SUMMARY

NATO expansion is a key issue both within NATO and in the context of alternative future security alignments in Europe involving NATO, the European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
States in Central and Eastern Europe are seeking membership in NATO. NATO has responded with outreach programs, most recently the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program. NATO leaders have said they expect and welcome NATO expansion as an evolutionary process in which PFP will play an important role. In the public debate, officials and scholars have made many arguments in favor of expansion, against it, and to defer it.
There appears to be general support in Congress, the American and European publics, and the executive branches in NATO states for inviting Central and Eastern European states, particularly the four Visegrad states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, to join NATO, but no decisions have been made nor dates established. Russian officials have been ambivalent but often object to expansion of NATO to include Central and Eastern European states but not Russia.
NATO is conducting a study to address how NATO might expand and what the implications would be. Among the issues that may be raised are:
- whether additional criteria for member-ship should be specified
- which states should be invited
- when and possibly in what sequence, if any, they should be invited
- how to avoid dividing lines in Europe
- the impact of enlargement on NATO effectiveness continuation of outreach programs with states not invited
- the relationship between NATO and Russia.
Of six illustrative alternative future security alignments in Europe (three involving NATO expansion and three not), the first NATO expansion to include Central and Eastern European states, adding from 1-1l new members, while continuing outreach pro-grams with non-members and establishing a unique relationship with Russia and perhaps Ukraine may be the most supportable.

SITUATION AND TRENDS IN INSTITUTIONS

There is an increasing web of cross membership and interrelationships among many of the security institutions related to Europe. With the revolutionary changes in Central and Eastern Europe beginning in 1989, many states in the area began pressing for membership in NATO and the EU.

NATO has responded by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 and the PFP in 1994. In establishing PFP, NATO leaders announced that they expected and welcomed NATO expansion as an evolutionary process in which PFP would play an important role. NATO is now conducting a study to address how NATO might expand and what the implications would be.

The EU and WEU have intensified and expanded cooperation in Western Europe and have also developed outreach programs to the East, which have lead to associate status for many Central and Eastern European states and may lead to full membership for some.

OSCE is becoming increasingly active and institutionalized in human rights activities, helping to prevent or resolve disputes, and promoting security.

The CIS is promoting cooperation among its 12 members.

NATO EXPANSION KEY ISSUES

Should NATO Expand?

Arguments in favor: NATO expansion could:

be responsive to requests for NATO membership made by reform leaders in Central and Eastern Europe.
enhance security from the West's perspective, by improving stability in Central and Eastern European and avoid-ing a security vacuum, nationalization of defenses, and an East-West clash.
enhance security from the perspective of Central and Eastern European states, by providing security assurances against what they see as the greatest threat or challenge instability in and possible challenges from Russia and others in the CIS.
provide stability and assistance so Central and Easter European states can consoli-date domestic reform, improve relations in Central and Eastern European, and integrate with the West.
help keep NATO vibrant and alive.
take advantage now of the situation in Russia and expand NATO before that situation possibly worsens.
not let NATO expansion be seen as subject to Russian veto.

Arguments against NATO expansion:

there is now no threat to Central and Eastern European necessitating expansion.
Extending membership to some states but not states such as Russia and others in CIS and even some in Central and Eastern Europe could mean drawing new dividing lines in Europe between the West and Russia and even within Central and Eastern Europe which could: undercut reformers in states not invited; set back the goal of a united Europe; and lead to tensions, bloc formations, and possibly confrontations.
NATO should not be extending security commitments, particularly when NATO states are reducing resources for defense.
Expansion could ruin NATO, in terms of: losing focus, cohesion, and ability to reach consensus; jeopardizing relations between allies in favor of and against expansion; possible introduction of a Trojan horse; increasing pressures to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe if forces are not forward deployed into Central and Eastern Europe; possibly including Russia in NATO, with a veto.

Arguments against expansion for at least the next several years:

NATO needs to address other issues first (trans- Atlantic relations) or avoid becom-ing embroiled in expansion now (given the crisis over Yugoslavia and instability to the South).
NATO needs to work out a relationship with Russia, and this will take time.
There is too much instability or uncertainty in Central and Eastern Europe now, and reforms are too new and insecure.
More examination and debate is needed, and time to see how much candidate states are prepared to cooperate and what they can contribute.
Early expansion could discourage reformers in states not admitted and foster complacency in states admitted.
NATO will need detailed study of how to expand and implications of expansion.
Parliaments and publics in NATO states have not sufficiently debated NATO expansion and extension of security guarantees to the East.
If Russia or others threaten Central and Eastern European states in the future, then NATO could extend membership at that time.

SHOULD ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP BE SPECIFIED?

The North Atlantic Treaty's Article 10 provides that for a state to be invited to accede to the Treaty it must be a "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."

In the PFP invitation and framework agreement issued at the January 1994, NATO Summit leaders indicated or implied that to become a member a state must be located in Europe, be able to promote NATO principles and security, be democratic, be located east of NATO, and be an active PFP participant. NATO leaders also implied that to join and be active in PFP a state would have to: be a member of NACC and/or CSCE(OSCE); be able and desire to contribute to PFP; share the values of democracy, the UN, and CSCE(OSCE); support stability and security through cooperation; support political and military cooperation; be ready to participate in bodies at NATO headquarters and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; support openness and democratic control of defense ministries and forces; support joint planning, exercises, and operations with NATO; plan for and document PFP cooperation; commit resources for PFP cooperation; and be ready to exchange defense information.

Congress has also attempted to establish criteria, primarily democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of armed forces, rule of law, protection of citizens' rights, respect for the territorial integrity of neighbors, and non-support of international terrorism.

NATO may consider specifying additional criteria, guidelines, or precepts. Attempting to agree on and specify additional criteria could suggest both a double standard (since such criteria were not specified for earlier accessions) and moving the goal line of membership further away. It could also cause problems as NATO tries to develop and agree on additional criteria and cause contentious issues to be raised as states apply for membership and some are accepted and others are not. It my be advisable for NATO ultimately to decide on new members using political judgment backed by criteria or guidelines already stated.

FULL OR PARTIAL MEMBERSHIP?

The U.S. Government and NATO appear to be considering full membership in NATO as the only step beyond participation in PFP, unlike the Western European Union which has observers, associate partners, associate members, and full members.

WHICH STATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR MEMBERSHIP?

Most of the states of Central and Eastern Europe have made known their desire to join NATO, some more vocally than others. States in the CIS have been more ambivalent or have not expressed interest, although almost all have joined NACC and PFP.

Many, including the U.S. Congress, appear to believe that the Visegrad states the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are the most qualified.

No members of PFP have been excluded from consideration, but many people have expressed reservations about considering membership for Russia and others in the CIS. NATO is working to develop a unique relationship with Russia, apart from relationships in PFP with Russia and other states.

TIMING

Neither NATO nor the U.S. Administration has suggested a timetable for accepting new members. New legislation introduced in the House states that the U.S. and NATO allies should assist the Visegrad states to transition to full NATO membership not later than 10 January 1999.

SEQUENCING

There are a number of sensitive issues involved in considering whether to address membership expansion country-by-country or to consider countries as a group; which countries to consider first; and how long intervals might be between admission of states.

DIVIDING LINES IN EUROPE

Many call for the integration of Europe and a united Europe, but the eastern boundary of Europe is subject to debate. Opponents of NATO expansion argue that adding selected new members to NATO will probably draw a new dividing line between Europe and Russia and the CIS, and/or even lines of division within Central and Eastern Europe. Others may argue that NATO membership (presently 14 European states, along with the U.S. and Canada, out of a total of 40 European states plus another 12 in the CIS) does not constitute a division of Europe, nor would addition of select new members to NATO, particularly if NATO continues to pursue cooperative outreach programs such as NACC and PFP.

READINESS OF PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS

Congress appears to support extending NATO membership to select Central and Eastern European countries, particularly the Visegrad states, but it has not addressed the details. Public opinion polls in the United States and Europe show considerable support for NATO membership for Central and Eastern European states (ranging, by state, from 66% to 42%). Majorities in Europe also believe Russia should be given the option to join when it meets all qualifications.

IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON NATO EFFECTIVENESS

The impact on NATO of adding new members would depend greatly on which states are admitted and how many states are admitted. Smaller states would likely have less impact in terms or requiring changes in NATO and reaching consensus; larger states, however, should have more to contribute to NATO security but would likely also be more influential. As the number of states admitted increases, so will the potential for diluting NATO's focus and creating problems in reaching consensus. States in which reforms have not been consolidated and states with internal or external ethnic group tensions could pose problems for NATO. Reformers in the Visegrad states generally emphasize the importance of American engagement, and they could add to Atlantic perspectives in NATO deliberations. The impact of enlargement on NATO political and military structures will need to be examined carefully in the NATO study of enlargement and in the context of inviting specific states to join.

THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM

To the extent NATO focuses attention on membership expansion, there could be less attention to NACC and PFP activities. Cooperation in NACC and PFP will be important both as steps toward NATO membership and as cooperation between NATO and states not joining NATO.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States and NATO should pursue an approach extending membership to states in Central and Eastern Europe. While giving primacy to expansion, NATO should encourage and promote a broader web of European-related security organizations, including OSCE, NACC, PFP, the EU and WEU. NATO should pursue unique relations with Russia and Ukraine.

move forward to expand.
proceed with utmost care.
not try to develop and specify new criteria for membership.
address candidate countries individually.
be very selective.
work toward inviting at least one country within the next 1-2 years to join NATO; at present, the first country admitted should probably be the Czech Republic.
not close the door on possible associations with NATO short of full membership.
work toward developing a unique relationships between NATO and Russia and Ukraine respectively.