The requirement for transparency in defense planning and budgeting is one of the most critical steps in promoting stability throughout the trans-Atlantic region as called for in NATO's Strategic Concept and the Rome Declaration. As the late NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner expressed it, "Partnership for Peace is, above all, an outstanding opportunity for Europe to begin to develop a common defense culture and habits of cooperation."[footnote #31] The defense planning mechanisms of the Alliance have played a central role in avoiding the renationalization of defense among the NATO allies, by fostering an environment in which security is viewed collectively rather than competitively. It is this benefit that the first objective of PFP seeks to extend to the East.
Recognizing that not all of the partners are comfortable yet with the idea of full transparency in all defense planning with their neighbors, PFP seeks to move in this direction in incremental steps. Once nations have indicated their willingness to participate in the Partnership by signing the Framework Document, they are required to present to NATO a "Presentation Document." This document outlines steps taken nationally to enhance transparency and democratic control of the armed forces, and contains "an indication of the kind of cooperative activities of interest to the partner, and the military forces and other assets that it might make available for Partnership activities."[footnote #32] The Alliance draws from these documents and its own experience to produce a "Partnership Work Program," which serves as a sort of "menu" of cooperative activities that could be undertaken by PFP. The Work Program and the Presentation Documents then form the basis for preparation of national "Partnership Programs," which, like the Presentation Documents, are developed between individual nations and NATO. Once these programs are finalized, however, they are made available to all partner states in the interest of transparency.[footnote #33]
It was the intention of at least some Allies that the processes of encouraging transparency and of promoting democratic control of defense forces could be advanced together by developing a defense component of PFP. Eventually, such a component might form the basis for involving partner states in a defense planning process parallel to that of the annual NATO defense review process. Despite the earlier French objections to including a Ministry of Defense component in the NACC, there were some indications that these objections would not necessarily apply to a new organization dedicated primarily to the task of peacekeeping. Paris had insisted, and the Alliance had acquiesced, in full French participation in all Alliance deliberations concerning peacekeeping operations. By mid-1993, this had translated into a more active, if not consistent, French role in the NATO Military Committee, and a tendency for NATO Ambassadors to make almost all decisions regarding Bosnia in the forum of the Council in permanent session rather than the DPC. Moreover, the French had led the way in insisting that NATO make its defense planning processes more transparent to potential non-NATO peacekeeping partners, as part of an effort to ensure similar transparency to Paris.
As a result, there appeared to be a window of opportunity to promote NATO cooperation with the NACC partners and other European states in defense matters¾at least those associated with peacekeeping. PFP was made a NATO Summit initiative in part to ensure that it was created by direction of the members' Heads of State, rather than Ministers of Foreign Affairs, so that the charter could be seen to include both Foreign and Defense Ministries. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the June 1994 Istanbul NAC Ministerial, which reviewed the implementation of the previous January's Summit decisions, the French objections to a formal role for Defense Ministers in implementing the PFP resurfaced, and this aspect of the concept remains unfulfilled.[footnote #34]
Instead of a formal Defense Ministerial component, NATO has established a Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) to provide the linkage between civilian political control of PFP programs and the military implementation of those programs. The PMSC, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, is designed to be flexible enough to permit nations to send representatives from whichever ministries or agencies are most appropriate for the individual topics under discussion. It also has the flexibility to meet in differing configurations: it can meet as the 16 NATO members with a single partner to address issues related to individual partnership programs; with a group of several partners to coordinate activities, such as limited exercises, common to several but not all partners; and with all NACC/PFP partners to handle common issues of PFP. To avoid duplication of effort, the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping will gradually be absorbed into the PMSC.[footnote #35]
The third stated objective of PFP, that of maintaining the ability to contribute to UN and CSCE peacekeeping operations, sets both a goal and the necessary boundaries for Partnership operations. The goal is the development of an effective multinational capability to bring force to bear, where necessary, in support of CSCE or UN missions throughout Eurasia. At present, this capability can be provided outside of NATO only as a unilateral initiative or on an ad hoc basis. Unilateral action tends to be perceived as lacking in legitimacy, and frequently is viewed with distrust or hostility by the states in the immediate neighborhood. Ad hoc operations, on the other hand, while potentially satisfying the need for a multilateral approach to peace support operations, take time to organize and run the risk of inefficient integration of forces that have little or no experience in working together. Both can prove disastrous when there is a crisis requiring rapid and effective response. PFP is designed to give both the UN and CSCE a more legitimate and effective tool to apply in such situations. At the same time, by clearly establishing the boundaries for employment of PFP as being "in support of UN and CSCE operations," the PFP charter seeks to remove residual fears that PFP could be employed as a vehicle for NATO intervention against the wishes of other states in Eurasia. Like NATO itself, it is the intention of the PFP members to use the capabilities they hope to develop for peace support operations only in connection with a UN or CSCE mandate. The types of operational capabilities that PFP seeks to develop among its member states are specified in the fourth and fifth objectives: cooperative relations with NATO for planning, training and exercises in peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and other operations; and developing forces better able to operate in conjunction with those of NATO. The former aims at developing the habits of cooperation necessary for effective employment of multilateral forces for collective responses to threats to peace and stability among the member states throughout Eurasia. The latter, and final, phase of PFP will be the eventual ability of PFP member states actually to perform such missions in a manner that allows them to draw seamlessly upon the effective operational and command capabilities currently available within NATO.
To establish the basis for such operations, partner states have sent permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters in Brussels and to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, Belgium, "where SHAPE is located."[footnote #36] The liaison officers in Brussels will participate in PMSC meetings, while the Coordination Cell in Mons is responsible for coordinating joint military activities and carrying out the broad military planning necessary to implement Partnership Programs. Detailed operational planning for deployments and exercises, such as the initial exercise in Poland, is the responsibility of the military commands that will actually be involved.[footnote #37]
The Partnership for Peace stops short of extending a NATO security guarantee to the Partner states, but it does dramatically expand the geographic area within which the legitimacy of collective allied and partner activities in peace support operations is recognized. This expansion is not without its potential costs. Designed to provide an institutional vehicle to advance the ability of the Alliance to make good on its promise in Rome to promote peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, it raises expectations of NATO-backed solutions for problems that may simply outstrip the ability of any institution to resolve. This may prove to be particularly true in the CIS, where it is far from certain that the partner states share identical interests in either the means or outcomes of peace support operations. Russia, for example, has suggested an arrangement under which "Russia, acting alone or together with its CIS partners, would conduct a peacekeeping operation, the CSCE would send observers, while . . . partners would provide logistical back-up or finance the training of Russian peacekeeping personnel."[footnote #38] Many of Russia's neighbors fear that this approach, with its implicit recognition of a Russian right of unilateral action in the "near abroad," could lead to PFP serving as a legitimating mask for the reassertion of Russian hegemony. At the same time, most would accept Manfred Wörner's observation that "a European-wide order of peace would be difficult, if not impossible to achieve without the active participation of Russia."[footnote #39] For the Partnership for Peace to be effective in this wider arena, its members will have to find a way to satisfy both sets of demands.