From the perspective of NATO expansion, there is a range of alternative alignments that might emerge to address security in the broad area of the North Atlantic, Europe, and Eurasia from Vancouver to Vladivostok. If NATO expands, key variables would include which states join NATO and what type of relations NATO has with states not invited to join. If NATO does not expand, a key variable would be whether NATO remains vibrant. In either case expansion, or nonexpansion NATO's relations with non-member states and with other security institutions will be important factors, as will be what programs and activities NATO pursues internally as an alliance.
If NATO expands, three general, illustrative subalternatives are:
(at 16) and Russia/CIS as the Russians have proposed.
In the first alternative, NATO would extend membership only to CEE states. As to which CEE states would be invited to join NATO, among the options are the following:
NATO might handle accession one country at a time or might invite several states to join simultaneously. In principle, NATO would be prepared to invite additional CEE states consistent with factors used in agreeing to invite the first state or states. Members of the CIS would not be invited to join NATO at least in the initial years, although NATO would not go on record with any statement specifically excluding them from eventual consideration.
Inviting one country at the outset and any others serially might ease objections from states not included, both those in CEE and in CIS. The more states admitted, the fewer would be CEE states complaining about not being admitted, although those states in CEE and the CIS not invited would likely object increasingly to their not being included.
Inviting only one or a very few states to join initially might make it easier for NATO to make the transition and let NATO learn from the experience before more states were admitted. This would apply to the many issues that NATO faces with expansion, including considerations stemming from extending security guarantees, expanding NATO's military structures, and opening NATO's committees to new members.
This alternative to move forward on NATO expansion, which NATO Summit leaders have welcomed and said they expected, would be designed to help extend security into CEE and keep NATO vibrant. It would help demonstrate that NATO can take and follow through on initiatives and is not subject to veto by any outside powers.
This alternative would reflect the interests of CEE states to have security guarantees that include the United States. It would reinforce efforts to keep the U.S. engaged in European security and to maintain U.S. forces in Europe.
On the issues of whether or not this alternative would establish dividing lines in Europe, much would depend on NATO's outreach to states not included and those states' reactions. If NACC and PFP remain active and if they engage those not invited to become NATO members, then concerns about dividing lines might be mollified. If NATO develops unique, effective relationships with Russia and Ukraine, concerns might be further mollified.
( NATO at 16 + 10-11 CEE + 4 CIS)
In this alternative, NATO would extend membership not only to states in CEE 10-11 states but also to states in CIS probably including at least 4 states in the CIS (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) and possibly more.
This alternative would be designed to extend security eastward while taking into account concerns expressed about NATO expansion by Russia, Ukraine, and others in the CIS and concerns about drawing new dividing lines at the borders between states in Central and Eastern Europe and those in the CIS.
If a decision were made in principle to invite CEE and CIS states to join NATO simultaneously, this could delay any invitations, as it would probably take much longer to assess issues and make decisions on which states to invite.
Admission of Russia would mean a fundamental change in the NATO Alliance. This approach would likely lead to a larger, more disparate Alliance, which could increase the difficulty in making decisions and in managing the Alliance. If the large Russian armed forces were to be included in the integrated NATO military command structure, this would require fundamental changes in military strategy, planning, organization, and command and support arrangements.
Inclusion of states from the CIS would significantly increase the size of NATO territory to be defended and raise major issues about commitments to defend territory of CIS states, especially Russian territory along borders with states of the Middle East and China.
U.S. influence in NATO would likely be diminished, while the United States would face increased demands on it in terms of security commitments in Eurasia. U.S. relations with states in Asia and the Middle East might undergo major change as the United States allied itself to Russia and other CIS states through NATO.
The relatively greater instability in states of the CIS, compared to that in states of CEE, could pose significant problems for NATO.
This alternative would be designed to pursue NATO vibrancy and expansion while conceptually emphasizing a united Europe and avoidance, at least in principle, of steps that might appear to make distinctions or draw lines between states in Europe and Eurasia.
Expansion to 41 or 53 members more than doubling or tripling the number of present members would fundamentally alter the NATO Alliance as it exists currently. Instability in many of these states could pose major problems for NATO.
New policies and strategies would be required; decisionmaking would be greatly complicated; and summit and Ministerial meetings, as well as meetings of permanent representatives, would be diluted. Management of the civilian bureaucracy and integrated military command would also be complicated, not only in sheer numbers of representatives working in NATO headquarters and commands, but also in terms of the functioning of committees and planning staffs and preparation of studies and processing of papers.
NATO security guarantees and the territory to be defended would be greatly expanded, stretching far out into Asia and into border areas with Asian and Middle Eastern states. Fundamental changes in military strategy and planning, military command organization and arrangements, and support functions would be required.
U.S. influence in NATO would be diluted, while demands in terms of the number of states enjoying security guarantees would be greatly expanded.
NATO would survive and perhaps be the center of security planning for Europe and Eurasia, but it would be a far different NATO from the one that has existed for more than 45 years.
This alternative would be designed to retain the essential character of NATO and avoid appearances of creating new dividing lines in Europe or between Europe and Eurasia, while continuing with NATO outreach programs to the East through NACC and PFP. The option would avoid the many risks or complications that might be involved in expansion, including complications in NATO in adjusting to new members and complications with Russia and perhaps other CIS states that might not be invited to join NATO.
On the other hand, this alternative could have a number of adverse consequences. NATO's credibility could be called into question, as it could appear to be backing down from the NATO Summit leaders' position of welcoming and expecting NATO expansion. Some might say NATO policy had been reversed in the face of external opposition and that NATO decisions were subject to an outside veto. This approach would not be welcomed by CEE states who might continue to press for NATO membership. Furthermore, as the EU and WEU expand their membership, NATO might be seen, in comparison, as stagnating and not adjusting to the changing environment. NATO could slip from its central, leading role.
The prestige of the United States, which has been at the forefront of NATO's outreach programs and the expansion issue, could suffer if NATO retreated from expansion. If it appeared that the European allies had worked against the United States in reversing U.S. and NATO policy on expansion, critics of the European allies in the United States could press for U.S. withdrawal from Europe.
as Russia has Proposed
This alternative is essentially what Russian President Yeltsin has proposed an OSCE-type umbrella over Europe and Eurasia supported by both NATO and Russian/CIS pillars or security guarantees.Note 1 This alternative would inhibit NATO from expanding. Moreover, NATO's prestige and position would shift from being the leading security institution in Europe to that of a supporting institution. Russia could strengthen its position within the CIS and help establish the CIS as an international organization. Russia or the CIS would be elevated to equality with NATO.
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel sees the Russian proposal as undermining NATO and argued, The Russians must accept being told that NATO remains the nucleus of the new European security architecture, in which we want to include Russia and from which we must not exclude it. We must not agree to the Russian concept that the OSCE should replace NATO."Note 2 He also rejected any subordinating NATO to OSCE, saying "There will be no relations of superiority or inferiority between CSCE, the NATO Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, and NATO."Note 3 (At the June 1994 meeting in Istanbul of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, the Russians proposed but NATO rejected turning "the NACC into an independent organization from NATO, in fact, into a superior organization to NATO."Note 4)
Some, particularly the CEE states, could view this as an effort to establish a NATO and Russian/CIS condominium over CEE. CEE states might be regarded as a neutral, buffer zone between the two pillars. They would almost certainly oppose such an alternative, preferring as they do closer relations with and even membership in NATO. U.S. prestige and influence would be diminished in CEE and within Europe in general.
This alternative explicitly states what was assumed for the alternative if NATO remains at 16 the EU would grow and expand into CEE and the WEU would also likely grow in terms of converting some of the states presently associated with it to full membership. NATO would not grow, and the focus for security issues could increasingly turn to the EU and WEU. NATO could remain strong and active, and many might continue to emphasize NATO's role in helping to provide the American security guarantee for Europe. On the other hand, as the focus shifted to the EU and WEU and their expansion, attention and support for NATO might diminish, and NATO might wither and perhaps dissolve. If NATO were to wither, so too would U.S. involvement in European security.
Closer security relations between the West on one hand, and Russia and the CIS on the other could be more problematic under this alternative, compared to alternatives for NATO expansion that include establishing unique relations with Russia and Ukraine and cooperative relations with other CIS states. The EU does not appear to be prepared to conclude "associate agreements" soon with states in the CIS and eventually to bring them in as members of the EU, and the WEU has invited only CEE states to join as "associate members," not reaching out to states in the CIS. It may be that only NATO, involving the participation, power, and influence of the U.S., can engage Russia and the CIS. This alternative could lead to a situation in which the EU and WEU expand into CEE, NATO withers, the United States withdraws from Europe, and Russia and the CIS prepare to respond to these developments.