McNair Paper 33 Chapter 4 (Continuation)

Institute for National
Strategic Studies


McNair Paper Number 33 Chapter 4, January 1995 (Continuation)

THE PRICE OF VIOLENT PEACE

The naval officer, more than any other government official, is significantly affected by the political position of the nation in peacetime regarding armed conflict between other states. The well-worn maxim of serving "on the frontiers of freedom" has rung true with frightening regularity during this century. Today, very few really "Remember the MAINE" or even other ships lost "on the frontiers of freedom" during periods when U.S. policy (usually for good reasons) violated the principle of impartiality, in practice or in proclamation:

Attacks on ships . . . played a major part in the outbreak in all but one of the major wars in which the United States has been involved in the last 80 years. These incidents were occasions rather than basic causes of war, but they are not to be overlooked because of that.(Note 16)

Beyond those attacks that started wars, or more appropriately, rendered their admission to the opening ceremonies in blood, numerous Navy ships and planes have come under attack when war did not ensue. In the case of World War II some would contend that the first American blood of the war was shed in December 1937. The gunboat PANAY was anchored in the Yangtse River when Japanese aggression in China spilled onto her decks. A Japanese court of inquiry concluded the attack was deliberate. In fact, military commanders issued orders for the attack. According to historian William Manchester, "The likeliest explanation was that the attack was a test of American nerve."(Note 17)

The "unneutral non-belligerence" of the United States began to have significant consequences for naval vessels in the Atlantic shortly after the signing of the Lend-Lease Act.

On 10 April 1941 U.S.S. NIBLACK was conducting a reconnaissance of the approaches to Iceland when she encountered the survivors of a torpedoed Dutch freighter. As the men were being pulled from the water, NIBLACK's echo sounder gained contact on what was believed to be a submarine closing for an attack. NIBLACK conducted a depth charge attack and the submarine appeared to retire from the action. The German submarine U-52's logs, recovered after the war, report an attack south-southwest of Iceland that day, but did not report being attacked. Nonetheless, NIBLACK engaged what was believed to be a German submarine, and this is recorded as the first engagement of the war between the United States and Germany.(Note 18)

The historical case study of the last voyage of the BISMARCK by Ludovic Kennedy relates that it was a U.S. Navy pilot, flying a Royal Air Force Catalina, who located the German Battleship in May of 1941, sealing her fate.(Note 20)

In September another engagement was fought between U-652 and the destroyer GREER. The official orders given to Atlantic Fleet destroyers were only to "trail and report," and thus the officers had no authority to attack. GREER, following those orders, held contact on her echo sounder for over 3 hours before the submarine, believing she was under attack, fired a torpedo at GREER. The destroyer responded with depth charges, but the submarine was unhurt. Both sides had fired in self-defense, but now both sides knew that the shooting had started. Seven days later, on 11 September 1941, the President issued his famous "shoot on sight" orders to the Navy. Hitler would later cite the incident in his declaration of war.(Note 21)

"Hitler's special ambassador, Dr. Karl Ritter, visited the (German) naval staff on 1 October 1941 only to be informed that the admirals were "dissatisfied" with the Fuehrer's "overly cautious treatment of the United States." The Battle of the Atlantic was seriously impaired by Hitler's restrictions. The naval staff informed Ritter that Roosevelt would not declare war even if Germany torpedoed all shipping headed for the British Isles."(Note 22)

In October, the tanker SALINAS and the destroyers KEARNY and REUBEN JAMES were torpedoed. REUBEN JAMES sank with a loss of over 100 men. The United States was then, and remained thereafter, a de jure neutral.(Note 23) President Roosevelt was quite candid on "Navy and Total Defense Day", 27 October 1941, when he said in righteous indignation while the country claimed to be neutral:

Very simply and very bluntly--we are pledged to pull our own oar in the destruction of Hitlerism . . . our ships have been sunk and our sailors have been killed.

I say we do not propose to take this lying down.

Our determination not to take it lying down has been expressed in the orders to the American Navy to shoot on sight. Those orders stand. The lines of our essential defense now cover all the seas. . . . Our Navy is ready for action. Indeed, units of the Atlantic patrol are in action.(Note 24)

Actually, since the "in plain English" order of October 1939, they had been in action for over 2 years.

On 6 November 1941, U.S.S. OMAHA took the German blockade-runner ODENWALD as a prize off the coast of Brazil. After months of looking for German commerce raiders in the neutrality zone, OMAHA and SOMERS were en route to Recife for fuel when they encountered a darkened ship flying the American flag. Suspicious, the OMAHA sent a boarding party by boat. ODENWALD's crew attempted to scuttle her, but the damage from the scuttling attempt was controlled by men from OMAHA, and with a prize crew in control, she was escorted to San Juan.(Note 25)

On 25 November 1941, while the United States still declared itself neutral, American forces landed in Surinam to protect Dutch bauxite mines. President Roosevelt had obtained permission from Queen Wilhemina of the Netherlands (then a belligerent) on the justification that "This country secures from the Bauxite mines in Surinam 2 million tons of ore annually or 65 percent of our total supply."(Note 26) The reliance of the United States on external sources for strategic resources was clearly established by 1937. American dependence on external strategic supplies had been documented as justification for the use of armed force. Senator David I. Walsh argued the United States could not survive in the face of a powerful enemy for more than 2 years without reliable supply via ocean trade.(Note 27)

American unneutral activity in the Atlantic continued unabated. The Kriegsmarine war diary entry for 6 December 1941 concluded that the fighting in the Atlantic made war with the United States a fact and only the declaration was lacking. Germany provided that declaration 2 days later.(Note 28)

When the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor they did more than destroy ships and kill their crews--they dispelled the illusion of peace, disposed of virtually all remnants of traditional isolationism, and shattered the elaborate legal fiction of U.S. neutrality. As Manfred Jonas said, "The Pearl Harbor attack was not merely the beginning of a war. It was also the end of a bitter political and ideological struggle."(Note 29) Robert Tucker summarized:

In pursuing discriminatory measures against the Axis Powers in 1940-41 the United States departed from its duties as a neutral, and . . . furnished the Axis Powers with sufficient reason for claiming the right to resort to reprisals. But prior to its actual (declared) entrance into hostilities as an active participant the United States retained its status as a neutral.(Note 30)


Return to Top | Return to Contents | Next Chapter | Previous Chapter

Return to NDU Homepage
INSS Homepage
What's New