China’s Aviation Capabilities

Presented at
Chinese Military Affairs: a Conference on the State of the Field
Sponsored by
The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs
National Defense University

October 26-27, 2000 

Kenneth W. Allen
Senior Analyst, TASC 

Most analysis of China’s aviation focuses on hardware and order-of-battle issues – how many aircraft of what types with what capabilities were produced, where are they located, and what systems are under development.  While most analysis of strategy and doctrine concentrates on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a whole, there is also interest in strategy and doctrine for the aviation forces.  During a seminar on Airpower in the Asia-Pacific Region I hosted in 1999, a former USAF Chief of Staff provided the following list of priority questions that he would want to know about China’s airpower: 

·        What is their battle doctrine?
·        Is their organizational direction defensive or offensive?
·        Which classic air missions do they cover effectively B air defense, counter‑air, conventional strike?
·        What is their basic employment concept for these air missions B manned aircraft, ground or air launched missiles?
·        What kind of support packages do they have B defense suppression, air escort, tanker support?
·        What kind of power projection capability does their equipment represent B range, payload?
·        How modern is their capability in precision guided weapons and battlespace surveillance?
·        What is their equipment and personnel readiness status?
·        What size, duration, and location of operations can they sustain with logistics support?

Most of this information, which is extremely valuable to war planners, can be ascertained by carefully analyzing intelligence information on existing equipment capabilities, weapons systems under development, deployment patterns, and the types of training being conducted.  However, it is also important to have a broader perspective of Chinese aviation in order to identify changes that could inhibit or lead to new operational capabilities.  Since Rick Fisher’s presentation will adequately cover the PLA’s hardware, my discussion today will focus primarily on the “software” issues that influence where China’s airpower is going. 

For purposes of this paper, Chinese aviation covers the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Naval Aviation.  The PLA’s Army Aviation was established in 1986, but there is very little open source information available about this force.  Although only covered briefly here, aviation also includes China’s defense industry that produces the PLA’s weapons systems and equipment. 

I have organized my presentation into ten issue areas, providing a little background information on the current status and some indications of future trends. At the end of the paper, I discuss how the United States can go about finding out information about these issue areas. 

Issue 1: Strategy and Doctrine 

The PLA’s airpower doctrine has progressed through several steps since 1949.  In the beginning, the PRC did not have any experience in developing aviation doctrine, so the PLAAF used the Soviet Air Force as its model. It was not until 1957 that the PLAAF began to develop and teach its own doctrine and make changes to Soviet doctrine, based on the PLAAF’s experience in the Korean War and operations against the Nationalists on the islands off of Zhejiang Province. 

In 1959, the Air Force created a Regulation Committee that wrote over 300 regulations, including the first elements of China’s airpower doctrine. Since the primary mission was to defend China’s major cities and industrial areas, the doctrine and weapons acquired focused on this mission.  For example, during the early years, seventy percent of the aviation force consisted of fighters, leaving the remaining thirty percent to be divided among the other types of aircraft (bombers, ground attack, and transport) and systems for the other branches (SAM, AAA, airborne, radar, and communications).  

It wasn’t until 1988 that the General Staff Department finally published a document (Air Force Operational Art) that explained the characteristics of operational/campaign art, the development of operations/campaign theory, and the mission of the PLAAF’s corps and regiments, and how these three elements pertain to a unified command organization.  The document also discussed the special characteristics of airpower operations in an electronic countermeasure (ECM), nuclear, chemical, and biological combat environment.  

Although PLAAF writings mention the broader PLA doctrine and strategic concepts of people’s war, people’s war under modern conditions, and people’s war under modern high-tech conditions, the PLAAF and Naval Aviation tend to focus more on campaign strategy, campaign tactics, and tactical training. During the late 1950s and 1960s, the PLAAF compiled teaching materials on tactics, but it wasn’t until the 1980s that the PLAAF published several documents on tactics theory for each of its aviation troop components and airborne troops. 

As arms of the PLA, the PLAAF and Naval Aviation have traditionally conducted their combat operations as a series of subordinate campaigns within the PLA’s overall campaign. While the PLA has always had an active defense (jiji fangyu) strategy, it was not until PLAAF commander Wang Hai laid out a program in 1987 that the Air Force formally stressed having a simultaneous offensive and defensive capability (gongfang jianbei). Wang emphasized that the combined arms combat environment of the 1980s required a force that could move quickly over long distances, could fight in an electronic environment, could have the capability to attack an enemy, and could keep the PLAAF from sustaining complete damage from an enemy air attack.  Starting in 1996, Chinese leaders, including CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin and PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao, began to re-emphasize publicly the PLAAF’s capability to fight offensive battles. 

“The Chinese Air Force plans to build up state-of-the-art weapons systems by early next century, including early warning planes, electronic warfare warplanes, and surface-to-air missiles.  The PLA Air Force is now able to fight both defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions.  The Air Force is now capable of waging high-level long-distance combat, rapid maneuverability, and air defense, and is able to provide assistance to navy and ground forces.  The Air Force now sources most of its equipment domestically, fielding a large number of Chinese-designed and produced high-quality fighters, attackers, bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and special purpose planes.  Over the next few years, the Chinese Air Force will enhance its deterrent force in the air, its ability to impose air blockades, and its ability to launch air strikes, as well as its ability to conduct joint operations with the ground forces and navy.” 

Although China’s airpower is also responsible for supporting the ground and naval forces, neither the Air Force nor Naval Aviation have yet to engage in this mission during combat and even admit that they can do so only indirectly. 

The PLA’s writings have always stressed that the most important element of China’s airpower doctrine is gaining air superiority.  In the past, however, this concept pertained primarily to areas around China’s airfields, since their aircraft did not have long legs and their SAM coverage was limited.  As China began acquiring better weapons systems during the 1990s, the PLA is now better able to implement this doctrine beyond China’s periphery. 

One of the most important strategic changes for the PLAAF took place in the late 1980s when the PLA began forming a rapid-reaction force consisting of “fist” (quantou) units.  The rapid-reaction strategy is based on the premise that China will only be engaged in local wars for the foreseeable future, that the PLA must strike to end the war quickly and meet the political objectives, and that cost is a big factor as equipment becomes more expensive to use and replace.  It wasn’t until the early 1990s, however, that the PLAAF  formally established any rapid-reaction units. 

The trend in the PLA’s airpower strategy and doctrine is to gradually move away from the myth of direct support for the ground forces.  This is already happening as the PLA receives SAMs with larger envelopes, aircraft with longer legs and greater mobility, air refueling, airborne early warning, and cruise missiles capable of striking targets from longer distances. 

Issue 2: Leadership 

Several trends in the Air Force’s leadership since the mid-1980s have affected the PLAAF’s status within the PLA.  Very little information is available about Naval Aviation and Army Aviation leaders.  Since 1949, the PLAAF has had eight commanders, ten political commissars, and thirty-two deputy commanders.[i] Both Wu Faxian and Zhang Tingfa served several years as the political commissar before becoming the commander. Since it was established in 1952, Naval Aviation has had five commanders and four political commissars (there was no commander from 1969-1978 when the headquarters was abolished and no political commissar until 1985).[ii]  Prior to the early 1980s, the PLAAF senior leadership was dominated by ground force officers, who viewed airpower as long range artillery to support the Army. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, most of the PLAAF leaders had come up from within the Air Force’s ranks. Wang Hai became the first aviator commander in 1985. 

The PLAAF has made a concerted effort at reducing the age of its leaders.  When ranks were re-instituted in 1988, Commander Wang Hai, who had already held the position for three years, was 60 years old.  The succeeding three commanders took over at age 63, 63, and 57 – their mandatory retirement age is 65.  In 1988, almost two-thirds of the 32 lieutenant generals were over 60 and about two-thirds of the major generals were over 54 – all of these generals had already held their positions for 1-5 years.  Today, the PLAAF has approximately 150 general officer positions, including one general, twenty-five lieutenant generals, and 125 major generals. The average age of officers holding the same positions as those in 1988 has been reduced by about 3-5 years (lieutenant generals are about 57 and major generals about 52), thus indicating a move toward a younger force.  By comparison, an analysis of  senior USAF leaders today shows that they entered the Air Force between 1966-1970, and were promoted to major general at age 47-49, lieutenant general at 48-51, and general at 52-53. 

Concerning experience, whereas almost every PLAAF leader in the 1980s had fought in the Korean War, they had all retired by the mid-1990s.  This leaves the current set of leaders without any combat experience.  Although they have been “influenced” by the Gulf War and Kosovo Wars, the question remains as to whether they can implement the changes necessary to meet the challenges of local wars under high technology conditions. 

The stature of each organization depends upon its position within the overall PLA hierarchy and the relationship of its leaders with other military and political leaders.  In the chain of command, the PLAAF, as a service subordinate to the Army, is only equivalent to one of the seven military regions. Over the years, some, but not all, of the PLAAF’s commanders, political commissars, deputy commanders and political commissars, and directors of the four administrative departments have been representatives at the National People’s Congress (NPC).  All of the commanders and political commissars have been members of the Party Congresses, and some of them have been members or alternate members of the Party Congress Central Committee. Besides Liu Yalou and Wu Faxian, the leader with the highest political standing was Zhang Tingfa, who was a member of the Politburo and the CMC. Zhang was the last PLAAF member of the CMC. 

There are currently both positive and negative leadership trends for the PLAAF.  Whereas all of the PLAAF’s leaders have now come up through the air force ranks and are on the average younger than their predecessors of a decade ago, the PLAAF’s institutional clout based on the commander’s political connections has decreased.  Furthermore, there are no leaders today with any combat experience.  We can expect the PLAAF to continue this trend of promoting younger officers, perhaps reducing the average age by yet another 1-2 years over the next decade.  Their lack of combat experience may actually help them as they will not be preparing for the last war. This transformation may come about as they have the opportunity to travel more and to learn through access to computers.  In my view, the biggest changes over the next decade will come from the bottom up, not from the top down, as younger officers become connected through the internet. 

Issue 3: Administrative and Operational Structure 

Since its founding, the PLAAF’s chain-of-command has basically been organized into four administrative and operational levels: Headquarters Air Force; military region air forces (MRAF); air corps, command posts, and bases; and operational units.  Depending on the type of unit, operational units are organized into divisions, brigades, regiments, groups, squadrons, battalions, companies, platoons, squads, and flights.  Operational units can be directly subordinate to HqAF, the MRAF headquarters, an air corps, a command post, or a base. 

Over the past fifty years, some PLAAF command organizations (MRAF, air corps, command posts, and bases) have been downgraded, upgraded, or abolished as the PLAAF consolidated and reorganized its regional control capabilities. By 1971, the PLAAF had created fifty air divisions and thirteen air corps, and had simplified its administrative command structure from a high of eleven first-level departments in 1955 to just three. Today, there are seven military regions, five air corps, and six bases that control the PLAAF’s operational units. 

Today, the administrative structure of the PLAAF consists of four major departments (headquarters, political, logistics, and equipment) that reflect the organizational structure of the four general departments (general staff, political, logistics, and armament).  This structure is mirrored through the administrative and operational chain of command from Headquarters Air Force all the way down to the lowest operational units. Besides the administrative elements, the core of the PLAAF consists of five branches, plus various support elements, schools, and research institutes. 

There is little chance of major changes within the organizational structure over the next several years.  However, as the PLAAF continues to downsize the number of divisions and regiments, some of the remaining air corps may continue the trend of the past decade and be changed to bases.  Bases are equal to an air corps, but most of the administrative functions have been moved up to the MRAF headquarters. 

Issue 4: Changes within the Branches 

The operational branches are the core of the PLA’s airpower.  The PLA makes a clear distinction in its writings between aviation and air defense.  Aviation includes aircraft (fighters, bombers, reconnaissance, transports, and helicopters), and air defense includes the AAA, SAMs, and radar.  The PLAAF also includes the PLA’s airborne troops. 

By 1971 the PLAAF had created fifty air divisions, which remained fairly static until the late 1980s. According to a 1999 Department of Defense report, the PLAAF’s combat aircraft are organized into some thirty air divisions, plus about 150 transport aircraft organized in two air divisions, compared to the fifty total air divisions that existed into the late 1980s. A 14 June 2000 Jane’s Defence Weekly report stated that the PLAAF currently consists of thirty-three divisions, including twenty-seven fighter, four bomber, and two transport divisions. In June 2000, the Department of Defense reported that the PLAAF and Naval Aviation combined number over 400,000 personnel, 4,300 tactical fighters, 1,000 bomber and close air support aircraft, and 650 transport aircraft. 

The reduction in force from fifty to thirty-three air divisions over the past decade is significant in that the PLAAF has been able to retire many of its F-6s, all of which were build more than twenty years ago (over 2,000 of the remaining fighters are still F-6s). This consolidation has saved the PLAAF money on maintenance costs and has allowed it to focus on other reforms, including logistics for a smaller and more mobile force.  As the PLAAF acquires new weapons systems (Su-27/J-11, Su-30s, Il-76s, J-10, and S-300 SAMs), there will be further changes in doctrine and the way the PLAAF supports a more mobile force. 

In addition to changes in the fighter and bomber force, the PLAAF and Naval Aviation are also focusing on special purpose aircraft, including airborne tankers, airborne early warning and control aircraft, intelligence collection platforms, and electronic countermeasures platforms.  This trend will continue over the next decade. 

Over the past fifteen years, the PLAAF has tried various organizational structures for its AAA, SAM, and airborne branches.  Prior to 1985, SAM and AAA units were structured as separate organizations.  In most cases, they were organized into divisions, with their subordinate regiments.  In other cases, the regiment or brigade was the highest level structure.  In 1985, the PLAAF began restructuring some of its AAA and SAM regiments into combined brigades, with the goal of eventually combining as many SAM and AAA units as possible.  The process involved turning over most of the AAA to the army, and combining some of the remaining AAA regiments with SAM regiments into combined brigades.  By the end of the1980s, all of the SAM and AAA divisions had apparently been abolished, but some individual SAM and AAA regiments and brigades still existed. By the end of the 1990s, however, the PLAAF had re-instituted the division level, at least for SAMs, and had apparently raised at least some, if not all, of the combined brigades to a combined division level.  This change probably reflects the PLAAF’s acquisition of the S-300s from Russia, and an increased number of SAMs overall, plus the view that the combined brigades may not be the best solution to accomplishing the air defense mission. 

The airborne forces have also gone full circle. The PLAAF’s airborne forces began in the early 1950s as a single brigade and then expanded to become a division.  In 1961, the CMC redesignated the PLA’s 15^th Army as the PLAAF 15^th Airborne Army and subordinated the original airborne division to this new organization.  By the mid-1970s, the army had three airborne divisions.  Sometime after 1984, the three divisions were reduced to brigades, but were again enlarged to divisions in 1993, each with about 10,000 troops. 

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the basic radar unit was the regiment, but some radar brigades have been noted over the past few years. This indicates that the number of radar units in each military region has grown considerably, thus necessitating higher level headquarters to maintain a proper span of control. 

It is apparent that the organizational structure for the SAM and AAA forces is still in flux.  It may still take a few years to sort itself out.  Much will depend on the number and types of SAMs the PLAAF deploys and where they are located.  One of the defining factors for the airborne force will be the amount of additional airlift the PLAAF acquires.  If no additional Il-76s are purchased, this indicates a greater internal role.  If the number of Il-76s doubles, then this will indicate a much greater external mission. 

The PLA will most likely continue to increase the size of its radar force, including a more comprehensive integrated air defense system (IADS) through better radars and communications capabilities. 

The overall trend is for further reductions in the size of the force as older aircraft are retired.  The PLAAF could easily be down to twenty-five divisions by the end of the decade. This will equate to further savings on operating costs as well and allow the PLAAF to focus on the tactics and mobility aspects of its newest aircraft.  The administrative structure is not expected to change over the next decade, but certain elements such as the airborne forces, SAMs, and ECM/information warfare will continue to receive greater attention. 

Issue 5: Command and Control 

There is very little information available in open source materials that specifically identifies command and control for China’s airpower elements.  However, the PLA’s overall increase in the use of fiber optics, satellite communications, and computers indicates that the airpower elements are also using these means of communication.  The changes in leadership demographics and administrative changes noted above, specifically changing from command posts to bases, are also part of the overall command and control system. 

This is an area where much more work needs to be done in order to understand future trends. In the past, joint training (to include intra-service training among the branches) was described as two or more elements training at the same time, but in different areas.  This situation is gradually changing as more emphasis is put on real joint training.  One of the biggest questions is whether a joint command and control relationship will be established between the PLAAF and Naval Aviation in time of war?  Specifically, will Naval Aviation become subordinate to the PLAAF?  There are arguments on both sides of this issue, but I believe that they will continue to operate as separate entities, but some Naval Aviation aircraft could be chopped over to PLAAF control to conduct certain missions. 

Issue 6: Training 

Although the PLAAF matured rapidly during its first fifteen years, it has spent the past twenty-five years recovering from the disastrous effects of the Cultural Revolution.  By 1959, the PLAAF had seventeen numbered aviation schools – not all of which were for pilot training – plus several other schools.  However, everything changed during the Cultural Revolution when two opposing ideas competed simultaneously. On one hand, Lin Biao and the leftists closed down non-pilot training schools, canceled all theory classes for pilots, and reduced the flight training time.  On the other hand, the 1960s war in Vietnam, plus Lin Biao’s paranoia about China facing an imminent large war, led to an increase in flying hours at the flying schools. 

While pilot training in the flying schools was reduced from 30 to 12 months in 1967, the number of flying hours rose dramatically: 180,000 in 1966 to 400,000 in 1972.  However, the training was so haphazard that by 1968 the achievement levels of graduates were so low they could not be used in the units where they were assigned.  Once cadets arrived at their units, their flight training was reduced significantly.  Average flying hours for PLAAF fighter pilots dropped from 120 hours in 1964 to 25 hours in 1968, then rose to 55 hours in 1970.  Naval Aviation fighter and bomber pilots averaged 25 hours from 1965-1971, with a low of 12.5 hours in 1968.  This situation began to change in the early 1970s when schools were reopened and technical and theory training was reintroduced. 

Over the past fifteen years, the PLA has placed a great emphasis on training at several levels, including professional military education (PME) for officers at different levels, and initial training within training units for enlisted soldiers.  PME for officers includes basic training at a two- or four-year academy, education at the PLAAF Command College for mid-level and senior level commanders and staff officers.  Some senior officers receive training at the National Defense University.  At the operational unit level, training includes unit training, intra-service exercises, and greater emphasis now on joint service exercises.  

Since the late 1980s, the PLAAF and Naval Aviation have been involved in several complementary organizational changes that have resulted in more realistic flight training.  Historically, fighter and ground attack pilot training was a three-phase process:  basic flight school (20 months), flying academy (28 months), and operational unit training (4B5 years).  Beginning in 1986, however, the PLAAF began to experiment with an additional fourth phase.  For graduates of fighter and ground attack flying programs, phase three became a one-year aircraft conversion program at newly organized transition training bases.  Phase four, or proficiency development, became a slightly truncated version of the old operational training in units (now three to four years).  The program was formalized in July 1988 when the Military Commission authorized each MRAF to establish a transition training base. 

Naval Aviation pilot training consists of three phases -- flying academy, training regiment, and operational regiment.  Cadets at the Naval Aviation flying academies graduate after four years with a Bachelor of Flight degree.  The goal is to have each cadet complete 300 flying hours.  After graduation from the flying academy, pilots go directly to a training regiment.  Following two to three years in a training regiment, the pilots can be awarded wings as a pilot third grade and are then assigned to an operational unit.  

In 1987, the PLAAF established a Flight Test and Training Center at Cangzhou airfield near Tianjin.  This center has three primary missions: to test new aircraft under development by the aviation ministry; to train the initial cadre of pilots in new type aircraft before the aircraft are deployed to an operational base for the first time; and to devise new air combat tactics. 

The Training Center also established a “Blue Army” aggressor unit located nearby to simulate offensive and defensive operations against the “Red Army.” The aggressor aircraft, mostly F-7s and F-8s, engage in exercises with local units, employing dissimilar aircraft air intercepts utilizing evasive maneuvers.  The tactics developed at the training base and through the “Blue Army” are now being moved to the unit-level, where several units have begun to turn these new combat theories and concepts into live-ammunition exercises.  

In 1958, the PLAAF built a large center for testing its AAMs and SAMs in the Gobi Desert near Dingxin, Gansu Province.  During the mid-1990s, the PLAAF began expanding this base to include a large tactics training center, where multiple PLAAF units could practice the tactics developed at Cangzhou and tested in individual units throughout the force.  The training base has a sophisticated command and control center and air and ground tactical training ranges, plus a mock up Taiwan’s Chingchuankang (CCK) airbase, including the runways, air defense SAM and AAA sites, radars, command posts, ammunition depots, and oil depots. Over the past five years, several large scale exercises have been conducted at the base. 

To round out the PLAAF’s tactical training and help make up for the limited number of flying hours per year, the PLAAF has increased its use of flight simulators.  The PLAAF now reportedly conducts more than ninety percent of its tactical training on simulators.  

As a result of these changes in training, PLAAF pilots have been noted flying in more sophisticated simulated air-to-air combat with the aggressor units, training in an ECM environment, flying over the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea, conducting live missile firings beyond the coast, dropping live bombs at ranges, and flying at night and under different weather conditions, as well as flying at low‑altitudes. They have also practiced emergency mobility deployments to permanent and auxiliary airfields within and outside their assigned military regions.   All of these changes have been aided by the acquisition of improved navigation equipment. 

Since 1979, Naval Aviation has been focusing training for its fighter and bomber pilots on long range navigation and deployment training in order to increase its operational mobility capability.  During November 1980, two B-6 reconnaissance conducted the first ever flights over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.  Within a couple of years, Naval Aviation gradually began routine flight activity over the East and South China Seas, including conducting patrols over the Spratly Islands. 

During the early 1980s, Naval Aviation also strengthened its training with the fleet.  In order to meet the Navy’s existing needs, the PLA Navy (PLAN) set up a “Fleet and Air Coordination Research Committee” to study ways to utilize modern equipment to meet fleet-air coordination needs.  As a result, the PLAN promulgated the “Ship and Aircraft Coordinated Training Regulations.”  Between 1979 and 1984, Naval Aviation participated in PLAN exercises involving attacks on enemy fleets, naval blockades, and counterair attacks, as well as joint training organized by military regions.  Furthermore, the PLAN organized exercises in the South, East, and Yellow Seas that involved Naval Aviation reconnaissance troops guiding submarines to attack enemy fleets at sea and enemy amphibious assault units as they landed ashore.  During 1984 alone, Naval Aviation units assigned to the North Sea Fleet were involved in twenty-seven exercises with the fleet, involving about 1,000 sorties.  Unfortunately, there is a lack of open source material that provides details about the exact types of training or the level of joint coordination that took place.  Finally, in 1988, Naval Aviation established its first shipborne helicopter squadron.  Helicopters are now assigned to several PLAN ships, including the Jianghu and Jiangwei destroyers, which are capable of carrying a single helicopter. 

Airborne troop training over the past few years appears to have focused primarily in western China and the Xingan mountains in northeast China.  At the same time, however, some airborne training has also concentrated on a Taiwan scenario.  By reporting this type of activity, the government is apparently trying to send a signal to inhabitants of Tibet and Xinjiang that the airborne forces are preparing for internal contingencies, should the need arise. 

The increased emphasis on the airborne forces in the early 1990s included several components.  Most notably, the PLAAF assigned Lieutenant General Jing Xueqin as a deputy commander.  When Jing retired in 1999, he was replaced by Ma Diansheng -- both officers spent their entire career in the PLAAF’s 15^th Airborne Army, including the commander’s position.  Jing’s appointment came at the same time the PLAAF upgraded its airborne forces from brigades to divisions, the Air Force began receiving its first Il-76s to support the airborne forces, and the airborne forces officially became part of the rapid reaction force.  The question remains, however, whether the airborne forces are being trained primarily for internal or external use. 

Although open source material has identified what the PLAAF and Naval Aviation are doing in terms of training, the biggest question remains how proficient are they, especially in terms of joint operations.  While large-scale exercises like the ones carried out near Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 are politically troublesome, they provide an excellent opportunity to observe how far along the PLA is with its joint training. 

Issue 7: Logistics and Maintenance 

As the PLAAF becomes a more mobile force, it has begun to adjust its logistics and maintenance operations to meet new challenges.  Changes have included computerizing and networking operations, establishing small rapid reaction teams capable of accompanying aircraft deployments, and adjusting the logistics structure, acquisition, storage, and distribution of spare parts.  Other areas include changing refueling techniques, and supporting multiple types of aircraft at a single base.  The PLAAF has also begun building hardened shelters for some of its aircraft.  

In the 1990s, the PLA began focusing on joint logistics at as many levels as possible.  While some successes are evident, such as changing the name of the military region logistics departments to joint logistics departments, the full scope of the jointness is not yet evident.  

The clear trends are for more joint logistics, especially in common areas such as hospitals, fuels, quartermaster supplies, and transportation.  The more difficult areas will be spare parts for aviation and air defense equipment.  One of the biggest challenges will be supplying the force with spare parts for all of the sophisticated weapons systems acquired from abroad and for domestically-produced systems composed of foreign parts. This is an area where more research needs to be devoted.  

Issue 8: Foreign Relations 

The PLAAF began sending delegations abroad as early as August 1949, when the Air Force’s first commander, Liu Yalou, led a delegation to Russia to purchase aircraft and equipment.  However, this program lagged until Deng Xiaoping opened the door in the late 1970s.  Since 1979, PLAAF commanders have emphasized direct contact with foreign air forces by leading an average of one delegation abroad per year and hosting visits to China by two to four foreign air force commanders annually.  In addition, the PLAAF’s political commissars since 1988 have also paid visits to several countries, including the United States, Cuba, Portugal, and Turkey. 

Most importantly, analysis shows that each of the PLAAF delegations led by the commander or political commissar have included directors from key headquarters departments, regional commanders, and/or personnel from air force research institutes and academies.  In addition, most of the PLAAF deputy commanders and deputy political commissars have visited abroad as part of a delegations led by senior PLAAF or PLA officers.  These types of visits also help indicate who the PLAAF is grooming for future leadership positions.  As a deputy PLAAF commander, Liu Shunyao accompanied Defense Minister Chi Haotian to the United States in November 1996 and became the commander the next month.  In September 1998, Deputy Political Commissar Qiao Qingchen accompanied Zhang Wannian to the United States and became the political commissar three months later. 

There are several limitations to the future growth of the PLAAF’s foreign relations program.  The first limitation is the small size of the PLAAF’s Foreign Affairs Division, which only has about five full time officers and has not grown appreciably over the past fifteen years.  These officers must plan the itinerary for and escort all foreign and PLAAF delegations.  Second, as discussed previously, each commander is authorized only one visit abroad under ordinary circumstances and the number of foreign air force leaders accepted for visits to China is guided by the overall PLA visitors plan.  Besides meeting with foreign commanders, the PLAAF also hosts or sends out an average of five to ten functional exchange delegations per year (about one per month).  Third, the PLAAF must pay for all in-country expenses for visiting delegations and all international travel expenses for PLAAF delegations.  Fourth, the PLAAF only has military attachés posted in three locations–Washington, London, and Moscow–and there are only about ten countries with air force attachés assigned to Beijing.  This limits the day-to-day interaction between the PLAAF and foreign air forces. 

In terms of international relations, Naval Aviation has remained fairly insular compared to the other PLAN branches and the PLAAF.  As far as can be discerned, Naval Aviation’s commander and political commissar from 1990-1997, VADM Wang Xugong and VADM Shan Dade, respectively, did not travel abroad.  The current commander, VADM Ma Bingzhi, accompanied the Director of the General Logistics Department, General Wang Ke, to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore in February 1997.  There are no indications that the current political commissar, Kang Chengyuan, has traveled abroad.  This situation is not expected to change over the near future, even though the current PLAN commander, Admiral Shi Yunsheng, is a naval aviator. 

The trend is for more working level exchanges, but not necessarily high-level exchanges.  The biggest question arising from the PLAAF’s and Naval Aviation’s involvement in foreign affairs is whether these exchanges are helping them improve their capabilities to conduct warfare against US forces, or whether they are providing an opportunity for the current and next generation of leaders to understand the importance of peaceful global interaction.  Equally important from a policy standpoint, can the United States use these types of exchanges to learn more about the PLA’s airpower? 

Issue 9: New Weapons Systems 

The PLAAF, Naval Aviation, and Army Aviation are all looking to enhance their operational capabilities through upgrading existing equipment and acquiring new equipment.  According to PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao,  

As the Air Force upgrades its capabilities by acquiring new fighters, AEW aircraft, ECM platforms, and SAMs, the PLAAF will be able to extend its range, increase its firepower, and change its tactics through the use of improved electronic warfare, night training, joint campaign training, live bombing and missile firing, training over the ocean, low-altitude flights, and emergency mobility deployments to other airfields. 

To meet its goals, the PLA has acquired or is in the process of developing new command and control communications equipment, radars, SAMs, fighters, tankers, AEW aircraft, ECM aircraft and pods, GPS, data links, cruise missiles, and air-to-air missiles for its forces.  Rick Fisher has provided a very good summary of the types of equipment the PLA has acquired or is trying to acquire. 

While there is no doubt about what China is acquiring or developing, the biggest question dividing analysts today is how proficient is the PLA in utilizing the equipment it currently has, and can they utilize and maintain even more sophisticated equipment in the future.  Even if they are not as proficient as they should be today, however, there is agreement that they should definitely get better as time passes.  

Some of the most important questions I have about the new equipment is where will the PLAAF deploy the remaining 200 Su-27/J-11 aircraft, the new Su-30s under contract with the Russians, the J-10 when it comes on line, and the AEW/AWACS aircraft they will most likely acquire from the Russians now that Israel has canceled the Phalcon sale?  The location of these systems will tell us much about how they are to be utilized, and how they will be supported logistically.  Furthermore, what aircraft besides the FB-7 will Naval Aviation receive? 

Issue 10: China’s Defense Industry 

Much has been written in and out of China about the defense industry’s ability or inability to produce the sophisticated weapons systems the PLA needs.  The pessimists point out that aircraft like the J-10 have been under development for over 20 years and are not yet operationally deployed.  The optimists point out that China is now co-producing the Su-27 and may co-produce the Su-30 as well.  The pessimists point out that the production rate for the Su-27 has lagged behind the projected schedule, thus indicating problems with the program.  The optimists point out that the defense industry has dramatically increased its access to Russian and Israeli technology, which will allow China to develop its own weapons in the near future.  The pessimists point out that the PLA’s need to go abroad for its newest weapons is an indictment of the defense industry’s woefully inadequate ability to produce sophisticated weapons. One point almost everyone agrees on, however, is that China’s ballistic missile program is a definite pocket of excellence.  They are also working diligently on their cruise missile program. 

As some analysts point out, it may have taken the Chinese over ten years to deploy their first B-6 airborne tankers or almost twenty years to develop the FB-7, but they are now in the inventory.  That should be the starting point for analysis of the PLA’s capabilities.  By the end of this decade, the PLA will have all of the pieces of the puzzle to wage effective combat – SAMs, AEW/AWACS, ECM platforms, fighters, ground attack aircraft, cruise missiles, and air-to-air missiles.  At that point, it won’t have mattered how long it took the defense industry to produce them.  The United States’ friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific Region have often said that the US needs to look at China through their eyes instead of only through American eyes.  Although the US may continue to have qualitative dominance over Chinese airpower systems, China’s neighbors are the ones most threatened and who must come to political terms with Beijing.  

Finding the Answers 

There are several ways to find the answers to these questions.  One way is through the collection and analysis of intelligence information gathered through national technical means.  Another way is through the collection and analysis of open source material.  A third way is through military exchanges with the PLA. The recent Department of Defense reports on the Chinese military have synthesized this material into a good overview of the PLA today.  One must not forget the role that NGOs play in this as well.  There is a growing literature on the PLA based on research and exchanges by academics and analysts in the NGO community.  In the end, however, the best way to collect information is through a combination of all of these ways. 

In my view, the United States has yet to seriously address the issue of collecting material on China’s military. Yet we complain about China’s ability to exploit the same type of material that is openly available in the United State.  The biggest hole is the exploitation of open source Chinese material.  While there has been a proliferation of material published in China, there is no coordinated program to identify, collect, translate, disseminate, and analyze open source information on the PLA and the defense industries.  

There is a definite need for a conference to discuss China’s airpower, including speakers from business, academia, and the government, as well as from China.  The Center for Naval Analysis has hosted two outstanding conferences in the past year – one on the PLA Navy and one on PLA campaigns.  Given the growing interest in the subject and the access to material and people in China, a conference on airpower would be very worthwhile. 

Over the past couple of years, Congress has seen fit to legislate how the Department of Defense interacts with the PLA.  While there is some merit to this legislation, it has also limited the ability of the US military to collect information on critical aspects of the PLA. The US needs to change its mindset about our relations with China.  We need to go as students rather than teachers.  The US needs to identify exactly what we are seeking, and we should tailor our delegations to ask the right questions. All participants in any delegation to China should be required to submit a detailed trip report of their findings -- something that is lacking today.  We also need to look at the long-term returns from a relationship with the PLA, rather than judge the results of each delegation. 

Finally, a review should be made of the number and types of analysts within the entire intelligence community who are currently focused on China.  While we complain about the Chinese ability to collect and analyze information about us, the number of analysts looking at China in the US intelligence community is seriously inadequate.