For the United States, Taiwan, and other major states near the People’s Republic of China, perhaps one of the most troubling national security developments for the coming decade will be the assemblage by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of a new force projection capability based on military space, information, missile, air and Special Forces elements. For the purposes of this paper this gathering capability will be called the PLA’s "information-strike combine." In this area of military endeavor the PLA is no longer a "Junkyard Army." But whether one accepts this proposition, it is indisputable that the PLA is devoting great effort toward improving its military space, information, missile, and air warfare capabilities.

It is indeed appropriate within the larger question of assessing the field of PLA studies, to focus on how the PLA studies community, and more specifically, the new National Defense University Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, might use its resources to better analyze the developing air-battle dimension of a modernizing PLA. Previous scholarship, and perhaps even the open assessments of the Department of Defense, have not provided policy makers with sufficient warning of the PLA’s gathering capabilities to pursue a theater level information-strike campaign. It is critical that the new NDU Center put a high priority on the gathering and dissemination of data on the PLA’s information-strike combine. This paper will examine general question areas and suggest how to pursue further investigations.

But before exploring areas for future research concerning the PLA’s emerging information-strike combine, it is appropriate to review briefly questions concerning sources for this area of study. For all of its growing importance to the PLA and its implications for the U.S. and its allies, there has been relatively little open-sector study of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLA’s emerging space and missile forces. Early major works include that of Ken Allen and the authors of 1995 RAND Corporation study on the PLAAF. These works, however, are now dated and the RAND study contains flaws that are examined later.

In addition, this field of PLA study is hampered by a lack of translated resources and by the inability to have personal contact with the PLA’s military units, or command, intellectual and industrial leaders in the space-air arena. This condition goes to the core of historical imperatives stressing the importance of secrecy in Chinese military culture. This stands in stark contrast to conditions in our own democracy—which are exploited by the PLA. Research can be assisted by U.S. policies of strict reciprocity in mil-to-mil contacts. Future U.S. policies might insist on equal access for U.S. researchers to Chinese technical universities known to conduct research, and for technical access to Chinese aerospace companies, as Chinese are afforded to the U.S technical universities and companies. The PLA surely has seen enough major U.S. weapon systems, bases plus military and industrial leaders to serve the goals of deterrence. Now it is time to balance the ledger.

One underutilized resource is military exhibitions in the PRC and Russia. Shows like the China International Defense Electronics Exhibition (CIDEX), the bi-annual Zhuhai Air Show, and the bi-annual Moscow Air Show offer analysts the opportunity to mix with Chinese and Russian officials and engineers, who represent companies and research institutes that would be otherwise off limits. At these shows an informed analyst can often glean parts of a larger picture or find the occasional big story. Private and government institutions with interests in learning more about the PLA should help analysts to attend these shows. The NDU Center can provide a real service by providing timely analysis of these shows and what they reveal about the PLA. Providing such analysis on an open web page would fill a reporting gap created by the open media’s lack of expertise.

Department of Defense reports on PLA modernization issued to comply with congressional mandates, since 1998, have revealed much new information. But these reports are also troubling in that they give the impression that much more could be reported upon if Clinton Administration officials had allowed more candor. There has been a clear resistance on the part of the Clinton Administration to issue a study of the PLA that approaches the usefulness of the Reagan Administration’s Soviet Military Power series. Open reporting, both Chinese language and from the West, is a dominant source of information on China’s aerospace sector. But quite often it is misleading or insufficient. This leads to caution on the part of PLA analysts, when perhaps there is often much more to be uncovered.

But at another level, the possibilities for open research are illustrated in the works of analyst Major Mark Stokes, who’s two major studies have set a new benchmark for analysis of the PLA’s space, missile and air forces. With his language faculty, Stokes has exposed new bodies of both doctrinal and technical PLA literature to produce a fuller, contemporary, and more sobering view of the PLA’s efforts to synergise space, information, missile and air forces. His work follows on the efforts of Ian Johnston and Mike Pillsbury, which exposed new PLA scholarship on strategic nuclear and broader conventional doctrine debates.

But these works are troubling in that they illustrate that the U.S. government could foster a much broader awareness of PLA efforts by translating what Stokes and Johnston have found, and what is likely a much larger body of available literature. One hears rumors that the capabilities of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service to translate PLA technical literature have been reduced in recent years so as not to feed alarms that would trouble political agendas with Beijing. Whether or not these rumors are true, it is a scandal that FBIS only translates a fraction of the likely available literature on PLA aerospace developments. It is possible that the denial of this literature to the broader private and government analyst community will be blamed for a potential U.S. or Taiwanese inability to meet a future threat, the ultimate price for which may be lost lives.

When considering future areas of study concerning the PLA perhaps it may be most logical to begin by reviewing previous scholarship to assess its usefulness in enabling an understanding of current and future developments. It is not unreasonable to suggest such accountability, as there are critical U.S. national interests at stake and the products of the PLA studies field does have an impact on national decision making. For example, the 1995 RAND study begins by stating "the PLAAF does not constitute a credible offensive threat against the United States or its Asian allies today, and this situation will not change dramatically over the coming decade. If anything, the PLAAF’s overall capabilities relative to most of its potential rivals will diminish over the next ten years." In the Summer 1999 issue of International Security, John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai wrote, "There is no near-to medium-term likelihood that China’s air force could match those of its possible foes." However, in late June of this year, the Department of Defense in its Congressionally mandated report on the PLA, stated that "after 2005…if current trends continue, the balance of air power across the Taiwan Strait could begin to shift in China’s favor…"

In a mere five years the consensus Department of Defense has essentially overturned the RAND projection, which was a U.S. Air Force funded study. To be sure, the RAND study remains a benchmark work in many areas. But for the Pentagon to suggest that the PLAAF’s capabilities could surpass that of Taiwan’s air forces after 2005 indicates that there is already a gathering potential that either was not acknowledged or could not be seen by the authors of the RAND study. At a minimum this indicates a disturbing gap between open scholarship and government analysis that begs for a more detailed review.

For example, the authors of the RAND study were flat wrong in their estimate of the potential for Russian technology to accelerate the modernization of the PLAAF. They downplayed the potential for Russia to provide a technology infusion for the PLAAF, discounting its ability to absorb large numbers of Russian aircraft, and discounting the likelihood of Sukhoi Su-27 co-production, now set at 200 aircraft. Furthermore, they did not anticipate that the purchase of the Su-30, the R-77, the Kh-31 and the A-50 could quickly boost PLAAF offensive and defensive capabilities. One might say that hindsight is 20-20, but the Sukhoi Su-27 is a weapon system linked to many others, most of which have been heavily marked by Russia since the early 1990s. If the authors had projected a worst-case "what if," that might today be closer to what is happening regarding Russian assistance to the PLAAF.

By the same token, it is necessary to challenge the Pentagon to substantiate its claims with far more details than it has offered so far. There are recent press reports that note the PLAAF could have closer to 300 modern fighters and attack aircraft by 2005—more than the 150 4^th generation fighters the Pentagon estimates the PLAAF will have by that year. The Pentagon is also reluctant to publicly disclose numerical estimates of PLA short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) and land attack cruise missile (LACM) production—although the Pentagon’s reports have stressed their numbers are increasing. But reported numbers—650 SRBMs and 200 new LACMs by 2005—plus reported aircraft production points to the making of a formidable hammer over Taiwan. If the reports are true or near true, then Taiwan is facing a mounting danger of combined missile-air assault the likes of which has not been adequately described to the public or to policy makers. But on the other hand, if open reports are an exaggeration, then there is just as much need for clarification.

There is a clear need for a "B-Team" effort in PLA analysis that is truly hard nosed and stands ready to offer rapid reaction to published analysis, both from the private and government sectors. The NDU Center could host a standing "B-Team" that would hold regular debates with an "A-Team" comprised of veteran analysts who have track record of presenting pessimistic views of the PLA’s military potential. Both views are healthy in a democratic system. The goal is to fully warn U.S. policy makers of the threat potential, or lack thereof, in PLA modernization. However, it would be a tragedy if the Center were to lean toward one side of this debate.

As the PLA gathers greater and more sophisticated space, information, missile, air, and naval weapon systems, questions concerning new doctrine, operations, command and control become paramount. For the Taiwan theater in particular, it is critical for the PLA studies field to concentrate on providing a better understanding of how these assets will be coordinated by the PLA in order to achieve victory. Will there be a dominant service; will the Second Artillery or the PLAAF emerge to control the space assets that will determine how missile and air elements are employed? Can the PLAAF move from a largely defensive posture to one that also stresses offense within this decade?

Can the PLA sequence missile, cruise missile, Special Forces, information, air and naval strikes to a maximum devastating effect? Is the PLA able to conduct its version of what the USAF calls "time critical targeting" to be able to destroy new Taiwanese assets that survive initial assaults? Can the PLA simply combine information and command decision-making for real-time effect? The very large scale control room with multiple visual screens unveiled for the November 1999 launch of the Shenzhou manned space capsule at least illustrates that the PLA can assemble a similar control center for theater wide military operations. In addition, for the PLA, might "time critical" be much longer than for the U.S.? Inasmuch as the first new PLA reconnaissance satellite network will contain four electro-optical imaging and four radar imaging satellites—enough for two daily revisits by each type—it may be that the PLA could organize its strikes around twice daily packages of sequenced operations.

Part of this question should address how the PLA deals with increasing complementarily between the services. This is already a matter for the Second Artillery and the Army in that both have effective SRBMs. The Army appears to have fewer DF-11 SRBMs. When the Second Artillery, the PLAAF and the PLA Navy all have land attack cruise missiles, this issue will become more acute.

Another actor whose contribution should be explored further is that of Army Aviation. Luke Colton, who argues that the Z-10 helicopter program is for a transport, not an attack helicopter, has offered some excellent analysis on PLA Army Aviation. Whether one believes there is a Z-10 attack helicopter program or not, the PLA Army does require a much more capable attack helicopter. The attached fuzzy photo shows what appears to be a new attack helicopter that bears some resemblance the Eurocopter Tiger, which is reportedly a model for the Z-10 attack helicopter. It would be of particular interest in Taiwan whether the PLA envisions an independent role for Army aviation that would allow future attack helicopters an active role in a Taiwan strike campaign.

For some analysts of the PLA, a proliferation of strike platforms is a problem for the PLA that may prove to be its undoing in a major conflict. For other analysts, it is a matter of how the PLA rationalizes its growing wealth in strike resources. It is possible to explore these questions to some degree by more aggressively seeking out new PLA literature that addresses these topics. But access to the PLA personnel most likely to be denied foreign contact is also necessary. Should such access become a priority, then mil-to-mil contact programs must be configured to produce these people.

Question 3: By what means will the PLAAF be supplied time sensitive reconnaissance data to be able to conduct its air campaign?

As the U.S. has come to recognize that sensors are the most critical aspect of rapid targeting and destruction of enemy assets, so it appears that the PLA is investing much more in strategic reconnaissance, and very likely, in tactical reconnaissance. Thus, there is a need to better understand how the PLA and PLAAF plan to meet their reconnaissance requirements, and just how the PLA defines those requirements. The questions of who controls space assets or whether the services are permitted to develop their own assets becomes critical. Or perhaps the PLA may or may not require constant imaging. The PLA’s first reconnaissance satellite network will be able to provide two daily revisits for electro-optical imaging and radar imaging satellites. However, the PLA is also interested in micro satellites and nano satellites, which in the future could be launched in constellations that may provide more complete coverage of a combat theater. These systems are also cheaper, enabling multiple services to own them.

There is also cause to investigate how the PLAAF will contribute to the reconnaissance mission. Today it appears that only some versions of the obsolete F-6 are outfitted for visual reconnaissance. While large numbers of these would provide a secondary means of reconnaissance, it would be valuable to know if the PLAAF is interested in acquiring more modern electro-optical reconnaissance pods from Russia, Israel or elsewhere. There is also the issue of UAVs, which are in use for reconnaissance by the Army and the PLAAF. These would be a less expensive alternative to manned aircraft—were this to be attractive to a force that has excess F-6 and F-7 fighters to modify for this mission.

Another potentially important source of intelligence for targeting may be Special Forces or existing fifth column units already deployed to potential theaters like Taiwan. The island is certainly vulnerable to this kind of activity especially with the increase in cross-strait trade and migration. With relatively inexpensive satellite telephone or high frequency radios such personnel could target location or relay battle damage reports to the command center.

The spectrum of information warfare that the PLA possibly envisions ranges from achieving a position of information dominance vis-à-vis an adversary, to denying access to information to the same adversary. Securing its own space and terrestrial information networks is as vital as destroying those of the enemy. It is clear that the PLAAF will have an increasing role to play in this area of warfare, thus meriting its future study.

When its obtains it’s A-50E AWACS from Russia, combined with Tu-154 EW/ELINT platforms, and likely improved radar networks, the PLAAF will be a major contributor to the PLA’s battlespace picture. In addition, when it obtains its Su-30MKKs, armed with Kh-31P ARMs, it will be able to attack the radar-information sources of the enemy. It will be necessary to watch whether the PLAAF, by virtue of its control over most long-range SAMs, gets future anti-satellite missions as well.

Question 5: What are the complete short and long term implications for the PLAAF of access to Russian and other foreign military or dual use technology?

One area of study that is not receiving nearly as much open sector attention as it deserves is the impact of foreign, and in particular, Russian technology on the modernization of the PLA. Such research is sorely needed if only to sound the alarm for foreign policy makers who have ignored this developing threat to U.S. interests. The Clinton Administration’s major success in July in convincing Israel not to sell its advanced Phalcon phased-array aerial radar to the PLA was but a first finger in the crumbling dike that used to hold back Western military related technology to the PLA. European sanctions are ebbing as both space and aircraft technology begins to flow in ostensibly civil co-development agreements like micro satellites with Britain’s University of Surrey and in helicopters with Italy’s Agusta.

If there has been any effort by the Administration to stop the flood of Russian technology in the last eight years, then there is little to no visible sign of that. The persistent attempts by some analysts to diminish the importance of the Russian technology infusion by downplaying its scope or by highlighting the various problems with absorbing new weapon systems just don’t get it: the PLA is learning how to utilize new technologies that pose an increasing threat to Taiwanese and American forces in Asia. The prospect by 2005 of over 180 Sukhoi Su-27s and Su-30s, armed with R-77 AAMs and Kh-31 ASMs, directed by 3-4 A-50E AWACS, guided by GLONASS partially owned by the PLA, protected by a coastal batteries of S-300s and their Chinese derivatives, and preceded by 600-800 SRBMs and LACMs, should be unsettling to the commanders of the ROCAF and the U.S. 7^th Fleet.

For the PLAAF, an ongoing infusion of Russian and to a lesser extent, Israeli technology has provided an introduction to what passes for modern military systems for most of the world, and is very likely opening the door to the next generation of technology. There have been some unconfirmed but detailed press reports over the last year that the PLA-Russian technology relationship is entering a new phase in which sales are being displaced by co-development. Reported PLAAF-related co-development projects include a new long-range self-guided AAM, base perhaps on the ramjet-powered version of the Vympel R-77, and a new stealth fighter-bomber.

The degree to which technology doors are opening for the PLA, particularly from Russia, give ample cause to address this question with a fairly broad brush: if the Russians have it today, it may be on sale to the PLA tomorrow. Whether or not the PLA has the money to buy new and larger weapon systems may not be an assuring prospect when considering the transfer of technology. The requirement to have advance warning of PLA modernization will require more detailed knowledge of the possible Russian, Israeli and European technology options open to the PLA. For this, there is no substitute for going to the source. Coverage of air shows and arms shows must be supplemented by greater efforts to visit design bureau or companies in these countries.

Lasers: More in depth investigation of the future of laser technologies for the PLAAF is long over due. A key technology that has received special attention under the 863 military technology investment program, the PLA likely has been researching multiple uses for lasers ranging from targeting, radar, communications and kill weapons. But currently lasers do not yet have a major role in the PLAAF. Today lasers are used to target an early indigenous laser-guided bomb and to trigger some short-range AAM warheads. Introduction of the Su-30MKK with Russian laser-guided PGMs will mark a greater supporting role for lasers in the PLAAF. But the potential for being a kill weapon is illustrated by the Pentagon’s reporting since 1998 that the PLA may be using lasers to dazzle low-orbit imaging satellites, and reporting by the Cox Commission that Russia may have sold the PLA nuclear-pump laser technology. In the 1980s the Russian Beriev bureau modified an Il-76 to carry a large airborne laser. This aircraft, called the A-60, represents one kind of advanced kill laser technology that could be made available to the PLA.

Stealth and counter stealth: There is a clear need for greater exploration of the impact of stealth technology on the PLA’s operations and equipment. The PLA is devoting great resources to the development of both stealth and counter-stealth technology. Incorporation of stealth into cruise missiles aircraft and ships will benefit their offensive capabilities. Success in developing effective counter-stealth could significantly devalue an expensive area of U.S. strategic investment.

At the 1998 Zhuhai show one could view the Seek Optics Company which was selling stealth coatings and software for stealth shaping. There is some reporting that a new variant of the JH-7 fighter-bomber will incorporate stealth coatings. Also being marketed at the Zhuhai show was the J-231 Mid-Range Surveillance radar made by the Institute No. 23 of the former China Aerospace Corporation. It was advertised as having "high anti-stealth capability."

UAVs: Yet another area for future research would be how the PLAAF intends to make greater use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is likely that the PLA is watching closely how the U.S. tries to have UAVs take on more missions from strategic reconnaissance to combat. Even if used with effect for reconnaissance or EW missions over Taiwan, UAVs would likely produce a significant force multiplying effect for the PLA.

Well known is the PLA’s reverse engineering of the U.S. Firebee drones captured during the Vietnam War, known as the Chang Hong series. There have been Chinese TV reports of F-7s turned into drones, possibly for air combat training. For the Army, the PLA fields a series of prop-driven target drones and the AN-206 drone revealed in the mid-1990s, is a first generation short range tactical reconnaissance drone that apparently benefits from Israeli technology.

However, there is plenty cause to consider that the PLA also views UAVs as a key future technology as does the U.S. The attached photo of two new drone concepts revealed earlier this year could indicate that the PLA is studying, if not developing new families of smaller drones for a variety of missions. The drones in the photo do not begin to approach the strategic significance of a system like Global Hawk. But if unleashed against Taiwan in large numbers, they could supplement satellites in the reconnaissance role and perhaps undertake EW and ELINT missions. And while it is difficult to envision the PLAAF developing unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) like the recently unveiled Boeing X-45, it is worth noting that Zhuhai 98 show featured the Chang chun Institute of Emulation Technology and its virtual reality control systems, a technology often associated with future advanced UCAVs.

 

 

 

Question 7: What will be the future defensive and offensive roles/capabilities of the PLAAF land-based anti-air forces

All of the PLA combat services are devoting greater attention and resources to the anti-air challenge and this deserves much greater study by the field. On the Taiwan Strait, new SAMs pose both an offensive and defensive challenge. There is also a potential for more in depth active defense of new SRBM and land-based LACMs. The PLAAF has since the 1990s acquired the Russian Fakel S-300PMU (SA-10). And inasmuch as the Almaz Tor-M1 (SA-15) was designed to protect the S-300, it may also be controlled by the PLAAF. These systems represent a generation advance over the HQ-2 (SA-2), which itself has been progressively improved. The Tor-M1 is said to be able to intercept some PGMs. If the PLA were to acquire the new Russian S-400, it would then have a 250-mile range SAM that could dominate the Taiwan Strait without having to be put in vulnerable coastal bases.

There is also the question of who will control future anti-satellite and anti-missile systems. The PLA has been studying both for many years and the recent Pentagon PLA modernization report notes the PLA is developing anti-missile systems. At the 1998 Zhuhai show, Chinese officials told the author that future active-guided versions of the FT-2000 missile would eventually have an ATBM capability. Will the Second Artillery inherit the main anti-missile mission or will the PLAAF? In addition, who will control future laser-based anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons?

A closer review of the PLAAF’s long-range bombing force intentions is necessary if only to gain a better understanding of the PLA’s post-Taiwan plans for beyond-theater power projection—if any. For example, a new long-range strike aircraft would be needed if Beijing were to attempt to equip the PLA to be able to contest control out to the "Second Island Chain." Some H-6 (Tupolev Tu-16) bombers reportedly will be modified to launch long-range LACMs and more airframes are being converted for support missions.

There are plenty of indications that the PLAAF is interested in a successor to the H-6. In the 1980s there were apparently some efforts to radically modify the H-6 to replace its two large turbojets with four much more efficient turbofans. This idea likely died a justified death. There are persistent suggestions that the PLA will purchase the Tu-22M Backfire, which would prove as worthy a successor to the H-6 in PLAAF service as it has to the Tu-16 in Russian service. There are also unconfirmed rumors of an H-9 bomber project that may involve some Russian technical assistance.

Perhaps more troubling are reports of a new Russian-Chinese stealth fighter program and reports that China is interested in purchasing the new Sukhoi Su-32 long-range strike fighter. This aircraft has a maximum take-off weight between that of the F-15E and the F-111 (now only used by Australia). Unlike both, it has provisions for greater crew comfort for very long missions. With aerial refueling, the Su-32, or the Su-30 for that matter, could undertake armed long-endurance patrols over the South China Sea, or strikes out to the Second Island Chain.

There is also cause to more deeply investigate the PLAAF’s expanding use of electronic warfare and other combat support aircraft. It is possible that the current modest effort to equip the PLAAF with EW/ELINT and tanker aircraft—which permeate modern Western air forces—belies a more intensive Chinese effort in this area. In the last several years some Tupolev Tu-154 civilian transports have been modified with EW/ELINT equipment and the second batch of Sukhoi Su-27s were equipped with the Sorbitsya ECM pod. Evidence of a more extensive effort was revealed at the 1998 Zhuhai Airshow, when for the first time the Southwest China Research Institute of Electrical Equipment revealed its KG300G airborne jamming pod, its KZ900 ELINT pod, and its KZ800 ELINT system for larger aircraft—like the Tu-154. At the same show Xian officials also told the author that an electronic warfare variant of the JH-7 strike fighter was in development. Such an aircraft might easily be equipped with the aforementioned pods.

Greater study of the implications of aerial refueling on the PLAAF’s reach and the subsequent impact on regional air forces is also necessary. It is clear that the PLAAF will now gradually build an indigenous aerial refueling capability that could be supplemented by Russian tanker aircraft. H-6 bombers converted for aerial refueling are now entering the PLAAF initially to service F-8IID fighters in the PLAAF and PLA Naval Air Force. These new H-6 tanker aircraft could also extend the range of Su-30 strike fighters now being procured, or in the future, Su-27 and JH-7s modified for aerial refueling. It is also possible that the PLAAF may acquire Russian Ilyushin Il-78 tankers, which have been intensively marketed to the PLA. The PLA may follow the example of India, which purchased the Il-78 after it had purchased its Su-30MKI strike fighters.

Aerial tanking poses challenges for the PLA air forces and for their likely adversaries. The PLAAF will have to master complex operations and be sure of high engine reliability for long term missions. For a Taiwan campaign, a refueling capability allows more distant airfields to be utilized and allows more easterly attack approaches to Taiwan, all of which should help ease the challenge of air battle management. For Japan and the other claimants to the South China Sea, the prospect of a PLAAF with longer legs and persistence will place greater pressure on their air defenses.

There is also call for more intensive study of the PLAAF’s future transport capabilities. The growth in number and capability of such aircraft could indicate a post-Taiwan PLA requirement to be able to project force beyond the Asian theater. For both intensive theater and beyond theater operations the PLA will require a far more robust airborne transport force. Perhaps it would be unwise to assume that the PLA will remain satisfied with its small number of Ilyushin Il-76 and XianY-8 transports, augmented by a larger fleet of civil jet transports in airlines linked to the PLA. As it stands, this PLA transport force is not particularly impressive. They require large airfields to operate, which complicates power projection even in "local war" theater campaigns. In the case of a Taiwan operation, such an airfield will have to be secured after a large and costly commando operation.

However, what if the PLA does have greater designs for aerial power projection? There have been occasional suggestions of PLA interest in the large outsized Antonov An-124, which is larger than the U.S. C-5 transport. The An-124 was displayed at the 1998 Zhuhai Airshow. China may also be interested in greater cooperation with Ukraine’s Antonov bureau, which makes the modern An-70 tactical transport. This transport can carry almost as much as an Il-76, and as far.

In addition, future PLAAF transports may not be completely dependent on new foreign aircraft. The attached picture shows the model of a novel four-engine canard medium size transport that looks to be an advanced development of the Y-8. This is possibly a late 1980s to early 1990s concept that may come from the same design group that produced some early J-10 concepts. There is no public evidence that the concept was developed into a full-scale prototype, but it demonstrates impressive forward thinking on the part of the PLA. Such a stol transport would be add much greater flexibility to airborne forces and give more options for Special Forces activities. It would also be able to ease logistic support of more South China Sea areas that could in the future have small airstrips.

In this regard, it is also necessary to evaluate the impact of the possible PLA purchase of the Russian Beriev Be-200 amphibious turbofan powered transport. With an impressive range and a 7.5 tonne/60 person lift capability, the Be-200 has the potential to transform PLA South China Sea outpost duty from punishment to vacation. For that matter, the Be-200 will give the PRC more political options or imperatives in the South China Sea as it will enhance its ability to undertake greater economic activities in these disputed regions.

It is generally noted that in regards to tactics, operations and logistics that the PLAAF has been challenged for a long period. In comparison to the U.S. or even Taiwan, the PLAAF lags in all of these areas to a degree that could pose a decisive weakness. That said, it can be noted that the PLAAF seems to understand these problems and is undertaking some improvements, such as providing small and large computer combat simulation equipment. In addition, the PLAAF deployments over the Taiwan Strait in the Summer of 1999 marking Beijing’s anger at then President Lee Teng Hui’s comments on state-to-state relations, also gave select units a high boost in air time.

But for the purposes of future study concerning the PLAAF, it is also worthy to ask whether victory as defined by the national leadership, especially on the Taiwan Strait, requires that the PLAAF be as fit and ready as its opponents. If one assumes that "victory" equals a level of destruction that forces a political capitulation in Taipei, then massive missile strikes that overwhelm ROC air bases may be the primary determinant of air supremacy. The PLAAF may not require parity because it is not expected to wrest air superiority from a powerful ROCAF.

As long as there is a growing national security imperative to learn more about the current and future capabilities of the PLA, both for military and political officials, there will be a requirement to devote greater attention and to devote more resources toward this goal. An effective Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs that is aggressive in its work, produces studies on a broad range of issues, and is accessible to a wide spectrum of policy makers and the interested public, could become a national asset.

On the other hand, if the Center takes to heart President Clinton’s admonition last Novermber, when he signed the Defense Authorization bill, that the NDU Center not become a "threat" Center, then that in itself could be seen as opening the Center to a pre-programmed bias would reduce its usefulness and question its necessity. The Center should also heed the views of Senator Richard Shelby, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who recently criticized "bias" in the intelligence community against viewing China as a future threat to the United States. To succeed the Center must actively encourage all views on the PLA and give them regular and creative venting.

The PLA studies field would be aided immensely if it had an advocate for greater resources to be devoted to the obtaining and processing of data on the PLA, and an advocate for increasing the resources for FBIS to translate Chinese military and miltiary-technical literature. There is also a greater need for funds to allow PLA scholars to have greater contact with the PLA and its future—be it Chinese government ordained contact, or no-so-ordained, such as to airshows or tours to aircraft factories. There is even a need for a mega-web site to host debates, opinion columns, and to be a clearing-house for unclassified government, private and Chinese world sources on the PLA. Could the NDU Center do all of this?

Regarding the future air-battle capabilities of the PLA there are many questions that deserve further analysis. Increasingly the PLAAF does not exist in isolation, but is obtaining weapon systems that allow it to be part of a greater strike combine that also includes missile, information, naval and special forces. There is an urgency to study issues that shed greater light on the PLAAF’s role in a potential Taiwan campaign. But it is equally important to focus on PLAAF developments today that will prepare it to be advance Chinese Communist security interests beyond its immediate border areas.