McNair Paper 36, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers, February 1995

33. Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 1-40. Also, see Krause, pp. 12-33.

34. Krause, pp. 1-98.

35. Robert E. Harkavy, "The New Geopolitics: Arms Transfers and the Major Powers' Competition for Overseas Bases," Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), pp. 131-51.

36. See, for example, Rajan Menon, Soviet Power and the Third World (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1986.

37. William D. Bajusz and David J. Louscher, Arms Sales and the U.S. Economy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), p. 14. There is no general consensus on the contribution arms exports make to a nation's economy and defense sector. See, for example, Lewis W. Snider, "Do Arms Exports Contribute to Savings in Defense Spending?: A Cross-Sectional Pooled Time Series Analysis," ed. David J. Louscher and Michael D. Salomone, Marketing Security Assistance: New Perspectives on Arms Sales, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 41-63, and U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary Cost Savings to the Department of Defense Resulting from Foreign Military Sales (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office Staff Working Paper, No. 1107, May 24, 1976).

38. Robert G. Sutter and Wayne Morrison, "Taiwan: U.S. Advanced Fighter Aircraft Sales- Pro and Con," Congressional Research Service, Sep. 1, 1992, pp. 1-4.

39. For example, during the mid-1980's, the percentage of defense production exported was 30% for the United Kingdom, 40% for France, 60% for Italy and Belgium, and over 70% for Brazil, versus only 11% for the United States. (Krause, p. 93). Also, see William W. Keller, "Global Defense Business: A Policy Context for the 1990s," ed. Ethan B. Kapstein, Global Arms Production: Policy Dilemmas for the 1990's (New York: University of America Press, 1992), pp. 61-104.