McNair Paper Number 20 Chapter 5, August 1993
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:
NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR NATO
democratic and free-market institutions.
Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, "changes of biblical proportion" have come to Europe "at space age speed."1 This is an adequate description. Nonetheless, as NATO enters the third year since the London Declaration, the allies can take satisfaction in the way they have adapted to Europe's future security requirements. No one who is familiar with the consensus nature of Alliance politics and its reputation for cautious, drawn out deliberations would have predicted the rapid approval of a new Alliance Strategic Concept, or the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council by December 1991.2
The consequences of the agreement in London have been particularly impressive: drastic reduction of nuclear stockpiles; reviews of strategy, command structure and force structure; the concept of multinational forces; crisis management exercises, and peacekeeping participation. Each successive achievement has confirmed the allies' determination to keep NATO relevant for the future, both in collective defense and in regional security.
Completing NATO's Transformation: Bringing in the East
Having defended its Cold War borders so successfully, NATO needs to look to the east with an eye toward extending Europe's security environment in response to the shift of the Continent's political center of gravity. It is logical for NATO to now strengthen stability and security beyond its borders, to those states that are rapidly expanding their political and economic relations with NATO allies. By extending a hand to Eastern Europe, NATO provides the opportunity for broader European security, and serves as a catalyst for fostering democratic values across the Continent. This is the best possible way to protect the Alliance's hard-won peace.
Alliance policymakers and military strategists are well aware that if NATO is to cope with the new dimensions of regional security, it must expand its role in Eastern Europe.3 They know, too, that momentum in Brussels is essential if implementation of the new Strategic Concept is to outpace instabilities growing out of the wreckage of the Soviet empire. But different visions of NATO's future, the intractable nature of the Yugoslavian conflict, and the accumulation of other solution-resistant issues of rapid change, have slowed progress toward resolution of security problems along NATO's eastern borders.4 We must find a way to get beyond our fears and regain the proactive posture that is the only means of ensuring our own security.
The allies know the importance of stability in Eastern Europe. While postwar Western Europe gradually developed mechanisms for accommodating old nationalist quarrels, Eastern Europeans could only suppress their differences under the Soviet dictatorshi In the absence of Soviet hegemony, we are now witnessing a reversion to nationalist and ethnic rivalry, and soon perhaps, renewed attempts to form competitive alliances against unfriendly neighbors.5 NATO allies are all too well versed in the dangers portended by these circumstances. As the Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens wrote in 1989, "What has to be prevented at all costs in tomorrow's Europe is the rekindling of nationalism as a result of a renaissance of the nation-state."6
The very real instability we see today at a distance will have an increasingly direct impact on the security of Alliance members tomorrow. That impact has already been felt: the growing burden of refugees fleeing conflict, economic deprivation and ethnic persecution. As a consequence, we have seen violent unrest in some cities of Western Europe, and the worrisome gains of political extremists at the polls. Less noticeable has been the drain on Western coffers from attempts to counter potential crises, and the diversion of political, economic and military resources away from the costly task of healing the divisions of the Cold War. Finally, and of greatest concern, is the resort to military action in crises born of immense socio-political hatred. It would be infinitely better to preempt crisis and conflict by creating an environment in which they cannot readily take hold and intensify.
Fortunately, most Eastern European leaders are determined to find international security arrangements which protect their infant democracies, and keep extreme nationalism at bay. Not surprisingly, the void left by the defunct Warsaw Pact has led them to see collective security with NATO as an immediate necessity.
For now, NATO is not ready to offer membership to its former enemies.7 But although there are a number of steps short of membership in NATO which could go a long way toward creating genuine collective security, time is not on our side. The pressing need to define national security policies and defense requirements causes Eastern leaders to seek stronger indications of how NATO will address the issue of pan-European security.
But thus far, NATO has approached regional cooperation and the evolution of a new architecture with lofty words but cautious actions.8 If NATO cannot take on this broader role and begin to implement it, the Alliance will become irrelevant and other structures will be found--at certain cost in terms of resources, organizational ability and Western political-military cohesion--to protect Europe's future.
More fundamentally, only NATO can offer effective security instruments beyond a mere forum for consultation. It is an infrastructure-in-being for meshing the security concerns of the East with the stability of the West. NATO alone can offer political-military expertise and a proven track record in all aspects of security. Therefore, NATO is the obvious nucleus for whatever broader security arrangement eventually comes into being. The allies have the opportunity to capitalize on the democratic principles of the Washington Treaty and NATO's unique organization, but to do so they must be willing to act more purposefully than they have thus far.
Yugoslavia: An Example of Why NATO Must Look East
Hesitation in countering crisis can be costly. Yugoslavia, as the first major crisis for Europe in the new environment, demonstrates clearly the potential dangers to the security of all nations in Europe, including NATO, if ethnic violence continues unabated. It also demonstrates the importance of early attention to political solutions to problems that may have no solution once they become military problems. More than eighteen months after it began,9 the conflict in Yugoslavia defies resolution, even as it grows more difficult to contain.
The problems of Yugoslavia are so formidable that no one can say whether an early Alliance response to the crisis would have made a large difference. Unfortunately, we will never know what an early Alliance initiative might have accomplished because we were still debating whether this was the kind of new political role we intended for NATO. Just as NATO was adopting a Strategic Concept based on protecting peace and managing crisis, the Alliance approached the first post-Cold War crisis in Europe haltingly and with a lack of consensus. The strong commitment and momentum of the earlier transformation (the redesign of the structure) had given way to a certain impotence when it was time to use the structure.
It may well be that NATO could have done little to influence the tragic course of events in Yugoslavia, but nations should have been more willing to meet in the right forum and address the crisis, and make judgements on an Alliance role. For example, Allies could have met in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and with other concerned countries in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and considered what to do in Yugoslavia. Even if it had been decided that Allied action was inappropriate at the time, the simple act of discussing Yugoslavia in those political fora and considering available options could not but have had a positive impact on the crisis.
While NATO action to deal with the crisis in Yugoslavia has apparently become more acceptable,10 this change occurred only after the situation deteriorated to the point where military solutions are being sought. And so NATO and the NACC are in a reactive-responsive mode, rather than a proactive one, the key to NATO's success in the past.
While we struggle now in response to the Yugoslav crisis, we also need to work to create an environment that prevents crises. In reaching out to the area most likely to spawn crises of concern to NATO, no concept has been more promising than the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. New initiatives in the NACC could significantly enhance regional security, and help realize the goals agreed to at Rome in the Alliance Strategic Concept.
NACC: The Logical Focus for a Broader Security
In the immediate future, the best way of enhancing NATO's transition is the emergence of the NACC as a concrete structure to deal with the security issues in Europe. NACC's attraction lies in its promise for engaging the legitimate security concerns of all of Europe in a true partnershi The aim of emerging states of the former Soviet bloc is to participate in a new security framework where they are real partners; not to be seen as defeated states or mere recipients of international aid. Now is the time to build cooperative relationships by means of such initiatives as NACC, as new governments and new militaries are forming, and new democratic values and open markets are being tested.
The NACC partners do not necessarily need to become members of NATO. Rather, they need to know that they do not face risks to their security interests alone: they are full partners in a structure for developing advice and assistance on regional security. Even without a defense treaty relationship, partner nations can realize many of the security enhancements and resource efficiencies that collective security brings. With solid ties between the Alliance and the security structures of each NACC partner, the principles on which the Alliance was founded will gradually become the basis of a broader cooperation, and thereby knit together a broad security fabric resistant to crisis and instability. The nations of Eastern Europe that desire eventual membership in NATO will undoubtedly act in ways consistent with NATO objectives.
The key, therefore, is for NATO to make the NACC a genuine forum for dialogue and cooperation on the foremost security concerns of its new partners. This means addressing difficult issues and helping to implement the decisions made. As an immediate priority, NATO should institutionalize procedures for substantive political and military cooperation on regional security issues. Also, to be a true partnership, NATO must be willing to support the worthy initiatives of its NACC partners. If the NACC fulfills its potential, it will become the major forum of European security. However, without a willingness to engage significant security issues, NACC risks becoming nothing more than a facade.
The Next NACC Agenda
How should NATO proceed toward ensuring the security for all of Europe? There are a number of initiatives that would focus NACC directly on the most important security concerns of the NACC partners. Early initiatives might include, for example:
NATO could extend participation in Alliance humanitarian relief planning and operations to NACC partners. Help from NACC partners would enhance relief operations such as those ongoing in war-torn Yugoslavia, and could eventually lead to aid for partner states. NACC cooperation might be in the form of planning, or providing advice during operations, or even outright assistance. By helping to mitigate human suffering, the NACC confronts a key source of civil unrest and a major cause of migration and refugees, from which they themselves may suffer in the near future.
NATO could establish procedures for consultation in the NACC on security issues of concern to a NACC member state, similar to the mechanisms established by Article Four of the Washington Treaty.11 By creating a forum for member-initiated consultations, non-NATO members are reassured that they can at least deliberate about security issues in a pre-crisis environment. Not only would this allow a nation facing a developing crisis to raise its legitimate security concerns, but also allow NATO members the opportunity to influence the early responses to crises.
In response to growing concerns over nuclear security and safety, NATO, through the NACC, could provide its expertise in radiation control and monitoring, and emergency preparedness to partner states. This would make available an important capability for addressing issues that could face former Warsaw Pact nations, including the risks of nuclear power-related disasters. One could envision emergency nuclear disaster response teams, under NACC sponsorship, fully prepared to respond in a multinational way to nuclear disasters any place in Europe, but with a focus on Eastern Europe.12
The NACC could help refine both the automated architecture and the requisite political/military procedures planned for CFE inspection information sharing, as well as for other arms control treaty compliance data. In a related area, NACC could establish joint task forces for technological cooperation on the destruction of "treaty limited equipment" (TLE) and overall CFE Treaty execution. The verifiable reduction of arms strengthens regional security, and a collective approach to treaty execution will further enhance the confidence-building value of national verification. This will be particularly beneficial to states with limited resources for treaty compliance or verification.13
NATO could enhance NACC's program of technical assistance for defense conversion, including the environmental rehabilitation of military facilities. The Alliance could also provide technical assistance on an appropriate scale to enable the militaries of Eastern Europe to aid civil agencies. This support is especially valuable to partner states who have adopted the principles of democracy and civil control of the military.14 By building up the systems and procedures that have succeeded in Western democracies, NACC can help accelerate democracy while shaping militaries to complement the needs of the civil sector, in both traditional and non-traditional missions.
Along with other agencies, the NACC is an appropriate forum for consultation on issue related to refugees.15 The NACC should agree to discuss the refugee concerns of all member states, with an eye to ultimately reducing migration through coordinated actions designed to address the root causes of displaced persons. Where refugees have become a direct security concern, or generate the need for disaster relief operations, NACC members should consider the commitment of appropriate military support for political decisions taken in the UN or CSCE.
In order to expedite support for UN or CSCE peacekeeping operations, NACC partners could establish sets of NACC-funded and maintained peacekeeping equipment, along the lines of POMCUS. Equipment could include vehicles, communications equipment, medical supplies, sustainment stores and weapons for self-defense. In addition, the NACC should conduct mission planning and peacekeeping training seminars, and propose peacekeeping scenarios for NATO crisis management exercises. A ready peacekeeping capability and institutional expertise will significantly strengthen the potency of peacekeeping as a tool for regional stability.16
While the focus here is the NACC, which is the proper forum for foreign policymaking, it is important to recognize that parallel policy structures have been established for cooperation by defense ministers and military leaders. Therefore, the Allies concerned should use the defense minister's Group on Defense Matters (GDM) and the military structure's Military Committee in Cooperation (MC CO-OP), each in their own area of cognizance, to generate initiatives similar to the NACC.
Finally, it is important to appreciate how difficult it is for some partner states to participate in any NACC endeavor, simply due to limited resources. Setting up a physical facility to facilitate cooperation, e.g., a NATO-NACC annex near NATO headquarters, or perhaps finding space for a "Cooperation Wing" within NATO headquarters itself, would significantly strengthen the prospects for cooperation and the sense of partnershi
Conclusions
Times of transition are both turbulent and dangerous. Yet our confidence in dealing with these challenges is bolstered by the knowledge that bold action forty years ago resulted in the birth of NATO, and made the peace of 1989 possible. Now, as then, we have no real alternative but to proceed decisively. NATO's interests have been well served by its capable leadership, skilled personnel, seasoned consultative mechanisms and political commitment by its members. Now, as then, the future is uncertain and the Alliance must move ahead. Our road maps are the Declarations of London and Rome, and the Alliance Strategic Concept.17 Azimuth corrections will come from the NAC and NACC.
NATO cannot rest on its laurels. While much has already been accomplished, the toughest steps are still ahead: engaging in the security concerns which most threaten Europe, i.e., the crisis-spawning divisions between peoples in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. We should proceed with purpose, even though we will have to proceed with caution.
Eastern Europe has the potential to either enrich the collective political and economic communities, or to unravel the security and stability of the West through instability and conflict. In acting to counter instability, NATO and its NACC initiatives provide the greatest hope for security through all of Europe.
To support NATO's renewed procedures and structures, a fresh new philosophy is needed in the halls and chambers of Evere--one that boldly accepts the burden of problems which, while they fundamentally affect NATO, are beyond traditional Alliance boundaries. NATO's former adversaries are now potential partners and friends. Where previously they were the focus of our defense planning, they must now become part of our security capability, their energies enlisted to grow beyond potential crisis spots into contributors of continent-wide security.
NATO needs to anticipate the potential security concerns of Europe as a whole, but especially of Eastern Europe. By stemming crises early and building confidence in a new security structure, Eastern Europe will more quickly develop democratic governments and open, prosperous markets. In turn, the prospects for all of Europe, both politically and economically will brighten.
Having defended its traditional borders so successfully, NATO should invest its values, organizational strengths and unique capabilities in a broader Europe, especially helping those nations which are rapidly becoming Alliance partners in the political and economic arenas. Alliance members will benefit from the resulting stability. All of us will prosper as Europe's newest democracies prosper.
1. General John Shalikashvili made this reference in his remarks at the U.S. Army, Europe change of command ceremony on July 9, 1992 at Heidelberg, Germany. The juxtaposition itself was first used by U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in speaking to the International Bertelsmann Forum in Bonn, Germany, April 4, 1992.
2. For a summary of NATO's accomplishments between June 1990 and November 1991, see "The Rome Summit," NATO Review, December 1991.
3. From the beginning of the transformation of the Alliance at the London Summit (June 1990), the Allies declared, "NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe." This has remained a central theme in subsequent communiques.
4. In the wake of the far-reaching agreements at Rome, we might have expected NATO to engage soon on broader European security issues, and especially on crisis management. Yet the Alliance has continued to work hard on structures and workplans such as the Group on Defence Matters and the MC Co-Operation, and to further internal developments, including a three-part contacts program and parliamentary exchanges under the North Atlantic Assembly. Although laudable and appropriate, these programs are short of being the clear security enhancements or direct crisis management which are both needed and expected. One tentative sign of progress occurred in June 1992 when the NAC approved qualified support for CSCE peacekeeping. See NATO Review, February 1992, and June 1992.
5. See Charles Gati,."East-Central Europe: The Morning After," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990-1991.
6. See Mark Eyskens,."The History of the Future," NATO Review, June 1990.
7. NATO has always been cool to the sometimes open suggestions that the Alliance expand its membership to the east, but has never taken the official position that membership is out of the question. At London, Copenhagen, Rome and Oslo the Allies consistently expressed the desire for closer ties, but sidestepped the issues of membership and extending security guarantees. However, this "constructive ambiguity" is slowly giving way to the notion that the Alliance will eventually expand. As relations become more substantive, the NACC is an ideal forum for exploring the possibilities of closer ties, to include membership in NATO.
8. Beginning in London (June 1990), and in subsequent pronouncements at Copenhagen (June 1991), Rome (November 1991), and Oslo (June 1992), the Allies have spoken repeatedly of adapting the Alliance to serve the broader needs of European security, especially in the political arena. Yet, some Allies, most notably France, continue to define the Alliance's post-Cold War agenda narrowly. For example, the Alliance has been painfully slow in responding to the crisis in Yugoslavia. Earlier, NATO was only lukewarm in its role of providing food to the former Soviet republics in the winter of 1992. The contrast between words and deeds could be explained as a fear of increasing costs at a time when the Western public expects significant defense savings. However, the real reason is a lack of consensus on what kind of an alliance the Allies want for the future.
9. The Yugoslav war is commonly considered to have begun in June 1991, when the JNA responded in Slovenia and then Croatia on behalf of local Serbian militias, following declarations of independence by both Slovenia and Croatia that same month.
10. From September 1991 until August 1992, NATO managed only public statements on Yugoslavia. However, in August 1992, NATO began a series of piecemeal responses with the deployment of its Mediterranean fleet, STANAVFORMED, into the Adriatic. In October 1992 NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft took up surveillance of the war zone, and later that month a contingent of headquarters personnel was deployed to assist the UN in command and control of humanitarian assistance operations.
11. Article 4 of the 1949 Washington Treaty reads: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."
12. The potential for a nuclear crisis is arguably the most serious concern facing Europe and the Alliance. There are two major threats: first, the potential for the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear technologies through the combination of de-centralized control and high demand among third world non-nuclear powers; and second, the potential for another Chernobyl-type disaster at any of scores of inferior reactors currently in use across the territory of the former Warsaw Pact. A high priority should be accorded programs which help neutralize these twin threats. For detailed treatment of the nuclear weapons risk, see Joachim Krause, "Risks of Nuclear Proliferation Following the Dissolution of the Soviet Union," Aussen Politik (Hamburg, Germany), 43, no. 4.
13. Fulfillment of the provisions of arms control treaties under CSCE will be a major contributor to regional security and stability. However, this work has just begun and its completion, in some respects, will continue indefinitely. As the CFE and CSBM automated data bases mature and issues unfold, there will be a role for the NACC in assisting new republics to fully participate in both the Vienna 1992 document and CFE.
14. The U.S. European Command has launched a dynamic program of military-to-military contacts aimed especially at the role of the military in a democracy, civilian control over military establishments, and non-lethal technical assistance such as environmental clean-u A complimentary program done on an Alliance-NACC level could speed the progress of all the partner states.
15. For the last two years, about one million legal and illegal immigrants have entered Western Europe from Eastern Europe annually. This is in addition to approximately 900,000 immigrants who traditionally enter Western Europe annually. On top of these groups has now come the influx of as many as 600,000 "asylum seekers" each year. The alarming increase in refugees is blamed by some for the upsurge in racism in Germany, where Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel argued that immigration is threatening German democracy. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd has called migration Europe's most serious problem. See The Economist, September 19, 1992, 64.
16. Recently NATO has taken steps toward acquiring a peacekeeping capability. In September 1992 the North Atlantic Council asked NATO staffs to explore practical options for assisting peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia. In October 1992, at their meeting in Glen Eagles, Scotland, NATO ministers tasked the Military Committee to start preparing peacekeeping contingency plans.
17. For text of the London Declaration see NATO Review, August 1990. For the text of the Rome Declaration and the Alliance Strategic Concept, see NATO Review, December 1991.