

# Democracy-Building in Central Asia Post-September 11

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Central Asia is back on the map of U.S. foreign policy. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the five “stans” of Central Asia became “frontline states” in the global war on terrorism, with important roles to play as strategic partners in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Budgets for assistance funds soared. The bulk of the new funds paid for military equipment, training, and various forms of counter-terrorism programs. However, the heightened U.S. interest in closer strategic relationships with these states also was matched by renewed enthusiasm—and more money—for promoting democratic political development. In fact, the Bush administration’s new conceptual framework for national security strategy and foreign aid offered strong reasons to build democracy in Central Asia.

This chapter will examine the scope and character of the democracy-promoting re-engagement in Central Asia. How much are we spending on such assistance, and what part does it play in our relationships with these states now? What kind of democracy promotion do we support, and how has our assistance changed over time? How does democracy promotion in Central Asia fit into the Bush administration’s plans for national security and foreign aid? Specifically, how has our assistance changed since September 11? Is our assistance worthwhile? Despite the persistence of obstacles in the Central Asian environment, and despite some fundamental contradictions and tensions in the U.S. policy formulations, optimism persists about the value and long-term promise of such assistance.

Foreign assistance practitioners are cheering America’s renewed interest in Central Asia and are eagerly expanding established democracy-building assistance activities — or designing new ones. Some of these

initiatives are exciting, and all of them promise to enlarge the political space for political reform. However, all parties recognize that the room to maneuver is still extremely limited. None of the sitting governments appear ready to warm up to democracy just because the United States believes that repressive regimes produce discontent and potential terrorist recruits.

While some have charged that strategic-level alliances with today's undemocratic strongmen in Central Asia ruin the chances for meaningful democracy promotion, this charge seems overdone. The path toward democracy in Central Asia was rough and steep well before September 11, and the follow-on U.S. rush to embrace these governments as partners in the war on terror. Most of those who are implementing America's democracy-promoting assistance projects in Central Asia are both realistic and sophisticated about what can be accomplished. There is no reason to reject their faith that a prominent U.S. presence, coupled with greater visibility for Central Asia and attention to its societies, can enhance the possibilities for successful small steps forward in the coming years.

### **The Assistance Surprise: Suddenly, Close Ties with Central Asia**

The Central Asian states did not take long to decide to support the U.S. war on terrorism, or the U.S. military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> By the end of September 2001, Russia had offered its support for a U.S. military presence in Central Asia, and all five states had offered use of their airspace, airports, roads, or bases in return for various forms of assistance. Agreements, memoranda, and joint declarations conveying these understandings were the subject of a number of high-level visits to and from the region in 2001 and 2002. In the case of Uzbekistan, a "non-specific security guarantee" took the form of an American pledge to regard any external threat to Uzbekistani security "with grave concern."<sup>2</sup>

Congress quickly granted President Bush's request for more money to pay for expanded cooperation with the Central Asian (and other) frontline states, through supplemental appropriations in December 2001 and March 2002 that designated nearly \$150 million in additional funding.<sup>3</sup> The effect was to quadruple total assistance funds for Uzbekistan, nearly double funding for the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, while sizably increasing funds for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Some of the extra money did supplement assistance activities to support democratic and economic reform; however, the bulk of the funds were for security-related purposes. Much of this covered provision of equipment to support

enhanced border security capabilities by ground or airborne forces, communications equipment for interoperability with U.S. forces, as well as improved counter-narcotics capacity.<sup>4</sup> The data for budgeted funds over the last four years is presented in Table 6–1. The trend in total obligated assistance funds appears also in Figure 6–1.

**Table 6–1. Budgeted Assistance to the Central Asian States, 1999 – 2002 (Millions)**

	1999	2000	2001	2002
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	74.49	71.04	74.92	86.25
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	64.19	50.11	41.60	93.53
<b>Tajikistan</b>	37.63	38.85	72.04	133.41
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	17.78	11.24	12.88	18.86
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	49.34	40.20	58.68	219.35

Data from the summary tables in "U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, Fiscal Year 2002." These figures represent total FSA and agency transfers budgeted, excluding the estimated value for donated commodity humanitarian assistance.

**Figure 6–1. USAID Funds for Central Asia, 1996 - 2002**





Figure 6–2. Democracy Promotion as Part of USAID Assistance to the NIS, 1996–2002\*



\*NIS refers to the 12 former Soviet republics (excludes the Baltic states); Obligated funds from Agency transfers. Data from USAID and the Annual Reports of the Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.

Just how much more money has been made available to promote democracy? Figure 6–2 gives a closer look at the trend in the proportion of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds obligated for democracy and governance activities. These funds are not large when compared with the millions made available for security, military, and law enforcement, but they still represent an overall increase.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, these funds were shared among a great many kinds of programs, ranging from activities to promote nuclear safety to medical advice about HIV/AIDS, to budget training, to student exchanges.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, most democracy promotion activities have been relatively inexpensive. Where other kinds of assistance provided materials or equipment, democracy promotion generally has emphasized training as well as conferences, seminars and materials and small grants for citizen groups.

### Promoting Democracy While Fighting Terrorism

What is the role of democracy promotion assistance in the post-September 11 environment? Has the global war on terrorism swept aside the old dream of democratic transformation in the former Soviet republics?

Strategic partnerships with the decidedly undemocratic governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan certainly pose risks. Human rights groups quickly questioned the wisdom of closer ties to these states.<sup>8</sup> Despite widespread agreement that the United States would need the broadest possible set of cooperative partners to exterminate the kind of terrorism that had so brutally attacked the U.S. homeland, the five Central Asian states were not attractive partners. In the words of one observer:

Courting these ex-Soviet republics has obliged the administration to cozy up to unsavory autocrats hitherto known chiefly for economic mismanagement, a contempt for democracy and human rights, and a single-minded determination to retain their hold on power by whatever means necessary . . . Freedom of religion does not exist, but then neither do most other freedoms, as the State Department's own annual report on human rights demonstrates.<sup>9</sup>

Another critic pointed out that these states could try to exploit the partnership to avoid political and economic reform:

Clearly, these governments will wish to use the U.S. need for access to their territory to slacken pressure on them with regard to political and economic reform. Worse, aid money provided to autocratic governments may exacerbate corruption making better governance more difficult instead of less. They will also try to leverage their relationship with the United States in their regional rivalries with each other. And of course, the United States risks being associated with unpopular regimes in the eyes of the peoples of these countries, and suffering when those regimes eventually fall.<sup>10</sup>

From the outset, however, the Bush administration voiced their position that any partnership with these Central Asian governments would require the states to declare their commitment to democracy and market economies. Congress, too, wanted to ensure that the new security relationships would not eclipse U.S. support for democratic values. Proposed amendments to the legislation authorizing extra funding to the “frontline states” linked the new money to satisfactory human rights performance. There were no illusions: Everyone recognized that the Central Asian regimes were politically unsavory, and that it would be unwise—not to mention politically unacceptable—to neglect concerns about democracy and human rights when dealing with countries like the “Stans.”

In every instance, agreements with the Central Asian states included provisions that renewed or confirmed their pledges to advance the reform agenda, both politically and economically. The U.S. side also affirmed its plans to continue efforts to promote democracy through foreign assistance to Central Asia, right along with heavy funding to re-equip and train military and security forces. While the increases in funding for democracy promotion are dwarfed by those for military and security assistance, more money for democracy really has been made available.

### **Fallow Ground: The Record of Democracy Promotion Prior to September 11**

Initial efforts in the 1990s to promote democratic development in Central Asia did build contacts with reformers, exposed thousands to Western ideas, and helped local people experience the power of organized citizenry. However, the overall impact of the efforts by the United States and others was limited, given the authoritarian styles of the region's firmly entrenched leaders. While not identical, all the Central Asian regimes to some extent restricted speech, limited citizen action, avoided competitive elections, stifled dissent, and suppressed or harassed potential opposition. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also resisted the emergence of markets and entrepreneurs, perhaps fearing the political consequences of a restructured economy they could not control. This restrictive environment retarded the emergence of local reformers, and limited the possibilities for democracy promotion by outsiders.

The bleak outlook for democracy promotion in Central Asia prompted a reorientation of assistance strategy. A five-year assistance strategy for Central Asia prepared by USAID in 2000 lamented the "overall lack of reform across the region."<sup>11</sup> Noting that the Eastern European model of a "rapid, structural transition to open market democracy is not appropriate for the Asian republics," this new strategy called for a shift to a longer-term approach that would build pressure for change by expanding opportunities for citizen participation. That is, USAID would "concentrate assistance on selected organizations, enterprise and people at local levels to grow dialogue, pluralism, the non-governmental sector, and partnership to build common good and mutual interest in stable change."<sup>12</sup> In other words, USAID adopted a "democracy from below" approach, emphasizing indirect efforts to support a "more open, democratic culture, with emphasis on nongovernmental organizations, independent information and electronic media, and progressive parliamentarians."<sup>13</sup>

What had gone wrong? Primarily, it was anti-democratic behavior by governments. Each of the five Central Asian states provided some reason for disappointment. The bad news included Kyrgyzstan,<sup>14</sup> which had seemed to be a success story for democracy promotion in Central Asia because of its “progressive leadership, vocal commitment to democracy and a market-based economy.”<sup>15</sup> However, President Askar Akaev’s moves in 2001 to harass citizen groups and restrict independent media changed this assessment.<sup>16</sup>

Despite its initial pledges to join the world economy and create a democratic, secular system that would protect citizen rights, Uzbekistan proved resistant to both political and economic reform. USAID’s 2000 report to Congress complained about the Uzbekistani government’s reluctance to introduce broad-based market reforms, and the “serious debilitating effect” of its restrictions on convertibility and access to foreign currency. “Citizen participation in economic and political life [in Uzbekistan] is limited and ill-informed. Political opposition to the regime is not tolerated, and the upcoming elections are not expected to meet international standards.”<sup>17</sup> A more recent report charged that Uzbekistan’s leadership “remains entrenched in a closed and stagnant political and economic system . . . Citizens remain poorly informed and their participation in economic and political life restricted. Political opposition is not tolerated and interference with the independent media persists.”<sup>18</sup>

Kazakhstan, often praised for its economic reforms, began to draw criticism for its political shortcomings. Unfair presidential elections, crackdowns on the media, and restrictions of freedom of assembly provoked a complaint in USAID’s FY 2000 Congressional budget presentation that despite some “great strides” in civil society, “hoped-for changes have not occurred at the national level.”<sup>19</sup>

Very little serious democracy promotion could occur in Tajikistan until the civil war had ended and recovery was underway. A political settlement in 1997 eventually brought the opposition into the national political process and created important openings for U.S. assistance directed at democracy building. However, this was a late start, and the subsequent American assistance program was quite small.

Turkmenistan, with a government uninterested in change, was clearly the most difficult case. As USAID’s FY 2001 program summary noted, “the Government of Turkmenistan has not yet made a demonstrable commitment to democratic and economic reform. Turkmenistan remains a resolute one-party state with power vested in a communist-turned-nationalist leadership.”<sup>20</sup>

These developments clearly showed that democracy promotion in Central Asia would be working, in practice, against governments. This seemed to make any real progress toward democracy building in this region part of a fundamentally political equation: Would the United States (and other democracy-promoting governments) be ready to pressure the governments of this region to tolerate and accept such programs? And how receptive would the Central Asian governments be to such pressures? Would further progress depend on unlikely political shifts within these states?

Just two months before the September 11 attacks, Michael Parmly of the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor outlined a rather depressing state of affairs in testimony on Central Asia before hearings on the Hill. While he indicated the United States would not give up its efforts to support the emergence of democracy in this region, his statement left little room for hope so long as the current Central Asian governments remained in power. Parmly's statement on July 28, 2001 is worth quoting at length:

The overarching goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia is to see these states develop into stable, free-market democracies, both as a goal in itself and as a bulwark against regional instability and conflict. This broader goal serves three core strategic interests: regional security, political/economic reform and energy development. While our security and energy interests are important, in the long run none of these goals can be achieved until these governments undertake comprehensive reforms to enfranchise their people both economically and politically. . . .

We have therefore encouraged, both through across-the-board political engagement and a variety of assistance programs, the formation of democratic civil societies and the development of free-market economies . . . In some countries, there has been progress on economic reform. However, despite such efforts, progress towards democracy has been uneven at best, while in places like Turkmenistan, it is almost non-existent. Even more disturbing, however, has been the varying degrees of backsliding in countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan . . . Political accountability, particularly as embodied by national elections, is the most obvious and well-monitored aspect of democracy. In this area, the Central Asian republics have performed abysmally . . . .

Unfortunately, our efforts to promote democracy and respect for human rights in Central Asia have not been enough. Indeed, these governments seem to be giving up on the reality of democracy (though they cling to the rhetoric). As a result, we have altered our approach. Democracy and human rights issues take up more of the agenda in our bilateral discussion . . . In addition we have reoriented our assistance programs to these states, shifting our democracy, economic and humanitarian assistance more toward direct grants to local communities or via local NGOs [non-governmental organizations], and rely less on government to government aid.<sup>21</sup>

Ambassador William Taylor, then serving as the U.S. Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States,<sup>22</sup> also appeared at these hearings. He raised the practical problem associated with the factors Parnly had described: “What can the United States do to help the people of Central Asia create democratic societies, given the fact that their governments are standing in the way of reform?”<sup>23</sup> This constraint, he said, explained why our democracy programs in Central Asia are “targeted almost exclusively at the non-governmental sector, with the exception of a few programs that work with reform-oriented local governments.” He also noted the importance of support for local independent media outlets and praised the popular academic and professional exchanges that were exposing so many of Central Asia’s young generation to the West.

Based on testimony by Ambassador Taylor and other regional experts, U.S. assistance providers had lowered their expectations for democratic change in Central Asia well before September 11, and shifted gears to longer-range strategies. This might be described as “democracy promotion from below,” but how bold would such a strategy be? Whatever assumptions one makes about U.S. capabilities and resources, no foreign government can force change on an unwilling society. Even where groups and individuals in a foreign state are receptive or even eager for democratic change, official U.S. assistance programs to support them can only operate by agreement with the host government. Such governments may resist, inhibit, or forbid efforts to enhance civil society and empower citizens at the grass roots.<sup>24</sup> How far would the U.S. government be willing to go, and how successful would its attempts to carry out democracy building be?

Long-time democracy assistance providers have reacted differently to the range of options available. Some of them have objected strenuously to any suggestion that the United States “give up” by limiting support for pro-democracy forces in undemocratic countries. Everyone seems to sup-

port educational exchanges that may prepare more pro-democratic future generations, and sing the praises of support for the emergence of civil society in former socialist states.<sup>25</sup> But for those impatient to see progress, educational exchanges and efforts to promote cultural change are not enough. The poor prospects for indigenous democratic reform in Central Asia brought new attention to the foreign policy priorities that would be set by the new U.S. administration under President George W. Bush.

### **The Bush Administration Reframes Assistance Policies**

The conceptual framework behind the Bush administration's new National Security Strategy, and a fresh approach to foreign assistance, give democratic values a prominent place. However, the new concepts have produced some still-unresolved tensions between national security and democracy promotion activities in Central Asia.

USAID, under its new Administrator Andrew Natsios, had already begun to redefine foreign assistance in ways that would emphasize performance, accountability, and cost-effectiveness. Essentially, this new approach stressed that assistance designed to support democratic development and market reforms would be wasted if it were given to governments unable or unwilling to pursue reforms. Early in 2002, USAID released a commissioned study<sup>26</sup> that buttressed these ideas by examining the accumulated experience of development assistance. This work attributed some of the failures of development assistance to faults of the recipient states themselves, noting that those performing most poorly had failed to achieve either democracy or good governance. Accordingly, the report offered five suggestions for promoting—and rewarding—political will to reform:

- Levels of foreign assistance must be more clearly tied to development performance, and to demonstrations of political will for reform and good governance.
- Good performers must be tangibly rewarded.
- If there is no political commitment to democratic and governance reforms, the United States should suspend government assistance and work only with nongovernmental actors.
- The United States should use its voice, vote and full influence within the World Bank and other multilateral development banks to terminate development assistance to bad governments and to focus on countries with reasonably good governance.
- The United States must work closer with other bilateral doors to coordinate pressure on bad, recalcitrant governments.<sup>27</sup>

This analysis also reflected impatience with undemocratic, nonreforming governments:

Only if governance becomes more democratic and accountable will development occur in the poorly performing countries. And only with a comprehensive, consistent, ‘tough love’ approach from the international community is political will for governance reform likely to emerge and to be sustained . . . Political leaders must learn that they will pay a heavy international price for bad governance, forfeiting material resources and becoming more isolated diplomatically . . . Strategies for promoting democracy and good governance must focus relentlessly on generating and sustaining political will for systemic reform, with diplomacy and aid working hand in hand.<sup>28</sup>

President Bush incorporated the key elements of this incentive- and performance-based concept of foreign assistance in his proposal for a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), announced in March 2002. His plan proposed a \$5 billion annual increase in assistance to developing countries with the funds intended to support development projects by poor countries that have enacted sound policies and achieved some measurable progress. A key element of the MCA is the plan to fund projects proposed by developing countries themselves.<sup>29</sup> Congress has accepted this program, but at much lower levels of initial funding. Considerable controversy remains over how to identify qualifying countries and administer the assistance. Despite tough talk about the need to promote political will for democratic development, the overall approach of the MCA makes it inapplicable to the Central Asian states. Instead, the MCA is directed at reducing poverty more efficiently by working with reform governments in very poor states.<sup>30</sup>

But while a shift toward a “tougher” development assistance strategy seemed at odds with the new funding commitment to the Central Asian states, the Bush administration’s strategy for dealing with terrorist threats appeared consistent with it. The National Security Strategy issued in September 2002 noted, “poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels.”<sup>31</sup> Repression also makes states vulnerable to terrorists. Hence, democratic reform—and efforts by foreign allies and supporters to promote democratic reform—offer an antidote to the growth of terrorism. Democratic reforms are expected to promote good governance and improve prospects for prosperity, while also defusing unrest by assuring all citizens a voice and improving the prospects for justice. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lynn Pascoe

in testimony to Congress on U.S. policy toward Central Asia made a practical link to assistance policy:

Authoritarian governments and largely unreformed economies, we believe, create the conditions of repression and poverty that could well become the breeding grounds for further terrorism . . . Thus, not only do we believe it is strongly in our national interest to engage fully with these governments to urge the political and economic reforms that we judge are essential to alleviate the conditions that breed terrorism, but we also firmly believe it is in these countries' own national interests. When citizens, and especially youth, feel that they have a voice in how they are governed, when they believe that they have an economic stake in the future, then they are less likely to be attracted to a radicalized path cloaked in Islam that offers a utopian solution to their discontent. *It is extremely difficult to convince Central Asian leaders that long-term economic and democratic reforms are necessary to eliminate the roots of terrorism if we are not willing to help them counter terrorism in the short term and prove that we will be engaged for the long term.* (Italics supplied)<sup>32</sup>

## **How Does the United States Promote Democracy in Central Asia?**

Dozens of programs, activities, and projects by many different U.S. government agencies and departments reflect the great variety of U.S. interests involved in our relationships with these countries. Most offer some form of technical assistance (advice and training), although a few provide equipment, and some give commodities, such as medicine, or surplus agricultural products that can be sold to support a designated purpose. Not all programs address development: U.S. assistance programs range from arms control efforts that involve dismantling and destroying weapons and support for safeguards to prevent the theft of nuclear materials, to training for public health and law enforcement officials. In contrast to the scale and costs of many of those programs, democracy-building activities generally involve relatively low-cost in-country training, advisors, and small-grants. USAID is the main administrator of such assistance, planning and monitoring activities it funds primarily through U.S. NGOs or companies under contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements.<sup>33</sup> USAID Missions abroad oversee implementation of the assistance, and play a critical role in ensuring that this aid is designed and assessed for results and impact.

Since American assistance began in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, USAID has modified its strategies, specific assistance objectives, and methods incrementally and often. While it is true that almost any U.S.-sponsored assistance can be considered to contribute to democratic development, at least indirectly, USAID has identified several categories of democracy-promoting assistance that apply in most countries. This is a long list that can be sorted in various ways. By purpose these activities promote the rule of law, including fair legal procedures, civil and human rights, free speech, and independent courts; citizen participation in public life; democratic political processes, including competent legislatures, competitive elections, political parties; independent media; responsible local government; independent trade unions; civic education; and civil society.

The activities funded in the Central Asian states present similar packages, with variations that have reflected the opportunities and constraints in each society, political and economic circumstances, as well as overall socio-political conditions as they have evolved. The mix of assistance activities also has responded to emerging problems, and shifted focus as experience closed off or opened new areas of concern—or as funding levels rose or fell. This process of adaptation and adjustment is supported by regular program reviews and reports, as well as by assessments and evaluations contracted in particular activity sectors for specific countries.

### **Democracy-Promotion Packages Before and After September 11**

The five Central Asian states present different needs and problems. A closer look at the democracy promotion packages before and after September 11 shows both the similarities and the variations. Turkmenistan, led by Saparmurat Niyazov, opted for a foreign policy of “positive neutrality,” and remained uninterested in committing to Western-style reform. Tajikistan suffered civil war and faced recovery, political restructuring, and the need for reform, all at the same time. Desperately poor Kyrgyzstan embraced economic, fiscal and trade policy reform, and at first welcomed assistance that helped strengthen an emerging civil society. Kazakhstan, with key nuclear and space installations, quickly built solid security relationships with the West and set out to establish a market economy as well; however, democratic forms were shoved aside in the rigged elections of 1999. Uzbekistan was blessed with many natural resources, but limited its economic development options by turning away from Western-sponsored economic reforms. The Uzbekistani government says it is threatened by

radical Islam, and uses this threat to justify harsh suppression of political and religious dissent.

In general, the political environment in all five Central Asian states has left little room for outsiders to encourage citizen empowerment or democratic laws and practices. All five governments have been unreceptive or actively hostile to some forms of democracy-building assistance activities, and all these governments stand accused of serious human rights abuses. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), none of the elections in the region have met international standards for fair practices.<sup>34</sup> It is not surprising that the array of democracy-promoting assistance activities in each of the Central Asian states are somewhat similar, reflecting comparable circumstances and limitations as well as some common social features. The array of activities also reflects USAID's choices of programs appropriate to the agency's overall strategy for promoting democracy in the region. USAID's shift toward the non-governmental sector, work with citizens at the grass roots, and long-range programs, such as student exchanges, affected portfolios in all five countries.<sup>35</sup> By 2001, so little money was being spent on democracy promotion that even modest funding increases after September 11 meant doubling the resources for some existing activities, and unexpected funding for some new initiatives. USAID programming accounted for some of these increases, but grants issued by the State Department Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) funded the most innovative steps. The DRL grants, made through the Human Rights and Democracy Fund, have emphasized political party building, training for human and civil rights advocacy, and support for free and independent media.<sup>36</sup>

In Uzbekistan, increasing citizen participation in non-governmental organizations was the chief emphasis through training, small grant programs, and civil society support centers. Counterpart International, the Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia (ISAR) and Winrock International implemented these activities. Specialized advice on NGO legislation to help Uzbekistanis secure a better legal climate for citizen groups was provided by the International Center for Not for Profit Law (ICNL). USAID also funded Internews, an organization specializing in media development, to provide support to some independent local television stations, and to train journalists, including training on media law and legal rights. The American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI) provided modest programs of training and technical assistance to support legal professionals and help advance important reform legislation, as well as women's legal literacy. In view of

Uzbekistan's persistent failure to follow international standards for free and fair elections, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) had bypassed technical elections assistance in favor of a civic education program for high school students, but this had ended before September 11.

How did this set of activities change after September 11? The activities underway or in the planning stages today represent a slightly different mix of old and new.<sup>37</sup> In Uzbekistan, the established programs already underway received additional funding which enabled them to expand their work to reach more people. Counterpart started a new civic advocacy program for NGOs, and ABA/CEELI opened the first free human rights legal clinic at Tashkent's main law school—to be followed by another in Namangan. Freedom House began a program to train and support human rights defenders and opened three resource centers for human rights NGOs that offer internet access, reference materials, and meeting space.<sup>38</sup> Both the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) received funding to support political party building through training and seminars. Complementing an extension of an internet access program to Uzbekistani schools, USAID established a new program to support basic educational reform. The new money also funded two information initiatives: one on anti-trafficking, and the other, a new civic education project for high schools that may start in 2004. The Community Connections program began taking Uzbekistani professionals and entrepreneurs to the United States for short-term internships and training. Another new idea is a Central Asia regional project called the Community Action Investment Program (CAIP). CAIP works to defuse potential ethnic conflict by stimulating multi-ethnic community problem solving. This project initially targeted communities in the Ferghana valley, a troubled border region between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; but also parts of southern Uzbekistan, Lebap in Turkmenistan, and Shymkent and Turkestan in Kazakhstan.

In Kazakhstan, democracy promotion included a broad program of support for civic participation, as well as a set of activities to promote more effective and accountable local governments. Counterpart International provided training and grants to NGOs, supported civil society resource centers, and worked with ICNL and other donors to promote NGO-friendly legislation. ISAR promoted advocacy and community education by environmental citizen groups. Internews supported independent media and trained professional journalists. ABA/CEELI helped build professional associations of lawyers and judges, encouraged reforms in legal education,

and assisted those working for an independent judiciary. IFES introduced and supported a civic education program for high schoolers that spread widely. The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) provided public access internet sites and training. The International City/County Managers Association implemented activities directed at local government officials designed to improve their management skills, their commitment to citizens, and their willingness to include citizen input.

After September 11, all democracy-promoting activities in Kazakhstan expanded somewhat. NDI received additional funding to support a full-time trainer, and thus increased its capacity for training political parties and democratic activists. NDI also expanded its civic advocacy work. The IRI established a presence and resumed its party-building work. More money has been allocated to support independent media through help for the National Association of Broadcasters and a production fund administered by Internews. Freedom House will be starting a new program of support for human rights defenders. Assistance to support judicial training is up, and the new CAIP began its work in ethnically mixed cities near the border with Uzbekistan. The National Endowment for Democracy received more money for grants to support public discussion on political issues.

Kyrgyzstan's set of democracy promoting assistance activities included elements similar to those in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However, greater progress in the development of civil society, citizen advocacy, legal reform, and elected local governments enabled these assistance programs to have more advanced objectives. Civic organizations had begun to form social partnerships at the local level, and had demonstrated skill in forming coalitions to advocate for or against proposed legislation on a national basis. ABA/CEELI's rule of law program established legal information centers, and assisted Parliament with the development of a manual on legislative drafting. The NDI worked closely with a non-partisan national civic organization, the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, hosted seminars for political parties, and also conducted programs to support professional development of the members of Parliament.

New elements in Kyrgyzstan's democracy promoting assistance activities after September 11 included funding for an independent printing press; a new program in basic education; training and grants through the National Endowment for Democracy for human rights NGOs; support for NGO advocacy campaigns; and the region-wide CAIP, designed to reduce the potential for conflict in ethnically mixed areas. Freedom House has begun a program to support human rights defenders. Additional funds

meant expanded efforts by existing activities—such as ABA/CEELI’s work with lawyers and law students, and ARD/Checchi’s commercial law training, and programs that support independent media. Both the NDI and the IRI received funding from the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) to support work in Kyrgyzstan.<sup>39</sup> NDI and IRI programs work to promote the growth of democratically oriented political parties and parliamentary factions, foster the development of civil society, and encourage constructive dialogue between government and opposition groups. NDI has received additional support for its civic advocacy work, and its assistance to a dozen civil society resource and information centers. The Urban Institute’s local government program was reoriented slightly to stress work with local governments to cultivate a more democratic civic culture—including support for public hearings.

Funding for Turkmenistan’s democracy promotion assistance was tiny, even when compared with the budgets for the other Central Asian states. Assistance designed to promote democratic culture focused on Counterpart’s program to help build non-political, non-governmental organizations and develop citizen advocacy. ABA/CEELI and others provided a smattering of training, seminars, and technical assistance to law students, legal professionals, and journalists. After September 11, the increase in funding for Central Asia meant that the existing NGO-support activities could expand, and gave them more money for community development grants and for the kind of civil society resource centers that had proved so helpful in other countries. The regional CAIP would be active in Turkmenistan as well, but has been slow getting started because of host government reluctance. USAID decided to use some of the new funds to introduce a basic education project that would help retrain teachers and introduce a modern curriculum into Turkmen schools—a long-term method for promoting democratic culture.

In Tajikistan, democracy promotion began modestly after the end of the civil war. Support for NGOs that promoted reconciliation and encouraged citizen participation in elections were key aspects of the initial efforts. USAID also funded training for political parties and legislators, voter education, civic education, and development work with legal professionals, journalists, and teachers. Small grants to NGOs supported advocacy campaigns that pressed for citizen access to Parliament and helped secure laws friendly to citizen groups and independent media. After September 11, the programs already underway received some additional funding. New initiatives included a civic advocacy center; a civic education program; anti-trafficking activities; a training program for journalists; more train-

ing for judges, lawyers, and law students; and a local government activity that offers training to city officials. With support from the Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau at the State Department, IREX started a small grants program to train local media on anti-trafficking. The increased funds also supported new efforts in basic education, legal literacy campaigns, and a set of conflict prevention programs—including Tajikistan's substantial share of the CAIP.

### **Renewed Democracy Promotion: Is It Worthwhile?**

An in-depth assessment of the impact of U.S. democracy promotion in Central Asia is clearly beyond the scope of this brief account. Practitioners who implement the small but vigorous activities in Central Asia are enthusiastic, and believe much more useful work could be done there. From their perspective, democratic development and the outlook for those who seek democratic change benefits when the United States takes a stand in its favor. This may be especially true for those who speak against human rights abuses. They—and their foreign supporters—are convinced that U.S. interest in their fate helps keep them alive and active.<sup>40</sup> Others are less hopeful about the merits of the re-engagement and more skeptical about the U.S. government's commitment to promote democracy while pursuing strategic partnerships against terrorism, despite many official statements confirming that both goals are central ones.<sup>41</sup>

Many recent assessments are gloomy. Martha Brill Olcott claims “developments are not moving in directions that the United States would want them to go. Central Asian leaders have made many promises that they would support democratic reform, but most of them are proving to be quite hollow.” Acknowledging that U.S. assistance efforts “remain limited in scope and by necessity take the long-term view of the problem,” she nonetheless concluded that overall, “the past year has been a dismal one for anyone who supports the goal of democratic transition in Central Asia.”<sup>42</sup> Fiona Hill of the Brookings Institution has said that the new spotlight on Central Asia “has had little positive impact on domestic developments . . . Indeed, in the case of Central Asia, the war on terrorism has empowered governments to continue aggressive campaigns against their opponents and given an added impetus to repression.”<sup>43</sup>

Lorne Craner, head of the State Department Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, has visited the region many times, and has spoken eloquently and often about the importance the U.S. places on the promises that our Central Asian partners have made to respect human rights.<sup>44</sup> However, human rights organizations have objected to his

bureau's report on human rights support efforts as unrealistically optimistic.<sup>45</sup> The acting Assistance Coordinator, Tom Adams, recently provided an overall assessment that was upbeat, but offered frank appraisals of the "less than rosy" picture on democratic reform, where "noticeable backsliding" had occurred. Taking a historical view, he noted that "the Soviet successor states have faced more difficult transitions than initially anticipated – both due to their long tenure under Soviet rule and their lack of historical experience with democratic and market systems."<sup>46</sup> A similar tone of realistic, resigned, and unhappy appraisal appeared in USAID's most recent budget presentation to Congress:

While economic growth for [Eurasia] has been positive, social conditions are dismal and trends in democratic freedoms are unfavorable . . . Lackluster reform in several countries has increased their economic and political isolation. With widespread corruption and an incomplete reform process, public trust in government and private institutions continues to deteriorate . . . Funding increases in Central Asia pose a different challenge. There, USAID is managing a greater magnitude of assistance resources with limited staff who manage activities in five countries. The program challenge is to continue pressing for progress in democracy and human rights within the context of high budget levels resulting from their cooperation in the war on terror.<sup>47</sup>

### **The Future: Keep On Keeping On**

Clearly, the United States will continue its efforts to support democratic development in Central Asia. Whether or not the level of funding and energy applied to this task will survive the inevitable fall-off in intensity of our strategic cooperation with these states in the war on terrorism remains to be seen.<sup>48</sup>

Our approach to the newly independent states of Central Asia began with contradictions, and remains constrained by competing goals, assumptions and needs. In time, we learned that democracy building in these former socialist states will be a long process, and can become irreversible only if the next generation internalizes the norms, habits, and discipline of daily democratic practice. Experience has shown many ways that outsiders can help the process along, but also has taught respect for the complexity of the transformation task. To ensure success, each of these countries also must nurture its own democracy advocates who can and will lead the transformation, and forge a new civic culture to support and sustain the new system.

Foreign assistance in support of fundamental political transformation is a tricky business. Realists recognized that a true restructuring of the political system in the former Soviet republics would be a mammoth challenge. And despite pro-democracy declarations by the new leaders, the lack of democratic experience and the strength of statist approaches and attitudes presaged a long and difficult road. It did not take long to learn that pro-democracy assistance programs were a hard sell in Central Asia. Across the region, assistance programs accordingly adopted a longer time frame for thinking about democracy building, and shifted toward programs that were less overtly political or threatening to the sitting regimes.<sup>49</sup>

The mix of U.S. interests in the region has lent an interesting dynamic to relationships with these states, with some interesting effects on our democracy building activities. Security interests and larger foreign policy concerns in the region appeared at first to complement the efforts to help these states transform their economic and political systems. For example, the United States established a large presence very early in Kazakhstan, in order to support the removal of this large state's many nuclear weapons, employ its weapons scientists, and improve safety and security at its nuclear research institutions. This cooperative effort laid a solid foundation for security cooperation and good working relationships with its new government. Kazakhstan, along with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, also proved quite receptive to the various military training and exchange opportunities provided through NATO's nonthreatening Partnership for Peace.<sup>50</sup> All three states also helped build the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, and participated in associated training. A steady traffic of military delegations to and from the United States paralleled a similar movement of administrators, educators, economists, and health officials invited to the United States for training. Promotion of trade and commerce in the region also seemed to have a reinforcing effect on our interest in economic transformation and serious movement toward world trade standards and free markets.

The Global War on Terrorism drove an American re-engagement in Central Asia—one that has included a re-energizing of our support for democracy there. This has brought a re-examination of lessons already learned about post-socialist transformations, and a search for a more effective mix of techniques and approaches that can achieve real progress without alienating the current regimes that ultimately may be affected by such changes.

The prospects seem mixed: The United States now has additional handicaps to overcome in convincing Islamic populations of its good intentions. Should the main currents of political reform in Central Asia take an Islamic form, U.S. democracy promotion must remain appropriate to these cultural settings, while offering realistic and achievable alternatives to the region's entrenched autocracies. The political space is small, and the tolerance of these governments to outside meddling is likely to be low. However, even if America and its allies cannot find ways to leverage their new strategic role into greater local tolerance for democracy promotion efforts, the renewed engagement in support of democracy in Central Asia will still nurture constituencies for future change.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See chapter 21 in this volume on U.S. security relations with Central Asia.

<sup>2</sup> For details about the reactions of Central Asian states to the September 11 attacks, and the first steps toward security cooperation with the U.S. against terrorism and the Taliban, see Jim Nichol, "Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests," CRS Issue Brief IB93108, Updated April 1, 2003, 2-4 and 11-12. Previous versions of this IB were issued in August, October, and November 2002. The U.S.-Uzbekistan Declaration on their strategic partnership of March 2002 is available at <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/11711pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/11711pf.htm)>.

<sup>3</sup> Details regarding assistance in FY2002 may be found in Nichol, IB93108 as updated for August 30, 2002, 1415. The supplemental funds came through existing instruments (the Freedom Support Act, which authorizes assistance to the former Soviet Union), as well as through the new Emergency Response Fund.

<sup>4</sup> Details are available in the country assessments, in "U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, Fiscal Year 2002," the Annual Report of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, at <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>>. Another source for information about U.S. assistance programs by country and region is the annual USAID Budget Presentation to Congress, available at <<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/>>. USAID's Washington headquarters houses specialists in development and democracy assistance, supports strategic planning, compiles lessons learned, and oversees adjustments to assistance strategy and implementation. As a results-oriented organization, USAID routinely re-examines its assumptions about development, and the models and expectations that underlie the goals and objectives of its assistance programs. Such models and strategies are not just academic exercises, as they build on accumulated experience in many countries and incorporate awareness of the tools and methods appropriate and acceptable to their foreign hosts. While USAID is not directly involved in designing assistance sponsored by other government agencies, its staff and specialists often indirectly contribute to such plans. Some of these other-Agency assistance programs contribute to the promotion of democracy directly or indirectly. The most important such pro-democracy programs are lodged in the State Department. These include educational exchanges run by the Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau, visitors and educational assistance programs run by the Public Affairs Bureau, and grant funding to support human rights and democracy from the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. The office for coordination of U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia (housed in the State Department) holds responsibility for overall coordination and tracking and covers all sources of U.S. assistance in its annual reports.

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that identifying which assistance funds support "democracy" can be tricky, and practices vary somewhat. Some accounts do not include educational exchange programs.

<sup>6</sup> The diversity of these assistance categories and activities can be reviewed in the annual reports of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, available on the internet at <<http://>

[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm). An excerpt from the table of contents of the FY2001 report (Appendix A) provides a handy list of all the agencies that provide assistance.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, *Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S. Military Assistance Since September 11* (Human Rights Watch, 14:1, February 2002) available at [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org) and Jennifer Windsor, Executive Director of Freedom House, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, July 9, 2003 on the State Department's report on "Supporting Human Rights and Democracy." (The testimony is available at [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).) Note that Freedom House (*Nations in Transit 2002*) rates all five Central Asian states as either "autocracies" or "consolidated autocracies."

<sup>8</sup> Andrew J. Bacevich, "Steppes to Empire," *The National Interest* (Summer 2002), 44.

<sup>9</sup> Charles Fairbanks, "Being There," *The National Interest* (Summer 2002), 40. Among the many others who raised such questions are: Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, "New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia," *Foreign Affairs* (Mar-Apr 2002), 61-70; Elizabeth Wishnick, *Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2002); Jessical T. Mathews, "September 11, One Year Later: A World of Change," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief* 18, August 2002 [available at [www.ceip.org](http://www.ceip.org)]; Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," *Foreign Affairs* (Jan-Feb 2003), 84-93; and the pair of articles on America in Central Asia by Charles Fairbanks and Andrew J. Bacevich in *The National Interest* (Summer 2002), 39-53.

<sup>10</sup> *USAID's Assistance Strategy for Central Asia 2001-2005*, USAID Regional Mission for Central Asia, July, 2000. Available at [www.usaid.gov/regions/Europe\\_eurasia/car/PDABS400.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/regions/Europe_eurasia/car/PDABS400.pdf) (accessed in November 2002) Hereafter: *USAID Central Asia Strategy*

<sup>11</sup> *USAID Central Asia Strategy*.

<sup>13</sup> While the state is commonly called "Kyrgyzstan," the Constitution of 1993 refers to the government as the "Kyrgyz Republic."

<sup>14</sup> From USAID's FY2001 Budget Justification program summary for Kyrgyzstan, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/kg/>.

<sup>15</sup> The statement of Michael Parmly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, before the Subcommittees on International Operations and Human Rights, and Middle East and South Asia of the House Committee on International Relations, July 18, 2001, is available at [www.Eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav072701a.html](http://www.Eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav072701a.html) (Accessed June 2, 2003).

<sup>16</sup> From the USAID Congressional Presentation for FY 2000, section on Uzbekistan, available at [www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/uzbekist.html](http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/uzbekist.html) (accessed in June 2003).

<sup>17</sup> From the program summary for Uzbekistan in USAID's FY2003 Congressional Budget Justification, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/ee/uz/> (accessed September 15, 2003).

<sup>18</sup> From the program summary for Kazakhstan in USAID's FY2000 Congressional Presentation, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/kazak.html>.

<sup>19</sup> From the Turkmenistan overview in the USAID FY2001 budget justification, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/tm/>.

<sup>20</sup> The statement by Michael Parmly, in Congressional testimony on July 18, 2001, is available at [www.Eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav072701a.shtml](http://www.Eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav072701a.shtml).

<sup>21</sup> This State Department position, established by the Freedom Support Act, has now been renamed the "Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia."

<sup>22</sup> William Taylor's remarks and prepared statement are available through the site in Note 21, or at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/group8/summit01/www01071805.html> (accessed 6/2/03).

<sup>23</sup> Ukraine's government, for example, has chafed under U.S. criticism of its elections, its treatment of journalists, and its business practices. The activities of U.S. organizations that work with Ukrainian political parties and democratic activists (some of which oppose the current President, Leonid Kuchma), have clearly been an irritant. The Ukrainian authorities withheld registration from both the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute for more than two

years (2001– September 2003), yielding only after considerable pressure from the U.S. made it clear the bilateral relationship would suffer otherwise. (Ukrainian law requires foreign organizations to re-register when funding instrumentalities change, as they did for both NDI and IRI in 2001.)

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, Charles William Maynes, “A New Strategy for Old Foes and New Friends,” *World Policy Journal* (Summer 2000, 17:2), 68-76. Maynes is President of the Eurasia Foundation, an organization that funds many civil society activities in former socialist states.

<sup>25</sup> *Foreign Aid In the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity* (USAID, 2002) is available at <[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)>.

Ibid., 10-11.

Ibid., 50-52.

<sup>28</sup> See the articles by Lael Brainard, “Compassionate Conservatism Confronts Global Poverty,” and Steve Radelet, “Will the Millennium Challenge Account be Different?” *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2004, 26:2), 149-87. Recent Congressional action is discussed in Susan B. Epstein, “Foreign Relations Authorization, FY 2004 and FY 2005: State Department, The Millennium Challenge Account, and Foreign Assistance,” CRS Report RL 21986, Updated September 2, 2003.

<sup>29</sup> See the analysis by Steven Radelet, “Bush and Foreign Aid,” *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 2003, 82:5), 104-117.

<sup>30</sup> The National Security Strategy is available at [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov).

<sup>31</sup> B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, “The U.S. Role in Central Asia,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, June 27, 2002. Available through [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov).

<sup>32</sup> A helpful short overview of the instruments of U.S. assistance to the former Soviet republics is included in Curt Tarnoff, “The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance,” CRS Issue Brief IB95077 (Updated July 24, 2003), and previous versions. Tarnoff noted that USAID transfers some of the funds obligated to it for these states to other agencies (such as the Commerce, Justice, and Labor Departments). These transfers have grown from about one fourth to over 40 percent of the total—an indication that other agencies are more involved in designing and overseeing assistance to the region. This Issue Brief points out that very little cash is involved (except for equity investments and loans to the private sector), that close to three-fourths of our assistance goes to the private or non-governmental sector, and that roughly 78% of funds used for programs run by USAID are spent on U.S. goods and services.

<sup>33</sup> Reports of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights may be located through the organization’s website, <<http://www.osce.org/>>.

<sup>34</sup> Details about all assistance activities from all agencies and funders is available in the Coordinators Reports, available through the Department of State website. As sited above, the Report for 2002 is available at <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>>.

<sup>35</sup> The State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (<<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/>>) has taken on a more important direct role in democracy promotion through its administration of the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF). The Fund has grown from \$9 million in 2000 to over \$31 million in 2003. The Fund was intended to permit highly responsive support for unique or especially timely short-term human rights or democracy promotion projects. In 2003, \$4.5 million was committed for projects in the non-Middle East Muslim world (including Central Asia), with the following priorities: 1) Empowerment of Muslim women, including projects that promote capacity building and/or networks of women or women’s organizations, especially as they relate to human-rights; 2) Addressing the problem of disenfranchised youth and the need to reach out to this group to prevent growth of extremism; 3) Political reform programs that would entail support for conducting free and fair elections, issues of good governance and corruption; 4) Independent media and access to a diversity of sources of information; 5) Judicial systems, especially in the context of Shari’a; 6) Promotion of the compatibility of democracy with Islam; and (7) Civil society and increasing political participation.

<sup>36</sup> See Appendix B for a summary of USAID activities prepared by the USAID Central Asian Regional mission in Almaty. Again, the Coordinator's Report for 2002 is the best source for detail on the activities of all funders. See <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rprt/c10250.htm>>.

<sup>37</sup> Two of the Freedom House centers were open as of November 2003 in Tashkent and Naman-gan; a third is planned, probably to open in 2004.

<sup>38</sup> IRI is currently in the process of re-establishing a resident office to support its work in Kyrgyzstan.

<sup>39</sup> The author interviewed representatives and officers of Counterpart International, ABA/CEELI, Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and IREX, and is grateful for their assistance in preparing this chapter.

<sup>40</sup> In testimony before the subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee, October 29, 2003, Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, reaffirmed that democracy promotion is a key pillar of U.S. policy in Central Asia. The testimony is available through the State Department website, <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798pf.htm>>.

<sup>41</sup> Martha Olcott, "Taking Stock of Central Asia," *Journal of International Affairs* (Spring 2003), 3-17.

<sup>42</sup> Fiona Hill, "Central Asia and the Caucasus: The Impact of the War on Terrorism," in *Nations in Transit* 2003 (Rowman and Littlefield: Freedom House, 2003), 39-49.

<sup>43</sup> See, for example, his remarks at a media roundtable in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on June 7, 2002 at <[www.state.gov/drl](http://www.state.gov/drl)>.

<sup>44</sup> Jennifer Windsor, Executive Director of Freedom House, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, July 9, 2003 on the State Department's report on "Supporting Human Rights and Democracy." (The testimony is available at <[www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)>.)

<sup>45</sup> Thomas C. Adams, Acting Coordinator of U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia, "U.S. Assistance Programs in Europe: An Assessment," Statement to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, March 27, 2003 (<[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19203pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19203pf.htm)>, accessed 6/2/2003).

<sup>46</sup> Europe and Eurasia, USAID Congressional Budget Justification, FY2004. (<[www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/europe\\_eurasia/](http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/europe_eurasia/)>, accessed June 2003).

<sup>47</sup> Budget levels for U.S. assistance to the former Soviet republics are coming down. While the largest drops are for Russia and Ukraine, this trend will affect Central Asia too. President Bush's FY 2003 budget cut the total outlay by four percent; his request for FY 2004 represented a cut of 24 percent from 2003. See Curt Tarnoff, "The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance," (Updated July 24, 2003), 1, 4.

<sup>48</sup> I disagree with the analysis of Thomas Carothers, author of many works analyzing U.S. democracy assistance, who has suggested that the "transition paradigm" has died. See the debate in *Journal of Democracy* on this issue, beginning with the Carothers article, "The End of the Transition Paradigm" in the January 2002 issue, and continuing two issues later with essays by Guillermo O'Donnell, Kenneth Wollack, Ghia Nodia, and Gerald Hyman.

<sup>49</sup> All the Central Asian states but Tajikistan joined the PFP in 1994. Tajikistan joined after September 11, in 2002.