CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL STABILITY

The term civil society is often used too broadly, and in the early 1990s it was almost chanted like a mantra by well-meaning intellectuals, in both East and West, who saw the revival or establishment of civil society as a panacea for all of Eastern Europe's problems. The definition used here refers to civil society as the realm of autonomous organizations, of both a formal and informal nature, which mediate between the individual and the state and are outside the direct control of the state.

There is a general consensus that a healthy civil society is an important prerequisite for a flourishing liberal democracy and its long-term stability. At a minimum, the establishment or revival of civil society must accompany and support transitions from authoritarian to liberal-democratic rule. A bogus form of stability can be ensured by means of authoritarian rule and drastic limitations on human rights. However, such stability would be temporary, and destabilization could rapidly set in once authoritarian controls were lifted.

Even if one argues that Ukraine will always remain, to a certain extent, within Russia's sphere of influence, the gradual emergence of a healthy civil society would greatly increase Ukraine's stability and its ability to withstand external pressures. It is important at least to assess briefly a few of the indicators usually taken into account in an evaluation of the state of civil society.

The level of popular political participation is an important factor, especially when it is channeled through an effective multi-party system. However, a full-fledged multi-party system is only beginning to emerge in Ukraine. Typically the membership of parties is small, they are dominated by a few individuals, and party members are overwhelmingly concentrated in large urban centers. The programs of many parties are very similar, their proposals concerning social policy and economic reform are usually vague, and they generally have made poor use of the media.64

The electoral system in place in 1994 appeared intentionally designed to downplay the role of political parties. As a result a large number of deputies in the current parliament are independents with no party affiliation, and party discipline is weak among the others. Most parties have a strong regional base and have demonstrated limited efforts (and sometimes little desire) to broaden their support, or have found it difficult to gain votes outside of their local strongholds. Most parties are dominated by a few strong individuals and bitter intra-party factional disputes are common.
Popular political participation is limited, cynicism is widespread concerning the honesty and capabilities of Ukraine's political elites, and the population as a whole is characterized by a high level of political apathy, especially among youth.65 However, despite this general apathy, voter turnout in the 1994 elections was high in most regions of the country, and some other positive trends are beginning to emerge. Some of the original party leaders who belonged to the cultural intelligentsia and who were long on rhetoric but short on practical experience are slowly being replaced by a younger and more practically oriented generation of politicians. After a long period of proliferation of parties, most of them with negligible memberships, some amalgamation of these parties is now taking place, and the next national elections in Ukraine are to be held under the provisions of a new, simpler body of electoral legislation. As a result these elections will take place under conditions which should lead to a more professional, structured parliament.66
The communications media also reflect the nascent state of civil society in Ukraine. One can find a great deal of diversity in Ukraine's print media, but the circulation of newspapers is low and the state continues to dominate the broadcast media. President Kuchma and government officials have repeatedly assured representatives of the media that they support their independence and have imposed few restraints of any kind on newspapers, which are often very outspoken.67 However, President Kuchma and his associates have occasionally taken advantage of the state's levers of influence over the electronic media to advance their agenda and restrict the access of reform opponents to radio and television.68

In addition, the publication runs of newspapers are small, and none of them is widely circulated. The quality of the broadcast media in Ukraine is poor, and a large part of the population relies on television and radio broadcasts from Russia, so the media have not played a significant role in supporting the development of a healthy civil society and helping to create a voluntary consensus on the need for reforms in Ukraine.69 For example, Ukraine lacks a national newspaper with the authority and popularity of Russia's Izvestiia.

Political control of or influence over the mass media is of vital importance in the struggle for power in the turbulent context of Eastern Europe. Because the independent media in Crimea are weak and Kiev is unable to effectively penetrate the information space in this region, the central government lacks an important means of influencing public opinion in Crimea.

Trade unions independent of the state can also play an important role in building a civil society. The old and highly bureaucratized Communist-era Federation of Trade Unions has survived the challenges posed to it by independent trade unions and has even expanded some of its activities. Meanwhile, the free-trade union movement has seen a decrease in the real growth of its membership. In early 1995, there were still no strong free-trade unions in the steel or chemical industries or among teachers,70 and according to Ukraine's Ministry of Statistics, only 0.5 percent of the workforce took part in strikes in 1994 as opposed to 1.1 percent in 1993.71
Survey data show that the percentage of the population of Ukraine that did not belong to any voluntary organization greatly increased between January 1991 and June 1993, from 44 to 86 percent.72 When President Kuchma was elected to office in 1994, Ukrainian society remained largely unstructured and was still establishing the initial infrastructure of a future civil society. This amorphous situation was reflected in the absence of a clear and effective legal and constitutional framework within which independent associations could operate with a clear knowledge of their rights and obligations.

Thus a rather paradoxical situation arises. Public frustration seemed to be on the point of spilling over into mass protests, especially if there were a further decrease in living standards. However, a high premium was placed on maintaining social peace because of fears of the potential explosion underlying social tensions, and because most of the population was still committed to lawful means of protest. By manipulating strong fears of the disruption that could be caused by social change, local and central elites maintained for a considerable period of time a gradually deteriorating status quo that led to the gradual impoverishment of the population.

In countries like Ukraine, where civil society and the legal system are still greatly underdeveloped, social conflicts can rarely be institutionalized; there are very few situations in which the appropriate rules and regulations exist that would allow for such conflicts to be readily resolved or managed. The other alternative, social revolution, is excluded in all but the most extreme of circumstance because of deeply ingrained fears of the consequences of social disruption and the absence of appropriately motivated revolutionary elites.

As in the case of other countries with a poorly developed civil society facing dramatic social change involving a massive redistribution of resources, it is difficult to envisage that such change can take place peacefully without a "strong hand" wielding legitimate authority and helping to create a certain social consensus on the need for reforms. In fact, a survey in November 1993 showed that there was a widespread desire in society at large for such a "strong hand" which would bring "order" to the country. Thus 50 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that "a few strong leaders are capable of doing more for our country than all laws and discussions" (16 percent of respondents did not agree with this statement, and 26 percent did not indicate their opinion).73

In retrospect, it is clear that when he re-emerged on Ukraine's political scene as a candidate for the post of president, Leonid Kuchma was seen by many to fit the requirements noted above because, as the former director of the Pivdenmash (Iuzhmash) Rocket Factory, he had the reputation of a capable manager with a direct and uncompromising style of work. He also benefitted from his background as a partly Russified Ukrainian with roots in central Ukraine, because many residents of the heavily populated and partially Russified industrial regions of Ukraine could readily identify with this background and accept him as a representative of local interests.74 Also, Kuchma's terse bluntness and apparent pragmatism appealed to many who were disillusioned with President Kravchuk's rather florid and long-winded rhetoric.

President Kuchma made economic reform his top priority and moved quickly to address other issues frequently mentioned by survey respondents in Ukraine, such as the problem of pervasive corruption, although it is too early to discuss successes. 75 President Kuchma also repeatedly called for closer economic ties with CIS countries, although at the same time he has frequently stressed and convincingly demonstrated that he will stubbornly defend Ukraine's interests and sovereignty.

President Kuchma is above all a pragmatist, and he appears to have adopted a technocratic approach to governing which suits his personal style and background, and which has been favored by other politicians/technocrats who launched successful economic reform programs in various political settings.76 Many of his advisers are quite young and, with the exception of Dmytro Tabachnyk, the head of the presidential administration, none has attracted a great deal of controversy.77 Last but not least President Kuchma has maintained a consistently high popularity rating, considerably higher than that of any other senior political figure, in all opinion polls conducted since he took office. In a poll conducted in December 1994, 46 percent of all respondents positively assessed President Kuchma's influence on the economy, while 22 percent backed the cabinet and 17 percent supported the parliament in this sphere.78

The Ukrainian public's general political passivity and preference for lawful, democratic forms of protest79 have already given President Kuchma and his reform team breathing space to initiate significant reforms in the economy and several other priority sectors. In the process President Kuchma has gained the respect of many Western leaders and a considerable amount of financial aid and credits. In addition, he has managed, albeit with some difficulty, to get the Ukrainian parliament's support for many of his most important projects, but even if this support continues President Kuchma's "honeymoon" will soon be over, and within a few months the general public will expect to see some concrete results from this reform program.

President Kuchma must therefore now focus his attention on ensuring the success of the local implementation of economic reforms. In initiating the economic reform process, President Kuchma was able to draw not only on the expertise of Western economists and other specialists, but also on the growing number of their local equivalents in Kiev who had studied, worked, or traveled abroad, even if only for brief periods, within the last few years. Now, however, implementing the reform process will probably run into considerable resistance, and possibly sabotage, from local political conservatives and hidebound mid-level bureaucrats with little experience in implementing reforms and little interest in seeing them succeed.

Further success of economic reforms in Ukraine will depend on the extent to which the center's authority, and the momentum of the reform process, can be extended to the regions. It will also be necessary to duplicate, in the regions, the process of consensus-building that so far has met with considerable success, albeit within rather limited circles, in Kiev. It is likely that President Kuchma will buy extra time for the introduction of economic reforms in the regions by continuing to press a vigorous anticorruption campaign, and cleaning up some of the more blatant abuses of authority that have led to widespread public disillusionment.

One can posit an alternative, more authoritarian path of development in place of the legitimate "strong hand" approach favoured by President Kuchma. However, Ukraine is an unlikely candidate for the imposition of efficient and effective dictatorial rule. This is not because of the strength of democratic traditions and institutions in Ukraine, but because Ukrainian society is very diverse, and the Ukrainian public has become accustomed to the political freedoms now widespread in Ukraine, even if it rarely takes full advantage of them. Unless massive coercion is employed, any attempt to set up a Ukrainian nationalist dictatorship, a Soviet-Communist dictatorship, or a dictatorship serving Russian imperial interests would meet substantial resistance and have limited staying power. Currently there are no domestic forces in Ukraine sufficiently strong and in possession of the necessary will and determination to introduce effective dictatorial rule throughout the entire country.

It is easier to envisage a "soft" form of dictatorship based on what is commonly called the "party of power." This term is used to describe the dominant post-communist oligarchy, largely composed of former Communist Party functionaries, which has used the emergence of an independent Ukraine to promote its personal careers and frequently lining its pockets in the process. However, this amorphous group lacks a program apart from self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment by means of the maintenance and manipulation of the status quo, and it is incapable of introducing reforms that would begin to reverse Ukraine's rapid economic decline. Given the lack of will and cohesion of this "power of power" and Ukraine's increasing impoverishment, it is unlikely that this category of individuals could install and maintain an effective dictatorship even if it truly desired to do so.80

However, the weakness of domestic forces favoring a dictatorial regime does not in any way ensure that Ukraine can engage in an easy transition to some relatively stable form of liberal democracy and a market-type system. President Kuchma has done an excellent job of preparing the setting for further reforms, but even if they unfold according to plan (which is unlikely) they will be accompanied by a sharp rise in unemployment, the continued demoralization of a large part of the population, and other problems.

One can envisage a number of scenarios whereby growing political apathy among the population at large, combined with a continuing economic decline, could lead to significant social unrest and a succession of weak governments in Ukraine. Ukraine's neighbors would naturally be tempted to take advantage of such weakness; in particular, in such a situation Russia would, over time, find it relatively easy to establish hegemony over Ukraine.