INSS

NATO FROM BERLIN TO BOSNIA
S. Nelson Drew

NATO, THE U.S., CJTF, AND ESDI

It was this combination of potential uses for the CJTF concept that helped shape a revision in the U.S. approach to the NATO relationship to ESDI at the January 1994 Summit. In theory, the United States had always been supportive of European efforts to forge a common foreign and security policy, and a European security and defense identity (ESDI) to help implement it as called for in Maastricht. Yet seen from a European perspective, the efforts of the U.S. had not always seemed to match the rhetoric. As the threat of a massive attack on Europe receded, and Europeans, for the first time since the end of WW II, began to feel that they might be able to meet more of their own immediate security needs without direct assistance from the United States, the U.S. was seen to be ambivalent at best (if not openly hostile) toward the efforts of the European members of the Alliance to develop their own security identity. The U.S., on the other hand, saw the development of ESDI as a logical extension of its long- standing desire for European states to assume a more equitable share of the burden of their own security, but the benefits of this development to the U.S. would be lost if it took place in a manner that set up a competition for scarce defense resources between NATO and ESDI commitments. The tension between a European desire for greater independence and the American desire to avoid creation of a competitor for NATO became a source of considerable frustration among Allies.

Initially, the United States adopted what might best be called a "hands off" policy toward discussions of the possible shape of an emerging ESDI. The source of this approach was two-fold. On the one hand, there was no desire in the U.S. to contribute to the emergence of a competitor to NATO. On the other, the shape of ESDI was seen, legitimately, to be primarily a European concern. The result was a period of nearly two years which saw the trans-Atlantic debate on ESDI reduced to a cycle: European proposals would be put forward with very little input from Washington; the U.S. would then react negatively to the elements of the concept it did not like, while saying nothing about the elements it found acceptable. Underlying this Washington approach was also a subtle suspicion among many on both sides of the Atlantic that, left to their own devices, the European Allies would never be able to agree on any alternative to acting within NATO.

This view was itself based on a reasonably accurate assessment that there was, for the foreseeable future, no militarily viable alternative to NATO. It overlooked the fact, however, that from the outset, the European need for ESDI had been political, not military. Although the events in Bosnia seemed to support the contention that there was no military alternative to collective action through NATO, they also served to exacerbate the political pressures for Europe to demonstrate an ability to act on its own. These pressures, however, did not lead to agreement among the European states as to how they should act on their own, or through what vehicle: NATO, WEU, CSCE, or something totally new such as the EuroCorps.

The result was a growing inability to obtain political consensus within the Alliance for NATO to act, with no real alternative in place. At the same time, the debate in Washington over the feasibility of committing American ground forces to Bosnia heightened awareness that, in the post-Cold War environment, there might be cases when it would be in the interests of the United States for Europe to have the capability to employ military forces without the direct involvement of American troops. What followed was Washington endorsement of a "separable, but not separate" ESDI that could draw on existing NATO assets and command structures to conduct operations at the behest of the European Union¾a concept that eventually emerged as the twin ESDI and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) proposals of the January 1994 Summit.[footnote #22]

The CJTF concept of NATO force employment was a logical outgrowth of the new strategic concept, which notes that, "to ensure that . . . Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary."[footnote #23] Thus the CJTF concept does not need ESDI as a justification, but rather permits the Alliance to adapt to its own requirements in a manner that is supportive of¾rather than in competition with¾ESDI. This is the first and most important use of the CJTF concept: as a configuration for deployment of NATO forces in the new trans-Atlantic security environment. Potential CJTF deployment in support of ESDI, facilitating the dual use of some NATO forces and command arrangements for European-only operations, would be a second possible configuration. In this configuration, the CJTF commander would in all likelihood be a WEU commander (or would at least report to a WEU commander). At the same time, the CJTF concept builds on the lessons learned in both the Gulf War and the experience of the former Yugoslavia to date by providing a third capability: for NATO or WEU forces to be augmented, if required, by forces from nations not in the Alliance, such as those that could be made available under the Partnership for Peace (PFP).

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