Chapter 2
NATO EXPANSION QUESTIONS

RECENT HISTORY

With the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe beginning in 1989 and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, many public officials and private citizens in Central and Eastern Europe began expressing the desire for their countries to join NATO. The Visegrad states Poland, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia), and Hungary were the first to press seriously for membership in NATO. Largely in response to this, NATO initiated an outreach program.note 1

The efforts of CEE states to gain NATO membership and NATO's outreach responses to these have gone through a series of four stages (these are elaborated in the Europe chapter of Strategic Assessment 1995, published by NDU Press).

In 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which has grown to 38 members and has an agreed work plan of political and security activities and cooperation.

When Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Poland and the Czech Republic in August 1993, Polish President Walesa and the Czech leadership pressed Yeltsin and appeared to gain his acquiescence on the issue of Polish and Czech membership in NATO. Walesa and Yeltsin on 25 August issued a declaration that in part stated, "The presidents touched on the matter of Poland's intention to join NATO. President L. Walesa set forth Poland's well-known position on this issue, which was met with understanding by President B.N. Yeltsin. In the long term, such a decision taken by a sovereign Poland in the interests of overall European integration does not go against the interests of other states, including the interests of Russia."note 2 Yeltsin reportedly told the press, "In the new Russian-Polish relations, there is no place for hegemony and diktat, the psychology of a 'big brother' and a 'little brother.'"note 3

After this statement, Polish Presidential spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski stated that "Now the West has no argument to say no to Poland. Until now the West has been using the argument 'We don't want to upset the Russians.' Now that is no longer a viable argument. Now we will see the true intentions of the West toward Poland."note 4

On 26 August in Prague, Yeltsin reportedly stated that Russia "has no right" to hinder the Czech Republic's joining of any organization, indicating that Moscow would not object to a possible accession to NATO by the Czech Republic. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at a meeting with his Czech counterpart reportedly pointed out that the Czech Republic is a sovereign state and that it has the right to join any organization it wishes to.note 5

About the same time, however, Russian officials were making cautionary remarks about NATO. The Warsaw press reported that on 23 August Kozyrev warned that if the countries of Eastern Europe joined NATO, the reactionary nationalist hardliners in Russia would be strengthened. He reportedly said that the East European countries should be friendly to both democratic Russia and democratic Western Europe including Germany, saying, "These states should not become a new 'little entente,' a buffer which could be crushed at any time, but should take on the role of a connecting link."note 6 Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in remarks made to reporters sometime between 25 and 27 August apparently referring to NATO, called for an end to military blocs, suggesting that "blocs" should only be formed to promote joint economic goals.note 7 After Yeltsin returned to Moscow, Russian government officials began speaking out against any NATO expansion that included Central and East European states and not Russia.

In the fall of 1993, Yeltsin wrote a letter to key Western leaders opposing NATO's admission of East European countries. According to the text of this letter as carried in a Prague newspaper, Yeltsin indicated that the opposition and moderates in Russia would view NATO expansion as a "new kind of isolation" for Russia. He observed that the treaty on German unification bans deployment of foreign troops in the eastern leader of Germany; he assessed that the spirit of these stipulations "rules out any possibility of a NATO expansion eastwards." At the same time he asked that possible eventual membership for Russia not be excluded, stating that "From a long-term point of view, the idea of us joining NATO should not be disregarded either. This notion, however, is presently a purely theoretical one." He called for relations between NATO and Russia to be "several degrees warmer than the relations between the alliance and Eastern Europe."note 8

In late 1993, the United States proposed to NATO allies the Partnership for Peace program, an outreach program to the East going beyond NACC and focused on defense and military cooperation. At the January 1994 NATO Summit meeting, NATO heads of state and governments agreed to the PFP program and invited other European states that were members of NACC or CSCE to join. PFP was seen as a compromise that held out the prospect for later NATO expansion but recognized that some relationship had to be worked out with Russia and that NATO states, parliaments, and publics needed to give greater consideration to the whole NATO expansion issue before making a decision.

At the NATO Summit meeting on 10-11 January, 1994, heads of state and government issued a "Partnership for Peace: Invitation and Framework Document" (see appendix C for the complete text). In this document, NATO leaders declared their commitment to the goal of "enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe" and outlined the PFP program. They also addressed expansion of NATO, reaffirming that the Alliance is open to new members. They referred to the provisions of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding accession by additional states. They avoided delineating among possible new members beyond that new members would be "democratic states to our East." They characterized expansion as an evolutionary process and emphasized PFP participation as important to this process. NATO Secretary General Willy Claes has indicated that there is a three-stage process for PFP a country signs the PFP framework agreement, the country then presents its ideas for an individual partnership program, and, in the third and last state, the proposals are "examined together." Claes has said, "It is up to the partner to make proposals, not NATO. That is the nature of PFP. If a partner wants to take cooperation very far, we say OK. If not, that is fine, too."note 9 As President Clinton said while visiting in Warsaw in July 1994, expansion of NATO was "no longer a question of whether, but when and how." He also said that when time comes to add new members to NATO "a democratic Poland will have placed itself among those ready and able to join" and announced that he would seek from Congress $100 million to support PFP, with $25 million going to Poland.note 10

By early 1995, 25 states of CEE, Western Europe, and Eurasia had joined NATO's 16 members as PFP partners and had begun to cooperate in military activities. Ten had presented individual partnership programs, and many Eastern states had sent representatives to participate in activities at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and the PFP Coordination Cell at NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium.

NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels on 1 December 1994, tasked the North Atlantic Council in permanent session with the advice of NATO Military Authorities, to begin an examination inside the Alliance to "determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership." The study is also to examine how PFP can contribute to the process. NATO Foreign Ministers are to discuss progress at their spring 1995 meeting and to present results of their deliberations to interested Partners prior to the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in December 1995.note 11

In early February 1995, a press article related to Austria's joining carried NATO Secretary General Claes words:

There is no formula for an expansion, not even informal agreements within the Alliance. We have only just started the internal debate. The political committee meets every week. Important issues have to be clarified: 'How can enlargement be carried out while avoiding all risks to the Alliance?' The 'budgetary aspect' is open, as are questions regarding institutions. And 'the question on enforcing the principle of mutual assistance has to be solved'. . . . It is imaginable that someone joins who does not meet all the conditions. But the contrary is also possible: Someone might not become a member despite fulfilling all the criteria.note 12

Secretary General Claes elaborated on the NATO process a few days later:note 13

We intend to enlarge. But I cannot imagine that those who are willing to join want to have less security and weaker guarantees than the current member states. All this is not quite so easy. How about the problem of the nuclear shield, the guarantee of assistance, or financial contributions? All this must be solved. In doing so, we must respect the principle of consensus. How can this be done with 22 or 24 members? So there are many questions. But we are not wasting time. We want to complete our debate by this fall. We will then inform all parties interested without delay. Then it will be discussed in the Council of Ministers [sic] in December. After that, the 16 member states will discuss the question of who will be admitted and when."

Henry Kissinger articulated a distinction between NATO expansion and PFP and suggested approaches that could be taken on NATO expansion and development of a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia:

Having started down the road of NATO expansion, the administration must choose between the concept of the NATO alliance, based on defining an area to be protected, and the concept behind the Partnership for Peace, designed by President Clinton's own statements to unite the former blocs. NATO is not the instrument to serve both purposes . . . NATO expansion represents a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and Russia. A wise policy, instead of pretending that Russia has an option for NATO membership, would take two steps. It would proceed with membership for the Visegrad countries and reject a Russian veto. But at the same time it would propose a security treaty between the new NATO and Russia to make clear that the goal is cooperation. Such a treaty would provide that no foreign troops be stationed on the territory of new NATO members, on the model of the arrangement for East Germany (or, better, no closer than a fixed distance from the eastern border of Poland.)note 14

PRECEDENTS

There are three precedents for NATO expansion, involving accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. In each of the three cases, a protocol, entitled "Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of" was negotiated. The protocols themselves are relatively short and pro forma, stating that parties to the Treaty, being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced, agree that on entry into force of the protocol an invitation to accede to the Treaty is to be communicated to the prospective new member and this prospective member will become a party to the Treaty upon depositing its instruments of accession. Other articles deal with entry into force of the protocol (upon notification of acceptance by each of the parties to the treaty) and depositing and copying the protocol.

Accession by Greece and Turkey

According to Dean Acheson's memoirs, Greece and Turkey felt abandoned when, in March 1949, Italy, not a North Atlantic state in terms of geography, was issued an invitation to become an original signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty and they were not; they lamented their status for the next 2 years until they were invited to join NATO.note 15

In January 1951, the U.S. Government began considering collaboration on establishing a Middle East Command. According to Acheson, "Greece and Turkey insisted upon being associated in the common defense through NATO and not indirectly through some regional organization. Furthermore, Turkey would not cooperate with a Middle East organization until her admission to NATO had been assured."note 16 In September 1951, at a regular NATO Foreign Ministers' meetings, Acheson and U.S. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace presented arguments for inviting Greece and Turkey to join NATO. After much private exhortation, NATO Ministers voted in favor of extending invitations.note 17 In October 1951, NATO Deputy Ministers signed the protocol on accession by Greece and Turkey.note 18 The U.S. Senate voted approval in early 1952.note 19 With the approval of other NATO allies and ratification by the parliaments of Greece and Turkey, on 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty by depositing their instruments of accession.note 20 The Soviet Union condemned the extension of membership as a violation of U.N. principles,note 21 and Bulgaria and Romania protested Turkish accession.note 22

Accession by Germany

In September 1950, after the start of the Korean War, the United States, France, and United Kingdom called for a German military contribution to NATO.note 23 Given French concerns about German rearmament, a plan was developed to put German troops under the control of a continental European Defense Community (EDC) within NATO. The EDC was to merge forces of six states France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

In May 1952, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States concluded an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany restoring its sovereignty, and on 27 May the Treaty of Paris setting up the EDC was signed. During the ratification process for the EDC Treaty, however, the French parliament defeated the treaty. The United States then began considering substitutes, including one that provided for establishment of an independent German military and admission of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO as a sovereign state.note 24 Europeans began to work on creating the Western European Union as a substitute for the EDC.

The admittance of Germany to NATO was worked in parallel to admittance to the WEU. Germany's Bundestag approved admission to both NATO and the WEU in late February 1955;note 25 the U.S. Senate in early April 1955 ratified agreements for FRG rearmament and NATO membership.note 26 With the approval of other Allies, and despite Soviet objections, the FRG became a member of NATO and the WEU in May 1955.

Accession by Spain

The process of Spanish accession has many interesting aspects, some more relevant than others for future NATO accession. As early as 1952, in connection with accession by Greece and Turkey, Portugal, an original NATO member, urged that Spain also be admitted into NATO.note 27 In the mid-1970s, the possibility of joining NATO was discussed in Spain, and a poll taken in Spain in 1975 reported that 57 percent of respondents favored joining NATO and 24 percent were opposed.note 28 In 1981, the possibility of Spain applying for NATO membership must have received increased attention, as the Soviet Union reportedly sent a message in September 1981 suggesting that Spain not enter NATO.note 2

It was not until October 1981, however, that Spanish President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo and Foreign Minister Perez Llorca introduced for parliamentary debate the NATO accession issue.note 30 Several reasons have been advanced to explain Spanish interest in NATO membership and the timing of the raising of the issue. First, President Calvo Sotelo, described as an advocate of Atlanticism as the focal point of Spanish foreign policy, took office early in 1981.note 31 Secondly, the military base agreement with the United States was up for renewal, and the Spanish leadership wanted to determine whether Spain should become a member of NATO and move the bilateral relationship with the United States into that context, or move to neutrality and break defense ties with the United States.note 32 Finally, some have emphasized that the Spanish President believed that Spain's membership in NATO would improve prospects for Spanish entry into the European Community, which France had blocked.note 33 In October 1981, the Spanish Congress of Deputies approved the application to join NATO by a vote of 185 for and 146 against, and about a month later the Senate approved it.note 34 The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) then began a large scale anti-NATO campaign.note 35

NATO began its process of considering Spanish accession in November 1981;note 36 the Protocol of Accession was signed a month later at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting.note 37 Following ratification by all the Parties, in May 1982 Spain deposited its instruments of accession, thereby becoming a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty and a member of NATO.note 38

SHOULD NATO EXPAND ITS MEMBERSHIP?

There are several issues regarding possible expansion of NATO membership. The fundamental question is should NATO expand its membership? If the answer is yes, there are many questions or issues related to which states to consider, how and when to move on expansion, and resultant implications.

Yes to Expansion

Many expansion advocates call for extending NATO membership soon to the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. Some of these advocates envision including in NATO most all of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States; they do not advocate extending NATO membership to Russia and other new independent states of the former Soviet Union, although they do see a need for some form of treaty between NATO and Russia. Advocates of NATO expansion include many key political and military leaders in Central and Eastern Europe. In the United States, the administration has declared its support for NATO expansion and Congress has passed legislation in support but in both cases without proposing a timetable. A new bill introduced into Congress calls for working toward expansion by January 1999. Among those who have written publicly in support of expansion are former Senator Richard Lugar, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Presidential National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Council official Peter Rodman, columnist William Safire of The New York Times. The following are some of the arguments in favor of expanding NATO membership.

Be responsive to requests for NATO membership made by reform leaders in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

Peter Rodman wrote, "The newly independent Central European states particularly Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia consider themselves part of the West; they categorically refuse to be relegated to a Russian sphere of influence or to a no-man's land between Western Europe and Russia. After a 60-year nightmare, they have finally had the chance to express their free sovereign will: They are morally and politically partners of the West, seeking membership in the European Union for their economic well-being and in the Atlantic Alliance for their security."note 40

Not to act positively on such requests could undercut these reform leaders. It could suggest that the West is not sympathetic to these states and their perceived vulnerability, and that the West does not view these states as part of Europe or as important.

Enhance security from the West's perspective by improving stability in Central and Eastern Europe and avoiding a security vacuum, nationalization of defenses, and an East-West clash.

Senator Richard Lugar wrote, "Defining the current problems in terms of the future of Europe as a whole helps clarify the issue of vital American national interests. The United States cannot afford to allow Europe to unravel for the third time this century. Projection of stability to the East is a prudent investment to secure the peace in Europe."note 41

Henry Kissinger, cautioning against allowing a "vacuum between Germany and Russia that has tempted so many previous conflicts," wrote, "If this request [the Visegrad states requests to join NATO] is rejected and the states bordering Germany are refused protection, Germany will sooner or later seek to achieve its security by national efforts, encountering on the way a Russia pursuing the same policy from its side."note 42

Peter W. Rodman wrote, "If the history of this century proves anything, it is that ambiguity about the status of these small Central European states is exceedingly risky for peace. It would only invite future revisionist temptations. In the interest of European stability, the uncertainty should be foreclosed by their admission to the alliance." He views NATO expansion as a misnomer and suggests the issue is really "the consolidation of the new status quo in Central Europe that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Stalin's ill-gotten conquests."note 43

Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan emphasized what the Czech Republic could contribute to European security: "In addition to being aware of the limitations of our own defense forces, we want to be part of Europe. This then leads to the duty to do something for Europe, to take part in protecting of its values . . . Participation, for instance, in NATO peacekeeping forces. There is also the air defense . . . Air defense is nowadays an affair of larger regions. Therefore, we can very well imagine joint coverage of airspace."note 44

Rand analysts Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee have argued that including the Visegrad states in NATO would be in America's interests because the Visegrad leaders are pro-American, their views on security issues closely coincide with those of the United States and other Atlanticist members such as the United Kingdom, Portugal, and the Netherlands, and their inclusion in NATO "would strengthen the Atlanticist orientation of the alliance and provide greater internal support for U.S. views on key security issues."note 45

Enhance security in Central and Eastern Europe from the perspective of CEE states, providing assurances against what they see as their greatest threat or challenge, i.e., instability in and possible challenges from Russia and other states of the CIS.

While Russian military capabilities may have diminished, many in Central and Eastern Europe, supported by some in the West, are concerned about Russia's efforts to gain increased influence in the member states of the CIS and to arrange for Russian forces and bases in many of these states.

The Russian use of force in Chechnya is probably increasing concerns in CEE and CEE interest in early NATO membership. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel was described in early January as thinking this "likely and logical."note 46 Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for International Affairs, has claimed that the recent use of force in Chechnya has increased the desire of East European countries to become members of NATO as soon as possible,note 47 and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred C. Ikle, who opposes NATO expansion, has observed that "This remedy may seem all the more urgent as Russian forces keep inflicting wanton destruction on Chechnya."note 48

Indeed, Czech leaders have suggested that Russian activities in Chechnya might influence NATO expansion, but largely in terms of NATO recognizing the importance of expansion. Referring to Chechnya, which he described as "very rash and very dangerous," Czech President Vaclav Havel has said that "Perhaps they (Western politicians) have been too credulous. Now they may better understand why the Czech Republic wishes to join the alliance."note 49 Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan has commented that "I think that throughout recent history, including this situation in Chechnya, all those who have any say about these matters have come to realize that it is necessary for the Central European countries to become a part of NATO."note 50

Provide stability and assistance so that CEE states can consolidate domestic reform, improve relations in CEE, and integrate with the West.

NATO membership could also help the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe achieve their goals of being integrated with the West. Many believe that Central and Eastern European states were abnormally separated from the West after World War II and that to be integrated with the West is not only natural but offers the best promise for their political, economic, social, and security future. They generally believe that inclusion in the EU and WEU will help but that NATO is the preeminent security institution and only NATO membership provides American security assurances.

Senator Lugar wrote, "Membership in NATO is a way to strengthen domestic forces committed to democracy and market economies. Western policy-makers and analysts tend to overlook the link between democracy and security."note 51 And Rand analysts Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee wrote,

East-Central Europe's democrats well understand that democracy will succeed only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political, economic, and military community. The West, too, previously understood this link as demonstrated with the case of West Germany. That nation might never have become a stable Western democracy had itnot been accepted into NATO's fold. Similarly, NATOmembership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey. Those who insist that democratic credentials must be presented prior to alliance membership should remember that the need for a stable security framework is greatest when democracy is most fragile and threatened.note 52

Help keep NATO vibrant and alive.

Zbigniew Brzezinski argued, "The absence of a long-range design for Europe could deprive it (NATO) of its historical reason for being" and that "Hesitation, inconsistency and weakness will not only discredit American leadership but probably doom NATO altogether."note 53

Take advantage now of the situation in Russia and expand NATO before that situation possibly worsens.

Zbigniew Brzezinski observed, "Westernists" are not gaining ground in Russia and that a faction is rising in Russia that argues "Russia is destined to exercise geopolitical sway over Eurasia" and Russia's "special political status must be asserted directly in Eurasia and indirectly in Central Europe." Brzezinski, at the same time, however, notes that there is no imminent threat from Russia and that "expansion should not be driven by whipping up anti- Russian hysteria that could become a self-fulfilling prophecy." Brzezinski and others also emphasize the importance of NATO pursuing as a second track some form of security arrangements with Russia.note 55

William Safire, observing that Kissinger and Brzezinski see Russia as "authoritarian at heart and expansionist by habit," calls for extending NATO membership now to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states, which he sees as the most Westernized nations of Eastern Europe. Safire argues, "The time to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a move would be an insufferable provocation to a superpower."note 56

Not let expansion of NATO membership be seen as subject to a Russian veto.

Peter Rodman argued that it is morally and politically objectionable to deny membership to the four Visegrad states over concern about provoking Russia. He also said, "Our failure to proceed would be more dangerous than to proceed" and suggests that Russian resistance to NATO expansion cannot be interpreted as anything other than a desire to restore its former sphere.note 57 Others might suggest that it is at least an effort not to let a former adversary expand eastward.

Arguments Against Expansion in General

Many are opposed in general to expanding membership in NATO, to include some or all states in CEE and the CIS. Some argue that expanding NATO is not necessary and would be counterproductive and even dangerous. Some make the point that it is only because the CEE states have pressed for NATO membership that the issue of NATO expansion has arisen, and that NATO would not have pursued expansion on its own initiative. In arguing against NATO expansion in present circumstances, some say that NATO could expand if and when Russia or other states present a military threat to Central and Eastern Europe. Many Russians oppose expansion of NATO, arguing that NATO should be disbanded, just as the Warsaw Pact was disbanded. In the United States, foreign affairs specialists who have written in opposition to NATO expansion include Fred C. Ikl‚, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Charles Kupchan, a former member of the U.S. National Security Council Staff, and Michael Brown of Harvard University. Some of the arguments that have been or could be advanced against expanding NATO follow.

There is now no threat necessitating expansion of NATO.

Michael Brown has developed this argument, writing that "Russia's military is in disarray at both the operational and ministerial levels." Observing that Poland and Hungary are reducing military conscription and the Czech Republic is reducing its mechanized and infantry forces, he concludes, "These are not the actions of states worried about military threats." Brown also reports, "Western defense experts believe that it would take Moscow at least a year or two to field an offensive military capability, should it be inclined to do so." He concludes that NATO leaders will therefore have ample time to extend security guarantees to Central Europe if and when this becomes necessary."note 58

For those who might argue that this course of action is too risky because NATO would not extend membership in a building crisis, Brown argues, "NATO is more likely to expand if and when real threats to vital interests emerge, than now when the Russian military threat to Europe is nonexistent. Whatever risks NATO would run by holding off can be minimized by developing a strong consensus with the alliance on its expansion strategy." Brown recommends a strategy of having NATO offer membership to as many states in the region as possible if Russia takes threatening steps such as withdrawing from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, building up its forces near western neighbors, using military threats, discontinuing denuclearization, violating pledges on Ukraine's sovereignty, absorbing Ukraine or Belarus into the Russian Federation, or transforming the Commonwealth of Independent States into a federal entity.note 59

Expanding NATO membership could mean drawing a new dividing line in Europe, excluding primarily Russia but also others.

President Clinton raised the issue of a new dividing line when he made his intervention at the NATO Summit meeting in January 1994 in support of the Partnership for Peace program and against immediately admitting the Visegrad states to NATO:

Why should we, now, draw a new line through Europe just a little further east? Why should we, now, do something which could foreclose the best possible future for Europe? The best possible future would be a democratic Russia committed to the security of all its European neighbors. The best possible future would be a democratic Ukraine a democratic government in every one of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, all committed to market cooperation, to common security, and to democratic ideals. We should not foreclose that possibility.note 60

The President went on to say that the Partnership for Peace "enables us to prepare for and to work toward enlargement of NATO when other countries are capable of fulfilling their NATO responsibilities" and "enables us to do it in a way that gives us time to reach out to Russia and to other nations of the former Soviet Union . . . in a way that leaves open the possibility of a future for Europe that breaks totally from the destructive past we have known."note 61

Charles Kupchan wrote, "Pushing NATO's boundaries eastward promises to resurrect Europe's dividing lines, not erase them. . . . The chance to build a European security community that included Russia would be lost. The West might be larger and stronger, but Europe would again be divided into hostile halves."note 62

Michael Brown wrote, "A new line would be drawn in Europe, a new Cold War could ensue, and the West would have itself to blame for bringing this about."note 63

Expanding NATO could create not just a division between the West and Russia but divisions even within Central and Eastern Europe.

If only one to four of the Central European "Visegrad" states were allowed in NATO initially, this could appear at a minimum to draw a temporary line within Eastern Eur‚ope. Competition, not sub-regional cooperation, could be stimulated if not all four "Visegrad" states were admitted initially. The Romanians may be concerned that Hungary might gain membership first and block an invitation to Romania. If almost all Central and Eastern Europe states are allowed in, some NATO allies might demand that Albania be excluded, as it has been excluded from associate partnership in the WEU. Would NATO admit the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia states that used to lie within the former Soviet Union (although the United States did not recognize their incorporation into the USSR) and which continue to have sizable Russian ethnic populations?

Fred Ikl‚, in addressing the argument that NATO expansion would fill a security vacuum in Eastern Europe, has asked: "If, say, Slovakia is a vacuum, why not Slovenia; if Slovenia, why not Macedonia, Moldova, or Belarus? By expanding eastward, NATO would merely shove the vacuum ahead of itself." He also suggests that advocates of expansion who propose ruling out deployment of allied forces onto the territory of new member states as a step to reduce Russian opposition to expansion would fill an "alleged political vacuum" with "a real military vacuum."note 64

Extending membership to some Eastern states, but not to all such as Russia and others could be counterproductive and have adverse political and military consequences in states not included.

Charles Kupchan has made many of these points. He argued, "Enlarging the alliance would alter the balance of power on the continent and make Russia feel less secure. The problem is that NATO is still a military alliance that concentrates power against an external threat; this is precisely why the Central Europeans want to join." Kupchan also said, "An expanded NATO would lead Russia to reassert control over its former republics and to remilitarize" and predicted "Even if NATO held open the prospect of eventual membership for Russia, nationalists would react to Central Europe's entry into NATO by charging that Russian reformers had sold out to the West and had jeopardized Russia's security" and that pro-Western forces in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, finding themselves "outside the West's new defense perimeter, . . . would look to Moscow to meet their security needs."note 65

Sergei Karaganov, a former advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin now serving on the Russian Federation's Security Council, wrote that if "NATO expands eastward, Russia under any government will become a revisionist power striving to undermine the already fragile European order."note 65

Michael Brown argued that if the four Visegrad states are admitted then "In all probability, Russian leaders would interpret NATO expansion as a delineation of spheres of influence in Central Europe, and they would move to establish greater control over non-NATO areas. Russian aggression would be encouraged, not discouraged, by NATO expansion. Four countries would be brought into NATO, but eight including the Baltic states would be left out. Russian withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty is not inconceivable."note 67

Charles William Maynes believed that Ukraine and the Baltic states would feel wronged if only CEE states were admitted to NATO.note 68

Russia's President Boris Yeltsin has opposed expanding NATO membership while excluding Russia; to do so could undercut him within Russia. In general, such expansion could undercut reformers in Russia and give grist to the mill for ultranationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Such expansion would tend to isolate Russia and other states in the CIS, compared to scenarios that did not expand NATO or opened NATO to states of the CIS. A senior U.S. official reportedly has acknowledged this concern by stating, "We certainly don't want to do anything that would do serious damage to the forces of reform" in Russia.note 69

On 19 December 1994, Belorusian First Deputy Foreign Minister Valerii Tsypkalo told a Russian news service that NATO's plans to expand were prompting a possible decision that might be made soon in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine to disavow their commitments under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. He was reported to have said that "If NATO draws nearer to the CIS borders, the CIS countries located in Europe will probably have to revise the agreement on cuts in conventional arms in Europe and stop scrapping their tanks, planes, and the like."note 70

NATO should not be extending security commitments to help defend the territory of other states, particularly at a time NATO members are reducing resources devoted to defense. Commentator and politician Patrick Buchanan wrote, "The United States cannot, and must not, give Poland and the other East European countries the guarantee that it would go to war because of their eastern borders, as would follow from their admission into NATO."note 71

Charles Kupchan argues that countries are focusing on domestic priorities, that the willingness of electorates to sustain, let alone expand, commitments is contracting, that military spending in NATO countries is likely to decline, that it would cost billions of dollars to prepare for the defense of Central Europe, that it is hard to imagine parliaments of all 16 NATO members approving extension of new security guarantees to Central Europe, and that rejection by one or more parliaments would be a crushing blow.note 72

Expansion could ruin NATO. Specialists have advanced several arguments why including Central and East European states in NATO would ruin NATO. Fred Ikl‚ wrote, "Far from solving an alleged crisis, expanding NATO would fatally weaken it."note 73 Some of the arguments on weakening NATO include:

• Adding new members to NATO could mean that NATO would lose focus and cohesion and find it harder to reach consensus and decisions.

• Pressuring NATO allies who may be reluctant to expand NATO could jeopardize relations within the Alliance.

• New members might introduce a Trojan horse into NATO.

• Pressures might increase to withdraw U.S. troops completely from Europe, if NATO decides it does not need to station forces forward in CEE states admitted to NATO, thereby undercutting the concept of forward deployment:.

• Expanding NATO membership might eventually lead to membership for Russia, giving Russia a veto in NATO.

Arguments Against Expansion For at Least the Next Several Years

Some may oppose NATO expanding in the next several years but hold an open mind to expansion after several years or if a serious threat arose in the meantime. The following arguments have been or could be used in support of deferring expansion:

NATO needs to address other issues first or avoid becoming embroiled in NATO expansion. NATO should focus now on developing a new Trans-Atlantic relationship between North America and West Europeans working to build up the European pillar through development of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, a European Security and Defense Identity, and a WEU Common Defense Policy.

This may not be a good time to move toward NATO expansion. Some NATO states appear reluctant to push too far too fast on NATO expansion. There are serious issues now in NATO over former Yugoslavia. Many NATO allies are focusing on instability south of NATO, especially in North Africa.

Former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher wrote, "What is required is a key concept for stable relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union, including Russia. Hasty and insensitive debates on an expansion of NATO merely cloud the Alliance's internal cohesion and decision-making capability, as well as undermining the requirement for comprehensive security cooperation in the entire zone between Vancouver and Vladivostok."note 74

U.S. officials have been reported to hope to assuage Russian fears of NATO expansion by first locking Russia into a series of cooperative relationships with the West; these officials are said to reason that once these relationships with Russia are developed, Russia will not see NATO expansion as threatening. Examples of such relationship are said to be inviting Russia to participate in portions of G-7 meetings of the heads of major developed countries, opening a direct line on consultations with NATO, and the EU's offering Russia a "partnership and cooperation agreement."note 75

There is too much instability or uncertainty in CEE now. Taking in any states from CEE now risks embroiling NATO in one or more potential ethnic conflict situations in CEE or to defending CEE states against potential threats from Russia and other CIS states. The next several years will determine whether the situation will become more stable or less stable.

Reforms have been underway in CEE for fewer than 5 years, and they could be reversed. CEE states need to work more on reforms, and focusing on NATO could distract them from economic reform and economic integration with the West. In some states in CEE, non-Communists who led the revolutions and the initial reform efforts have been voted out of power and former Communists, now generally called socialists, have been voted in. What this means for progress on reforms remains to be seen.

Charles William Maynes, Editor of Foreign Policy, reportedly argued that the CEE states are not ready for NATO membership, the results of the Polish elections demonstrate the possibility of communists being elected to power again, and the membership debate should at least be postponednote 76. Maynes also argues that CEE states "need integration into Western economic institutions more than they need NATO, so that the quest for NATO membership turns them away from the main target economic integration."note 77

Poland, for example, has been seen as a leading candidate for NATO membership but recently has had a crisis among the president, prime minister, and defense minister over which elected officials control the military, and a former Communist may become Prime Minister. Poland is trying to work out civilian control over the military in a new constitution, but this will take time, perhaps 1 or 2 years or more.

One report indicates that Pentagon officials have worried that a state admitted to NATO too soon might revert to authoritarian or communist leadership or provoke ethnic conflict, leaving NATO in the position of having to defend a government with ignoble aims.note 78

More examination, debate, and time is needed. PFP was initiated only in January 1994. Partner states are sending representatives to NATO and SHAPE Headquarters. There have been two PFP exercises. There has not been time enough to assess which of the 23 PFP partners have shown the most interest in cooperating with NATO.

Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry both wrote, "If we arbitrarily lock in advantages now for some countries, we risk discouraging reformers in countries not named and fostering complacency in countries that are."note 79

NATO has only recently begun a study of how it might expand and what the implications might be of expansion. This study may take considerable time and should not be rushed.

The U.S. Congress appears to be the only legislative body in NATO states to have passed legislation favoring NATO expansion. In discussions in the Congress, there have note been extensive hearings or debates on the details of possible NATO expansion and the extension of NATO security guarantees. Senator William S. Cohen has argued that NATO expansion has not even begun to be debated in the United States and any vote would have failed in the Senate if it had been raised as of early February 1995.note 80

If Russia or others threaten CEE states in the future, then NATO could extend membership to CEE states. Some, such as Charles Kupchan and Michael Brown, hold open the option for NATO to expand if and when Russia or other states present a serious military threat to Central and Eastern Europe. Kupchan, for example, argues, "Expanding NATO makes sense only if Russia again poses a military threat to Central Europe. To act now might give the Poles and their neighbors a boost, but by alienating the Russians and undercutting the reformers, NATO would set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy." He goes on, "There is no need to take that risk when Central Europe does not now face a serious external threat and when NATO can always expand later. Since it would take Russian years to rebuild an army that could invade and occupy Central Europe, NATO would have ample time to extend its protective umbrella eastward.note 81

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