McNair Paper Number 33 Chapter 2, January 1995
The intercourse . . . steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so enormously that a violation of right in one portion of the world is felt all over it.(Note 1)
The change from mainland expansionism to worldwide interests and influence came to the United States in the final decade of the 19th century. On 16 January 1893,(Note 2) U.S. citizens residing in Hawaii became involved in a plot to seize power from the royal family and were saved from themselves by the U.S. Minister in the islands, John L. Stevens, when their so-called insurgency was about to be crushed by the native Hawaiians. U.S.S. BOSTON was in Honolulu harbor at the time; Stevens requested that her Commanding Officer land troops to prevent bloodshed. A provisional government was established, and Queen Liliuokalani was dethroned when 164 sailors and Marines arrived at the gates of the royal palace. Minister Stevens, without proper authority
recognized the insurrectionists (who had escaped defeat through his humanitarian actions) as the government and established a U.S. protectorate. The protectorate was proclaimed by the U.S. Minister on 1 February, a mere two weeks later. By mid-month a proposed annexation treaty was delivered to Washington by one British and four U.S. citizens who presented themselves as "Hawaiians." According to diplomatic historian Thomas Bailey, newly elected President Cleveland would have none of it and attempted to restore the Queen to the throne; she, however, quickly pledged to have the heads of the insurrectionists. Although the annexation treaty remained intolerable, Cleveland's ethics succumbed to domestic political considerations--no president could restore a sovereign intent on butchering his constituents.(Note 3)
Consideration of the problem lingered for years. In 1897, when it became clear the Japanese wanted to annex Hawaii, the issue moved closer to resolution. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, the noted naval strategist, and others argued that Hawaii in Japanese hands posed a threat to the Pacific coast of the United States. Annexation was finally precipitated by the Spanish-American War in 1898. The de facto insurrectionist government compromised its neutrality to support the United States' effort to resupply Admiral Dewey and support the transport of troops destined for the conquest of Manila. This sacrifice of neutrality in favor of the United States became part of the rationale for annexation when the U.S. Government finally ended a half decade of ambivalence and debate.(Note 4)
Other questions regarding neutrality played important roles in this momentous time of national transition for the United States.(Note 5)
The United States tried in vain to avoid involvement in the civil war ravaging the Spanish colony of Cuba as it sought independence from Madrid. An activist press and an adventurous populace combined to place the United States a bit too close to the vortex of the dissolving Spanish Empire. The government maintained an appropriate public policy but did little to prevent support to the insurgents who kept an informal, but very effective financial and logistic support infrastructure operating out of New York City under the guidance of Cuban hero Jose Martí. Indeed, private U.S. citizens became deeply involved in both the financial and operational aspects of the revolution.(Note 6)
One of the earliest and most notorious incidents involved the U.S. flag sidewheeler VIRGINIUS. In October 1873, VIRGINIUS was involved in landing rebels and arms when a Spanish warship, TORNADO, interfered. A pursuit ensued that ended within sight of refuge in the British waters of Jamaica. The American prize was taken to Cuba, where the captain, crew, and passengers were sentenced to death and executed. The incident--despite VIRGINIUS covertly but notoriously belonging to the Cuban Junta--almost took the United States to war with Spain over the seizure of an "American" ship on the high seas.(Note 7)
The pattern continued essentially unabated. U.S. citizens were also funding Martí's efforts when he died in Cuba in May 1895, a few short weeks after he went ashore to join in the insurgents' fight directly.(Note 8) A variety of actions by private citizens, who could not be, or were not, restrained by the U.S. government, and seemingly endless agitation by domestic newspapers severely strained relations with Spain.
After a riot in Havana there was great concern over the safety of U.S. citizens and their property in Cuba. A stabilizing influence was sought. In January of 1898, the battleship MAINE was sent to Havana, in an effort to impress the importance of this concern upon the Spanish colonial government.(Note 9) The mission was unstated and never alluded to during the various calls made by Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, MAINE's Commanding Officer. Regardless of its subtlety, no one was confused about the message delivered by the "friendly" visit of this warship that arrived without notice. As history has recorded, the ship and many of her crew were to remain in Cuba for the rest of their lives.
The loss of the battleship MAINE is popularly cited as the reason for the war with Spain,(Note 10) but the blatantly partiality of the United States undoubtedly contributed to the conflict. By the time MAINE blew up, the relationship with Spain had degraded sufficiently to make the idea of sabotage by the Spanish all too credible. Analysis of information more clearly understood with hindsight indicates the ship actually may have destroyed herself. Experiences of similar ships at the time indicate that bituminous coal in one of MAINE's bunkers likely ignited through spontaneous combustion. Such a fire would transmit deadly heat directly to an ammunition magazine through a shared bulkhead, causing an explosion sufficient to destroy MAINE. It is unlikely that anyone will ever conclusively prove how the explosion really occurred. The United States assumed the Spanish were at fault, believing Spain was motivated to take such drastic action because of the interference of the United States and U.S. citizens in the civil war.(Note 11)
The war that ensured involved actions that stretched halfway around the world. Commodore Dewey's campaign against the Spanish forces in the Philippines, which, oddly enough, compromised Hawaiian neutrality, came as part of the effort to free Cuba. Dewey far outmatched and easily defeated the Spanish Fleet at Manila Bay but likely could not have sustained his forces for long if the Hawaiian Islands had not served as a logistics base for U.S. naval forces in Asian waters. Hawaii also facilitated the reinforcement of Dewey's ships by Army troops. After defeating the Spanish and accepting their surrender, Dewey spent a period in which he did not have sufficient forces to occupy the city he had just conquered; army troops needed to come from the United States to make that a reality. Meanwhile, Dewey was doing a superb if tenuous job of maintaining a blockade in Manila Bay. The neutral British had denied Dewey's forces access to, and support from, Hong Kong, even to the extent of not permitting the use of telegraph facilities.(Note 12)
Before long Dewey found a superior German fleet at his back. The German naval force failed to respect Dewey's blockade of Manila Bay, and on more than one occasion U.S. warships fired across the bows of their German counterparts before the Germans would heave to or even identify themselves. The Germans were intent on seizing bases in the Philippine Islands for themselves, specifically in Mindanao, and this
eventually became an important factor in the U.S. decision to annex the Philippines.(Note 13) Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Guam had come under U.S. rule when the armistice was signed in August of 1898, but the United States was still unsure about its appropriate role in the Philippines. National sentiment was ambivalent. Spain was seen as despotic, but the United States wanted to avoid an imperialist label.
When the peace treaty was signed in Paris that December, Cuba was freed, much to the chagrin of the Spanish who would have preferred to lose it to the United States, and the Philippines were purchased from Spain for $20 million. The United States was now a world power responsible for island empires in the Caribbean and the Pacific and far-flung interests associated with them. The impact of this on the character of the nation was not so subtle as to be unnoticed.(Note 14)
At the Hague Peace Conference in 1899, Captain Mahan, according to Barbara Tuchman's account, believed "What had been good for the United States as a weak neutral . . . would no longer be good for her as a Great Power. . . . He looked ahead to the rights of the belligerent rather than back to the rights of the neutral."(Note 15)
It appears Mahan understood the impact of the new role the United States had undertaken, and it didn't take long before the international responsibilities inherent in new and some long-standing U.S. policies became clear to everyone else.
As an example, in February of 1904 the Hague Court of Permanent Arbitration gave precedence over other creditor nations to the states that used armed force to extract payment of debts from Venezuela in 1902,(Note 16) thus offering new incentives to states who would use force to collect debts. During the Venezuela crisis, the United States imposed itself as a shield between those creditor nations and Venezuela, to uphold the Monroe Doctrine. The world economy, especially in much of the Western Hemisphere, was not well. If the United States were not to ignore extra-hemispheric interference and forsake the interests that gave birth to the doctrine, it likely would confront creditor nations attempting to collect payment by force more frequently in the future, or would somehow have to guarantee payment of other nations' debts. The United States chose the latter course. The result was the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that sent Navy and Marine Corps units throughout Latin America establishing and protecting U.S.-operated customs houses that supervised the international trade relations of debtor states, to keep the United States out of European wars.(Note 17) Some have alleged this effort was a brand of imperialism and the trappings and temporary results bore this interpretation out. These temporary protectorates were not sought as prizes, however; intervention was simply the lesser of two evils.(Note 18) Indeed, there was so little profit to be made in these ventures that the Department of State had problems convincing private U.S. bankers to underwrite the foreign debts.
Foreign investment had dominated the Mexican economy and foreign policy for decades. The unscrupulous behavior of the regime of Porfirio Diaz included seizing Indian land holdings and embezzling federal funds. Mexico was overdue for revolution by the time Diaz' government began to recognize that its control of the country might be challenged in 1910. Much of the foreign investment in Mexico at the time was in the form of enormous land holdings of U.S. citizens. Further, citizens of the United States owned a significant portion of the Mexican oil industry and their investments were expanding. These interests made the stability of the Mexican government a matter of concern for the Taft Administration.(Note 19)
The Mexican revolution suffered an early setback in 1911 when Francisco Madero, an insurgent leader, escaped across the border into Texas and found refuge in the neutral territory of the United States. Initially he denied any intention of setting afoot a new revolutionary force, but he found great sympathy for his cause in the borderlands by praising the United States for all the rights and freedoms Mexico lacked. Soon Madero did take a small force across the border. When the revolutionaries were driven back by Mexico's Federal Army, Madero was arrested by the Department of Justice for violation of U.S. neutrality laws.(Note 20) Madero's support was widespread by then, and there were even allegations Standard Oil was financing his adventures because Diaz was giving preferential treatment to British oil investors. In any case, the charges against Madero were quietly dropped. This failure of enforcement and Madero's growing moral and material support in the United States prompted Diaz to send the noted Mexican lawyer Joaquin Casasus as a special emissary, first to Texas and later to Washington to plead for enforcement of strict neutrality along the border.(Note 21)
President Taft was wedded to the idea of providing protection to U.S. citizens and their property, but he was equally committed to avoiding the use of force without the express authorization of the Congress. Seeking a course to avoid confrontation and enforce neutrality simultaneously proved quite a challenge.
In March 1911, President Taft sent between 15,000 and 20,000 troops to patrol the Texas border and mobilized Army and Navy Units at Galveston, San Antonio, and Los Angeles. These actions, aimed at contributing to stability, missed the mark completely because the President neglected to notify Mexico of the purpose of these actions before they were taken. When Mexicans learned U.S. warships were en route to Mexican coastal states there was a great fear of invasion. Only after the First Secretary of the Mexican Embassy in Washington submitted a formal request for clarification did Mexico understand the purpose of the force movements; tensions then quickly subsided. Recognizing the effects of his well-meaning actions, President Taft offered assurances of his intentions and ordered the ships to stop only briefly to take on coal and put back out to sea.(Note 22)
According to one detailed history, the demonstration of force was not only poorly coordinated with diplomatic efforts, it came too late. This second time he launched a revolution from U.S. soil, Madero proved unstoppable. By the time the border patrols were in place, Madero already was established inside Mexico and soon seized the reins of power. Taft recognized Madero's government and pledged himself not to permit another counterrevolutionary force to stage from the United States and in fact established strict controls to prevent any factional force access to U.S. arms and munitions. The United States again mobilized troops along the border during the brief rebellion led by Pascual Orozco. This mobilization to control the border again gave rise in Mexico to rumors of impending intervention.(Note 23)
On 2 March 1912, President Taft delivered a proclamation warning the nation that U.S. neutrality laws would be enforced and private citizens should not meddle in Mexico's affairs. By September, however, Taft's concern for Mexico's internal situation and the potential for the Madero regime to enact laws inimical to U.S. interests caused him to issue a warning, tantamount to an ultimatum, to Mexico not to tamper with U.S. interests. When Madero's regime experienced its own stability problems the following month, Taft sent the cruisers DES MOINES and TACOMA to Veracruz and Tampico, respectively, to protect U.S. citizens. Madero prevailed, and when stability returned the ships were withdrawn.(Note 24)
In February 1913, U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson sounded the alarm from Mexico City telling Secretary of State Knox "Our Government . . . should take prompt and effective action."(Note 25) This time the threat to the Madero regime was real. President Taft responded to his ambassador's warning in time and six ships were put in place to protect U.S. citizens when the regime fell: SOUTH DAKOTA was sent to Acapulco; COLORADO to alternate between Mazatlan and Manzanillo; and VERMONT, NEBRASKA, GEORGIA and VIRGINIA to the Veracruz-Tampico area. It is noteworthy that the earlier naval demonstration was conducted with two small cruisers and this one involved two large cruisers and four battleships, a significant escalation, both quantitatively and qualitatively that must have been recognized by the Mexicans. The ships' mission was to protect U.S. citizens and foster stability, but once these large cruisers and battleships were on station, Ambassador Wilson took it upon himself to call upon Madero and threaten to intervene unless foreign interests were protected and the fighting stopped. Madero agreed and wired Taft pleading for restraint and offering to compensate all U.S. citizens' losses. Despite his personal philosophy regarding intervention, Taft was not going to be caught unprepared. He embarked 2,000 Marines in transports at Guantanamo, and an additional 5,000 soldiers embarked at Galveston before the Decena Tragica was over.(Note 26) Madero's regime fell to the forces of General Victoriano Huerta.
An investigation led to the dismissal of Ambassador Wilson for his personal intervention with Madero (done in the name of the United States), but Taft and Knox, perhaps unwittingly, had also played key roles in the undermining of Madero's position. Their indiscriminate flexing of armed force helped weaken two successive Mexican governments while the stated Administration goal was only to protect U.S. citizens, property, and economic interests and preserve stability.
President Wilson Confronts Huerta
Huerta, however, could not be so sanguine about events inside Mexico. An insurrection under Venustiano Carranza, a leader in the Constitutionalist faction, was gathering momentum, and in his quest to consolidate power Huerta apparently allowed his police to kill Mexican Senator Belisario Domingues. This led President Wilson to abandon private diplomacy. The United States called on other nations to join in trying to persuade Huerta to retire, but Wilson's more public diplomacy was ineffective. President Wilson then proved that Huerta had underestimated his personal commitment to the "legitimacy doctrine." The President decided to unseat Huerta using whatever level of force might be necessary and instructed naval forces in the area to be prepared to assist U.S. and third country nationals should force be necessary. The months following saw impartial neutrality discarded as relations grew openly closer with, and supportive of, Carranza's Constitutionalist faction.
Carranza's representative in Washington, Luis Cabrera, was successful in first obtaining covert arms shipments, despite the U.S. embargo Taft had established, and ultimately in having the embargo lifted altogether. Given the state of relations at the time, lifting the embargo directly benefitted Carranza at Huerta's expense. Wilson told the Congress and the people of the United States that this action was intended to bring U.S. policy into line with the "law of neutrality." (Remember, the embargo was imposed to comply with neutrality as well). While lifting the embargo theoretically may have been consistent with neutrality, the motivation in doing it was clearly partial to the Constitutionalist cause. Wilson's intention was to let the Constitutionalists get rid of Huerta for Mexico.(Note 28)
Early in 1914 a naval demonstration was conducted off both Mexican coasts. While no blockade was attempted it was quite clear U.S. power could be brought to bear quickly. U.S. forces operating in support of U.S. policy again entered the territorial waters of a state whose policies the naval forces were trying to influence during a civil war and problems resulted which dangerously increased tensions.
The infamous "Tampico Incident" of 9 April 1914 precipitated (or according to some, provided the excuse for) the occupation of Veracruz. One of the ships in the inner harbor at Tampico, U.S.S. DOLPHIN, sent a party ashore in a small boat to buy gasoline for the Admiral's barge. Two Federal Mexican Gunboats in the harbor were shelling Constitutionalist forces just outside the city by firing over Tampico and were supposed to establish a blockade of Tampico, but Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces off the east coast of Mexico, had told them the city would remain open. The sailors were so unconcerned, however, that no one in the boat was even armed. Upon arrival at a pier, the sailors were arrested by members of Huerta's army. Two were taken from DOLPHIN's whaleboat, which was operating under the U.S. flag, and thus the boat's "territorial integrity" was violated by the arrest.(Note 29)
Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Commander Fourth Division U.S. Atlantic Fleet was embarked in DOLPHIN because the battleships could not cross the bar. He received the report of the arrests about the time the sailors were released. His immediate response was to insist Mexico apologize and fire a salute to the flag of the United States. Huerta apologized but would fire the salute only if Mayo assured him it would be answered in kind. Mayo accepted no conditions. The President wanted to back up Mayo's demand (issued without coordination with Washington). On 20 April, President Wilson asked Congress for approval to use the armed forces of the United States as necessary to obtain from Huerta recognition of the "rights" of the United States.
The President, as Commander-in-Chief, already had the authority and the obligation to use the armed forces to protect U.S. rights already. In asking Congress for their cooperation and approval to use force as necessary, Wilson foreshadowed the war powers debate that ensued decades later. Wilson must have seen this as a task that exceeded his direct responsibilities regarding defense of U.S. rights (especially in the case of our "rights" regarding a salute to the flag). In essence, the President sought Congressional authority to go to war with Huerta under international law without appearing to do so in the eyes of the U.S. Constitution.
The Senate resolution, which passed after the landing at Veracruz, called the President's action "justified" rather than "authorized" to stress they did not consider the resolution a declaration of war.(Note 30)
According to a variety of contemporary accounts and well researched historical reports, sailors and Marines landed at Veracruz on 22 April 1914. While the stated motivation for the operation was to obtain a salute to the U.S. flag, after Veracruz was seized the salute was apparently never demanded.(Note 31)
Additional insight to the President's (but not Admiral Mayo's) motivation is gained when it is understood the steamship YPIRANGA of the German-American Line was expected to moor at Veracruz 4 hours after the landing began. YPIRANGA was carrying 200 machine guns and 15 million rounds of ammunition the Constitutionalists wanted to keep out of the hands of Huerta's forces. Because the United States was not prepared to go to war, the naval forces present were not conducting a blockade and the cargo could be considered contraband only by the Constitutionalists. The United States occupied the customs house at Veracruz, but YPIRANGA landed her cargo and delivered it to Huerta's forces at Puerta Mexico, too late to help Huerta.
The most pressing objective of the U.S. operation had ultimately failed:(Note 32) the salute was not fired, U.S. citizens and their property were still at risk in Mexico, and the YPIRANGA 's guns and ammunition delivered. All the United States came away with was 13 dead sailors and 4 dead Marines.(Note 33) The operation did establish the partiality of the United States--while not being able to claim a causal relationship to the change of government in Mexico in the summer of 1914, the occupation of Veracruz certainly contributed to Carranza's victory.(Note 34) The President limited his objective to the removial of Huerta from power and publicly renounced any effort to dictate the form of a new Mexican government, emphasizing this promise by removing U.S. forces from Veracruz in November even though Carranza's Constitutionalists themselves became factionalized--but domestic critics who frowned upon the initial landing were no more pleased with the withdrawal. After Huerta lost, Veracruz was formally delivered to Carranza and Villa in November 1914 after 6 month's occupation by U.S. troops, without any guarantee regarding the safety of American citizens.
By mid-1915 Wilson was totally frustrated with the situation in Mexico and issued a statement calling on factional leaders to end the strife and suffering in Mexico before the United States did it for them. When this ultimatum had no effect on the situation Wilson again overtly took sides granting Carranza's regime recognition as the de facto government.(Note 35) The enormous share of its economy controlled by U.S. interests made Mexico's internal war a domestic political concern for the United States and impartiality regarding the contending belligerent forces impossible. Wilson also prohibited the export of arms to Mexico yet another time but allowed deliveries to continue to the Carranza regime. Even if Wilson's earlier reversal of Taft's embargo was due to differing interpretations of the law of neutrality, there is no rationale to interpret Wilson's Administration as complying with neutral duties after being on both sides of this issue.(Note 36) Wilson was apparently convinced that the best course for the United States was to support the Carranza government and hope it would eventually be in a strong enough position to guarantee the rights of all foreigners.
AVOIDING WORLD WAR I
In sum, the second decade of the 20th century saw the United States struggle with the responsibilities which foreign investments bring. A pattern of behavior was emerging. Commitment to neutrality notwithstanding, the United States interests were forcing involvement where they never had before.
August 1914 probably marks the zenith of impartiality in U.S. foreign relations in the 20th century. War engulfed Europe, but Washington was determined to stay clear of it. On 20 August 1914, President Wilson told the people of the United States to be "impartial in thought as well as action,"(Note 37) leaving little doubt about the chief executive's awareness that even public statements by government officials could ill afford to be seen as biased in favor of any belligerent if U.S. neutrality was to be preserved.
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 recognized the true global interest in averting war. They also established extensive rules designed to reduce the horror of war once it erupted and put into place neutrality regimes to inhibit the spread of war to other states. World War I was being fought, in large part, under the recently codified Hague rules. As such, neutrality was unquestionably understood in light of the impartiality that was the essence of the law codified at the Hague, but neutral states were having real problems when the rules were measured against the reality of war.(Note 38)
Germany needed to prevent the resupply of Britain or suffer defeat; England found itself facing the same alternatives. The laws of war and neutrality were badly bloodied in the Atlantic.(Note 39) Submarine operations were unprecedented in maritime warfare and could not effectively conform to the established legal practice of warships acting as commerce raiders known as the "cruiser rules." Generally, these rules required merchant ships to heave to when challenged and required that belligerents allow their crews to abandon ships, which would then be destroyed and to place their logs and important papers into the lifeboats before an attack commenced. Even this was not enough if the crews could not reasonably be expected to escape to safety. If a coast or other ships were not nearby, the ship needed to be taken as a prize or the crew had to be embarked in the warship that attacked their ship. Neutral ships were immune from attack if they fulfilled their neutral duties.
The vulnerability of submarines on the surface forced difficult decisions regarding their employment against merchant ships when they became indistinguishable from another controversial class of vessel--the armed merchant. The possibility that her prey might outgun her forced a submarine to treat all belligerent shipping alike and attack without warning. On the surface, submarines were vulnerable to gunfire. Using her torpedos on the surface would likely require her to maintain a steady course at close range while under fire; few captains would like their odds in that situation. It is difficult to say whether submarines or armed merchants did more to cause ships to be attacked in violation of the "cruiser rules."
In reality the armed merchant was a double-edged sword. This was not lost on the British Parliament, and in response to their negative reaction to the proposed policy of arming merchant ships, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, told Parliament on 10 June 1913:
The House will perhaps allow me to take the opportunity of clearing up a misconception which appears to be prevalent. Merchant vessels carrying guns may belong to one or the other of two classes. The first class is that of armed merchant cruisers which on the outbreak of war would be commissioned under the White Ensign and would then be indistinguishable in nature and control from men-of-war. In this class belong the MAURETANIA and LUSITANIA. The second class consists of merchant vessels, which would (unless specifically taken up by the Admiralty for any purpose) remain merchant vessels in war, without any change in status, but have been equipped by their owners, with Admiralty assistance, with a defensive armament in order to exercise their right of beating off attack.(Note 40)
This argument apparently convinced Parliament. While there were two distinct classes of these vessels, in the eyes of the First Lord of the Admiralty, common sense, if not the law, made them all look the same through German periscopes. But the actions of submarine commanders were condemned in the court of world opinion--they denied neutrals their rights and were seen as barbaric. Whether she was armed or not the Germans had every reason to believe she was when LUSITANIA was sunk 7 May 1915, carrying over 100 U.S. citizens with her to the bottom. Public outrage in the United States was more persuasive than the niceties of any German legal argument.(Note 41) Germany quickly abandoned its case when events in the Balkans led Italy to declare war on Austria-Hungary on 23 May. The fear of Bulgaria, Romania, and the Netherlands abandoning neutrality as well caused the Germans to heed the protest of the United States. A brief period saw Germany attempt to employ the cruiser rules, but the armed merchants escaped most of the time.(Note 42)
In early 1915, the British undertook to arm all their merchant ships since it was clear that submarines would save their torpedoes and attempt to attack apparently helpless merchants on the surface using boarding parties or with their deck guns. The results in terms of the survival of armed merchants attacked on the surface were remarkable even after the cruiser rules were again abandoned:(Note 43)
By April 1916 about 1,100 had been armed and results were quickly discernable: between January 1916 and January 1917, 68 percent of unarmed ships were destroyed by U-boat gunfire and only 22 percent escaped, while 3.9 percent of armed ships were sent to the bottom by gunfire and 76 percent escaped.(Note 44)
This loss of effectiveness alone could have threatened the German efforts at lawful employment of their submarines and does not even consider the exceptionally severe risks involved in exposing the submarine to defensive fire from armed merchant ships carrying guns comparable in calibre to those carried by destroyers. Clearly, armed merchants enjoyed a significantly higher chance of survival against submarines if they were not attacked with torpedoes. The policy, legal, and tactical results of armed merchants cannot be accurately measured today, but much can be assumed considering the number of submarines now fitted with deck guns.
More important than the tactical questions posed by assuming all merchants were armed, however, was the strategic damage Germany suffered. The success of armed merchants improved the resupply of Great Britain, not to mention the extended consequences of contraband that reached the enemy. To make matters even more complicated for the Germans, the British blockade policy against Germany was so effective that merchant commerce in North Atlantic and European waters provided no benefits to Germany. The reciprocal benefits that usually make maritime law effective no longer existed.
The term blockade policy is used advisedly because the British, early on, had elevated the blockade above the scope of the terms "tactic" or even "strategy." Walter H. Page, Wilson's Ambassador to the Court of St. James advised President Wilson that his naval attaché had been told:
To prevent Germany from receiving food or other help, (the British) might issue a proclamation that neutrals must not trade with Germany, and (the British) would be prepared, if necessary, to go to war with any neutral power, even the United States, that should disregard such a proclamation. In other words, in extreme need, they might practically forbid neutrality.(Note 45)
Such an extreme would make no sense, but so extreme a statement wouldn't be communicated to the President by the Ambassador unless it couldn't be disregarded. Either the British were communicating desperation early, or they were trying to make a point to the attaché. No matter how it was intended (Page did state this was not the present British policy and obtained assurances to this effect from the Foreign Ministry), this communication from an ambassador posted in a belligerent state to his president takes on many of the characteristics of a British démarche. It could then be expected to have at least a subtle effect on Wilson's view of how U.S. neutrality should be shaped.(Note 46) On the other hand:
That the sinking of unarmed neutral ships was a clear violation of international law, Germany did not deny; but she justified her policy on the ground that it was necessitated by the equally lawless British blockade.
To Wilson and to most Americans the distinction between British and German violation of neutral rights was clear. As (Prime Minister, Lord) Asquith said, "Let the neutrals complain about our blockade and other measures taken as much as they may, the fact remains that no neutral national has ever lost his life as a result of it."(Note 47)
The effectiveness of the British blockade denied Germany access to the same sources of war material regardless of a neutral's impartiality. In February of 1916, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, then Secretary of the German Naval Office, wrote a memorandum for Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, in which he reported U.S. financial interests in Great Britain were increasing and he predicted these interests would eventually bring the United States into the war. Consequently, Tirpitz depicted the United States as "a directly involved enemy of Germany."(Note 48)
Although the United States was attempting to stop the war through diplomacy, it was also watering down its neutrality policy in favor of Great Britain as a result of domestic pro-Allied sentiments. The situation of Great Britain in the war and the violations of neutral rights at sea continued to worsen throughout 1916. While efforts could be undertaken to save the British from defeat, the sentiment was not yet strong enough to justify entering the war.(Note 49)
By the end of 1916 it was plain that (the U.S.) neutral status had again been made unsafe through the ever increasing aggression of the German autocracy . . . this conflict was the last great war in which (the United States) would remain neutral.(Note 50) (emphasis added)
Germany's dilemma was, how much neutral trade with its enemy was too much? When did Germany benefit from accepting the risk of direct U.S. involvement because indirect involvement was too damaging to German interests? It is curious that the neutrality of the United States was not more broadly challenged by Germany. It would seem that the thought of the United States as a potential adversary was a greater threat than its bias toward the Allies.
Germany, however, was entering a do or die environment. According to Herwig's analysis, this was clearly reflected by Admiral Henning von Holtzendorf, the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, telling Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg on 22 December 1916 that war with America was such a serious matter that everything must be done to avoid it. But he also felt that the submarine was the weapon that would bring victory to Germany, believing the United States would not be able to resupply Germany's enemies fast enough in the face of unrestricted submarine warfare. Further, he believed even if the United States joined the war openly, U.S. troops would have to run the gauntlet of German submarines before they could land in Europe and begin to make a difference. Holtzendorf argued for renewal of the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign, saying that there was no other choice, even if it brought the United States into the war. Hindenburg agreed on Christmas eve.(Note 51)
By 1 February 1917 unrestricted submarine warfare had recommenced. History recorded the accuracy of Holtzendorf's assessment. The United States broke diplomatic relations with Germany 2 days later.(Note 52)
In March, with the United States still legally at peace with Germany, U.S. armed merchants went to sea with orders to fire on hostile submarines.(Note 53) In the same month Germany's submarines sent four still unarmed U.S. flag vessels to the bottom. On 2 April 1917, President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war. Congress obliged, and the President declared war on 6 April. A major force behind the U.S. decision to forsake neutrality and bring its military power to bear as a belligerent was the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral merchant ships.(Note 54)
That unrestricted submarine warfare was precipitated by the arming of British merchant ships, U.S. trade with Britain, and the British blockade. This untenable situation brought about the termination of U.S. neutrality and, the United States could never again expect to sustain impartial neutrality where her interests were involved. In the words of Woodrow Wilson, "America . . . reached her (age of) majority as a world power."(Note 55)
Even in the wake of the Hague Peace Conferences' codification of neutral impartiality as the best legal policy to inhibit the spread of war, impartiality for the United States eventually proved impractical and unattainable.