PLA Ground Forces:

Topics for Additional Study

by

Dennis J. Blasko 

            Last year James Mulvenon asked me to do a baseline study of the PLA’s ground force organization and structure for this year’s CAPS/RAND conference.  Though I gladly took on the task, I knew I would have trouble finding details about the current status of the force structure.  As well all know, the PLA has just finished a 500,000-man reduction and major reorganization of all its elements.  The majority of cuts were felt in the ground force, and timely specifics of what has developed over the past three or four years are difficult to uncover.

            The gross structure of how PLA main force elements are organized is fairly discernible.  We understand pretty well the general composition of the Military Regions, Military Districts, and Group Armies.  We are aware of the formation of ground force Rapid Reaction Units (RRU), helicopter units, and special operations forces (SOF) over the past ten to 15 years.  We know that in the last three years the PLA has begun to experiment with the downsizing of divisions into brigades in order to make a more rapidly deployable, combined arms force.  We can read about the major trends the PLA ground forces are pursuing in doctrine and training.  Thanks especially to the October 1, 1999 military parade in Beijing we have an idea about some of the new equipment that has been introduced into the ground forces in recent years.

            However, after listing these generalities, it becomes much more difficult to talk authoritatively about the specifics for nearly all of these trends and developments.  Obviously the main reason for this lack of specificity is the paucity of detailed information the Chinese government provides.  The US government, particularly the Department of Defense, has added to the information released by Beijing, but not in the detail necessary to answer the specific questions I will raise in the remainder of this paper.  Moreover, I am not aware of a book published in the past 15 years or so that addresses some basic fundamentals for any military.  For example, though we know there are 21 Group Armies in the PLA ground forces, is there an authoritative study that says how many men are in an infantry squad, how is that squad organized, and what are the responsibilities of each individual squad member?  Where can I find out how many tanks are in an armored platoon, company, or battalion?  These are the building blocks of any army.  Though we may be able to see the green PLA forest, we have a difficult time understanding the individual trees.

1.  Rapid Reaction Units

            Let me begin with a few questions about Rapid Reaction Units, the forces we generally consider the most capable and most likely to deploy in case of emergency.  For example, is there an authoritative source that defines which units the Chinese have designated as Rapid Reaction Units?  The latest DOD report on the PLA says “approximately 14” ground force divisions have been designated as RRU, but which 14?  Are there two divisions per MR?  What about all the writers who identify the 38^th and 39^th Group Armies as RRUs, are all of the units in each of those GAs RRUs, or only a portion of each of those GAs?  By themselves, two group armies would amount to nearly half of the total RRU force identified by the Pentagon.  Are RRUs really division-strength, how do the newly formed brigades fit into the RRU force?

We say in general RRUs receive better equipment, more training, and are manned at higher levels that other ground force units, but what evidence supports such a claim?  How often do RRUs train and what kind of training do they receive that is different from other PLA ground force units?  Are the demonstrations of small unit proficiency displayed at PLA show units representative of the training RRUs receive; is that sort of small unit training standard throughout the force?

2.  Helicopter and Special Operations Units

            A similar set of questions can be applied to PLA ground force helicopter units and special operations forces.  But more importantly, for these units, how are helicopters and SOF units integrated into larger combined arms operations?  How often do they train with the infantry and armored divisions/brigades which their operations will support?  How do helicopter units train to operate at remote bases, away from their logistics and maintenance support base at home?  Without some idea of the answer to these questions, we really cannot even attempt to make an assessment of the PLA’s capabilities in combined arms, helicopter, or special operations.

            RRUs, helicopter, and special operations forces are the spear tip of the PLA ground forces, how do the remainder of the main force units stack up?  We may be able to extrapolate if we know a little more about these units that are generally assessed to be in the highest level of readiness.

3.  Local Forces and the PAP

            While we have a fairly good picture of the force structure of PLA main force units, we know much less about the composition and organization of local forces: the “independent” units that do not belong to the Group Armies, many of which may be categorized as border defense units.  The Military Balance, 1999-2000 says there may be as many as “87 infantry regiments/battalions” as local forces.  That is not an insignificant force, perhaps as many as 100,000 to 200,000 combat soldiers, and we know almost nothing about them, except that their mission is to assist the main forces in protecting the regions in which they are stationed.

            And how would the forces of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) be incorporated into local defenses?  The PAP was formed from many local force units and has received at least 14 ground force divisions from the PLA since 1996.  Its light infantry, rapid reaction structure is suitable for rear area security operations.  We can assume that the PLA and PAP have planned for such operations, but have they actually trained with each other for such external defense missions?  I am not aware that the Chinese government has acknowledged that these PLA divisions were transferred to the PAP, they certainly have never provided any details of which units were so transformed.

4.  The Reserves

            At the same time the PAP has expanded, the reserve forces of the PLA have also grown in size.  It is logical that many of the units or personnel demobilized since 1996/7 have been assigned to the reserves.  The number of personnel assigned to the reserves is generally believed to be about 1.2 million.  The Directory of PRC Military Personalities lists some reserve units, but it does not identify enough units to account for that 1.2 million number.

            How will reserve forces be incorporated into the new PLA doctrine?  How often do they train, and do they train with their active force comrades?  Though there may be one out there, I am not aware of any detailed study of the PLA reserve forces in this new era.

5.  The Militia

            As the PLA has modernized and the PAP and reserves expanded, there has also been very little discussion of the current role of the militia.  Militia forces have been used as work forces during national emergencies, such as the 1998 floods.  But how do they fit into the new PLA doctrine and warfighting concept?  Again, I am not aware of any recent examination of the role or force structure of the militia.

I can only assume that their importance has diminished as the PLA looks to operate on China’s periphery, but the militia could have some role in assisting the deployment and sustainment of main force units.  They also are likely the major component of local air defense and chemical defense planning.

6.     Logistics Support

            Many analysts of the PLA have recognized the importance of logistics support and sustainment in the PLA’s new concepts of warfighting.  There have been several extremely useful studies of PLA efforts to improve their logistics capabilities based on what members of the PLA have written in their own newspapers and journals.  The PLA is certainly aware of the high consumption rates of ammunition, particularly precision guided munitions, and fuel in modern warfare.  Some foreign observers have been to PLA logistics exhibitions and have seen new equipment on display.  However, we are less certain of the extent to which the new logistics support equipment on display has actually been deployed into the forces.

            In the open literature we have focused less on arcane topics such as the size of fuel tanker trucks and the number of such tankers assigned to units than on the modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery that they will support.  But as vehicle engines become bigger and consume more fuel, does the PLA have sufficient capabilities to keep its forces supplied with fuel and lubricants as it maneuvers?  We have seen pictures of rapid refueling of armored columns and tactical pipeline units, but where are these units found and how large of a force can they support?

            Similar questions can be asked of the engineering units necessary to enhance mobility and survivability on the battlefield.  Engineering units are essential to executing the camouflage and deception operations that remain at the heart of PLA doctrine.  Construction engineers and bridge units enable the maneuverability required on the modern battlefield.  Do these units train with the combat arms units they will support so that their operations can be effective?

            Have the field maintenance elements of the ground forces received adequate attention as the PLA receives greater numbers of high technology equipment?  Can the PLA keep its new equipment operational at locations miles from their home bases in the adverse weather conditions associated with the battlefield?  I have no doubt the PLA has studied and understands the maintenance requirements of high technology weaponry, I am simply unaware of the evidence to demonstrate that its operational units have exercised to the extent necessary to ensure that their new equipment can be maintained for an extended period of time away from their garrison locations.

7.     Tactical Communications

            We are all aware of the progress China has made at the national level to improve its communications infrastructure and there is evidence that the PLA has also benefited from the satellite, optical fiber, and mobile communications systems now found throughout the nation.  These developments appear to be best suited for higher headquarters, fixed, strategic sites.  How has the communications revolution been translated down to tactical level?  There are reports of the PLA’s interest in frequency-hopping, secure radios for tactical use.  Are RRUs equipped with secure tactical communications, down to what unit level?  Are main force communications compatible with local forces and reserve comms?

            We’ve seen the staged photographs of a PLA tactical headquarters on the frontline with soldiers working on bright white personal computers, with tanks in the background, helicopters overhead, smoke and explosions all around .  But in reality, how are computers integrated into tactical operations?

One of the big problems with computers and new radios is their dependence on a constant source of electricity.  Does the PLA have enough generators to make the electricity necessary to keep their computers running?  Can the logistics system provide enough fuel to keep the generators going and are there enough generator mechanics assigned to the units to keep these fickle machines operational?  If these and other systems, like night vision goggles (NVGs), laser designators, can be run by batteries, is there a logistics system in place to provide a sufficient amount of batteries of all the different types necessary?  Are there sufficient batteries available for training?

PLA newspapers often talk about units not using new equipment because the soldiers are not familiar with their new gear and don’t want to break it.  Therefore, they don’t use it.  Radios, computers, NVGs, and laser designators can be intimidating to soldiers with little technical background.  With the new two-year length of conscription service for the army, who actually operates this new high tech equipment?

8.     Equipment Identification Guide

            All the new indigenously produced and foreign equipment that has been introduced into the PLA in the past decade makes identification of equipment types important in order to determine which units have what capabilities.  By just reading some news articles and looking at parade pictures and photographs in PLA journals one could get the impression that much of this equipment has been issued throughout the ground forces.  Though I cannot be positive, I would guess that much of the new equipment we see has been deployed into relatively few units throughout the PLA.

New high tech equipment is much more expensive than the more simple weapons of the past, even when made in China.  The 10-15% defense budget increases over the past decade simply are not sufficient to buy the gear in quantities large enough to equip the majority of the forces, much less then buy the fuel and spare parts necessary for proper training.

            It is nearly impossible to determine through open sources exactly what equipment has been issued to which units.  The PLA has resigned itself to having its units equipped with a mixture of low, medium, and high technology equipment for the foreseeable future.  It is unlikely that units of similar type and size in various parts of China are equipped with similar models of the many kinds of equipment necessary for modern operations.  Imagine how this complicates the logistics of operations across MR boundaries.

            As a result of the lack of detailed information from Chinese sources on the extent of deployment of new weapons systems foreign observers cannot agree on the numbers, types, and nomenclatures of equipment in the PLA.  It is often difficult to determine when a basic system has been modified or a new system deployed.  The Chinese have various designators for many pieces of equipment and this confusion is further compounded by the names assigned by foreign sources.

            PLA-watchers throughout the world would be greatly aided by a comprehensive ground force equipment guide, which includes tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, artillery, missiles (anti-tank and air defense), small arms, engineering, and communications equipment.  Such a guide would necessarily include proper nomenclature, equipment characteristics, and photographs.  If at all possible, it would be very useful if the numbers of each type of equipment that have been deployed into the forces could be determined.  This is a major task, and it would not be easy or done over night.

            A lot of detailed work remains to be done for a true understanding of PLA ground force capabilities.  As we all know, our understanding of PLA capabilities will be limited by access, the actual ability to observe PLA training in person, which is controlled by the Chinese government.  We can read accounts in Chinese newspapers and journals, and indeed if one tries hard enough that sort of information is available, we can attend military equipment exhibitions, but the sort of data necessary for the next level of analysis can only be acquired by actual observation by trained and experienced objective observers.  Without such access, military planners and policy-makers are likely to use worst case estimates of PLA capabilities in order to ensure that the military forces arrayed in China’s neighborhood are prepared sufficiently to cope with any potential use of Chinese military force.  Through greater openness the Chinese government could quickly and easily take steps to build confidence and decrease tensions and suspicions that are building in the region.  However, I have little optimism that the PLA is confident enough of itself to take such steps and therefore expect that we will make only marginal gains in understanding the PLA in the next few years or reducing the military tensions that have been growing since 1995.