Sessions & Jones
It is going to take a long time to reach the degree of interoperability described by General Colin L. Powell: "all the information needed to win the war . . . when he wants it and how he wants it."
C4I for the Warrior recognized this dynamic situation with its portrayal of: (1) an immediate or quick fix phase, perhaps during the 1990s, merging into, (2) a mid-term phase into the early 2000s, and (3) a final phase thereafter. The last phase would embrace many of the far-out, almost fantasy-laden inventions and processes that futurists speak of today. With some very basic artificial intelligence models already in place, modest movement toward the dream has taken place. Additional esoterica such as, "multilevel security solutions using a multiple layer concept for encryption, combined with electronic, benign, transparent cryptographic key distribution, automated key management approaches, and data compression and transmission technologies,"(Note 1) will undoubtedly occupy the interests of those in defense-related research and development for many years.
In the meantime, two interoperability assets JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) and IRIDIUM (telecommunications network) continue to attract considerable developmental involvement from both public and private sectors. JTIDS dates back to the late 1960s and, 25 years later may find new applications, beyond AWACs and F-15s, when JTID equipment is placed on F-14 and F-16 aircraft in the mid-1990s. The lessons learned from this extraordinary technological development and the people who have resisted it could be instructive to the believers in total interoperability's resulting primarily from executive fiat.
Interoperability in joint operations has taken many forms, ranging from geographic isolation and coordination in the 12-minute bombing raid in Libya (where the Air Force took the west side and the Naval pilots the east) to the use of an ATO in Desert Storm.(Note 2) An obvious observation: when one service component uses another service's component to strike mutual targets radar must tell each
force's commander what the other force is doing. To accomplish this critical objective, Tactical Digital Information Links (TADILS, see Appendix B) Voice Systems, the Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF), and Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) were designed.
JTIDS is a nodeless, many-to-many architecture, based on the Time Division Multiple Access design, which uses TADIL J to increase the performance of C2 over joint forces. With JTIDS, messages can be transmitted over an extended range of 500 miles. Its antijam capability results from the use of spread spectrum and frequency-hopping techniques.(Note 3)
Thousands of participants can be on the link at any one time, which results from the TDMA design. This feature led one observer to characterize JTIDS as "a disc drive in the sky."(Note 4) Other features include position location and identification to JTIDS-equipped elements and a secure system that provides participants with digitized voice capability.
Hill and Ulrich summarized the importance of JTIDS as follows:
The JTIDS can assist in achieving interoperability among the Services for a wide range of applications. Its deployment on a variety of airborne, shipboard, and ground platforms allows communication of both voice and data among the combatants as well as providing a common grid to these participants. The JTIDS will provide an effective means of coordinating tactical assault and defense activities.
From the history and evolution of JTIDS it is apparent that a joint product, system, effort, or process is bound to run into obstacles from its inception. In the case of JTIDS, which has yet to be fully funded and developed, there was a major conflict between the Air Force and the Navy over TDMA versus DTDMA.(Note 5) The Air Force preferred the TDMA architecture, being concerned with ground-based jammers and the necessity for the hardware to fit in fighter aircraft. The Navy supported DTDMA to protect its carrier-based battle groups against airborne jamming. Were it not for a DOD/OSD fiat in 1975, which followed a bitterly contested battle, the two services might have had their own systems, or stovepipes, but still not have been able to communicate with each other, according to Hill and Ulrich. As it turned out the Air Force was selected as the executive agent for JTIDS utilizing TDMA.
Are there possible, even probable, similarities between the Air Force/Navy account above and C4I for the Warrior's prescription for assigning the JCS Chairman "the responsibility for achieving interoperability among the services?" Continuing, "Through the Military and Communications and Electronics Board (MCEB) and in accordance with the policies of the ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense, C3I], that responsibility will be focused on identifying and resolving interoperability and standardization issues relevant to joint and combined operations." Similarly, a "Quick Fix Phase" in the same document, calls for "adherence to a common set of joint standards, rigorous testing for conformance and configuration management enforcement."
What is the likelihood of such an agreement? If you were to mastermind such conformance what elements would you like to control? Is financial control over acquisitions adequate? Does the JCS have the required clout with DOD and Congress to prevent "end runs" by services? Is this really the beginning of jointness for interoperability? If not, what obstacles do you see ahead and how would you forestall or overcome them?
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