These arrangements were put to an initial test following the Serbian shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace in February 1994, when NATO issued its ultimatum to carry out airstrikes under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 836 unless Serbian weapons were withdrawn. The ability of the Alliance to coordinate its actions closely with both the UN authorities and with its former adversaries to the East proved essential in establishing the legitimacy of the NATO role in this case.
Still, strains continue to exist both within the Alliance¾where the French government has resisted efforts to use the existing NATO command structure for any non-Article 5 operations¾and in NATO coordination with the UN¾where the initial authorization to use NATO air power for CAS to protect UN peacekeepers was delayed for so long that the forces were no longer in contact. Moreover, the pattern of NATO-UN coordination in applying pressure to the Serb forces around Sarajevo and Gorazde did not carry over to efforts to protect the UN safe area in Bihac. It is clear that NATO and the UN still have a long way to go in developing a common understanding of the role of force in such situations.
The NATO ultimatum also revealed lingering Russian concerns about the Alliance's new role in peacekeeping, as nationalist elements launched a strong domestic campaign against the use of force by NATO. Despite such reservations, Moscow did exert influence on the Serbian side to comply, and subsequently acknowledged the legitimacy of such enforcement operations¾and the role of NATO as the only multi-national agent currently capable of taking such actions effectively.18 However, the Russian appreciation of the effectiveness of NATO as a vehicle to support UN-sanctioned peace operations in Bosnia does not extend to a willingness to accept a role for NATO forces closer to Russia's borders.
Nevertheless, the modest success of the application of NATO air power to the no-fly zone and the situations around Sarajevo and Gorazde (the first actual uses of force in Alliance history) may provide some indication that the concept of deterrence, which NATO is uniquely positioned to bring into the equation, can play a role in future peace support operations. Unfortunately, the reluctance of the UN to use NATO airstrikes effectively in retaliation for Serbian air attacks across the Croatian border into Bihac in November 1994 reflects the need to go much further in developing tactics and doctrine that are trusted and understood by both NATO and the UN. If this can be accomplished, NATO will have taken a significant step toward developing a capability to foster stability in the post-Cold War European security environment.