The ultimate goal is simple: give the battlefield commander access to all the information needed to win the war. And give it to him when he wants it and how he want it.

GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL(Note 1)

Chapter 1 Interoperability

General Powell's ambitious vision statement, in July 1992, heralded a new era for interoperability: an era of budget cuts, multinational services, and public clamor for congressional efficiency. At the same time, specialized, regionally based conflicts took the place of vast ocean and huge land-mass battlefields.

Interoperability has many facets. Its definition encompasses two radios talking to each other, an Ocean Venture exercise, hardware and software matching, and cross-service training. It is "equipment, procedures, doctrine, and training" and "the ability of people, organizations, and equipment to operate together effectively."(Note 2)

During the Storm

Desert Storm typified the new era with its successful melding of many units from many services and many countries. But a lack of interoperability caused enough tactical problems to give any seasoned observer pause. "Communications for artillery fire support were a particular problem because the (radio) equipment lacked sufficient range or frequencies," according to one Marine General. Some platoon leaders could not talk on the radio to squad leaders "a mere 75 feet away,"(Note 3) said one Army battalion Commander. These problems were part of a broader category including hardware and software systems, functions, and processes, all comprising an element of C4I system's interoperability, or the compatibility of communications hardware, as formulated by Dr. Stuart Starr (see below).

Policy decisions on role assignments were to blame for other interoperability breakdowns. The Gulf anti-air warfare ships, for example, could not exchange data directly with the on-station E-3As (airborne warning and control systems) assigned to cover the land-related portion of the Kuwaiti theater. In contrast, the Gulf-based ships received airborne early-warning data from shore-based Marine Corps tactical air operation and command centers. These circumstances hampered early detection and tracking efforts in that target-rich domain.(Note 4) Admittedly, this illustration is more in the domain of Command and Control wherein a Commander "assigns forces in the accomplishment of a mission." But whenever time is a factor, interoperability is, too.

In a similar sense, problems of operating procedure were associated with the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The Gulf ATO was an intricate, computerized, daily list of all air assets in a Joint Task Force (JTF) environment (see Appendix A for a facsimile). From the ATO, strike mission planners could obtain information about numbers of missions, squadrons assigned, targets, restricted operating zones, low-level transit routes, drop/landing/extraction zones, and air refueling areas. It did not specify tactics or flight plans.

During Desert Storm ATO was an unusually effective system yet not without imperfections. From one Naval officer's vantage point, while the Air Force considers the ATO "the playbook for the vastly successful Air Bowl. . .

We in the surface Navy, from our more parochial perspective, remember it simply as the 300-page, `Personal For,' flash-precedence, randomly sorted message, rarely received before the middle of the day to which it applied. The sheer bulk of the document implies that the Air Force--whose own composers designed it--expected a lot more people around who could make sense of it. The JFACC's (Joint Force Air Component Commander) six-pound Air Tasking Order had to be picked up in Riyadh at 0200, delivered to the carrier, and transferred to the surface ships (usually a three to four hour mission). The people who published this tome probably never envisioned that a couple of junior enlisted air controllers on a three-week caffeine high in the back of a combat information center would have to flip through this six-pound chunk of fanfold paper on their knees to find the whereabouts of a tanker for their combat air patrol."(Note 5)

Yes, but the data were "not user friendly," another Naval officer responded. "The Navy and Air Force have since learned a great deal about the process and have made progress in providing that data via other means."(Note 6)

The ATO was to be transmitted in digital form through personal computers, but the Navy's computers and software were not up to the volume of traffic. As a result, the ATO was flown on Lockheed S-3A Vikings to the carriers.

The Air Force had its own problems in using the ATO and initially sent it to its forces on F-15 Eagles.(Note 7) Eventually, the Air Force managed to double its data transfer capability but had no hardware to spare for the Navy. Even with the right computers and software, however, "the Navy . . . would have been impeded by satellite circuit capacity limitations."(Note 8)

The arguments between the Air Force and the Navy concerning centralized air control were not the only issues. After Desert Storm, Army Corps commanders criticized the Air Force for targeting only 300 (15 percent) of the 2,000 Army-nominated targets.(Note 9)

An Air Force officer justified this situation on the basis of, (1) a two- to three-day lag in Army intelligence from CENTAF and (2) a redundancy in the target lists. He also said that half of the Marine Corps' sorties (150 to 200 a day) were dedicated to MARCENT (Marine Corps Command Center) and therefore not available to the Joint Forces Air Command Center (JFACC), which narrowed the effectiveness of JFACC management of the air effort.(Note 10) Centralized air command was superior to allowing theater commanders to operate relatively independently, he concluded.

Storm Workarounds

"We've come along ways from the bombing of Libya," said another officer, where the Air Force took the west side of the country and the Navy the east, "in a perfect recipe for fratricide . . ."(Note 11)

In the Gulf we ran the air offensive through a single management. The CENTCOM was first located in August 1990 on a parking lot in Riyadh surrounded by an "awesome" four-foot high fence--a satchel charge thrown over the fence could have destroyed the center. We soon moved to the basement of the Royal Saudi Air Force Center and Ministry of Defense which was a nice place to be. However, as far as bomb proofing was concerned, there wasn't much protection since we had to leave the doors open for the power cables which ran from room to room.(Note 12)

Cables also ran from the rooftop DSCS (Defense Satellite Communications System) satellite terminal, over and down the wall, through a window to the basement. The entire communications network consisted of a few voice and data circuits routed through four tactical ground-based terminals.(Note 13) Soon, this rudimentary system was enhanced allowing Desert Storm Commanders to talk to their counterparts in the United States. By January 1991 the number of downlinks had increased from 1 to 118 with 12 commercial satellite terminals in place. These gateways supported 324 voice trunk lines and 30 Automatic Digital Network data circuits, all of which carried over 2 billion characters of data message traffic daily.

One of the first major telecommunications challenges related to a call completion rate to the United States of only 20-30 percent a day. It took the military and representatives of AT&T and GTE three months to identify the problem as incompatible signaling between tactical and fixed systems. The solution was later found over a long weekend by AT&T Bell Lab employees.

A second problem related to the communications switches in the Army's new Mobile Subscriber Equipment which would not work with the vintage-technology switches in other services' equipment. The solution was derived by JTC3A (Joint Tactical C3 Agency) over 17 days: new software made the Army's switches work with the Marine/Air Force Level Circuit Switch and the French RITA communication system.

A third problem was created by the vast volume of message traffic and the relative shortage of military satellites to do the job. Commercial suppliers immediately assembled 15 ground-based stations from off-the-shelf components which handled 20 percent of the traffic during the war.

Also in short supply were Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, known as Sluggers, which linked with the Pentagon's 16 GPS satellites. Almost immediately over 8,000 off-the-shelf receivers,(Note 14) the size of a paperback book, were obtained to aid in mapping, clearing minefields, and guiding the navigation of troops who swept through Kuwait. "We have known for some time that we need to do a better job of standardizing our data links and protocols: a more widespread deployment of Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals will help in this regard," commented one contemporary C3 player.(Note 15)

These few illustrations of workarounds focused on the managerial responses to particular problems that were either not anticipated or which came earlier than anticipated. Both conditions suggest some framework for structuring interoperability analyses to prevent such problems from reemerging.

Managing Interoperability

Interoperability is somewhat like quality. It is an integral part of an institution's output, always present in some degree, a determinant of an institution's continued life-- yet difficult to define, pinpoint, and manage. Often it is seen as a truism, something that is evident and expected. Once someone derives a pragmatic, clear approach to coping

Source: Stuart H. Starr, MITRE Corporation, "Perspectives on C3 Interoperability," briefing at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 1990 .

with interoperability, it may sound like "just common sense" but it deserves attention.

A case in point is Stuart Starr's perception of the elements of interoperability. His Venn diagram shows that the elements of interoperability are interrelated but have distinct boundaries (Figure 1.1).

Operating procedures indicate the frequencies to use, pattern of employment, and codes; compatibility of mes-

sages (the identification of message length, message field contents, and order of the message fields). Data base applications among systems must use the same formats for records, for example, is it 10 May or May 10?(Note 16)

Other definitions of interoperability are more strategic than Starr's, but sometimes reach a point of abstraction that makes implementation difficult. While general descriptions of overarching goals are a necessary part of the process of formulating any workable strategic statement, they must be completed by details. The accompanying description must analyze and explain (1) an institution's technological, legal, and economic operating environment; (2) its competition (which interservice rivalry in the congressional arena constantly provides), and (3) its precise strengths and weaknesses. Finally, all these factors must be evaluated in terms of the values of the institution or what is important to senior leadership.

Strategic Implications for Interoperability

C4I for the Warrior, produced and published by the Joint Staff in June 1992, documents the answer to General Colin L. Powell's charge, "The time is ripe to set a course to resolve our C4I interoperability issues." The document resolves the interoperability issues in concept, but one of its framers, an Army Colonel, questions how well it will work in real life. "Interoperability gets to the worst of human nature: giving up the short term to envision, plan, and pull it off," he said. But, he added "We cannot afford any longer to fix these elements later without an over-riding process that leads from jointness to oneness."(Note 17)

Turning to the demise of the Soviet Union, from threat to world peace to now "having lunch with the Allies at NATO, the Colonel said:

Once this took place we did Command and Control without acknowledging the threat, anyplace, anytime in the world. This was a classic stovepipe [systems] environment as indicated particularly in Ernest Fury when no one had the same signals, meaning that J6 was kept outside the huddle. These circumstances continued until the second day of Desert Shield when an electronic connection was found to link the stovepipes together. This was an ideal situation because we never want to force a standardized approach on the Services. To accommodate this principle I see interoperability as driving the train with standards being the engine or locomotive . . . enforc[ing] the standards . . . is not an easy thing to do in Washington where the only game is money, and the JCS has no leverage over the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). This means that you can only exercise control over the expenditure of Service-related dollars through policies and standards which affect the acquisition processes. This is the major reason we are building this concept into C4I for the Warrior.

Marine Corps General Harry W. Jenkins, Assistant Chief of Staff C4I2, reinforced that comment:

The Gulf War saw the first space/electronic assault based on highly intelligent systems. It succeeded in many areas and failed in others. It did prove that the Services will never again operate independently; jointness is in. But, we must have better performance standards as far as software is concerned to make interoperability work.(Note 18)

Many of the managerial issues raised by these officers, relating to the tactics or implementation of interoperability strategy, are part of the global interpretation of what interoperability is, what it is designed to do, and when. Some of the positions outlined in C4I for the Warrior show how all such issues fit together:

Interoperability is the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and to accept services from other systems, units or forces, and to use the exchanged services to operate effectively together.

And, a more comprehensive, even strategic version in the same document:

Interoperability encompasses doctrine, procedures, and training as well as systems and equipment. It is the capability of people, organizations, and equipment to operate effectively together so that "every unit on the battlefield can share information with every other unit on the battleground."(Note 19)

A final description of the importance and meanings of interoperability is contained in the National Military Strategy Document, which assigns interoperability Number One priority.(Note 20) The ramifications of stressing interoperability extend to: (1) technology: providing the means for exchanging information among systems and users, through the use of common standards and protocols designed into the equipment and systems; (2) applications: providing a common understanding of how information will be fused,(Note 21) processed, and used; (3) data: to be freely shared and transferred among systems and applications without translation; (4) procedures and doctrine: requiring parallel development among systems; and (5) equipment and systems: Information Systems Agency (DISA) through the Joint Interoperability Test Center (JITC).

Looking Ahead

Interoperability, in summary, has been illustrated and defined, both from a tactical, managerial outlook and from a strategic viewpoint. This will lead to a review of other problems associated with Desert Storm, with subsequent solutions: some temporary to meet the vital day by day needs of the war, but most still in the process of being solved.

A serious issue [with Desert Storm] was the lack of trained users of the technology in U.S. forces. Most of the computers were user owned and operated--no special staff existed to develop software, maintain the data, or provide quality control. It was not uncommon to see a singular junior enlisted soldier or officer act as the expert on a staff. Unfortunately, the quality of their knowledge of the computer, its application, and the data which it processed received little scrutiny from superiors who were just as often ignorant of the limitations of the technology.(Note 22)

This statement focuses on the computer as the driver of the nature of the message, which drive tactics, which drives strategy. This situation is in sharp contrast to the conservative, traditional lines of thought wherein top leadership derives and implements strategy, including a communications strategy. Now, with so many lateral information systems in existence catering to text, voice, imagery, and data links, it is often hard for the uninitiated to catch up, and leaders can turn into followers.

The overwhelming amount of data produced and disseminated during Desert Storm is another aspect of computer information. Sometimes excessive amounts of data forced organizations to focus on particular data sets, which created blind spots for other information. Stories are legion about the masses of computerized and telephonic data generated during the operation, including 700,000 telephone calls and 152,000 telephonic messages daily. "The services put more electronic communications connectivity into the Gulf in 90 days than we put into Europe in 40 years," according to Lieutenant General James S. Cassity, Director of C3 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

According to C4I for the Warrior, the administrative power of information and information systems will serve as a common denominator for future military engagements. How the common denominator will evolve, in spite of service rivalry, is precisely described:

The common global vision of C4I for the Warrior is to create for these joint war fighters a single view of military C4I. This view is a widely distributed, user-driven network to which the Warrior "plugs in." This network provides seamless, secure connectivity through multiple, highly flexible nodes to all other operational elements and data bases (which are automatically updated and from which desired information can be pulled) for any assigned mission.

Looking ahead, if you were a "commander, director or department head of interoperability" exactly what would your job entail if you were to implement these C4I charges? Once you had defined and determined the elements of interoperability how would you manage needed changes? What would you need to know to be responsive to the greater economic and political environment where you have to manage? How would you assess your present interoperability status in terms of equipment, systems, and personnel? On what basis would you determine your overall goals and objectives? How would you establish the requirements for moving from where you are to where you would like to be, in keeping with strategic directions? Aside from equipment acquisitions how would you set up a training program for those involved with interoperability? Training for what?

| Return to Top | Return to Contents | Next Chapter | Previous Chapter |