32. Richard Nixon, 1999: Victory Without War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 122-123.
33. "It is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another." From Washington's Farewell Address, Richardson, I, 205-216.
34. ASIL (1968), Elihu Lauterpacht, 60-61. In this work, "Middle East conflicts" means the Arab-Israeli wars, the internal situation in Lebanon, and the problems which arose within the Persian Gulf region, but does not include the acts of terrorism throughout the region.
35. "India and U.S.S.R. Sign 20-Yr. Friendship Treaty Intended to Deter Pakistan from Attacking India," The New York Times, 10 August 1971, 1:2. "U.S.S.R. Ratifies 20-Yr. Friendship Treaty With India and Warns It Will Take `Urgently Effective Measures' to Protect India from Attack," The New York Times, 14 August 1971, 6:1. Henry Kissinger wrote: "What had caused the war, in Nixon's view and mine . . . was India's determination to use the crisis to establish its preeminence on the subcontinent. . . . The Soviet Union could have restrained India; it chose not to. It had, in fact, actively encouraged war by signing the Friendship Treaty." Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), 885.
36. TIAS 3170. The pact was supposed to protect Pakistan against communist aggression (according to a unilateral declaration by the United States -- Article 4 of the treaty is unequivocal regarding "armed attack" in the treaty area) but Kissinger's interpretation transcended the words of the treaty. He explained: "The victim of the attack was an ally -- however reluctant many were to admit it -- to which we had made several explicit promises concerning precisely this contingency. Clear treaty commitments reinforced by other undertakings dated back to 1959." Kissinger, 886. (A bilateral defense agreement was concluded in 1959). Interestingly, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1972.
37. "Text of Ghandi Statement", The New York Times, 4 December 1971, 10:6.
38. Kissinger, chapter XXI, passim; Kenneth R. McGruther, "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy", NWCR, September-October 1974, 7; Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), 259; Bailey, 934.
40. Grotius, Book III, chapter III, Section IX, 320-321. Though the war was not communist aggression, India could have interpreted the Kissinger interpretation of SEATO link (if known to them), the Nixon Doctrine, and the "tilt" statement to mean the United States was behaving as an ally of Pakistan.
41. According to Kissinger, Nixon told a Soviet Minister visiting the United States at the time, "The Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan. You must recognize the urgency of a cease-fire and political settlement of the crisis." Kissinger,. 904.
42. James M. McConnell and Anne Kelly Calhoun, "The December 1971 Indo-Pakistani Crisis" in Dismukes and McConnell, 178.
43. "If the American aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE dares to intervene . . . a member of the Indian Parliament said . . . 'the Government should not hesitate to blast it out of the water.'" Quoted in Fox Butterworth, "U.S. Ships With Dual Role Moving Up Bay of Bengal: Indian Animosity Grows", The New York Times, 16 December 1971, 1:7; "The remedies available to an aggrieved belligerent as a consequence of the neutral's failure to fulfill its obligations range from the demand for moral or material reparation to the taking of retaliatory measures." Tucker, 261.
45. McConnell and Calhoun, 184. The term "blockade" seems not to be applied here as a legal term of art. The authors likely mean that the Indians had achieved command of the seas in the vicinity of the Pakistani coast. The United States did engage the issue of Indian behavior regarding U.S. flag merchant ships. BUCKEYE STATE had been the victim of an Indian air attack and another ship was intercepted by an Indian naval vessel. Secretary of State William P. Rogers complained to the Indian Ambassador about the incidents which also occurred on 5 December.
U.S. owned--but not U.S. flag ships--also warranted U.S. diplomatic action and the threat of "whatever measures were necessary" that month. Cuban gunboats seized the Panamanian flag, Miami based merchant ship LALIA EXPRESS near the Bahamas over 100 miles from the Cuban coast on that same 5 December. Her sister ship, JOHNNY EXPRESS, was attacked and then seized by gunboats on 15 December about 120 miles from Cuba. The Captain, Jose Villa--a naturalized U.S. citizen was wounded in the attack. The two ships crews totaled 27 men. The State Department protested the seizures and threatened the action mentioned above on 17 December. Cuba claimed the ships were carrying arms to anti-Cuban forces. In April of 1972 U.S. warships in the Caribbean were instructed to assist any friendly state's merchant ships which were interfered with by Cuba as a result of the incidents. See Commander J. B. Finklestein, U.S. Navy, "Naval and Maritime Events July 1971--December 1971", USNIP, May 1972, 352, and Commander J. B Finklestein, U.S. Navy, "Naval and Maritime Events January 1972--June 1972", USNIP, May 1973, 56. Commander Finklestein does not report the resolution of the incidents.
47. "Iraqi Sources Confirm STARK Attacked Deliberately", Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, May 22-28, 1989, 8. Although this report was unsubstantiated (and is not given much credibility among naval officers) it does raise the possibility the attack was not an accident -- or if it was it was seen as beneficial by some in Iraq. The report alleged the pilot of the attacking craft was given high honors and bonuses for the successful execution of the "planned operation." The Iraqi motive allegedly was to punish the United States for closer ties with Iran. In a conversation with Ambassador David Newton, who was posted in Baghdad at the time of the attack, made clear that his contact with the Iraqis left him with the impression that the representatives he spoke with believed it was an accident. Of course, such a decision would have been made by Saddam Hussein who is famous for neither his trustworthiness nor his candor with other Iraqis.
48. Kissinger, 912. See also Gaddis, 300. Obviously, this effort failed to protect the territorial integrity of Pakistan.
49. Consider this contribution to the literature by Commodore K. R. Menon, Indian Navy: "The supremacy of the supercarrier battle group may not be in question in a shooting war, but the use of large forces in low-intensity conflicts could change if the threshold of losses sustained by a superpower navy were to increase to unacceptable levels because of the introduction of missile armed air-independent submarines." K. R. Menon, Commodore, Indian Navy, "Third World Navies React", USNIP, March 1989, 94.
50. "Key Sections of the Pentagon's Report on Attack on the Marines", The New York Times, 29 December 1983, A13:1; Hedrick Smith, "Reagan Upgrading Lebanon Presence", The New York Times, 13 September 1983, A1:5; and Hedrick Smith, "Deepened Involvement", The New York Times, 14 September 1983, A1:3-4.
51. Hedrick Smith, "Deepened Involvement", The New York Times, 14 September 1983, A1:3-4, A15:1.
52. Steven V. Roberts, "Congress Adopts Measures Allowing Marines in Beirut", The New York Times, 30 September 1983, A1:6.
53. Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan to Let Marines Give Some Aid to Lebanese Army and European Peace Forces", The New York Times, 14 September 1983, A1:6, A14:1.
54. James Reston, "Leave it to the Marines?" The New York Times, 18 September 1983, E19:1-4.
55. Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Warships Fire on Lebanese Area Held by Syrians", The New York Times, 18 September 1983, 1:4; Bernard Gwertzman, "No Truce Yet for Reagan in Congress or in Lebanon", The New York Times, 18 September 1983, E1:1-2; Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Warships Fire in Direct Support of Lebanese Army: Washington View", The New York Times, 20 September 1983, A1:5; and E.J. Dionne, Jr., "U.S. Warships Fire in Direct Support of Lebanese Army: Shelling is Heavy", The New York Times, 20 September 1983, A1:6.
57. U.S. Navy Department, Law of Naval Warfare NWIP 10-2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Department, Office of the C.N.O., 1955), para. 230.
58. "Key Sections of Pentagon's Report," A11:6 and A12:1.
59. "Navy Jets Shot Down in Raids", The Boston Globe, 4 December 1983, 30:6 and Alan Cowell, "U.S. Warships Hit Syrian Positions in Lebanon Hills", The New York Times, 19 December 1983, A1:3.
60. "President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issues", The New York Times, 21 December 1983, A22:6. In a February 1994 conversation with an authoritative government source, this writer learned that Department of Defense lawyers were successful in getting the President to communicate a "clarification" of this statement to the Syrians.
61. Schindler, 4n-5n, and Rubin, "Reagan's Error," A22:3-4.
62. 3250 USC 1541, 84 Stat. 2053-2055, Public Law 91-672, 12 Jan. 1970, Sec. 12; see also Whiteman, 12, 59.
63. Richard Nixon, "Veto of War Powers Resolution (Oct. 24, 1973)," Department of State Bulletin 69 , no. 1796 (1976), 662.
64. "Pres Nixon Vetos War-Powers Bill Limiting Pres Powers to Commit Armed Forces to Foreign Hostilities Without Cong Approval", The New York Times, 25 October 1973, 1:8. "U.S. HR and Sen, on 7 Nov, Vote to Override Pres Nixon's Veto of War-Powers Bill, Which Curbs Pres Power to Commit U.S. Forces Abroad Without Cong Approval; HR Vote is 284-135, Only 4 Votes More Than Required 2/3; Sen Vote is 75-18, 13 More", The New York Times, 8 November 1973, 1:8.
65. For an excellent discussion of the issues involved and the practice of Presidents since passage of the Act, see Robert D. Clark, et al., The War Powers Resolution (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1985).
66. Rick Maze, "War Powers Resolution Hindered Navy in Gulf, Crowe Tells Hill Panel", Navy Times, 3 October 1988, 29:1. It remains unclear from open source material exactly what these actions were. Reflection on the operations conducted there, however, gives the clear indication that selective responses against military targets such as armed oil platforms and others used as intelligence support facilities for Iranian maritime operations in the Gulf were on the list of options.
67. UNSC Res. 678 of 29 November 1991. See also Peter David, Triumph in the Desert (New York: Random House, 1991), 58.
68. David, 59. It is worth noting that this vote could not have been successfully obtained anytime between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1992 and the conclusion of the congressional elections in November of that year. Section 8 of the War Powers Resolution specifically excludes United Nations operations from its requirements.
69. Elmo R. Zumwalt, On Watch (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), 442; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1982), 708-709. Also, "Only Portugal (which curiously formally declared its neutrality) and the Netherlands continued to allow supply of Israel (by the United States) from their territories. The general refusal to allow transit rights to the United States in its attempt to resupply the Israelis caused severe strains in the NATO alliance, and the Netherlands failure to conform to this decision similarly caused strains in the European Economic Community." Cable, Gunboat, 19-20; and Norton, 295-296; Norton also notes that the United States claimed neutrality through the Yom Kippur War despite the fact that such extraordinary efforts were taken to support Israel, 260.
70. "Backing Britain on the Falklands -- What Next?", U.S. News & World Report, 10 May 1982, 27.
71. A personal visit to the Argentine War College in May 1989 revealed that senior Argentine military personnel were still extremely bitter about the U.S. actions during the war. Another visit, in 1993, with their War College class and high ranking members of the Argentine Defense and Foreign Ministries and their legislature raised not one mention of the war policy of the United States-- a marked change. The Menem Administration has clearly focused Argentine energies on the future instead of the past.
72. "U.S. Says That 2 Navy F-14 Jets Shot Down 2 Soviet-Built Libyan SU-22's About 60 Miles From Libyan Coast After Being Fired On by One of the Libyan Aircraft", The New York Times, 20 August 1981, 1:6. For the U.S. Navy analysis of the event see Dennis R. Neutze, "The Gulf of Sidra Incident: A Legal Perspective", USNIP, January 1982, 26-31. For the incident in the South China Sea see Richard Gross, "Warships Draw Fire", Newport Daily News, 23 June 1982, 12. See also Christopher C. Wright, "U.S. Naval Operations in 1982", USNIP, May 1983, 225.