McNair Paper 36, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers, February 1995

40. Chen Qimao, "China's Global Strategic Perspectives on the Third World," After Tiananmen Square: Challenges for the Chinese-American Relationship (New York: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1990), pp. 22-26.

41. Chinese military aid to Cambodian resistance forces was driven by Beijing's fear of their encirclement by Moscow. One of the three major obstacles to progress in Sino-Soviet relations articulated by the PRC during the 1980's was Moscow's aid to the Vietnamese Army in Kampuchea. See Douglas Pike, "China's Policies Toward Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1990s," After Tiananmen Square: Challenges for the Chinese-American Relationship (New York: Brassey's (U.S.), Inc., 1990), pp. 72-84. 42. Ian Anthony, The Arms Trade and Medium Powers (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 108.

43. Even during the brief, but sharp escalation of tensions along the Chinese-Indian frontier in 1987, PRC military strategists still listed Soviet troop strength in the Far East and Mongolia, Moscow's occupation of Afghanistan, and Vietnam's domination of Cambodia as their chief concerns. (Author's discussions with PLA National Defense University and Academy of Military Sciences researchers in Beijing in 1987). At any rate, it is hard to imagine Beijing, after sitting on the sidelines during the 1965 and 1971 Indian-Pakistan Wars, could contemplate any realistic scenario in which it would undertake coordinated military action with Islamabad against New Dehli.

44. Chanda, 348-49.

45. Stockholm International Peace , SIPRI Yearbooks 1988-1992: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988 -1992), from the chapters "Trade in Major Conventional Weapons" (see "Thailand").

46. Bertil Linter, "Rangoon's Rubicon," Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 11, 1993, p. 28, and William Branigin, "Armed and Dangerous: China's Neighbors Are Getting Nervous," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, Apr. 12-18, 1993, p. 7. Reports of the PLA gaining special military access in Burma were vigorously denied by Chinese authorities after the visit of PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to Burma in January 1993. See Wang Fang, "Zhonggong Weixie Yazhou," Zhongguo Ribao, Mar. 7, 1993, p. 9.

47. George T. Yu, "Chinese Arms Transfers to Africa," ed. Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Arms for Africa (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1983) pp. 110-17.

48. Guillermaz, p. 525.

49. John Garver, "China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash Over Chinese Arms Sales," Asian Survey, October 1991, p. 961.

50. Richard Grimmett, Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World by Major Supplier, 1982-1989 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Jun. 19, 1990), Table 2; Richard Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1984-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Jul. 20, 1992), Table 2G; and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 72.

51. Krause, p. 93.

52. "Military Commission Official at Weapons Meeting," Jiefangjun Bao in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), Daily Report, China, Mar. 31, 1992, p. 22.

53. United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Affairs, "Trade in Conventional Weapons: The International Arms Bazaar," Hearings, 102nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 158.

54. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, pp. 245-48 and 259.

55. Bitzinger, p. 27.

56. Note, for example, the tentative 1993 deal between the Malaysian company Aneka Bekal Sdn Bhd, and the PRC's NORINCO, to manufacture Chinese armored vehicles in Malaysia. Michael Vatikiotis, "Political Weapons," Far Eastern Economic Review, Aug. 26,1993, p. 12.

57. William Branigin, "Oil-Hungry Asia Relying More on Middle East," Washington Post, Apr. 18, 1993, pp. A33 and A36.