11. Philip C. Jessup, "Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between Peace and War?" AJIL 48 (1954), 102-103.
12. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed 12 August 1949, (Convention III), TIAS 3364, UST 6, Article 4 B (2) states, "The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favorable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30 fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, within conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties." (emphasis added); Schindler and Toman, 355-425; see also Whiteman, 11, 164. It is interesting to note that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary which examines the Geneva Conventions Article by Article discusses only neutral states making no reference whatsoever to non-belligerents. See Jean S. Pictet, ed., Commentary: I Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952).
13. Cf. "Changing conditions require changing rules and . . . a law or peace and law of war dichotomy is inadequate in . . . contemporary situations." William O. Miller, "Belligerency and Limited War", NWCR, January 1969, 25. In the same vein: "The existence of a state of 'war,' in contrast to a state of 'peace,' has had a determinative effect upon the prescriptions regarded as applicable to events upon the sea. During 'peace' one set of laws has been regarded as relevant, and during `war' an entirely different set of laws has been involved. It is no longer new, however, to suggest that this supposedly dichotomous state of affairs does not accurately depict the many nuances of contemporary state practice, and that `peace' and `war' are but the polar terms for the extremes of a continuum in exercise of coercion, not necessarily representing the only policy-relevant stages in that continuum." McDougal and Burke, Public Order, 22-23.
14. Rubin, "Rules of Thumb for Gut Decisions: International Law in Emergencies," 44-47.