Dragons in Orbit

Since the Gulf War, and even more since the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the PRC has been devoting significant time and effort to considering the shape of future warfare. In general, PRC analysts of security issues appear to have reached a consensus that:

For the PRC, therefore, development of space technology is an essential element of their future security strategy. As such, it is important for US analysts of the PRC to develop a better conception of the Chinese approach towards space, and their consideration of how the US looks at space.

Given the amount of resources devoted to China’s “two bombs, one satellite” programs in the past, it would appear self-evident that such systems are a centerpiece in Chinese strategic thinking. That they are items of major political prestige is not open to question. They are hallmarks of Chinese self-reliance, as well as technological achievements that reflect well upon the Communist Party. What is less clear, however, is how the PRC envisions the strategic and operational utility of such systems, beyond the prestige garnered.

In the US, the initial impetus for the development of space systems can be traced, at least partly, to the lessons of Pearl Harbor.[1] The “shock of that disaster remained forever tattooed on the memories of people who lived through it,” and was a key motivating factor in the development of the early US intelligence satellite program.[2] This was compounded by the success of Sputnik, at least for the average American. The “space race” was therefore dominated by matters of prestige and national security. It is certainly possible that initial Soviet satellite efforts, to some extent, mirrored the US, and may have also been motivated by similar concerns (i.e., the desire to avoid another Operation Barbarossa). What is unclear is whether similar factors drive China’s space efforts. Is it primarily a desire to avoid another Marco Polo Bridge incident? If it is, Chinese space efforts can perhaps be explained by a common paradigm. It is by no means clear, however, that a desire to avoid military surprise has been the driving force. As important, it is the first suggestion that the PRC’s paradigms, in space and in other aspects of military strategy, may be significantly different from that of the US or the USSR (and by extension, more difficult to understand).

Indeed, given the two decade long primacy of economic development, it is at least conceivable that the space program is intended to serve China’s current national strategy of developing the national economic base, by extending its technological foundations. Through its space efforts, it has developed greater systems integration capabilities, such as mating payloads and launchers. It has acquired or gained impetus in the development of more advanced sensor technology, including CCD systems for the Ziyuan-I and Ziyuan-II satellites, jointly developed with Brazil. By exploiting commercial space developments, particularly foreign technologies, China moves forward in its technological base, at a reduced cost to itself.

The answers to these questions may well provide clues to what priorities the Chinese will set, both for space asset development, but as important, for its military space doctrine. Fundamentally, for example, is the PRC interested in space dominance? This would imply an effort to retain use of space assets in the course of a conflict, as well as denying space operations to an opponent.

Or is it space denial, in which case denying the West the ability to use space freely may take precedence, even to the point of accepting constrained operational parameters for the Chinese themselves? Given the importance of Western space systems to RMA-type military operations, as well as the relative communications problems of naval versus land forces, the Chinese may well conclude that there is a greater benefit to be gained by denying space than by exploiting it themselves.

Or is it deterrence through space systems? For example, Chinese writings in the wake of the Gulf War, and more importantly since the NATO intervention in Kosovo, have repeatedly made the point that China is not an Iraq or a Serbia. Explicit reference is often made that the PRC’s possession of nuclear and space technologies make them, if not an outright peer of the United States, at least a force to be reckoned with.[3] Whereas the United States could strike at Baghdad and Belgrade with relative impunity, Beijing has a far greater ability to disrupt an opponent’s plans. With nuclear weapons, it has the ability to inflict unacceptable levels of damage. At the conventional level, Beijing has a far greater ability to detect enemy forces at a distance through its space systems; it therefore has a far greater chance of inflicting casualties and achieving a political outcome more favorable to itself. The primary harvest of China’s past “two bombs, one satellite” effort, in short, may simply be the ability to retain its autonomy and defend its sovereignty, whatever the intentions of “hegemonic” powers.

Yet, exactly how the PRC would utilize such systems is not clear. With nuclear weapons, for example, it is presumed that the PRC subscribes to a doctrine of limited deterrence. It is suggested that “a recognizable, realistic ability to fight and inflict sufficient…damage on an aggressor assures deterrence; and if that fails, it assures an ability to prevent an enemy victory.” It is also noted, however, that “there is no open evidence that limited deterrence has been explicitly endorsed by the most senior political and military leaders.”[4]

Similarly, in terms of space systems, the Chinese clearly recognize their importance. Discussions of countering air campaigns note the role of space systems in warning of the approach of US carrier battle groups. As important, Chinese analysts recognize the import of space systems to the United States. The book Unrestricted Warfare, for example, assumes that American military leaders have integrated space operations into their campaign planning. Other articles discussing the Kosovo campaign note the array of US satellites employed in the course of these operations, including not only reconnaissance and surveillance systems, but meteorological, data relay, and DSP missile early warning. These were used not only in order to determine targets, but also to coordinate various forces and to undertake bomb-damage assessments. Yet, as with nuclear weapons, China’s intentions in space remain unclear.

Such uncertainty affects the ability of Western analysts to predict China’s behavior. Given PRC concerns with the prospect of hegemonic opposition, China might, on the one hand, prove to be an implacable opponent. In particular, it might believe that it can confront the United States, given its possession of more advanced technologies and a nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, it might also prove more amenable to dialogue, especially if treated as an equal, since its sovereignty is less at stake (at least where issues other than Taiwan are of concern). Finally, it may well react more ferociously to Western initiatives that threaten these guarantors of Chinese security, e.g., missile defense, ASAT systems, etc.

In light of such circumstances, it is essential for Western planners to understand the place of space in Chinese thinking. That, in turn, requires addressing not only the straightforward concerns of technology (what is the state of the Chinese art in cameras, attitude control thrusters, training of imagery analysts), but also the issues of strategy, doctrine, and methodology, in order to place Chinese space efforts in context.

A. What kind of security strategy will the PRC pursue, given its view of the future? How will this affect its space policy?

Until the mid-1990s, the PRC seemed to view its security more in economic than in traditional military terms. With the Taiwan Straits crises, however, and the NATO intervention in Kosovo, military threats were more explicitly enunciated in various Chinese writings. Even before then, there had been a steadily increasing allocation of national resources to military programs, including a growing publicly acknowledged defense budget. Despite this, however, there are regular observations that the key to the PRC’s long-term security is the development of its economic and technological base. For the moment, it would appear that military development will continue to be subsumed to economic progress.

This priority on economic development, even while seeking improvement of relevant military technologies, is epitomized in the Chinese space sector. The current array of PRC satellites, for example, is dominated by dual-use systems, namely meteorological, communications, and some remote sensing systems. As important, its acquisition of foreign technology, through joint development programs and purchase of foreign systems, have been focused on systems and capabilities that would serve both economic as well as military clients. The Chinese space-launch sector, with its array of boosters, can obviously provide important support in time of crisis, as well as peacetime. Given that development of space systems is acknowledged to have both economic and military benefits, it is likely that the PRC will continue to pursue broad development of its space industries, including launchers, satellite manufacturing, etc. Such an effort is likely to produce more capable commercial systems, with obvious attendant improvements for the PRC military.

Unfortunately, it is not clear whether a change in Chinese security strategy would be reflected in their behavior with regards to space. What is the likelihood that analysts would, in fact, be able to determine a shift in Chinese security strategy based on its approach to space asset acquisition? Conversely, it is equally unclear whether a shift in technologies sought would necessarily presage a change in security thinking. Chinese writings suggest that, given the political prestige and economic benefits attendant from a robust PRC space program, this will be a national objective, regardless of military strategy. Short of a focused effort to develop purely military satellite systems (presumably including such specialized features as radiation hardening and armoring), it is worth considering what, if any, indications might be noticeable from an effort aimed at developing a robust Chinese military space force.

What systems the PRC constructs, in turn, would presumably be affected by the PRC’s conception of space exploitation in time of crisis or war. There are several possible options the PRC might pursue with regards to military exploitation of space in wartime or crisis. One, of course, would be to develop its own constellation of military satellites, including dedicated meteorological, communications, and surveillance systems. Various articles suggest that the PRC already exploits satellite imagery in order to monitor defense developments on Taiwan. As important, they clearly envision the use of space-based assets to track Taiwanese, and potentially American, naval forces. These uses are likely to be enhanced by future Chinese developments, including real-time relay of imaging data.[5]

From a US analyst’s perspective, this would be the best of all choices. Such an effort would be easily identifiable, as the PRC lofted satellites in particular orbits, with particular performance characteristics. It is also how the US, and the Soviets to a great extent, operated. Yet, given the paucity of resources available to the Chinese, it is not at all clear that this is necessarily their preferred strategy. For example, although the PRC has demonstrated an ability to place satellites in geosynchronous orbit, there is no publicly available indication that the PRC has ever placed any early warning satellites akin to the US Defense Support Program (DSP) systems in orbit. Indeed, the PRC did not even deploy a large phased-array radar (as part of a ballistic missile early warning system) until 1994. Despite a substantial satellite tracking capability, including several ships and a number of other radars, these are not a substitute for a missile early warning system, as they does not provide regular coverage of US ICBM fields or possible SSBN patrol areas. This suggests that the PRC holds a different view on the exploitation of space for military purposes from either the US or the former Soviet Union.

Another possibility is that the PRC does not intend to rely on space-based information systems in wartime at all. It might, for example, decide to utilize space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, and other means during the preparatory phase of war, while expecting its forces to have to operate without them once hostilities commence. Given the US dominance of the space arena, Chinese analysts may well expect that any PRC space assets would be neutralized, in one way or another, upon the advent of hostilities, and therefore not expect to have to operate with them at all. Indeed, the Chinese note repeatedly the October 1997 US tests, in which inert meteorological satellites were hit by lasers, prior to being deorbited, as well as the mid-1980s kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) test from F-15s. These analysts seem to believe that this presages future US efforts at eliminating satellites outright.

Given the dual-use nature of many current PRC space assets, it is also at least possible that Beijing may choose not to develop a dedicated military space force. It could instead choose, for reasons of economy or political efficacy, to rely on its own satellite network for some things, and purchase more detailed images or other information from international vendors, thereby exploiting internationally accessible space systems for its needs. Such an approach might conceal Chinese technological capabilities, as well as specific areas of Chinese interest.

This last strategy, of course, would be predicated on the inability of the West, and especially the United States, to deny access to the PRC of such information. Yet, given the political repercussions from any US effort to deny access, especially if the United States sought to limit information flow to third parties, such a strategy may not be ineffective. In particular, as commercial entities as well as other nations develop ever more sophisticated surveillance systems, efforts at “blockading” Chinese access to space-based information may prove as diplomatically and commercially damaging to the US. It is possible that the PRC expects that the weight of international opinion would serve to counter US military technological supremacy, particularly in a situation wherein the US itself is not threatened directly.

Finally, there is the possibility that the PRC may choose a completely different approach. Chinese space experts have exhibited some interest in small satellites, mini-satellites, and microsatellites. Given the large throw-weight of Chinese missiles, as well as their relatively lower reliability, the PRC may choose to rely on a large number of cheaper, less versatile systems, as it would for them to develop a small number of large, highly capable (and highly expensive) ones.

Another question is how the PRC envisions its ability to deny “hegemonic powers” the ability to exploit space-based systems. Chinese writers, as noted previously, recognize the importance of space systems to supporting US military operations. If the PRC is not intending to replicate the US space architecture, then the Chinese ability to deny the benefits of space to an opponent might take many forms.

One possibility would be to engage in active measures aimed directly at space assets. Such measures would include KKVs and co-orbiting systems to ground-based lasers and electromagnetic weapons. Another, more asymmetrical response, would be to target the earth-side stations and data relays. Developing a jamming system against GPS, for example, might prove as beneficial (and far cheaper) than destroying the GPS satellites themselves. Such means, moreover, might be far simpler, and cheaper, than development of actual space weapons.

If the purpose of space denial is to reduce the benefits of space to an opponent, however, then denial and deception operations are at least as important. The PRC recognizes that, for the short-term, its military will not be able to directly confront a Western military successfully. As important, this situation will not change, even with the acquisition of some additional modern systems, simply because there is neither the time nor the resources to create the qualitative and quantitative means to do so.

In this regard, then, perhaps Chinese space systems have a key role in allowing Chinese forces to circumvent the RMA in general, and Western space and advanced weapons systems in particular. A December 1999 article on PLA “anti-reconnaissance” exercises suggest that there is a significant effort underway to develop countermeasures to satellite and other overhead monitoring. “With repeated practice, the division developed new methods combining the tactics of hiding, lying low, and drilling, with the tactics of moving, deceiving, and harassing.” The article claims that such efforts successfully masked detection by satellites and aircraft.[6] If Chinese space systems (and/or access to foreign space systems) allow the PLA to successfully avoid Western targeting, then Western space dominance may be less relevant.

What is particularly of interest in this story is the claim of non-detection, which suggests:

2. The existence of a cadre of trained imagery analysts to examine the resulting photographs.

Both of these are areas on which there is much uncertainty. Unfortunately, the article does not answer any of the questions that arise subsequently from these suggestions, such as:

1. Which assets were tasked and what are their capabilities? If there were several capabilities being utilized at the same time, were they all successful?

2. If the satellites involved are foreign-owned, how was such tasking undertaken? How was the realism of the exercise maintained (particularly if the satellite’s course was known in advance)?

3. What has been the training and experience level of the imagery analysts? If they were experienced, where did they gain such experience from? If they were not, how useful was this exercise?

It is likely that the PRC will seek to engage in all three elements of space denial, i.e., direct countering, tactically asymmetric responses, and denial and deception operations. Indeed, the concepts of fan, fang, and kang, probably all apply to Chinese views of space denial operations. As important, they may well seek completely “outside the box” operations.

Finally, a key problem confronting any security studies specialist is that of methodology. How does one go about answering these questions, particularly when the Chinese have no incentive to provide clearcut answers? While there needs to be an effort to examine as much of the Chinese literature as possible (and to do so in the original wherever possible), it is just as essential to have some means of determining whether the sources utilized are, in fact, meaningful and/or authoritative.

While gaining access to authors from the Academy of Military Science, the Chinese National Defense University, etc., are important, as is neibu documentation, there is some question as to what will constitute authoritative Chinese statements on any of the aforementioned subjects. In particular, the need to avoid mirror-imaging, or otherwise allowing preconceived notions to influence analysis, is essential.

[1] Dwayne Day, John Logsdon, et al., “Introduction,” in Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites, ed. By Dwayne Day, et al. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 1998), p. 2.

[2] Albert Wheelon, “Corona: A Triumph of American Technology,” in Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites, ed. By Dwayne Day, et al. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 1998), p. 29.

[3] The fact that China has a more developed satellite reconnaissance capability than Japan, Germany, or even the UK has been remarked upon. See, for example, Zhou Guanwu, “China Has Long Possessed First-Rate Reconnaissance Satellites,” Ta Kung Pao (HK) (September 13, 1999), in FBIS-CHI (September 22, 1999).

[4] Alastair Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization,” in China’s Military in Transition, ed. By David Shabaugh and Richard Yang (NY: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 291.

[5] Chou Kuan-wu, “China’s Reconnaissance Satellites,” Chiao Ching (HK) (#306, March 1998).

[6] Sing Tao Ribao (Internet Version) (December 6, 1999), in FBIS-CHI (December 11, 1999).

Dragons in Orbit? Analyzing the Chinese Approach to Space