There is broad consensus in DoD that a robust research and development program has been an important element of our military advantage. In this context, an important debate is taking place on the role of the DoD labs in developing and then inserting new technology into our armed forces. Our seminar will address two aspects of the question.

What is the role of the DoD laboratories in ensuring an innovative research and development program for the DoD? This includes their relationship to industrial labs, academic research programs and FFRDCs. ?
How can the labs attract capable new talent to replace the significant cohort of scientists that is approaching retirement?

Renewed focus on the services' role in science and technology vis a vis that of private industry prompted this discussion of the role of the Department of Defense (DoD) Laboratories and the challenges the laboratories face. Tim Coffey, former director of NRL, moderated the discussion between Walter Morrow, director emeritus of MIT/Lincoln Laboratories, and James Colvard, who served as deputy director of the Office of Personnel Management under President Reagan and later as associate director of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. He also served as technical director of the Naval Surface Warfare Center.

The panelists and moderators pointed out that the debate over the need for service laboratories, their roles, and the challenges they face has been addressed often. Tim Coffey mentioned that the Bell Report from 1962 was one of the best and all subsequent reports repeated many of its conclusions. However, the lack of consensus about the laboratories between policy makers, industry, and DoD leadership in science and technology (S&T) makes them vulnerable and targets for reduction in the upcoming congressional debates on base relocations and closures.

No one questioned the impact that science and technology developed for and by the military has had on our society. The development of radar by the Naval Research Laboratory was an oft-cited example. However, the panelists posited several different roles for the service laboratories, including maintaining the technical competence within the military, providing technical institutional memory, monitoring contracts, performing innovative research, and providing incremental advances in existing technologies.

The panelists also addressed the labs' ability to recruit and retain quality performers. Solutions presented depended upon one's view of the source of the problem, either the restrictions of a one-size-fits-all Civil Service Personnel System or the lack of an informed and passionate leadership.

Dr. Morrow began by addressing the DoD's need for advanced technology to ensure the continued dominance of US military forces. He indicated how military capabilities have evolved over a period of 100 years and also provided data indicating how soon the military adopted a particular technology after its first demonstration. To illustrate this point, Dr. Morrow asked the audience to consider technology used in World War I, in which chemical warfare was introduced, to the current campaign in Iraq, in which new technologies have bred high speed, few casualties, and decisive victory. The supremacy of technology will dominate conflict.

But, by presenting data indicating, that even using different measures, Dr. Morrow made his case that the most innovative individuals and those recognized as the best in their field were not by and large in the defense laboratories. He noted that membership statistics of the National Academies found most members are in universities, large industry, and research institutes rather than government labs. [There was some question whether one set of data was objective and unbiased.] Further, the essentially constant level of DoD funding in research and development over the years as global investment has increased implies that the DoD's influence is waning.

This does not imply that the DoD should not be involved in S&T, but instead its role in S&T needs to be well defined. An important role, but one insufficient on its own to justify DoD involvement in S&T, is contract monitoring. Incremental improvements in technology capabilities is yet another role but one that can probably be shared with industry. The key role, as addressed by Dr. Morrow, is the development of innovative technologies for military unique capabilities. Radar, night vision, and space-based navigation were examples of capabilities developed for the military that have had a broad impact on society but in which no commercial firm would have made any initial investments. The market was uncertain and the risks too high.

Having justified the need for service laboratories and the role they should play, Dr. Morrow identified the civil service personnel system as a key contributor to the alleged poor performance of the service laboratories. The system designed to serve the needs of custodians and administrative assistants, is poorly constructed to serve adequately the recruiting and retention of scientists and engineers. For example, pay is below private market place levels, hiring is slow, it is difficult to terminate poor performers, and raises are typically based on years in service rather than performance. These factors make it difficult to attract innovators into the government. Confronted with the unlikely possibility that the personnel system will change, it is necessary to seek alternatives for operating the laboratories. For example, they can be populated with individuals on temporary appointments from industry and academia or run as government-owned contract-operated facilities like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

[It is interesting to note that, since the personnel system has not changed over the years, the significant contributions noted by everyone were made under the same restrictive personnel system that exists today. From this one can conclude that it is possible to be successful in spite of the personnel system. It would nice if it could be successful because of it.]

Dr. James Colvard started his argument by noting that NRL was established through the efforts of Navy leaders who recognized that technical institutions, and not just technical individuals, were important to the future of the Navy. The service laboratories should be involved in understanding military needs, crafting them as technical problems, and finding solutions. However, the preeminence of NRL has eroded due to a lack of stewardship and informed leadership in Washington D.C. In his opinion, vision needs a sense of association and passion, which is more likely to come from a flag officer than a political appointee.

In agreement with Dr. Morrow, Dr. Colvard asserted the need to change the Civil Service Personnel System. As Director of the Office of Personnel Management during the Reagan Administration, Dr. Colvard supported the Civil Service Simplification Act, whose passage was successfully defeated by unions.

Recruiting and retaining the workforce happens as a matter of course when good problems are well defined and people can solve them through hands-on work. This generates a passion for the work and satisfaction in a job well done. Passion cannot be outsourced. Recognition and pride are essential to the vitality of serious research institutions.

Jack Bachkosky, CEO of SPC, made a few comments about the Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) panel he chaired. He advocated support for a strong DoD S&T foundation in order to insure continued technological superiority. The NRAC found that the DoD laboratories are essential, critical, and require the highest quality scientists and engineers. However, the NRAC was concerned about the laboratories' ability to recruit and retain world-class scientists and engineers, and estimated that 80% of the scientists and engineers in the laboratories are close to retirement. This will lead to a severe void of talent and institutional knowledge. Mr. Bachkosky felt that action is needed now. He felt that talented workers are more likely to leave if they feel no one cares for their situation. [Recent statistics from ARL indicate the problem might not be so dire, especially after the decline in the economy. The average age of its workforce is now 47 and, after several recent hires, the average age of the ARL Sensors Directorate is 42.]

Mr. Bachkosky stressed that the laboratories require sustained commitment. However, despite numerous studies on the DoD labs, which have all enumerated the same problems and difficulties the laboratories face, little has been done to implement their recommendations. Mr. Bachkosky listed three recommendations that the NRAC panel made to Congress. One, the Secretary of Defense needs to make a strong statement indicating his support for the service laboratories; two, a separate personnel system needs to be created for scientists and engineers; and three, the services need to experiment with alternate structures to govern the laboratories. Bachkosky noted that the Secretary of Defense, under the National Defense Authorization Act Sec. 1114, was given the authority to create a separate system, however he has chosen not to exercise this authority.

With regard to the latter two recommendations, discussion centered on the backward steps being taken within the DoD to create a different one-size-fits-all personnel system and, at least within the Navy, to relinquish control over research facilities to a central Navy Installation Command. It was reiterated that sustainment of the laboratories requires a long term commitment and investment, control over the tools of research, great work, and adequate pay.

A problem raised for discussion was that, although there is considerable funding in DoD Research, Development, Test, and Engineering (RDT&E), the lion's share of the funding is in test and engineering and not in the 6.1-6.3 early research and development stages. In response, it was commented that the structure of the system commands are such that money invested in 6.1 takes away from funding necessary to solve today's problems. It was suggested that one way to remedy the problem is improving the transition of technology out of the laboratories into systems.

The seminar ended with an anecdote relevant to the discussion on military versus commercial S&T. In preparation for the impending Y2K catastrophe the Navy purchased Iridium satellite phones for its fleet at $1000+ for each handset. But, because the customer base for Iridium was land based, the satellites charged down over the seas, which rendered the phones useless to the Navy. It is for that reason that the Navy has its own Space S&T program.