The People

This paper represents the views of the author and may not represent those of the National War College, the National Defense University or any other agency of the U.S. Government. This paper may not be cited without the direct permission of the author.

Introduction

This paper will address Beijing’s view of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN), focusing on Chinese concepts of how the navy may be employed. These concepts are “active defense,” “offshore,” the “island chains” as strategic delineators, and “blue water navy” as a force describer. The PLAN’s ability to fulfill the missions inferred by these terms will then be evaluated.

China is obviously expanding and modernizing its naval capabilities. This is unsurprising in terms of classic maritime strategy, given the nation’s offshore territorial disputes, concentration of economic growth in its coastal regions, and its increasing dependence on extended sea-lines of communication (SLOCs).

China’s Maritime Strategy

PLAN officers have studied classic maritime strategists since the 1950s, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, but current Chinese maritime strategy is usually credited directly or indirectly to General Liu Huaqing, PLAN head from 1982-1987 and Central Military Committee Vice-Chairman from 1988-1997. Most notably, he called for expanding the navy’s operations from coastal defense to “offshore active defense.”

Liu reportedly expressed this concept in terms of a three-stage naval development process, applied to two strategic maritime areas of vital concern to the nation. The “first island chain” encompasses the first of these, usually described as a line through the Kurile Islands, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Borneo to Natuna Besar).^[1]

No national security goal is more important to China than the reunification of Taiwan, however, and a more reasonable definition of the first island chain would extend it well east of that island, perhaps to a point 200 nautical miles (nm) from the mainland.^[2] This first island chain area encompasses the Yellow Sea, facing Korea and Japan; the western East China Sea; and the South China Sea, extending deep into Southeast Asia. It addresses many of China’s maritime national interests: the concentration of economic investment along the coast, offshore territorial claims, oceanic resources, and coastal defense. It is ambitious in scope, extending from approximately 200 to 700 nm from the mainland, to include Taiwan and the South China Sea land features claimed by Beijing as sovereign territory.

The “second island chain” bounds Liu’s second strategic maritime area: a north-south line from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia. This is a much more ambitious goal than that implied by the first island chain, since it encompasses maritime areas out to approximately 1,800 nm from China’s coast, including most of the East China Sea and the East Asian SLOCs.

The third stage of Liu’s putative maritime strategy poses the PLAN as a global force built around aircraft carriers, deployed by the middle of the century. This goal would imply a PLAN many times larger and more air-capable than China’s current force. Alternately, however, global naval force might be deployed in a fleet of ballistic missile submarines (FBMs) capable of launching ICBMs and long-range land-attack cruise missiles.

China currently has just one FBM, the Xia, and that may not be operable. Its successor-class, the Type-094, is probably under design with Russian assistance, but its completion date and class-size are not known. The eventual size of China’s FBM force will be determined in large part by Beijing’s perception of how many ICBMs have to be deployed to form an effective nuclear deterrent against possible enemies, including the United States.^[3]

Beijing’s current naval modernization is almost always discussed in the context of Liu’s theory. But what if Liu Huaqing’s maritime strategy is not operative; what if “China’s Mahan” is more like “China’s Tirpitz,” theorizing more for the purpose of domestic and service politics than for future fleet operations?^[4] We will return to this question later, as we will to the significance of Taiwan as the target for Beijing’s maritime strategy: would the island’s reunification be the end or the beginning of Chinese naval expansion?^[5]

Liu also offered doctrinal direction, proposing: (1) stubborn defense near the shore, (2) mobile warfare, and (3) surprise guerrilla-like attacks at sea.^[6] This paradigm appears to have been taken directly from Mao Zedong’s writings, which may well indicate Liu was most concerned with convincing a domestic audience—perhaps the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PLA leadership—of the need for a maritime strategy.

In fact, Mao Zedong’s strictures seem to influence the PLAN’s current operational thinking. “Active defense,” for instance, is a concept Mao discussed in the mid-1930s, when his army was fighting a superior enemy in relatively unconstrained geography. At the level of operational art, Mao described the advantages of operating on interior lines, which allowed him “to choose favorable terrain [and] force the [enemy] to fight on our terms.” Chinese forces must “pick out the enemy’s weaker units for attack,” he argued, and “always concentrate a big force to strike at one part of the enemy forces.” He insisted on a “war of movement” to achieve victory on the battlefield.^[7]

Mao emphasized mobility, surprise, dispersion, flexibility, concentration, “the alert shifting of forces,” and retaining the initiative: “the attack must be made on [our] initiative. . . . it is only by attack that we can [win].” He did not view “defense” as a passive concept.^[8] Mao’s principles still appeal to PLAN strategists: the Chinese navy holds the maritime equivalent of “interior lines” with respect to naval conflict in East Asia, would almost certainly face superior maritime and air forces in relatively unconstrained geography, and would have to depend on mobility, initiative, and surprise to achieve its objectives.

The meaning of “offshore” is less obvious. First, Alexander Huang has done the most complete job of analyzing the concept, noting the distances that might be involved. These range from strictly coastal operations within 100 nm of the shoreline, to the 700 nm required to patrol the South China Sea’s Spratly Islands.^[9] PLA officers and civilian commentators have also discussed the distances involved if the PLAN is no longer constrained by old-fashioned concepts of “coastal defense,” and their estimates fall within the band of ranges discussed by Huang.

Second, the concept of “offshore” may be linked to the ranges of PLA weapons systems. China’s longest-range, shore-based systems include three surface-to-surface missiles: the HY-2, with a 52 nm mile range; the HY-4, with an 84 nm range; and possibly the C-601, which has a 54.5 nm range.^[10] Increased PLANAF and PLAAF over-water experience and expertise is another relevant factor. The newest Chinese aircraft, the Su-27 and Su-30, have combat radii of 800 and 1,600 nm, respectively, although these allow very little time “on station.”^[11] The PLANAF’s B-6 bombers have a combat radius of 1,700 nm. FBMs, of course, imply global coverage.

Third, “offshore” may be defined by Beijing’s insular territorial claims. The most distant of these is the Spratly Island group in the southern South China Sea, about 700 nm from the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet bases on Hainan Island.

Fourth, possible opponents may also bound China’s naval ambitions. South Korea is just across the Bohai, Japan is almost as close, and Taiwan is within 100 nm; these fall within the first island chain. India and the United States pose geographic issues of a different magnitude, since China does not have the traditional naval or air capability to threaten them credibly, except with missiles, although the American bases in Japan and South Korea fall within the first island chain. Beijing might consider the continental United States to be fair game in an all-out maritime campaign, however, employing information warfare (IW), special operations forces, and biological-chemical attacks.

To sum up, “offshore” may be defined by (1) various Chinese strategists, (2) PLA capabilities, (3) territorial claims, (4) potential maritime opponents, or (5) some combination of these factors. None of these lead to a conclusive definition of “offshore;” it is likely that a doctrinal definition of “offshore” is not tied to specific distances, but is derived from the operational objective at-hand. For instance, the current PLAN commander, Admiral Shi Yunsheng, has been quoted as describing “offshore” as “not a concept of distance, denoting ‘how far it is from the coast,’ but covers a vast maritime space within the second island chain of the Pacific ocean, including Taiwan.”^[12]

Naval operations may be framed in terms of maritime geography, usually under four categories: riverine, brown water, green water, and blue water. These designate operations ranging from inland waters, to global deployments by large, relatively self-sufficient fleets. The latter three areas are not neatly, consistently delineated, but in China’s case “brown water” may be defined as reaching from the coast to about 200 nm to seaward. “Green water” refers to the ocean areas from the seaward end of brown water to a point, marked by the Caroline and other islands, about 1,800 nm from the coast. “Blue water” refers to the remaining global ocean areas.

Brown water is the most important maritime arena for China, as it is for any nation, since it includes coastal traffic, territorial waters, the contiguous zone, and the claimed exclusive economic zone.^[13] In these areas occur the great majority of a nation’s maritime police, customs, environmental, and economic concerns. China’s territorial claims heighten the importance of its brown water as a naval arena; Taiwan is the most important of these, of course, but maritime disputes also exist with Korea, Japan, and most of the Southeast Asian nations.

Beijing’s most important maritime strategic concern in the green-water arena is probably homeland defense against sea-based, long-range missiles. Other concerns in include regional SLOCs, and economic resources both in the continental shelf area and even further afield, especially fisheries.

As far as the blue water realm is concerned, the PLAN is already active in terms of the naval mission of “presence,” of sending naval units on long voyages to extend diplomatic reach and spread the nation’s influence. Another blue water capability is represented in China’s sea-based ICBM force, limited though it is.

The PLAN will have to rely on speed, mobility, flexibility, and surprise/preemption in a contest with a strong opponent, especially the United States. The goal will be to deploy enough naval strength to tip the balance in a limited, regional scenario.

This raises the issue of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), widely written about by PLA authors.^[14] Effectively managing information flow and the electronic spectrum will be key to PLAN operations. This does not mean “information warfare,” as such, but refers to a historical constant in naval warfare, situational awareness: knowing the location of own and opposing forces.^[15] Achieving full situational awareness requires the “effective fusion of reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence information.”^[16] The PLAN is not capable of accomplishing this.

“Sea denial” is a particularly attractive option for even a small naval power in littoral waters, if it has access to mines, missiles, small surface ships and submarines, and shore-based aircraft—as does the PLAN. An effective submarine force is key.^[17] The most practicable way for China to pursue a sea-denial strategy is to employ the PLAN against specific naval threats, integral to a PLA campaign plan with land-, air-, and space-based assets. This plan would have to be strictly limited in its objectives, and fully acknowledge potential opposing forces and possible negative outcomes of both success and failure--including political, economic, social, and even environmental consequences.

China has more than fifty active, medium sized or larger surface warships, but only a very few of these possess modern capabilities. The two Soveremenny-, one Luhai-and two Luhu-class guided-missile destroyers, and the eight Jiangwei-class frigates, are the most capable of China’s ships, because of their potent anti-surface-ship cruise-missile batteries. Yet not a single one of these ships is armed with a capable area air-defense missile system, and their anti-submarine systems are almost as limited. Furthermore, PLAN ships might be viewed as relatively expendable in a Taiwan scenario, since the nearby mainland provides ample air and missile power.

Conclusion

Is China’s maritime doctrine indeed based on “active offshore defense” embodied in a blue-water navy? Dramatic naval expansion toward a PLAN with global reach is doubtful, given current modernization priorities and the low level of threats to China’s national security.

Beijing is being very selective in pursuing even a restricted slice of sea power. For instance, it does not have and is not building a significant amphibious assault capability, either in the PLAN or in its merchant fleet.^[18] China also is not moving rapidly to acquire the systems and conduct the training in aerial refueling crucial to extending airpower to seaward. The PLAN is a large, growing, modernizing force, but one that will have to isolate its objectives and narrow the ocean area in which it wishes to prevail.

Is the three-stage navy-building plan attributed to Liu Huaqing leading to the development of an expansionist Chinese naval strategy? PLAN modernization during the past decade has been steady but quite slow; obviously, China is making no attempt to meet Liu’s strategic deadlines. Hence, the effect of Liu’s tenure is probably as much domestic as international. He should be considered more as an effective bureaucrat than an enduring maritime strategist.

Taiwan has been the predominant issue during the past decade and half of PLAN modernization. Historic instances of Chinese naval building would indicate that the PLA will continue as an army-dominant military, with just enough naval strength maintained for coastal defense—and the first island chain is a convenient way to describe “coastal” in this construct—and enough blue-water capability to continue executing the naval mission of presence. Some form of sea-borne nuclear deterrence is also likely, although the size of this force will depend on the progress of the Type-094 currently in the design/early construction stage.

The PLAN is positioned to play an increasing role in China’s national security process, but one that does not require a blue-water navy. Doctrinal development to support active, offshore defense appears to be occurring, evidenced in PLAN single-ship, multi-unit, and fleet-level exercises.^[19] China wants a PLAN able to oppose successfully any East Asian force that stands in the way of achieving China’s objectives in the region.^[20] The PLAN almost certainly intends concentrating its operational capabilities in waters within a couple of hundred miles of its coast: it is not in China’s interest to expand the geographic scope of a naval contest.

[1] See Alexander Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications,” Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994):16ff, for a good discussion of the “First” and “Second Island Chains.”

[2] One nautical mile equals approximately 1.2 statute miles.

[3] Alistair Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control,” The China Quarterly (June 1996):548-576, remains key to gaining an understanding of Chinese thinking about nuclear deterrence.

[4] See, for instance, Jeffrey B. Goldman, “China’s Mahan,” Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 122 (March 1996), pp. 44-47. My colleague Dr. Cynthia Watson suggested this question.

[5] One might argue that historically Chinese governments, whether the Song or the Ming, have deployed large navies to achieve relatively limited goals and once those have been achieved, the navy has been again relegated to secondary status.

[6] Discussed in Huang, “Chinese Maritime Modernization and its Security Implications: The Deng Xiaoping Era and Beyond,” Ph.D. diss., The George Washington University, 1994, 225ff.

[7] See Mao Zedong, On the Protracted War (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1954): 83ff (“Interior Lines”), 88ff (“Initiative”), 101 (“Flexibility”); Mao Zedong on Guerrilla Warfare (2^nd ed.), Introduction and translation by Samuel B. Griffith II (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co., 1992): 81 (“Mobility”), 119ff (“Initiative”, “Mobility”); Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967):97 (“Active Defense”); 105, 233 (“Mobile Warfare”, “Interior Lines”), 160 (“Initiative”).

[8] Paul H.B. Godwin, “China’s Defense Modernization: Aspirations and Capabilities,” draft of paper prepared for the Asia-Pacific Symposium, “Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China,” at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 7-8 March 2000.

[9] Huang, diss., 231, Table 5-1, lists distances from “coastal” and “inshore,” to “EEZ + Continental shelf,” which would equate to 350 nm, out to “600+ nm.”

[10] Norman Friedman, ed., The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-1998 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 321. “C-601” designates a system designed for foreign sales.

[11] “If War Starts in the Taiwan Seas, where will the U.S. Carriers Assemble?,” anon. author, at http://military.china.com/zh_cn/critical3/27/20010823/10087071. html, states that the Su-27 “would be able to extend the Chinese front lines 900km out to sea,…”

[12] “Jiang made the Final Decision on Adopting Offshore Defense Strategy,” Hung Fang Jih Pao, Hong Kong (24 August 2001), in FBIS-CPP20010824000062.

[13] The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines four areas of national concern: a nation’s sovereign waters is the maritime area from a nation’s coastline to a point 12 nm to seaward; the contiguous zone extends to a point 24 nm from a nation’s coastline, the exclusive economic zone out to 200 nm, and a nation’s continental shelf may reach to a maximum distance of 350 nm from its coastline.

[14] See the two volumes edited by Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press 1997) and China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2000) for a unique and valuable sampling of these writings. A third volume is forthcoming. A few of these writings are at the National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Internet: http://wwww.ndu.edu/inss/books/chinview/chinapt4.html.

[15] The March 1996 arrival of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs)—which reportedly became known to China through CNN--showed the PLA’s severe limitations in this vital area.

[16] Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986):44.

[17] As Hughes points out, p.138.

[18] This may be wise on Beijing’s part, since only one successful amphibious landing under active opposition has occurred since 1950—the British assault on the Falklands.

[19] See Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 21^st Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), Ch. 7.

[20] China’s leaders might decide to engage in naval warfare despite likely third-party intervention, if they believe they have been backed into a corner—that their political position as national leaders is so threatened by a national security situation that likely war with the United States would be a justified risk. Any such feeling would be intensified by the extremely defensive view—approaching paranoia—so often apparent in China’s press. See, for instance, Yi Jun, Hua Shan, and Xu Shujun, “Behind the US-South Korea ‘RS012001’ Exercise,” Jiefangjun Bao, 30 April 2001, p. 12, in FBIS-CPP20010430000061, for the claim that “the United States is seeking to restore the arc of blockade against socialist countries in Asia in the 1950s.”