INSS

NATO FROM BERLIN TO BOSNIA
S. Nelson Drew

THE MEMBERSHIP QUESTION

In addition to the basic objectives of the Partnership set forward in the Framework Document, the NATO Heads of State used the occasion of the formal PFP "Invitation" to reaffirm the fact that the Alliance "remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty."[footnote #40] Despite the popular perception in the press that PFP was merely "an alternative to expanding NATO into Eastern Europe,"[footnote #41] it was, as noted above, originally conceived to fill a set of legitimate needs in its own right. It was not, however, merely happenstance that PFP also was designed to provide a vehicle to draw the Central and Eastern European states into a closer relationship with NATO that fell short of their aspirations for membership. The Alliance would have been hard pressed to emerge unscathed from a full blown debate on membership expansion in late 1993 or early 1994. Even if there had been consensus in principle on immediate membership expansionžand there clearly was notžit would have been impossible to reach consensus on precisely which nations should be first in line to join. The issue was tied up not only with the concerns of several Allies not to provide ammunition to potentially destabilizing nationalist elements in Russia, but also with the thorny problems associated with the pace of membership expansion in other European organizations such as the EU and WEU.

The PFP concept avoided this no-win debate, while at the same time providing some immediate benefits to the partner states through joint exercises and training with NATO forces. It also served the interests of both the Alliance and its prospective new members by making it possible to develop some performance-based standards for consideration of future membership expansion. The ability of partner states to meet their obligations under PFP, to include transparency in defense planning, democratic standards of civilian control of the military, and an ability to fund their own participation in exercises,[footnote #42] should provide a useful indicator of which states are capable of satisfying the requirements of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty that new NATO members must "be in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." It is on this basis that the Alliance has been able to press forward with plans for limited expansion in the near term, as called for in the 1994 fall ministerial meetings in Brussels.

There are, however, some potentially negative, unintended consequences of the way in which the membership issue has been linked to the Partnership for Peace. By making it appear that membership may be tied to "outstanding performance" in PFP, the Allies may have encouraged competition rather than cooperation among the partners. In such a competition, it is likely to be the development of a more efficient military establishment, rather than more efficient democratic control, that is seen by the partners as having the potential of paying the biggest and most immediate dividends.[footnote #43] Such a misreading of the Partnership program would, rather than contributing to peace and stability, have exactly the opposite effect.

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