during the summer, until a thorough investigation of the matter was completed.

take advantage of us?" seems to be the question uppermost in their minds. Insecurity prompts Mexican officials, alternately, to bluster or bargain, always in their inimitable style. A case in point took place under the administration of Luis Echeverría Alvarez (1970–1976) whose representatives pressed Ambassador John J. Jova on removing the American cemetery in Mexico City. The facility held the remains of U.S. combatants killed in the Mexican War. And, apparently, their presence, even in death, constituted a perceived insult to Mexican sovereignty. As a result, Jova was told in so many words: "The cemetery must go!" His pointing out that the French were not being asked to remove their cemetery made no impact—probably because Mexico had ousted Napoleon III's blue-caped troops and executed Archduke Maximilian of Austria, the French-imposed "emperor" of the country.

Once the Mexicans reached the height of intractability, the astute Jova suggested that he simply "couldn't listen to any more talk" of disinterring bodies because to do so would be "ignoble and dishonorable." Besides, such an act would incite resounding protests from the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and other patriotic groups, thereby harming U.S.-Mexican relations. Ultimately, a compromise was reached: the cemetery remained—with a superfluous part of the grounds sold to Mexico for a public works project.⁷

Mexico's inherent misgivings about the United States also give rise to "scapegoating." A prime example of this took place in 1982. Amid an economic crisis that was largely of his own making, President José López Portillo appealed to his country not to stand with open arms and allow Mexico to be bled dry, gutted, and eaten away. He said that the Mexican "nation cannot work and be organized only to have its life blood drained off by the gravitational pull of the colossus of the north."⁸

The Myth of the All-Powerful President

Mexico's decision-making process can only be described as labyrinthine. Nevertheless, all of the paths that snake through the maze lead to the president. Of the chief executive, a veteran observer of Mexican affairs wrote:

Mexico's political stability has rested on the myth that the President is all-powerful. It is itself a powerful myth, believed

by most Mexicans and sustained by those who know it to be untrue. Like the Divine Right of Kings and the infallibility of the Pope, it maintains the mystery of the office. The President is, after all, the heir to a pre-Hispanic tradition of theocratic authoritarianism that was enormously reinforced by the political centralism and religious dogmatism of the Spanish Colony. Submission to each President therefore provides continuity to the system. And because the myth reflects the traditional need of Mexicans to believe in some unifying symbol of power, the incumbent is largely above public criticism: he is too important a focus of security and stability to be openly challenged.⁹

The Mexican leader's Olympian position in his nation's political system does not mean that he is always above public reproach. The mercurial behavior of Echeverría (1970–1976), the flagrant corruption associated with López Portillo (1976–1982), and the indecisiveness of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982–1988) have exposed the office to scathing criticism, often in the form of jokes told by a people for whom humor provides an outlet for their frustrations. A favorite target of this humor is graft. According to one popular story, after President de la Madrid took office in December 1982, a senior government official opened up the country's coffers for the first time. Finding only 70,000 pesos, then approximately \$466, he frantically called his predecessor. "There are 70,000 pesos left," the officials screamed into the telephone. "What happened?" "I don't know," replied the former bureaucrat. "We must have forgotten them."¹⁰

Even though the popularity of the presidency has declined, the incumbent still enjoys enormous power from his vantage point at the apex of a highly authoritarian regime. He can make or break the career of any diplomat or other Mexican representative whose actions can brighten or tarnish the presidential image. Hence, Mexico's negotiators seek to achieve results that will ingratiate them with the chief executive. Satisfying their superior, the Congress, the media, or public opinion is infinitely less important than currying favor in the Los Pinos presidential palace.

National Characteristics

Until the 1970s, for Mexico "foreign policy" meant relations with the United States, whose cooperation, if not goodwill,

was crucial to its neighbor's well-being. The oil bonanza impelled a move to diversify Mexico's international portfolio—with emphasis on attracting fresh sources of investment capital, entering into new diplomatic arrangements, and finding a variety of customers for the country's exports, two-thirds of which traditionally have been shipped north of the Rio Grande. Rhetoric notwithstanding, efforts toward diversification proceeded in a manner designed to preserve the cornerstone of Mexican foreign policy, that is, a correct, if not cordial, relationship with Washington. In general, maintaining this relationship takes precedence over the details of a particular negotiation.

Fondness for Lofty Principles in International Affairs

Nonetheless, Mexican diplomats have shown a fondness for embracing lofty principles in international affairs. Indeed, countries often define their distinctive position in regional or world politics in terms of a "national-role conception." This idea, as elaborated by theorist K.J. Holsti, embraces "the policy makers' definition of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state and of the functions their state should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings."¹¹ As such, it is the "image" of the appropriate relationship of their state toward the external environment.

A thorough examination of statements by national leaders in 71 countries in the 1965-1967 period furnishes evidence of at least 17 role conceptions. Typical of these is "Defender of the Faith," as articulated by President John F. Kennedy. He said, "We are still the keystone in the arch of freedom and I think we will continue to do, as we have done in the past, our duty. Let every nation know . . . that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty."¹² Another prominent role is that of "Faithful Ally." For instance, in 1967 Premier Pierre Werner indicated that Luxembourg, "too small to defend itself by its own means, . . . has integrated itself with a larger collectivity. Our fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance and our European convictions constitute the base of our foreign policy."¹³ Historically, Mexican leaders have considered their country a "Repository of Moral Values." Specifically, they have championed the sovereignty of states, noninterference in the affairs

of others, the equality of nations, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Devotion to these precepts represents a reaction to manifold interventions in their domestic affairs, particularly by the United States. The petroleum boom emboldened Mexico to adopt still another role, that of "Regional Leader." In playing this role, it helped capsize the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, offered generous diplomatic and economic assistance to the revolutionary Sandinista government that emerged, joined Venezuela in an imaginative oil-loan plan known as the San Jose Accord, and became an energetic member of the Contadora Group.

The soaring petroleum prices reinforced the emphasis on ideological principles, giving rise to fierce haggling over details. Nowhere was such dickering more evident than in negotiations with the United States over the sale of natural gas. Mexico's asking price was \$2.76 per thousand cubic feet (mcf), a figure equivalent to that paid for a comparable energy source, No. 2 fuel oil delivered in New York harbor. As a regional leader committed to equal treatment of all countries, how could Mexico accept less than the world price for its patrimony, especially from the United States? To do so would be unfair, immoral, and demeaning. Yet, in December, 1977, the Carter Administration turned thumbs down on the daily purchase of 2 million mcf at the requested rate. Secretary of Energy James R. Schlesinger delivered the bad news to the Mexicans in a manner considered abrupt and arrogant.

Mexico reacted swiftly and with self-righteous fury to the collapsed discussions. President López Portillo averred that he had been left "hanging by his paintbrush" when Schlesinger knocked over the ladder—a phrase more clever than accurate in light of the repeated warnings of potential pricing problems by U.S. officials. Still, Mexican journalists, intellectuals, and politicians vented their collective anger at the U.S. cabinet member. One of the most undiplomatic statements came from the country's chief diplomat: "Schlesinger is a liar," said Santiago Roel García, "and you can quote me on that."¹⁴

Clearly the Mexicans tended to see the U.S. political system as a mirror image of their own. Inured to presidential dominance at home, they could not comprehend how the bureaucracy or legislative branch might thwart a natural gas accord if the American *líder máximo* sincerely wanted it, as he claimed. "They thought that

Carter could wave a magic wand and the deal would go through,"¹⁵ confided Robert A. Pastor, a member of the staff of the National Security Council with responsibility for Latin America. However, it was politically impossible for the U.S. president to approve a contract on Mexico's terms when, during the fall of 1977, he was strenuously lobbying Congress on legislation to decontrol domestic gas prices, many of which were far below \$2.76 per mcf.

Only after Carter visited López Portillo in February 1979 was the political climate such that negotiations could recommence. In April a U.S. delegation headed by Julius L. Katz, assistant secretary of state for economic and business affairs, and Harry Bergold, assistant secretary of energy for international affairs, arrived in Mexico City to resume talks.¹⁶ Haggling over the selling price stretched out for five months—eight sessions—before an understanding was reached. Ultimately, the Mexicans consented to a compromise at \$3.625 per mcf—an amount well below the more than \$6.00 per mcf the United States would have been paying in 1980 had it accepted the 1977 terms, linking the price to No. 2 fuel oil.¹⁷ The accord came only after the White House made clear that a López Portillo-Carter Washington summit, scheduled for late September 1979, could be cancelled for want of a gas deal to announce. The Mexican leader eagerly looked forward to a successful trip, both because of the enormous publicity that would attend a meeting with his North American counterpart and because, while in the United States, he planned to unveil to the U.N. General Assembly Mexico's "World Energy Plan" for preventing an international conflict arising from petroleum shortages.

Pragmatism in the Face of Harsh Economic Reality

In early 1981 a shift from a sellers' market for oil to one favoring buyers devastated Mexico's economy. A consequence is that the fixation on ideologically-motivated principles, accompanied by intense bargaining over fine points, has given way to more pragmatism. For instance, evolving energy conditions produced a persisting surfeit of gas in the United States. This situation led to a cut-back in purchases before Mexico, under pressure to reduce prices from Border Gas, its U.S. customer, suspended deliveries on November 1, 1984. *Petróleos Mexicanos* (Pemex), the state monopoly, concluded that it would be more cost effective to divert the 180,000

mcf, then exported, to domestic consumption, thereby freeing up for sale abroad some 30,000 barrels per day of fuel oil. Mexico made this decision in a business-like fashion after consulting Border Gas, which—in turn—kept the Departments of Energy and State abreast of the situation. The public announcement, issued routinely, was devoid of the rhetorical pyrotechnics sparked by the December 1977 breakdown in negotiations. The fall in oil prices is closely correlated with a decline in emotional negotiating tactics because Mexico realizes how important U.S. public and private entities are to its economic recovery.

The Importance of Personal Relationships

Personal relationships are immensely important to Mexicans. In foreign policy matters, they prefer to establish rapport with senior U.S. officials. Their goals are to nurture a mutual confidence, engage in unpublicized, informal discussions, and seek solutions to particular problems. Thus, the Mexican foreign minister likes to be able to meet with or phone the secretary of state; the finance minister seeks ties with the treasury secretary and the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; and middle-range officials relish the cultivation of similar contacts with their U.S. counterparts. While more prevalent in the López Portillo Administration, "closet diplomacy" continues,¹⁸ although the presence of John Gavin as a strong ambassador in Mexico City until May 1986, assured that he would authorize, participate in, or at least be kept informed of any high-level communications.

Informal meetings are important to the Mexicans as revealed by the success of the Bilateral Energy Consultation Group (BECG), which helps promote understanding in Mexican-U.S. energy relations. Modeled after a highly successful joint U.S.-Canadian commission, the BECG was created in 1983 as a forum for discussions between American and Mexican specialists. These conversations have taken place twice annually since their inception, with meetings held alternatively in Mexico City and Washington.

The American contingent is small when the BECG meets in Mexico City. For instance, when the group convened in the Ministry of Energy headquarters in mid-1985, the U.S. delegation was composed of only three Department of Energy representatives, three from the State Department, including the American embassy's pe-

troleum attache, and a Department of Commerce official invited to analyze energy-related trade matters. The U.S. delegation is larger when sessions occur in Washington. Similarly, only a small group of Mexicans, composed of Ministry of Energy and Pemex officials, attend Washington parleys.

Typically, the sessions begin with an analysis, often provided by the Department of Energy, of the world energy picture, stressing supply, consumption, inventories, and prices. Next the participants take turns describing energy developments within their respective nations—with Mexico particularly interested in U.S. consumption patterns for oil and natural gas, while the United States has shown greatest concern about its neighbor's oil developments, foreign marketing strategies, and relations with OPEC. The Mexican delegation took advantage of the November 1984 bilateral conference to outline the National Energy Program that President de la Madrid had recently announced. Still, the United States furnishes far more information than it receives. Finally, participants focus on such matters of topical interest as U.S. administrative actions affecting gasoline and other light product imports, the status of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and the friendly forced mergers involving U.S. oil companies.¹⁹

BECCG sessions are conducive to the frank exchange of ideas. Agendas are flexible; position papers are dispensed with; media attention is minimal; no communique is issued upon adjournment; and the goal of the specialists is not to reach decisions but to inform each other—a practice that discourages inflammatory speeches and political posturing. Although Ambassador Gavin and the director-general of Pemex took part in a “working luncheon” at the June 1985 meeting, the two governments have emphatically de-emphasized protocol in favor of substance.

Above all, the group has provided Mexico with a more realistic appreciation of the world energy scene. U.S. participants have sought to allay misgivings expressed by some of their Mexican counterparts, who—for instance—feared that the contagion of mergers in the U.S. oil sector portended the reemergence of the “Seven Sisters,” that is, the domination of the oil industry by a collection of behemoths. Discussions about pending legislation have helped illuminate the complex, decentralized character of the U.S. political system, thereby challenging a widely held impression

among Mexicans that it is, like their own, markedly authoritarian presidential, and hierarchical. The ever more informal meetings have enabled U.S. and Mexican officials to get to know each other as individuals, not simply as representatives of another country.

One participant, who asked to remain anonymous, expressed satisfaction over the increasing signs of "comradery" evident at the work sessions and the social events surrounding them. He, like others, praised the consultative group for building confidence between the two countries on energy questions. Certainly, the Mexicans feel their status is enhanced as a result of meeting on equal terms with the United States, whose information on energy is unparalleled. More important, the opportunity to establish personal bonds in an informal setting appeals to the Mexicans. They relish personal relationships and often despair at the aloofness of Americans, who too often attempt to get down to business after exchanging only pro forma pleasantries.

Needless to say, the effectiveness of American negotiators will be enhanced if they have developed a rapport with their Mexican counterparts, have identified mutual friends, boast the "school ties" of having studied at the same university, and know each other's families. Establishing such a relationship eludes U.S. officials who jet into Mexico City in hopes of arranging a deal within 72 hours and immediately returning to Washington, New York, or Los Angeles. It is difficult enough for Foreign Service officers with three- or four-year duty tours to nurture such ties. One of the most successful, perhaps the most successful, U.S. representative in recent years was Treasury Attaché Llewellyn P. Pascoe. Not only did he speak excellent Spanish, treat Mexicans with unfailing courtesy and respect, and entertain with impeccable taste, but also he spent seven years in the country. His contacts, most of which could not be transferred to a capable successor, were incomparable. His style resembled that of Ambassador Jova, who served with distinction in Mexico in the mid-1970s.

The Power of the Bureaucracy

In a society where men rather than laws prevail in the polity, compliance with written agreements is, as Sportin' Life said in *Porgy and Bess*, a "sometime thing." The three-million-person bureaucracy, which has eclipsed the ruling Institutional Revolutionary

Party (PRI) as the most powerful institution after the presidency, poses a formidable obstacle to implementing any agreement. Americans negotiating for the government and private corporations report apparent success in reaching a good faith understanding on trade, investment, or some other sensitive issues only to discover its promulgation slowed or frustrated by the bureaucracy. What accounts for this situation? First, inefficiency compounded by feather-bedding suffuses Mexico's "come back tomorrow" bureaucracy. Second, widespread corruption springs from low pay, a proprietary attitude toward positions of public trust, and the imperative to take advantage of a post that may be lost after six years when the president, who cannot succeed himself, leaves office. Third, a negotiated agreement may threaten jobs and bureaucratic perquisites; for example, dismantling tariff barriers and welcoming private investment could stimulate free enterprise and attenuate the economic role of the public sector, which generates or controls almost two-thirds of the gross domestic product. Finally, despite what cabinet members or even the president have agreed to, second- and third-echelon bureaucrats may have their own ideological axes to grind. Many of these men and women—especially those with a Marxist perspective in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce and Industrial Development—feel it is their mission to protect the country from greater penetration by the wily Yankees. They regard commercial treaties with the United States, entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, hospitality to foreign capital, compliance with International Monetary Fund austerity measures, etc., as increasing Mexico's dependence on, and vulnerability to, international imperialism. Hence, in rendering day-to-day decisions, they can impede the implementation of even the most praiseworthy conventions.

The Negotiators

Chain of Command

The president is Mexico's principal decision-maker. He permits flexibility to his negotiators in questions of tactics. However, he and he alone must assent to the terms of any important agreement, particularly one involving the United States. A case in point is the frenetic effort by then Finance Minister Jesús Silva Herzog in

mid-August 1982 to obtain U.S. support to prevent default on \$82 billion (now \$100 billion) foreign debt. Even though Silva Herzog arrived in Washington during a sleepy, late-summer weekend, he found a receptive audience in Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul A. Volcker, Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan, Deputy Treasury Secretary Timothy McNamar, Agriculture Secretary John R. Block, and Ambassador Gavin. Two days of lengthy and intensive talks yielded a multibillion dollar rescue package, including a \$1 billion cash purchase of Mexican oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The imposition of a negotiating fee, frequently used in private deals, was proposed to obscure the size of interest charges on this transaction, an extremely sensitive item in Mexico. The U.S. Treasury proposed a \$100 million fee. The Mexican negotiators, unhappy over the amount, had to secure López Portillo's approval, even though assessing a fee had been accepted in principle. The president vetoed the \$100 million payment and authorized Silva Herzog to break off the talks. "Let Rome burn," López Portillo informed him. The bailout was accomplished only after the Americans halved the fee to \$50 million.²⁰

Mexican negotiating teams exhibit a united front, making it virtually impossible to exploit differences among their members, who dutifully defer to the principal negotiator. He, in turn, defers to the president in Mexico's centralized system. The style of principal negotiators depends on their personalities, constituency, and the issues on the table. The Foreign Ministry's emphatically Third World orientation means that its spokesmen frequently articulate their points in ideologically-charged, anti-U.S. language, urging policies congenial to Nicaragua's Sandinistas or the establishment of a New International Economic Order that would transfer resources from "have" to "have not" states. Pronouncements by Mexico's U.N. delegation reflect this tendency, which is particularly notable in international organizations where the United States is a popular whipping boy. Further, in 1985 in the U.N. General Assembly, Mexico voted with the United States only 14.5 percent of the time—a figure lower than that of any nation in the Western hemisphere with the exception of Guyana (13.9 percent), Nicaragua (8.4 percent), and Cuba (6.2 percent).²¹ Such a tack is in contrast to the pragmatic, business-like approach of negotiators from the Treasury and Commerce ministries, the Central Bank, or Pemex.

Mexico's Principal Negotiators—An Impressive Team

Mexico's principal negotiators are excellent. In fact, a U.S. Treasury official described Angel Gurría, Mexico's chief debt negotiator, as a "miracle worker" who has obtained "fantastic terms" for Mexico in negotiations with private banks. He is arguably the best in the Third World. Also possessing world class talent are Silva Herzog, Central Bank President Miguel Mancera Aguayo, and Commerce Minister Hector Hernández Cervantes. These men have mastered their subjects, know their opposite numbers, are familiar with the U.S. political system, and understand the international economic and political environment. For his handling of Mexico's 1982 debt crisis, *Euromoney* magazine saluted Silva Herzog as 1983's "finance minister of the year." Meanwhile, the *Wall Street Journal* said, "Bankers smile at the mere mention of Mexico's charismatic finance minister."²²

Interestingly, the most acerbic critics of these sophisticated, middle-class technocrats or *técnicos* are Mexicans. Specifically, old-line politicians despair at the ubiquitous presence in key positions of well-educated cosmopolites who have no electoral experience, much less an appetite for pressing the flesh with peasants, hammering out deals with ward heelers over tequila and Carta Blanca beer, or keeping their ears to the ground.

Charges of elitism aside, Mexico does field an impressive first team on a half dozen or so perennial issues. Its negotiators are intelligent and well educated. Moreover, in contrast to most U.S. Foreign Service officers, Mexican diplomats, eager to keep their contacts current in a Byzantine political system, prefer to remain in Mexico City, where they are available for negotiating assignments. As Ambassador Jova has reported, the Mexicans do not hesitate to bring back an envoy from a distant land to participate in talks if he is an expert on the subject at hand.

Weakness in Back-Up Staff

But, to continue the sports metaphor, the Mexican bench is weak, making it impossible to carry on two or more separate negotiating matches in different parts of the world. This is especially true in an area such as energy, where the Mexicans boast only a few years of "big league" experience. The need for oil specialists to attend

various OPEC-related gatherings in Europe forced three postponements of a Washington meeting of the Bilateral Energy Consultation Group, scheduled for early 1986. But the U.S. record of continuity is worse because of relatively brief assignments, the escalating number of political ambassadors, and the ever faster moving revolving door between government and private careers. Mexican staff work has improved greatly. Yet, it pales in comparison to the U.S. capability, mainly because of a comparative dearth of information.

Negotiating Strategies and Tactics

Mexico's negotiating strategy resists categorization into phases such as "opening moves," "period of assessment," "end game," and "implementation." In fact, circumstances dictate whether Mexicans begin with a position that is "extreme," "reasonable," or "non-engaging." In recent years, expectations about oil prices correlate closely with Mexico's behavior at the bargaining table.

Intractability

During the halcyon days of rising oil prices, Mexican negotiators frequently displayed an intractable or non-engagement style. Following resumption of natural gas talks in the spring of 1979, the Mexicans clung tenaciously to the idea of keying the price to the BTU content of No. 2 fuel oil, a demand that had precipitated the breakdown of discussions in 1977. Under Secretary Julius L. Katz reported Mexico's unwillingness to consider other pricing mechanisms.²³ At the beginning of the third session, for example, the U.S. team asked if their hosts wanted to begin the dialogue. "No," was the reply. The U.S. spokesman next proceeded to sketch his country's position. Still no response, not even the suggestion that the American proposal, or a part of it, sounded interesting or had any merit whatsoever. The Mexicans might eventually ask a question tangential to the initial presentation, prompting a desultory and patently unsatisfactory discussion. Nonetheless, they refused even to indicate that they felt a natural gas agreement would be a good idea. The sessions proved "very painful," according to Katz.

At this point, the Mexicans were greenhorns at the poker table on energy matters. They realized that the United States had substantially more information than they about oil and gas markets. Moreover, no member of the Mexican team wanted to make statements that might be interpreted by his peers, superiors, or the media as his having "sold out to the gringos"—action tantamount to political suicide. (In the United States, it behooves many politicians, especially presidential aspirants, to appear sympathetic to Mexico in order to ingratiate themselves with Chicano voters; in contrast, closeness to the United States may be the kiss of death to an aspiring Mexican politico.) As previously mentioned, only political pressure—the spectre of Carter's withdrawing López Portillo's invitation to the White House—gave impulse to a settlement of this controversial issue.

In the negotiations that produced a U.S.-Mexican trade subsidies agreement in April 1985, Mexican negotiators started out with an extreme position but eventually became more reasonable. The three-year accord requires that domestic industries demonstrate a direct injury before higher tariffs, known as "countervailing duties," can be imposed on subsidized Mexican merchandise entering the American market. The lack of any major trade treaty between the two nations since the late 1940s reflects the deep distrust toward the United States by Mexico, which abhors external constraints on its commercial and fiscal policies. More than three years of negotiations preceded the signing of the subsidies pact. During this time, several factors softened the initially extreme Mexican position; oil prices fell; domestic economic conditions deteriorated; devaluation of the overvalued peso obviated the need to rely on subsidies to spur traditional exports; a strong trade surplus developed with the United States; de la Madrid endorsed economic liberalization that stressed an export-focused growth model to replace import substitution and reliance on petroleum as the engine of Mexico's economic advancements; and by early 1985, some 25 countervailing duty petitions had been filed against Mexican goods as varied as steel, cement, ammonia, carbon black, glass, and textiles. These considerations bolstered the hand of U.S. negotiators who insisted that Mexico curtail export subsidies and modify its pharmaceuticals law before the "injury test" would be granted.

The Use of Linkage

The concentration of power in the presidency would seem to encourage Mexican negotiators to pursue grand trade-offs as opposed to dealing with each issue in a separate channel. Relatively unrestrained, the chief executive might decide to cooperate on combatting narcotics traffic if the United States maintained a porous border for illegal aliens. In a 1978 visit to Mexico, Vice President Walter F. Mondale, in response to Mexican overtures, was prepared to discuss linkages among issues. Much to his surprise, his hosts never raised this possibility. Apparently, when López Portillo alluded to "package" negotiations, he meant attempting to resolve one outstanding problem to improve the climate for addressing another—and, upon settling that one, still another.

In any case, Mexicans involved in trade negotiations continually remind American officials that failure to open the U.S. market to Mexican goods will accentuate the country's economic and social woes. It is pointed out that such woes accelerate capital flight, thus imperiling the long-term stability of Mexico's political system, whose disintegration would pose an enormous security threat to Washington. More than a hint of linkage was embedded in comments about debt made by Finance Minister Silva Herzog in early 1986. He stressed that access for Mexican exports to the U.S. market would reduce his country's need for external credits.

Ironically, the United States has emphasized linkages more frequently than the Mexicans in recent years. A prime example was American insistence that Mexico modify its February 1984 pharmaceuticals decree, which deprived American firms operating in that country of protection for its patents, before a trade subsidies agreement could be signed.

Manipulating the Media

The Mexican government can manipulate the media in an attempt to assist its negotiators. Ministries possess special funds to pay reporters assigned to cover their activities. Such covert payments, known as *iguallas*, should not be confused with *gacetillas*, stipends given to editors or reporters to carry specific stories in the news columns of their publications.²⁴ The government's ability to

shape what appears in print prompted political scientist Evelyn P. Stevens to comment:

To read a Mexican newspaper is to venture onto factual desert in the midst of an ideological hailstorm. Headlines scream, news stories bellow, and columnists and cartoonists belabor "enemies of the revolution" with sledgehammer sarcasm.²⁵

The president and his entourage will not hesitate to plant news articles or otherwise shape press coverage. This tendency was patently evident with respect to the natural gas issue in the late-1970s. In late 1985, a carefully orchestrated media campaign in favor of Mexico's joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade prefaced de la Madrid's endorsement of entering the 90-member organization, which is committed to promoting international commerce through mutual tariff concessions.

In contrast, negotiators usually shy from such press manipulation lest articles which they inspire precipitate negative coverage that may undermine an agreement and earn for them a dreaded "Made in USA" reputation. Mexicans negotiating on trade issues are especially anxious to avoid publicity, for the prospect of concluding a deal with the United States could encourage government officials opposed to closer bilateral economic ties to plant articles hostile to the proposed agreement. Publicizing talks could generate both critical articles in *Proceso*, an independent and respected weekly renowned for its muckraking articles on government actions, and condemnatory speeches by Mexican congressmen who thrive on baiting Uncle Sam.

Mexico enjoyed remarkable success in manipulating the U.S. media in the late-1970s. Invariably, American newspapers and periodicals uncritically reported Pemex's announcements of ever larger "proven" oil reserves, even though there was no independent verification of what turned out to be highly inflated figures. For instance, Pemex Director-General Jorge Díaz Serrano informed participants in the 1978 annual meeting of the American Petroleum Institute, held in Chicago, that Mexico's Chicontepec field was "one of the bigger hydrocarbon accumulations in the Western hemisphere," containing up to 100 billion barrels of crude oil. Headlines trumpeted this figure as gospel. Later, however, the figure was

quietly modified to 7 billion barrels. Release of blue-sky numbers often coincided with Mexican efforts to affect the outcome of some bilateral initiative, be it in immigration, trade, or natural gas pricing. U.S. reporters, who only discovered Mexico during the oil boom, have become increasingly aware of the gap between rhetoric and reality in the ancient Aztec nation.

Manufacturing Delays

As the example of the subsidies pact indicates, delays inevitably occur in U.S. negotiations with Mexico, a country that spurns the use of mediators or third parties. These delays reflect sharply different attitudes toward time above and below the Rio Grande. Americans are mesmerized by schedules and deadlines that are far less important to their Mexican counterparts. Even more important than cultural considerations is the widely held belief among Mexican officials that negotiations with the United States constitute a "zero-sum" rather than an "expanding-sum" game—if one side wins, the other must lose—and history demonstrates that Mexico deals with the United States at its peril. This helps explain why Mexican negotiators frequently manufacture delays. After all, why rush to be taken advantage of? It also helps explain the occasional use of dramatic gestures epitomized by Silva Herzog's desperate visit to Washington in August 1982 when he said, in essence, "If you don't help us at once, Mexico will go belly-up and the international financial structure will totter!"

Mexican officials don't carry the same ideological baggage into talks with other countries as they do with their obtrusive northern neighbor. Hence, in dealing with Japan or France, they are prepared to contemplate an expanding-sum game in which both players win. Ironically, size, history, and resources mean that Mexico appears as overbearing to Central American republics as the United States does to Mexico. When Guatemalans allude to the "colossus of the North," they are referring to Mexico.

Guidelines for U.S. Negotiators

In a biography of Louis XI, Paul Kendall described the political and diplomatic machinations among the medieval states of

the Italian peninsula in language that invites comparisons with U.S.-Mexican relations:

The smallest gesture, subjected to elaborate analysis, became menace: the slightest fortuity, studied with unrelenting minuteness, was turned into a dangerous portent. The face of Italian politics was scrutinized at claustrophobically close range: the twitch of a cheek, tremor of a lip, a slide of eyeball assumed significance, probably sinister . . . Within this closed space, statecraft had become capable of everything but statesmanship; subtlety of calculation able to master all political mathematics except harmony.²⁶

Indeed, an effective U.S. negotiator must realize that his country's actions and inactions are scrutinized "at claustrophobically close range" by politicians, parties, professors, newspapers, and others in Mexico who then continually assign significance to "the twitch of the cheek, tremor of a lip, slide of eyeball." What accounts for such scrutiny? Undoubtedly, the history of bilateral relations—with which the negotiator should familiarize himself.

He must also comprehend the outlook of the Mexicans. True, they have been influenced by Western values, especially the men and women graduated from U.S. and European universities. Still, the more powerful tradition for most Mexicans is that emanating from their Ibero-Islamic heritage, modified by the influence of an indigenous culture. This heritage embraces such concepts as the hierarchical organization of society, including the presence of classes, the centralization of political power, emphasis on personalism and strong leaders, corporatism, fondness for military might and masculine prowess, fatalism, and a manipulative attitude toward law. Such concepts collide with the Anglo-American devotion to pluralism, equality, civil liberties, and free enterprise. Put briefly: U.S. negotiators must understand that Mexicans are not Spanish-speaking North Americans.

Sensitivity to Mexican values should be complemented by several practical considerations:

- Establishing personal rapport is critical to negotiating successfully with Mexicans. Preliminary meetings, telephone conversations, and social activities involving family members and long-time mutual friends will facilitate the development of such a re-

lationship, which will be enhanced if the United States avoids frequent changes in the composition of its negotiating team.

- As is the case with representatives of most countries, Mexicans prefer to negotiate privately, beyond the spotlight of press attention. Respecting this preference is particularly important for the United States inasmuch as Mexican leaders, long adept at manipulating their media at home, frequently interpret newspaper, radio, and television reports about bilateral affairs as having been fashioned by the White House, State Department, or some other U.S. governmental actor.

- U.S. negotiators must remember that their Mexican counterparts have limited discretion in making decisions. Therefore, any pact should be considered tentative until approved by the appropriate cabinet secretary or the president of Mexico himself. To press a Mexican representative to take firm positions before he has consulted with his principal will prove embarrassing and counterproductive.

- Although gradually becoming familiar with the U.S. system, most Mexican leaders view policymaking in Washington through the optic of their own experience in an authoritarian, centralized, presidential regime. Hence, it is imperative for U.S. negotiators to explain thoroughly the role that the legislative and judicial branches may play in implementing any agreement, especially if the subject matter is financial or commercial.

- The tractability of Mexicans is frequently correlated with the size of the negotiating arena—that is, the relative flexibility present in bilateral talks may give way to acute inflexibility in such multilateral forums as the United Nations or the Organization of American States, where diplomats from the Foreign Relations Ministry often address leftist, nationalist constituencies at home, as well as representatives of other nations. The obvious lesson is to encourage bilateral negotiations on substantive matters, while taking up essentially symbolic issues in international organizations.

- That Mexico seldom votes with the United States in the United Nations, where symbolic issues abound, must not blind U.S. officials to the growing pragmatism in Mexican foreign policy with respect to substantive matters. For example, Mexico has (1) halted oil shipments to Nicaragua's revolutionary regime, (2) hardened terms under which it ships discounted oil to ten under-

developed nations of the Caribbean Basin, and (3) refrained from either repudiating its huge foreign debt or joining a debtors' cartel.

- Above all, U.S. negotiators must remain sensitive to the real or perceived implications for Mexican sovereignty in any agreement with Mexico. Even a partially credible accusation that "you've sold out to the gringos" is the most potent weapon that any detractor can use to tarnish the image or even destroy the career of any diplomat, cabinet secretary, or president.

NOTES

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