SPACE, THEATER MISSILES, AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE: EMERGING FORCE MULTIPLERS FOR THE PLA AEROSPACE CAMPAIGN 

Mark A. Stokes 

CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS:
A CONFERENCE ON THE STATE OF THE FIELD 

26-27 OCTOBER 2000

FORT MCNAIR, WASHINGTON DC
AEROSPACE I PANEL 

The views expressed within this paper are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Aerospace power is emerging as a key instrument of Chinese statecraft.[1] Heavily influenced by U.S. air campaign theorists and by the U.S. performance in the Gulf War and Operation ALLIED FORCE, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) understands the role aerospace power can play in getting others to do their bidding.  Driven largely by the desire to stem steps toward greater Taiwanese autonomy, Beijing is prioritizing strike aviation, theater missiles,[2] space systems, and associated force multipliers as coercive tools of choice.  The PRC is caught up in a global trend that views aerospace power, more than other forms of military power, as relatively easy to manage, to employ or threaten, in the hope of achieving deliberate political effects.   

Aerospace power will become an increasingly powerful instrument of PRC coercion as the range and number of PLA strike aviation assets increase, land attack cruise missiles are fielded, their inventory of increasingly lethal and accurate theater ballistic missiles expands, and sophisticated electronic attack assets are deployed.   Aerospace power likely will dominate any conflict in the Taiwan Strait and will shape its ultimate outcome. PLA planners may perceive that an aerospace campaign, involving the integrated application of theater missiles, electronic warfare, and strike aviation assets, offers the PRC political leadership with quick, decisive political results, perhaps more so than other options, such as gradual escalation involving a series of island seizures or slow strangulation through a maritime blockade.  Such a perception may be misguided, but it appears to the source of an intense debate within upper echelons of the PLA high command.  

The specific aerospace campaign strategy that Beijing would adopt is unclear, and is perhaps also the subject of extensive debate within the inner circles of the Central Military Commission, General Staff Department, PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, National Defense University, and Academy of Military Science. A PLA air and/or theater missile campaign may seek to deter or punish a neighboring adversary through the sudden application of violence. The PRC may choose to gradually escalate the level of violence, targeting an adversary’s economy or population, to compel an enemy leadership to adopt policies favorable to Beijing’s interests.  On the other hand, Beijing may seek to deny an opposing military of its ability to resist, thereby convincing the leadership that further resistance is futile.  The PLA could also adopt a decapitation strategy, seeking to neutralize the opposing leadership on the assumption they are the driving force behind the war, and that their elimination will lead to the desired results because their successors would be expected to adopt policies more favorable to Beijing. 

The PLA is developing a force capable of applying limited aerospace power in a joint environment.  Investment priorities include increasingly accurate and lethal theater ballistic and land attack cruise missiles; development or acquisition of multi-role fighters; development of stand-off and escort jammers; and ground force assets such as attack helicopters and special operations forces. At the same time, Beijing is investing in advanced command, control, communications, and intelligence systems and is increasing emphasis on training, particularly through the use of simulation.   Denying or complicating the ability or willingness of the United States to intervene in reaction to the use of force around its periphery is a key driver.   

The PLA understands their current limitations.  Plagued with a relatively backward aviation establishment, the PLA is investing in aerospace technologies and strategies that that can offset shortcomings in the face of a more technologically advanced adversary. The PLA has sufficient airpower today to prevail over most adversaries around their periphery albeit over a prolonged period and at an exorbitant cost.  However, economy of force considerations, together with a strategy that requires a rapid political resolution, are driving the PLA toward more effective strike aviation assets and other supporting aerospace systems. Surprise and preemption are crucial. 

Space, theater missiles, and electronic warfare are perhaps the most important supporting aerospace systems.  Space assets facilitate command and control, and provide crucial strategic intelligence, theater awareness, targeting, and battle damage assessment information.  Increasingly accurate theater missiles that are relatively immune to defenses provide a means to suppress enemy air defenses, creating a more permissive environment for subsequent conventional air operations.  Electronic attack assets may reduce early warning and confuse enemy commanders.  Together, the joint application of aerospace forces can combine to create a synergy that can have significant military and political effects. 

Space.  Development of a viable architecture of space-based sensors and communications systems is fundamental requirement for expanding the PRC’s battlespace awareness. China’s space and missile industry intends to field a constellation of dual-use remote sensing satellites that could support the PLA with near-real-time intelligence early in this century.  Senior PLA officials believe that constellations of communications, remote sensing, electronic reconnaissance, and weather satellites are crucial for 21^st century warfare.  Theater air and missile operations in particular must be supported by a surveillance architecture for strategic intelligence, targeting, and battle damage assessment (BDA). Before targets can be struck, they must be identified as targets, precisely located, and defenses accurately assessed so that they can be hit without prohibitive losses.   

To expand its battlespace awareness, the PLA is developing the means to monitor activities in the Western Pacific, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean. China Aerospace S&T Corporation (CASC) appears to be developing at least four space-based systems that would expand PLA battlespace awareness and support strike operations further from Chinese shores. Space assets could enable the monitoring of naval activities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the South China Sea, and track U.S. Air Force expeditionary aerospace force deployments into the region. Space-based reconnaissance systems also provide the images necessary for mission planning functions, such as navigation and terminal guidance for land attack cruise missiles.  Satellite communications offer a survivable means of communication that will become particularly important as the PLA operates further from its shores.  

Theater Missiles. China’s growing presence in space is intimately related to the PLA’s emerging capacity for theater strike operations. Today, the PRC leadership could employ conventional theater ballistic missiles against densely populated areas and economic centers in order to inflict enough pain on enemy civilians to force their government to concede.  However, Beijing understands that civilian punishment as a coercive strategy rarely if ever has succeeded.  As they increase in number, accuracy, and lethality over the next five-10 years, PRC theater missiles may become an important means of increasing the military vulnerability of its neighbors.  Theater missiles are a form of aerospace power that will be critical for achievement of information dominance and air superiority in the opening phase of a conflict.  In fact, theater ballistic and land attack cruise missiles, supported by space-based reconnaissance, appear likely to emerge as a cornerstone of PLA warfighting early in the 21st century.  

Theater missiles may change the nature of the air battle around the PRC’s periphery, particularly in a future Taiwan Strait scenario.  Large scale theater missile raids, combined with other enablers such as electronic attack, directed against selected critical nodes within a neighbor’s command and control structure or air defense system, could produce sufficient shock and destruction to enable conventional air operations to be carried out at reduced risk and cost.  Because potential adversaries around the PRC periphery have limited countermeasures, ballistic missiles have a strong coercive effect by themselves, whether applied as part of an aerospace campaign or held in reserve.  

As PLA ballistic missiles incorporate advanced inertial and satellite aided navigation systems, the accuracy of the PLA’s conventional ballistic missile force is expected to improve significantly. Fewer missiles will be required per target during the critical first minutes of a military campaign.  The incorporation of sophisticated conventional warheads, including a mix of submunition payloads, will increase the lethality and kill radius of each missile. Improved command and control systems and effective implementation of joint campaign concepts can enhance interoperability between the Second Artillery, PLA Air Force, and other PLA elements to create synergistic effects. 

To augment its theater ballistic missile arsenal, China is creating a new generation of cruise missiles able to penetrate defenses and strike critical targets with increased precision and firepower. Fielding of land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) may prompt expansion of missions of the PLA Air Force, Second Artillery and Navy. Increasing availability of cheap navigation and guidance systems and digital mapping technology have increased the incentives and reduced the time required to field a LACM.  Cheaper and more accurate than ballistic missiles, LACMs appear to have a relatively high development priority. The PLA’s first generation LACM likely is not expected to be on a par with U.S. cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile.  However, the size and flight profile of the PLA’s ground-, air-, and sea-launched LACMs may stress the capabilities of even the most modern air defense systems. Chinese research and development of LACMs is being aided by an aggressive effort to acquire foreign cruise missile technology and subsystems, particularly from Russia. The first LACM to enter production is expected to be an air-launched SILKWORM derivative with a range of 500 kilometers or less.  Flight International has reported that as many as 200 LACMs could be available by 2005. 

Electronic Warfare.  Electronic warfare is an emerging aspect of PLA aerospace operations and is viewed as crucial to achievement of information dominance.  China’s development of electronic warfare is intimately linked to its revolutionary advances in information technology. China is procuring state-of-the-art technology to improve its intercept, direction finding, and jamming capabilities. The PLA’s first generation anti-radiation missile, likely to be fielded by 2005, can target key air defense fire control radar systems.  Basic objectives of an electronic attack campaign are to conceal PLA operational preparations, weaken enemy air defense early warning, and to paralyze or disrupt enemy integrated air defense systems. Chinese electronic warfare operational concepts emphasize concealing the activities and disposition of PLA forces and to mislead the enemy. Electronic attack can deceive or desensitize enemy air battle commanders through insertion of spurious radar tracks, or blot out entire avenues of approach.  

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 

The PLA has signaled their intention to develop the capability to conduct an effective aerospace campaign around its periphery in the 2005-2010 timeframe, complete with space-based, airborne, and ground based sensors; a large arsenal of land attack and tactical ballistic missiles; and an increasingly sophisticated array of electronic attack assets.  However, significant gaps exist in the academic community’s understanding of PLA joint aerospace campaign theory, particularly in the area of strategy and command and control.  An understanding of the influence that Western strategists have had on PLA campaign theory can be useful as well. 

It is important to determine how aerospace power would contribute to successful PLA coercion, particularly in the Taiwan Strait context, and under what circumstances would its contributions be most successful.  The synergy created by the integrated application of theater missiles, strike aviation, and electronic warfare, supported by a space-based, airborne, and ground based sensors, can be significant. The shock of an initial integrated aerospace campaign by itself could create the effect necessary to achieve the political objectives. This shock effect is especially important in militaries that have limited ability to sustain operations.  But will the PLA be able to integrate assets from different organizations, such as the Second Artillery and the PLA Air Force, in an efficient and effective manner?  As their modernization program proceeds, could the PLA sustain an integrated air and missile campaign long enough to achieve the desired political result?  Could the PLA achieve the requisite surprise for a successful first strike?  What obstacles stand in the way, and, more importantly, what steps are being taken to correct deficiencies?  

Political Ends.  To adequately assess PLA aerospace capabilities, it is necessary to address what political objectives a coercive aerospace campaign would seek to achieve. PLA capabilities must be judged against specific political objectives in a given scenario and assessed in light of the adversary’s vulnerabilities.  Future political objectives driving the threat or actual use of force against Taiwan could include, inter alia, deterring further steps toward greater autonomy, and/or compelling Taiwan’s leadership to agree to the PRC formulation of “One China,” a timetable for unification, or immediate political integration with the PRC. In a worst case scenario, a successful air and theater missile campaign could provide the necessary conditions for physical occupation of the island, barring third party intervention, albeit at great cost. 

An understanding of PLA targeting is important, particularly their process of evaluating how neutralizing a particular target set would trigger a specific reaction that would yield the desired military and/or political outcome. Could Beijing identify points, or specific targets of a neighboring enemy that if neutralized, suppressed, or paralyzed, would result in at least temporary systemic failure, either throughout the entire military, or in one particular subsystem, such as an air defense network or in a particular geographic area? Would Beijing be able to increase the military vulnerability of Taiwan through an aerospace campaign sufficient to persuade Taipei to accede to PRC demands? What is Taiwan’s threshold for pain? What countercoercive strategies could a potential adversary such as Taiwan adopt and how effective would they be? 

Other regional security implications of Beijing’s aerospace modernization drive must be addressed in greater detail. How will the deployment of relatively sophisticated strike aviation assets and a growing arsenal of theater ballistic and land attack cruise missiles exacerbate the cross-Strait arms race? What domestic bureaucratic trends are influencing the predominance of aerospace forces in the Taiwan Strait?  Is a “cult of the offensive” developing within military establishments on both sides of the Strait? 

Technological State of Development.  Questions surround the technological capabilities of the PRC defense industries to produce quality weapon systems.  However, in light of PRC access to Russian, Ukrainian, Israeli, and Western European technology, one should not dismiss Beijing’s ability to develop and manufacture relatively sophisticated systems sufficient to support operations around the PRC’s periphery.  Establishments best able to make significant progress include the information and space and missile industries. 

Uncertainty surrounds the PRC’s long term intentions in space, the direction of their architecture development, budgetary sources, and the role of foreign technology. China’s space program has been subsidized in part by the commercial space launch program, but this does not fully explain the financial sources of military space development.  The level of Russian, Ukrainian, and European assistance in all facets of the Chinese space program is believed to be significant, but details are unavailable.  The potential for Chinese counterspace operations deserves additional attention.  Because of their potential in rapidly launching small tactical satellites, the development of solid-fueled space launch vehicles, recently announced by China’s space industry, merits scrutiny.  Little information is available on China’s space-based electronic reconnaissance and other satellite early warning programs. The implications of China’s first generation navigation satellites, as well as exploitation of U.S. NAVSTAR Global Positioning System and Russia’s GLONASS, must be addressed in greater detail.  Additional information on the PRC’s incipient data relay satellite program is needed. Finally, uncertainty surrounds the longer term military purposes, if any, of China’s manned space and lunar exploration programs. 

The PRC is on the verge of deploying their first generation land attack cruise missile, increasing the accuracy and lethality of its growing arsenal of conventionally armed ballistic missiles, and preparing for the deployment of its first generation anti-radiation missile.  Land attack cruise missiles pose perhaps the greatest challenges for potential adversaries such as Taiwan, but confirmed production rates and deployment modes are unavailable.  LACM accuracy is expected to be significantly greater than ballistic missiles, but still remains shrouded in obfuscation.  Capabilities and implications of the PLA’s anti-radiation missile development program must be addressed as well. 

The Second Artillery’s conventional theater ballistic missile units are an elite force that merits greater scrutiny.  The growing number of conventional theater missile brigades in southeast China must be closely monitored as should improvements in the missiles’ navigation systems.  Breakthroughs in ballistic missile terminal guidance over the next five to 10 years could be devastating not only for the PRC’s neighbors but also for U.S. forces operating in the Western Pacific. 

There is a tendency to interpret information gaps related to electronic warfare as a lack of PLA interest in developing a viable capability in this niche area.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Since the Gulf War, the PLA has demonstrated significant interest in electronic warfare, and has invested in a range of ground-based and airborne jammers. Greater research into operational methodologies, command and control concepts, and technological development is needed.  Areas that merit special attention include research and development of jammers capable of operating against an adversary’s joint tactical information distribution system and satellite communications; Russian, Ukrainian, and Western European technical assistance in electronic warfare; and progress in the development of directed energy weapons. 

Analysts attempting to assess PLA capabilities are faced with numerous obstacles.  The PRC political system and traditional Chinese strategic culture place a premium on secrecy and obfuscation.  For example, estimates of the number, accuracy, and costs of the PLA’s key aerospace forces, particularly the conventional Second Artillery, vary widely, and likely are known only to the Central Military Commission, portions of the General Staff Department, the Second Artillery, and China’s space and missile industry. Several measures, including hedging, greater exploitation of open sources, and adopting an integrated approach to PLA analysis, can reduce gaps in our understanding of PLA intentions and capabilities. 

·        The Hedging School of Analysis.  Prudent analysts hedge their conclusions regarding PLA capabilities.  The hedging school errs on the side of caution, since a complete understanding of all the variables in a future conflict, and current and future PLA capabilities – judged against the vulnerabilities of potential adversaries – is difficult if not impossible. Exclusive focus on PLA shortcomings can be dangerous since the stakes involved are so great.  A mistake in underestimating PLA capabilities could be catastrophic should U.S. and PRC interests ever collide.  The hedging school has a healthy respect for past Chinese accomplishments and the PLA’s future potential, without necessarily casting the PRC as an imminent threat to U.S. national security interests.  Cognizant of the possibility that the PLA could make significant breakthroughs in key areas, hedgers review future U.S. military capabilities, as well as those of allies and friends, against a range of plausible threats. 

·        Open Source Exploitation.  Perhaps the greatest tool for a better understanding of the PLA is exploitation of open source materials.  PLA interlocutors, when faced with accusations of not being transparent, have occasionally lamented that there is a remarkable volume of data on PLA programs available in PRC-affiliated publications.  They are correct – the PRC is more open than many people give it credit for.  However, one must have the resources for translation or the patience to sift through volumes of material for common themes or an occasional grain of valuable insight.  One also must be cognizant of intentional obfuscation, advocacy, or political propaganda.  Regardless, a concerted effort to obtain and digest a wide range of publications available on the open or gray market can be very revealing.  Open source literature can expose strategy and resource debates, reveal organizational details, highlight programs in various stages of the research and development cycle, and identify key personalities.  Familiarization with primary source materials establishes a common frame of reference for concepts and vocabulary, naturally leading to a better understanding of the Chinese perspective.  

·        The Integrated Perspective.  PLA aerospace campaign theory envisions the integration of PLAAF assets; conventional theater ballistic missiles under the Second Artillery; space-based, airborne, and ground based sensors; army aviation and special forces; and electronic warfare assets of all Services.  Intangibles that are extremely difficult to predict, such as strategem and deception, would also play a major role in any future conflict.  Stovepiped analytical approaches can lead one to underestimate the PLA’s capability to conduct integrated joint operations that are sufficient to achieve limited political and military objectives around the PRC periphery. Some studies have made inroads into PLA air campaign theory, but have focused almost exclusively on the PLA Air Force.  Others have written about another component of aerospace operations – the theater missile campaign – but failed to examine effects of a synergistic application of strike aviation and other aerospace forces.  In particular, little has been written about PLA electronic warfare.  Furthermore, static balance of power assessments that compare numbers and types of aircraft, ships, and tanks across the Taiwan Strait can be misleading.    

In sum, PLA ambitions to become a preeminent regional aerospace power have significant implications for security in the Asia-Pacific region. The buildup of PLA aerospace forces, and theater missiles in particular, may exacerbate a regional arms race and prompt development of an offensive culture throughout the region.  This is especially true in the Taiwan Strait context.  Such trends must be monitored and implications for U.S. policy assessed.