McNair Paper Number 20 Chapter 1, August 1993
ACCOMMODATION:
AGREEING TO DISAGREE
WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN
and THOMAS DURELL-YOUNG
Washington continues to have a vital stake in European stability, which in turn hinges on Western European political consistency and economic growth. Prolonged confusion over the future course of European integration affects European efforts to reform its international defense institutions to meet the post-Cold War challenges. The only certainty is that Paris and Bonn will be at the heart of efforts to resolve current dilemmas, for the Bonn-Paris axis has been the engine that has driven greater European integration and provided a means to overcome a long
history of Franco-German conflict and discord. This article focuses on the implications of this important bilateral relationship on bilateral defense cooperation.
In and of itself, the establishment of the European Economic Community represented a significant historical achievement. More recently, members of the European Community (EC) have expressed an intent to build a more comprehensive foundation of European unity that looks toward complete economic union. Moreover, these nations seek a European political union that will further expand European integration. Naturally, discussions concerning political union have generated considerable dialogue over closer integration of security and defense policies.
Progress toward these goals initially appeared to be accelerating. The Single Economic Act (signed in July 1987), one of European Commission President Jacques Delors' greatest accomplishments, was implemented, in principle, on January 1, 1993. At the December 1991 Maastricht summit the EC heads of government agreed to the "Draft Treaty on Political Union" that laid out the plan European political union.1
Nor has cooperation been limited to economic and political issues. At Maastricht, the EC heads of government also agreed to the goal of establishing a common defense policy and the development of the Western European Union (WEU) "as the defense component of the European Union...."2 Moreover, in May 1992 at their summit in La Rochelle, President Mitterrand and Federal Chancellor Kohl formally announced the creation of a joint multinational corps, which, in time, could include other European participants.3 To many observers and officials, the combination of these events indicated that the long elusive objective of European integration appeared to be close at hand.
Obstacles to European Integration
But events have proven otherwise as EC politics have become rather messy, not to mention complicated, of late.4 For example, prior to the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in May 1992, the path toward greater Western European integration appeared clearly set. However, the Danish electorate rejected the Maastricht draft treaty in June.5 This rejection, in the words of Daniel Vernet, Foreign Editor of Le Monde, "...has brought into the open in many European countries a situation their governments had been trying to pretend did not exist: a crisis in foreign policy."6
Shortly thereafter, when, for domestic political reasons President Mitterrand placed the Maastricht Treaty before the French electorate, it passed by only the narrowest of margins (50.95 to 49.05 percent).7 Even the much vaunted Single Market may well not function in practice (e.g., due to lack of consumer confidence in product quality and efficiency), despite the implementation of all the necessary legal instruments.8 And, high German interest rates (due to the ever escalating costs of unification) and low British interest rates (to stimulate a lagging economy), combined to force Britain and Italy out of the EC's Exchange Rate Mechanism in September.9 Finally, the EC's inability to achieve consensus on the means for halting the war in the former Yugoslavia, underscored the difficulties inherent in crafting common security and defense policies.
The obstacles to full implementation of these policies raises the question: where does European integration, particularly in the realm of security, go from this inauspicious point? This is not merely a rhetorical consideration; nor is the outcome without implications for the United States. Since the 1950s, Western European political stability, consistency in general political outlook, and impressive economic growth have been, in large part, the result of European integration. These conditions have supported U.S. interests in Europe in the past and, undoubtedly, Washington will continue to have a vital stake in the maintenance of stability in Europe. At the same time, confusion over the future course of European integration has had, and will continue to have, a direct impact on U.S. and Western European efforts to reform its integrated defense institutions to meet the new challenges of post-Cold War European security.
How the EC will overcome this recent rash of highly publicized setbacks and reinvigorate its efforts to realize the goal of European Union is open to question. However, is certain is that Paris and Bonn will be at the heart of efforts to resolve these dilemmas. The Paris-Bonn relationship has been the engine that has driven greater European integration since the late 1950s and has provided a proven means to overcome the long history of Franco-German conflict and discord. Yet, the interesting, and exceedingly confusing, aspect of this Franco-German accommodation is the fact that the overriding political necessity to maintain the appearance of consensus on their overriding objective of greater integration, oftentimes papers over fundamental differences as exactly how European Union is to be achieved. Thus, the need to be seen as being in agreement, particularly when there is discord, remains a constant element of their bilateral relationship.
What are the implications of Franco-German political relations on bilateral defense cooperation? One cannot understand defense integration without a firm grounding in the political bases of the Franco-German relationshi On the other hand, while understanding that political and economic integration are critical to overall European integration, assessing security cooperation is important for three crucial reasons. First, efforts to expand bilateral defense cooperation have long been a convenient vehicle to manifest publicly heightened levels of cooperation during periods of discord in the political and economic sphere. Second, despite the past record of using defense cooperation to maintain momentum in overall European integration, disagreements over the particulars of security policy are currently running high. And, third, the potential emergence of a true European defense identity has become a major point of contention in Washington's attempt to redefine the U.S. role and mission in a post-Cold War Europe.
Paris's and Bonn's Vision of "Europe": With or Without Consensus
To grasp better the full implications of European Defense Integration, one must first understand the political background, goals, and differences in Franco-German defense policy. In the insightful words of Jim Hoagland, a noted observer of European affairs, European integration has had much more to do with overcoming the historic Franco-German conflict, than any other issue.10 Indeed, the slow (but not to be underestimated) progress toward fuller European integration has been largely a product of Paris and Bonn enmeshing themselves within supranational European organizations to overcome their history of bloody conflict.
Long-standing French policy has been to oppose any move by the Federal Republic to establish a national foreign or defense policy. At the same time, these policies have enabled Paris to effect a long-term rapprochement with Bonn, while simultaneously allowing France the luxury of being the only European member of NATO to pursue an independent defense policy.11 This latter condition also provided France with considerable independence and flexibility in its diplomacy.
This unique process of working toward historical rapprochement remained constant until the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, when the unification of Germany considerably complicated the integration process. Indeed, a large part of the current difficulty in reaching agreement on new European political and security architectures within the EC is a result of Europe coming to terms with the newly unified Germany. To comprehend better these difficulties, an understanding of French and German expectations of European integration is essential.
The unification of Germany shattered many of Paris's comfortable assumptions of European integration. The French are now unsure whether the Germans are still suitably enmeshed in the EC and, if they are not, Paris may lose the considerable influence and flexibility it previously enjoyed. In the words of Daniel Vernet, "...all of us ... are afflicted with the `German obsession'."12 In short, the French are concerned about a Germany of over 80 million that will possess an economy--once the eastern Laender have been rebuilt--that will dominate Europe.
In fact, German unification has already reduced the heretofore politely accepted myth of French political leadership in the EC and altered the leading French role in the Franco-German relationshi Fearing an eastward-oriented united Germany, or, worse, a Germany "that goes it alone," Paris moved quickly after German unification to tie Bonn firmly to Europe through economic, political and security linkages. Hence, the relatively quick (by EC standards) move to write and seek ratification of the Draft Treaty on Political Union. Mitterrand and Kohl's surprise announcement at Lille in October 1991 to form a Franco-German sponsored European Corps established a similar linkage in the security arena.13
French Obsession, German Fixation
Just as Frenchmen are "obsessed" with a unified Germany, so, too, is Bonn fixated on France. Simply stated, in German eyes, France has long held the key to German acceptance into the "polite" company of Western European society. Germany's leadership will go to great lengths, even to the extent of occasional public pandering to French sensitivities to maintain this status.14 One cannot overestimate the value to the Federal Republic of French assistance in guaranteeing inclusion in Western European institutions. For without this institutional entré, the legitimacy within Europe of the Germany's national economic, political, and military power would have been questioned.
Therefore, to a degree unlike any other EC member, Bonn has long favored expanded integration. Indeed, maintenance of the integrational status quo is insufficient. Integration must, however slowly, continue to expand lest Bonn be suspect in the eyes of its physically smaller, economically weaker, and militarily less powerful neighbors. Such perceived dedication to integration has obviously become even more imperative to Bonn following unification. As former Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stated, "A Germany that is firmly anchored in the EC will not be regarded as a threat to anybody. A Germany that rejects Europe would soon be very alone. It would become cold--ice-cold--around Germany."15
An underrated manifestation of the importance of this bilateral relationship is that despite agreement on the criticality of European integration, Paris and Bonn do not share a common view of how to create this ambiguous supranational institution. For instance, Germany has long favored transferring greater power from the European Commission (and those increasingly unpopular and overpaid "Eurocrats") in Brussels to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Highly centralized and statist France, on the other hand, has opposed this move largely because such a transfer would give the Federal Republic, with its larger population, the largest number of parliamentarians; thus, further reducing French influence in that body.16
Germany has also advocated "enlarging" the EC through the acceptance of the developed European neutrals, as well as the newly democratizing states in Central and Eastern Europe, all of whom are clamoring for membershi From the German standpoint, good reasons exist for this policy. The entry of wealthy neutrals like Switzerland and Sweden would help finance the economic rebuilding of Central and Eastern Europe, a sine qua non of economic viability and, most importantly, long-term political stability. Moreover, increased EC membership might appear to dilute Germany's dominant position in the Community and, therefore, dampen criticism of growing German economic power.
France, on the other hand, has traditionally seen the EC as a vehicle of balancing German power. Should countries like Poland and Hungary gain admission to the EC, the center of gravity may well shift toward Germany.17 Nor is this new French policy; it dates back to De Gaulle's opposition to British entry into the EC in the 1960s. Thus, Paris has been loath to contemplate an enlarged Community that could diminish French power, as well as allow the EC to become a mere Zollverein, or customs union.
Common Means for Common Ends
As these brief examples indicate, France and Germany lack an agreed definition and mutually accepted means to attain their declared common objective. This lack of Franco-German consensus and concomitant drive to appear to be making progress toward increased integration has not gone unnoticed by their EC partners. In recent years, the Franco-German haste to press toward the "ill-defined" goal of integration has resulted in a series of faits accomplis that have increasingly irritated their EC partners, particularly smaller members who have not been consulted on important issues.18 Indeed, this lack of Franco-German consultation in their mutual effort to restrain and reassure each other, has helped produce the current backlash against greater integration manifested in the Danish rejection of the Maastricht draft treaty, the narrow margin of approval in the French referendum, and Prime Minister John Major's back (and front) bench revolt in the House of Commons.
Yet, so strong is their drive toward integration that France and the Federal Republic have refused to accept any of these rebuffs. Indeed, these obstacles have only spurred the partners to greater efforts to assuage their partners. For example, at the emergency EC summit in Birmingham in October 1992 the French and Germans committed themselves to introducing more democratic arrangements into the EC process. Another fascinating example is the widely circulated (but officially denied) rumor that Mitterrand and Kohl agreed to consider merging the Deutschmark and French Franc, and in consequence, their central banks.19 This option would establish an inner circle within the EC and, in effect, make a two-speed approach to integration inevitable. Such an option writes the European, "...reflects the increasing sense of desperation of Mitterrand and Kohl as their Maastricht vision of European union fades...."20 Thus, France and Germany may be prepared to go it alone to achieve greater integration, even at the risk of politically alienating some of their closest EC partners. Such a two-track option, while economically advantageous to their EC partners, implicitly includes much greater political and security arrangements than these EC states have heretofore been willing to accept.21
Notwithstanding their economic, political and security differences, conflicting policies, and divergent national interests, both countries are intent upon pressing forward, perhaps blindly, toward creating a unified Europe. Indeed, within this bilateral relationship, the French and Germans have evolved an ideology whereby they must be perceived as continuously making progress toward European unity, and are always in agreement. The latter point becomes even more imperative during instances when Paris and Bonn do not agree. One can sympathize, therefore, with France's and Germany's EC partners, who have become increasingly frustrated by what they see as a Franco-German abuse of the delicate process of decreasing state sovereignty within a greater European super-state in order to solve what are basically mutual French and German suspicions.
That EC states have been willing to accept these ambiguities to date reflects their interest in promoting stability in Central Europe, and their belief that "integration," particularly in the field of security, has not been framed within the context of zero-sum game. However, the point has been reached where difficult decisions in this sensitive area need to be made. Moreover, European concerns and efforts coincide with Washington's attempts to redefine the U.S. role in European security.
European Defense Identity: Defined, Redefined, Undefined
If striving to create closer political structures in the EC that are mutually acceptable to all member states were not complicated enough, trying to reach accord on European security structures has been even more challenging. No matter how EC countries contemplate future European security integration, the relationship between the United States and NATO must be addressed. With the significant exception of France (arguably based on interpretation, vice stated French policy), all EC states are convinced that NATO and the United States must continue to play a key leadership role in the maintenance of security and stability in Europe. Moreover, French reasoning flows from an unusual, if not deterministic, rationale. As Claire Trean of Le Monde explains, France's current position toward NATO is based on two key assumptions. First, the United States is in the process of withdrawing from Europe and, therefore, the EC requires unified security structures to face an uncertain future. Second, it is simply inconceivable that the EC countries can seriously discuss political union without making provisions for creating an independent military capability.22
This reasoning does not imply, however, that France favors the dissolution of NATO or the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Europe. On the contrary, French policy has long supported the political existence of NATO and a U.S. military presence in Europe.23 French cooperation over the years and into the future is evident in many areas.24 But French policy is currently at odds with NATO on two key points. First, the French believe NATO should be led not by "les anglo-saxons," but by "Europeans" (read: les français"). Second, NATO should not enter into new activities which might detract from its most important mission, collective defense.25 Thus, from this aspect, one can better understand French opposition to either the establishment in December 1991 of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council and its mission of consulting with NATO's former Warsaw Pact adversaries,26 or the expansion of NATO's mandate to include supporting humanitarian or peacekeeping operations.27
There are two problems with current French policy toward NATO. First, as German commentator Guenther Nonnenmacher notes, "One has the impression that the French government thinks that relations between NATO and the EC are defined in the context of a zero-sum game. This is, perhaps, a fundamental error."28 Second, according to French commentator Pierre Lellouche, French policy does not adequately support French national interests and fails to comprehend the changing European security system.29 For example, it is incongruous for France to maintain an independent national defense policy while promoting increased European security integration and coaxing allies to expand defense integration.
The apparent confusion within the French government concerning NATO compounds these discrepancies. This confusion stems in large part from the nature of the Fifth Republic, where the President exercises de facto control over foreign and defense policies, and internal quarrels within the French executive branch.30 Officials in the French military and Ministry of Defense have long endorsed closer ties with NATO, however, the Elysée (Presidential Palace) and, particularly, the Quai d'Orsay (Foreign Office) have opposed strengthened ties. In November 1991, for instance, Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe stated that French policy would seek to remove the ambiguity in France's relationship with NATO. The Elysée subsequently denied that Joxe's statement marked a change in French policy.31 In more recent speeches both Joxe (to an official gathering of international security experts in Paris)32 and Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy33 called for a greater degree of French participation in NATO consultative bodies. But again, the Elysée remarked that French policy has not changed.34
Franco-German Conflicts
Given the internal confusion associated with its own approach to NATO, it should come as no surprise that French policy regarding European security integration sometimes conflicts with the Germans as well, despite the supposed close integration between the two. German officials continue to argue on a number of points that NATO must be maintained as a stabilizing influence in Europe, and most importantly, a legitimizing vehicle for a continued U.S. military presence in Europe.35 First, if for no other reason than a strong NATO and continued U.S. presence in Europe eases acceptance of Germany within an integrated Europe. Second, the NATO and U.S. nuclear guarantee, so long dismissed by France, allows the Federal Republic to continue to abjure obtaining nuclear weapons.36 Third, German defense planning acknowledges that the Bundeswehr will have serious structural and capability limitations for many years to come, not the least of which are in the area of operational control structures. Thus, NATO and U.S. capabilities can compensate for German shortcomings. Finally, even the economically powerful Germans realize that it is simply economically unfeasible to expect the members of the Western European Union (the organization designated to become the security organization of the EC), to create structures that already exist in NATO.37
Despite being at odds with Paris over details of European integration, Bonn does not see any contradictions in its approach to supporting both the continuation of NATO and the creation of a European Defense Identity. This same opinion is not necessarily held by some in Washington who view recent Franco-German efforts, particularly the Eurocorps, with a great deal of suspicion. As a result, while Bonn, Paris, and their European allies have been discussing the creation of European security structures, apprehensive U.S. officials have been issuing démarches criticizing the Franco-German initiative. These critiques stem largely from concerns that such initiatives will negatively affect NATO, the organization that gives them both an institutional pied à terre and leadership role in Europe.38
Indeed, nowhere is the U.S. concern over the future course of the European Defense Identity or confusion over policy more evident than in the proposed Franco-German Eurocorps. Since Mitterrand and Kohl announced the initiative following their October 1991 summit in Lille, the Eurocorps has symbolized the Franco-German preoccupation with being seen in agreement in principle even when they diverge on details. Subsequent to the announcement of this formation, German officials have taken great pains to affirm that the proposed Eurocorps would not exclude NATO and that Bundeswehr contributions (all of three brigades and German contributions to the Franco-German Brigade)39 will remain dual-hatted under NATO. Moreover, the Eurocorps will be available for NATO contingencies and will fall under NATO operational control.40 The French position has ranged from the predictable "Quai d'Orsay" gloating that the Eurocorps represents the first step toward creating a true European defense structure outside of U.S. meddling, to more moderate voices, such as Joxe, who has long argued that the corps will fall under NATO command in the case of aggression.41
Notwithstanding these contradictions in approach, Paris and Bonn have good reasons to propose this structure. From the French perspective, the creation of such a corps, based in Strasbourg, France, lends legitimacy to the reciprocal stationing of the 1st French Armored Division in Germany. This issue takes on added importance in the wake Mitterrand's faux pas following the London Summit in 1990, where he speculated in public (apparently without consulting the Germans and after German officials had signalled they wanted French forces to remain on German soil) about the total withdrawal of French forces from Germany.42 Moreover, as a multinational European formation, the Eurocorps conforms to the Alliance's New Strategic Concept that recognizes future military contributions to NATO will be based on such multinational units.43
For the Federal Republic, participation in such a formation is even more important. Given the strong pacifist feelings in Germany, a "European" body, detached from NATO and the United States, offers a strong legitimizing rationale to support the commitment of German forces in military operations outside the now tranquil Central Region.44 For example, such a multinational formation could simplify German participation in UN humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. Or, integration in the Eurocorps could be used to legitimate German participation in so-called "out of area" operations under the auspices of the WEU. Finally, the political left in Germany recognizes that cooperation in the Eurocorps reinforces the close political relations with France which constitute the sine qua non for German external policy.
Wider acceptance of the proposed corps centers around three principal sticking points. First, many of France's and Germany's European allies have expressed reservations that the corps could encourage American estrangement from Europe at exactly the time it is least desired. For example, Britain's predictable opposition to this "European" initiative has found unwavering support from Italy and the Netherlands.45
Second, while the Germans and French have averred that the corps would fall under NATO operational command and control in a time of crisis, exact conditions and circumstances have not been articulated. For example, the corps itself has been presented by its supporters as a "European" military force, but with little explanation of the conditions under which political organization would fall (i.e., EC, WEU, NATO?).46
Clarification of operational command arrangements of the Eurocorps had to wait until the end of November 1992, following protracted negotiations at the Franco-German working group level. As of November 1992, the French and Germans have agreed, in principle, to the subordination of the Eurocorps to NATO. The exact details of the conditions and command arrangements remain to be negotiated between France, the Federal Republic and the Supreme Allied Command, Europe.47
Third, should control of the corps pass to NATO, the French are not part of NATO's integrated military structure. This condition is no small matter since numerous interoperability problems could hinder close cooperation at the tactical and operational level. Moreover, considerable confusion exists within the French government surrounding the issue of "foreign" command of French forces which traditionally has been a politically sensitive issue in France.48
Finally, Washington's reaction to the Eurocorps has been negative and confusing. Shortly after Kohl's and Mitterrand's announcement of the creation of the Eurocorps in May 1992, for instance, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, William H. Taft, IV, stated that "Undermining the alliance's integrated military structure in the uncertain process of developing a European security identity would be the height of folly," without explaining how the Eurocorps might contribute to such a dire result.49 Yet at the same time, U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney stated that the U.S. would not object to the corps as long as it were subject to NATO.50
Germany: Between the United States and France
This small episode reveals a manifestation of a larger problem; that is, the United States must come to terms with an eventual European Defense Identity. Nowhere is the contradiction in U.S. attitudes better summarized than by Jenonne Walker:
...successive administrations have voiced support for European political as well as economic union, but also objected vehemently when Europeans discussed security issues "behind Washington's back."
Once some form of EC unity on security issues seemed possible, the U.S. tried to straddle that contradiction by a misguided focus on the organization charts so dear to bureaucratic hearts (e.g., opposition to a formal EC-WEU link) and by ultimately futile efforts to pin down allied agreement on the precise roles and responsibilities of NATO and the EC, including what could and could not be discussed outside of NATO.51
Moreover, Washington's strenuous objections to Germany over the Eurocorps, in particular, and the European Defense Identity, in general, have placed Germany in a most uncomfortable position. In short, Germany is caught in the middle between its two principal allies. On the one hand, the Germans must address considerable U.S concerns over the European Defense Identity, particularly perceptions that Franco-German initiatives may undercut NATO; ensure the retention of a U.S. military presence in Germany, and maintain the close relationship that has been carefully cultivated over the past forty-plus years. These concerns have resulted in the Germans taking steps to calm the United States that pull Germany away from France.
On the other hand, the Germans must also satisfy their French allies. And, because of Franco-German differences over the details of implementing European integration and Bonn's craving to soothe French fears, Bonn is being pulled toward Paris. But public comments made by otherwise reasonable French officials on the eve of the French referendum on Maastricht (e.g., Michel Rocard: the treaty must be ratified to save Germany from its "demons") have infuriated German officials.52 That said, the truly historic rapprochement achieved since the 1950s between France and Germany, means no government in Bonn would be willing to sacrifice its special relationship with Paris.53
Thus, German policy appears to be all things to all people and, therefore, fully satisfies no one. But, so long as France and the United States largely define security arrangements in zero-sum terms, German policies will remain dominated by the need to play the "balancer" between its two principal allies,54 and observers will likely continue to see mixed signals from Bonn. Thus, placing Bonn in position where it must choose between Washington/NATO and Paris/European Defense Identity, therefore, is simply counter-productive.55 If Washington continues to reduce its forces in Europe (particularly in Germany), U.S. policy will be increasingly viewed as hypocritical. "Sniping" at the proposed creation of the European Defense Identity, while reducing forward deployed U.S. forces, will only erode support for U.S. policy issues in Europe (e.g., support of NATO). In sum, U.S. interests in the Federal Republic will suffer if the Germans perceive that the United States opposes effective European integration.
To Integrate or Not to Integrate: What Was the Question?
Defining and working to achieve a European security structure, therefore, has not been a neat exercise in logical policymaking. Uncertainties over the future role and mission of the United States in Europe and the evident lack of consensus within the EC as to how political and defense areas should evolve have led understandably to a confusing state of affairs. Clearly, France and the Federal Republic need to be more open in their efforts to create European security structures, if for no other reason than to garner greater consensus among their EC and American partners.56 If not, countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, already suspicious of French and German motives in the security sphere, are unlikely to support any initiative that would risk diminishing NATO or alienating the United States.
Therefore, as European political and security affairs continue their confused evolution, how will France and Germany orient their policy to achieve the illusive goal of a European Defense Identity? While events and proposals will change with the times, a number of constants can be discerned. First, both France and Germany will continue to use "Europe" (however "defined" at the moment) as a vehicle to maintain close bilateral ties. Both countries have vital interests in maintaining this marriage of historic and geographic necessity. Second, whenever political and economic integration become stalled, the security "option" as a modality to maintain or further relations, or, at least, give the appearance of tighter bonds, will likely be used (e.g., the Eurocorps).
Finally, the easy options for European integration have long ago been adopted. Future options (e.g., monetary union, political union, defense identity) strike at the very heart of the concept of state sovereignty and are issues that many states are loath of compromise. While France and the Federal Republic may have national reasons to press ahead toward a still undefined European future, many other EC partners are unlikely to acquiesce. Hence, while officially denied and opposed by many in the EC, the "two-track," or "Europe à la Carte,"57 option for the EC may very well become the only viable alternative to meeting the objectives of EC members and other European states wishing admittance into the Community.
This issue lies at the crux of the future European Defense Identity, as well. Europe must reach agreement on the overarching concepts of political union before coherent policies on its European Defense Identity can be hammered out. If nations adopt the all-or-none approach to integration, it is unlikely that a political agreement will be reached. Thus, a rational defense structure will be difficult to fashion. On the other hand, the "Europe à la Carte" approach offers considerable flexibility and permits a gradual evolution of the political, and hence security, system.
On the other hand, adoption of the all-or-none approach to political union will adversely affect the development of the European Defense Identity. Because nations are unlikely to agree quickly on such politically sensitive issues, the Franco-German imperative to foster the appearance of continued deepening of integration may drive nations to tinker with the security sphere before they agree on the political bases necessary to underwrite defense policy. Such conditions argue for increasing confusion and frustrations over defense and security issues that would only complicate the process of political integration, as evidenced in the recent historical example of the Eurocorps.
Implications for Washington: "Europe" Calling
Despite the fits and starts of European integration and resulting frustrations, the United States must actively support the integration process. Put simply, the process will go forward whether the United States likes it or not. Therefore, from even a narrow assessment of U.S. interests in Europe, it is more profitable for our European allies to see a cooperative United States. Moreover, active U.S. support can be translated into future participation in an integrated Europe that will still allow the United States to make its voice heard. Opposition to European integration, whether overt or subtle, only risks U.S. exclusion from European decisionmaking bodies. And, after all, surely one of the most important interests Washington has regarding Western European security is for its European allies to maintain as much force structure as possible. If "justification" of forces require the creation of a "European corps," clearly the value of maintaining these forces in-being overrides the predicable ambiguity in any ensuing command and operational control arrangements.
One also should not forget that stability in Western Europe has been a long-standing U.S. interest, and increasing European integration over the past four decades has served that end quite successfully. Given the potential for instability in Central and Eastern Europe, the increased integration of Western Europe can only contribute to a larger, more stable Europe. Thus, support of integration initiatives in Western Europe will further overall U.S. interests in that critical region of the world.
Similar logic applies to U.S. support of the European Defense Identity. Again, the defense identity will emerge with or without U.S. blessing. If the United States desires to exert positive influence over the development of the European Defense Identity, then it behooves the United States to provide de facto support to bolster its long-held declaratory policy of support. Carping from the sidelines about the details of the emerging security identity will only alienate key allies and damage long-term U.S. interests in the region. If the United States is to influence the development in ways that support U.S. interests (or at least does not harm them), then the United States must support the efforts of its European allies to establish a coherent and capable defense identity.
Nor should the formation of the Eurocorps overly concern the United States. First, the small numbers of units presently envisaged in the Franco-German corps are not significant. Second, the Germans and the French have agreed that the corps will serve under NATO operational control in time of crisis, albeit considerable details remain to be resolved.58 Third, regardless of the eventual size and scope of the Eurocorps, U.S. assistance will still be required to provide capabilities that the Europeans lack (e.g., airlift, intelligence, etc). Thus, the United States will likely be involved with planning and execution and will be able to exert influence over both activities.
Fourth, the full establishment of this organization will require substantial time and events will undoubtedly result in considerable fits and starts that will shape future developments. It makes little sense to expend significant political capital now to influence a concept that may be considerably altered by future events--perhaps in directions the U.S. desires, but without the U.S. having to spend political capital.
Finally, the United States needs to keep the issue of European integration in perspective. The intent behind European integration is not to freeze out the United States. To the contrary, Europeans recognize the importance of keeping the United States engaged in Europe. European integration is about promoting European stability in general, and, in particular, putting an end to Franco-German animosities that have frequently overturned that stability. The United States must not get caught up in architectures or wiring diagrams and lose sight of the critical issue of promoting European integration to sustain stability gained at such tremendous cost.
1. See Washington Post, December 12, 1991.
2. Paragraph 2, Annex V, "Draft Treaty on European Union," December 10, 1991, a copy of the treaty text may be found in ,Europe (Brussels), December 13, 1991, 1-28.
3. Mitterrand and Kohl originally raised the possibility of the Eurocorps in a footnote to the summit communique of their October 1991 meeting in Lille. For background and analysis on the creation of the Eurocorps see, Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Ein Spaltpilz fuer das Atlantische Buendnis? Das deutsch-franzoesische 'Eurokorps'." Europa-Archiv 45, nos. 15-16, August 25, 1992, 445-452.
4. International Herald Tribune (Paris), September 15, 1992.
5. See Washington Post, June 2, 1992.
6. See Daniel Vernet, "The Dilemma of French Foreign Policy," International Affairs (London), vol. 68, no. 4, 1992, 655.
7. For Mitterrand's motivations see, New York Times (International ed.), June 7, 1992. For the outcome of the vote and commentary, see Washington Post, September 21, 1992.
8. See Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Muenchen), October 29, 1992, for a report of a EC-sponsored study by a group of experts, led by former Irish EC Commissioner Peter Sutherland, pointing the many shortcomings in the Single Market.
9. For a concise overview of the currency crisis ,see either "Europe in Pieces," Newsweek, September 28, 1992, 24-26 or Adam Zagorin, "On Each Other's Nerves," Time, September 28, 1928, 41-42. For a day-to-day account of the economic issues, see Financial Times (London) during the period immediately following September 14, 1992. For blow-by-blow accounts of political fallout from the currency crisis, See Times (London) during the period September 16-24, 1992.
10. See The Washington Post, October, 1, 1992.
11. Albeit dated by contemporary standards, a good assessment of French defense policy is found in David S. Yost, France and Conventional Defense in Central Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).
12. See Vernet, op. cit., 658.
13. For an excellent assessment of current Franco-German affairs, see Peter Schmidt, "In the Midst of Change: The Special Franco-German Security Relationship in the 1990s," unpublished paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, FRG, August 1992.
14. See Jenonne Walker, Fact and Fiction about a European Security Identity and American Interests, Occasional Paper Series (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, April 1992), 7.
15. Quoted by Theo Sommer in Die Zeit (Hamburg), June 12, 1992.
16. See Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe," in The New Germany and the New Europe, Paul B. Stares, ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), 266.
17. For an excellent analysis on this point, see Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Toward a New European Political Economy," in Stares, 189-193.
18. See Theo Summer's excellent commentary on this point in, Die Zeit (Hamburg), June 12, 1992.
19. See Frankfurter Allgemeine, September 29, 1992, 1-2 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-92-190, September 30, 1992, 11-12; and Der Spiegel (Hamburg), September 28, 1992, 18-23.
20. See The European (London), September 24-27, 1992.
21. It is interesting to note that despite French and German efforts to create common European security arrangements, there has been increasing lack of consensus among EC member states over foreign policy issues, if measured by, for instance, their stance in the U.N. General Assembly. One source cites a significant decrease in uniformity on EC members' voting on General Assembly resolutions; from a 65.3 percent conformity in 1975, to 44.2 percent in 1990. "If the Europeans are keen to give the Community an army as if it were a 19th-century state writ large, then the first step would have to be a foreign policy made and implemented in common." See David Buchan's article in Financial Times (London), October 18, 1992.
22. See Le Monde (Paris), June 23, 1992.
23. For background on this subject, see David S. Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity," Survival, July-August 1991, 327-351.
24. For example, according to Jacques Isnard, France has agreed to examine the possibility of participating in a NATO air operations network. See Le Monde (Paris), June 27, 1992.
25. See Claire Trean's essay in Le Monde (Paris), June 6, 1992.
26. See "North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation," Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, Press Communique M-NACC-1(91)111(Rev), December 1991.
27. See "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, Norway," Press Communique M-NAC-1(92)51, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, June 4, 1992.
28. Nonnenmacher is the chief of the foreign affairs section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine. This particular quotation is taken from an article he penned for Le Monde (Paris), June 23, 1992.
29. See part two of a three-part series by Lellouche on France and NATO in, Le Figaro (Paris), July 22, 1992.
30. See David S. Yost, "Mitterrand and Defense and Security Policy," French Politics and Society, Volume 9, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Fall 1991, 141-158.
31. See Le Monde (Paris), November 10-11, 1991.
32. See Le Monde (Paris), September 30, 1992.
33. See Le Monde (Paris), September 6-7, 1992.
34. For a short, but excellent assessment of this issue see The Economist (London), October 3, 1992, 34.
35. For a recent example, see The Washington Times, November 7, 1992.
36. For an interesting contemporary German perspective on alliance nuclear strategy, see Holger H. Mey und Michael Ruehle, "Deutsche Sicherheitsinteressen und Nuklearstrategie der NATO," Aussenpolitik, 42, no. 1, 1991, 21-31.
37. For background on German defense policy, see Thomas-Durell Young, The Normalization of the Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1, 1992); and Wolfgang F. Schloer, "German Security Policy," Adelphi Paper (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, forthcoming).
38. See Amand Menon, et al., "A Common European Defence?', Survival 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), particularly, 105.
39. See, Frankfurter Allgemeine, December 16, 1992.
40. See Federal Defense Minister Volker Ruehe's comments following the La Rochelle Summit in Handelsblatt (Duesseldorf), May 27, 1992, in FBIS-WEU-92-105, June 1, 1992, 15.
41. See Le Monde (Paris), June 19, 1992, and Frankfurter Allgemeine, June 22, 1992.
42. See Le Monde (Paris), July 8-9, 1990, 5, in FBIS-WEU-92-131, July 9, 1992, 1.
43. "Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence." See "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Rome, November 7-8, 1991, Press Communique S-1(91)85, Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991, para 54.
44. See comments attributed to CDU/CSU Faction spokesman on foreign policy in Guenther M. Wiedemann's article in Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger, May 22, 1992.
45. For examples of British, Italian and Dutch criticisms of Eurocorps, see London Financial Times, June 15, 1992; Stefano Silvestri's article in Mondo Economico, May 30, 1992, 44-45, in FBIS-WEU-92-118, June 18, 1992, 4-5; and AFP (Paris), May 21, 1992 in "Spokesman Comments on Eurocorps' Creation, Mission," FBIS-WEU-92-099, May 21, 1992, 27.
46. For example, at La Rochelle, French Presidential spokesman Jean Musitelli noted that the corps would be open for membership to all members of the WEU and that the forces would defend NATO territory. See, AFP (Paris), May 21, 1992, in FBIS-WEU-92-099, May 21, 1992, 27. Recent discussion within the EC and WEU that the WEU will evolve as the defense arm of the EC further complicates the issue. For elaboration on the WEU's role as the defense arm of the EC, see "Petersberg Declaration of the Western European Union," Information Letter from the Assembly of the Western European Union, No. 12, July 1992, 12-13.
47. See The New York Times, December 1, 1992.
48. French participation in the recent Gulf War provides the most recent example. To be fair, the command and control difficulties were predominantly at the political, not military levels. For background on command and control of coalition forces during the Gulf War, see Thomas-Durell Young, "Preparing the Alliance for the Next Out of Area Campaign," Naval War College Review, Summer 1992, 32-36.
49. See The Washington Post, May 23, 1992.
50. See Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), May 21, 1992 in, FBIS-WEU-92-100, May 22, 1992, 6.
51. See Walker, op cit., 12.
52. See William Drozdiak's piece in The Washington Post, September 1, 1992.
53. See Holger Mey's excellent essay on this point in Europaeische Sicherheit (Herford), July 1992, 369.
54. See The Washington Post, June 27, 1992.
55. For a concise discussion of the various sides of this issue, see Frederick Kempe's article, "U.S.-Bonn Clash Over Pact with France," The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 1992.
56. The lack of information on the Eurocorps made available to France's and Germany's allies can only be assessed as having been appalling. See The Times (London), June 27, 1992.
57. "Europe à la Carte would allow countries to choose from a menu that offers differentiated degrees of integration within various policy areas.... As long as the concept of L'Europe à la Carte is understood as a menu of transitional options, it may well be an ingenious response to the multiple challenges that Europe faces--in particular to the dual pressure of widening and deepening." See Reinicke, op cit., 208.
58. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), November 29, 1992.