McNair Paper 42 - Notes

1. See for example, A. Birch, "Overload, Ungovernability, and Delegitimation,"British Journal of Political Science 14 (April 1984): 135-160.

2.The Washington Post, 25 January 1994.

3.See the comments in Elizabeth Pond, "An End, Maybe, to Sleepwalking in Ukraine,"The Washington Quarterly 18 (Winter 1995): 73-74.

4.On this topic see the discussion in Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj, "Russian and Ukrainian Studies and the New World Order,"Canadian Slavonic Papers 34 (December 1992): 445-458.

5.See, for example, David Sanders,Patterns of Political Instability (London: Macmillan, 1981).

6.Juergen Corbet and Andreas Gummich,The Soviet Union at the Crossroads: Facts and Figures on the Soviet Republics (Frankfurt: Deutsche Bank AG, Economics Department, 1990), 11.

7."Panel on Patterns of Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union," Post-Soviet Geography 33 (June 1992): 390; and Georgii S. Golitsyn, "Ecological Problems in the CIS during the Transition Period," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 2, 8 January 1993, 33-42.

8.On Ukraine's MIC, its drain on the Ukrainian economy, and the problems of conversion, see John Tedstrom, "Industrial Conversion in Ukraine: Policies and Prospects," Report on the USSR, no. 34, 23 August 1991, 12-16; and the chapters by Antonov and Bodruk in Henry S. Rowen et al., eds., Defense Conversion, Economic Reform, and the Outlook for the Russian and Ukrainian Economies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

9. For example, according to Nasha respublika, 7 April 1995, 2, over 2,000 trolleybus repairmen from all regions of Ukraine were workin in Moscow in early 1995, which contributed significantly to the deterioration of the public transportation system in Ukraine.

10.On this brain-drain, the demoralization of Ukraine's intellectual elite, and the poor state of Ukraine's educational system, see the articles by Astakhova and Horodianenko in the Kharkiv journal Sovremennoe obshchestvo no. 3, 1994.

11.The discussion in this and the next few paragraphs is based on the following sources: Oleh Havrylyshyn, "The Ukrainian Economy,"Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine 1 (Nov.-Dec. 1994): 2-4; David Marples, "The Ukrainian Economy in the Autumn of 1994: Status Report," Post-Soviet Geography 35 (October 1994): 484-491; the special section "Unruly Child: A Survey of Ukraine," in The Economist, 7 May 1994; Valerii Popovkin, "Suchasna katastrofa ukrainskoi ekonomiky (Vytoky i shliakhy podolannia)," Suchasnist no. 9 (1993): 94-106; and conversations in April 1995 with Mr. Michael Zienchuk, Economic Analyst/Advisor to the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine as well as his unpublished paper entitled "Ukrainian Economic Policy: Now Getting it Right," written in February 1995.

12.A very high percentage of the individuals at the highest levels of government have been accused of various forms of corruption. See, for example, the analysis in Moscow News no. 10, 17-23 March 1995.

13.The information in this and the next few paragraphs is based on reports in the newspapers Finansovaia Ukraina and Post-Postup, and well as articles from the Economist and news items from the OMRI Daily Digest.

14.See, for example, the article by Mar'iana Chorna in Post Postup no. 36, 6-12 1994, 3. For a more analytical discussion of the roots of liberalism in the Donbas region see Iurii Iurov, "Liberal'nyi trykutnyk Donbasu," Studii politolohichnoho tsentru Heneza no. 1, 1993, 43-52,

15.For a good report on President Kuchma's first 100 days in office by Volodymyr Zolotar'ov see Post Postup no. 37, 20-27 October 1994, 3.

16.See, for example, the interview with Ukraine's ambassador to Germany in Vseukrainskie vedomosti, 6 April 1995.

17.V.S. Nebozhenko, Sotsial'na napruzhenist' i konflikty v ukrains'komu suspil'stvi (Kiev: Abrys, 1994), 17-18; 32-33.

18.Ibid., 21-24.

19.Ibid., 24-28.

20.Ibid., 30-32.

21.Ibid., 43-45.

22.Ibid., 38-42.

23.Mikhail Beletsky, "Ukraine: Alignment of Forces on the Political Scene," New Times, January 1995, 45.

24.Anatolii Rusnachenko, "The Workers' and National-Democratic Movements in Contemporary Ukraine," Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18 (Summer-Winter 1993): 123-149; and Most no. 6, 13-19 February 1995.

25. Vseukrainskie vedomosti, 25 March 1995. See also the bleak picture painted by a document, entitled Ukraine Human Development Report, published by the United Nations. For a summary of the contents of the report see Ukrainian Weekly, 19 March 1995.

26.See, for example, Ihor Vynnychenko, "The Deportation, Incarceration, and Forced Resettlement of Ukrainians in the Soviet Period, " Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18 (Summer-Winter 1993): 55-68; and Andrew Wilson, The Crimean Tatars (London: International Alert, 1994).

27.John Jaworsky, "Dissent, Ethnonationalism, and the Politics of Coercion in the USSR," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Carleton University (Ottawa), 1990, Chapters 5-6.

28. Ukrainian Weekly, 4 August 1991. For negative reactions to President Bush's speech, which was criticized as being condescending and quickly labelled his "Chicken Kiev" speech, see theUkrainian Weekly, August 11 and 18, 1991.

29.See, for example, the statement by Chornovil in Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 3 October 1992.

30.The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Commonwealth of Independent States no. 4, 1992, 43.

31.Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (Washington, January 1993), 60.

32. Literaturna Ukraina, 19 July 1990.

33.For the text of this legislation, see Holos Ukrainy, 16 July 1992.

34.For analyses of the draft constitution of Ukraine see Ukrainian Weekly, 6 September 1992, 20 September 1992, and 15 November 1992. The full text of the draft was published in Holos Ukrainy, 17 July 1992.

35.Uriadovyi kur'ier, 26 April 1993.

36.For interviews conducted with Shul'ha soon after his appointment, see Kyivs'ka pravda, 8 September 1994 and Vseukrainskie vedomosti, 19 October 1994.

37.See, for example, Dziuba's presentation delivered at the international conference, "Problems of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," held in Kiev 7-9 June 1991, in a special issue of Svit, Nos. 3-4, 1991, 1. For a good recent overview of Ukraine's nationality policy see the interview with the Vice-President of Ukraine's National Academy of Sciences in Nasha respublika no. 13, 7 April 1995.

38.The significance of this "Little Russian" inferiority complex is assessed in "Little Russianism and the Ukrainian-Russian Relationship: An Interview with Mykola Ryabchuk," in Ukraine: From Chernobyl' to Sovereignty: A Collection of Interviews, ed. Roman Solchanyk (Edmonton: Can. Inst. of Ukr. Studies Press, 1992), 19-30.

39.Roman Solchanyk, "Language Politics in the Ukraine," in Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages, ed. Isabelle T. Kreindler (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), 57-105; and "The Politics of Language in Ukraine,"RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 10, 5 March 1993, 1-4.

40.The speeches delivered at this congress, including Dziuba's speech, and other congress materials, were published in Suchasnist' no. 12 (December 1989).

41.Much of the material which follows is based on Jaworsky, "Dissent, Ethnonationalism and the Politics of Coercion."

42.Nebozhenko, Sotsial'na napruzhenist', 42.

43.See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine," in the special issue, entitled "The Politics of Intolerance," of RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 16, 22 April 1994, 42-49.

44.Summary of address by President Kuchma to the Supreme Council of Ukraine, 4 April 1995, supplied to author by the Ukrainian Embassy in Ottawa.

45.On this point see, for example, Viacheslav Savchenko, "Kryms'ki uroky Leonida Kravchuka," UNIAN-Polityka no. 0074, 1 August 1994.

46.Savchenko, "Kryms'ki uroky," 11.

47.For a recent assessment of the quality of the programs on Ukraine's main state television channel (UT-1), see the article by Inha Balyts'ka in Visti z Ukrainy, 8-14 December 1994.

48.See, for example, the section on Ukraine in "The Media in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union," RFE/RL Research Report 2 (2 July 1993): 5-6. On the great popularity in Ukraine of Russia's Ostankino television broadcasts, see Oleksandr Vyshniak, "Bezperechnym liderom sered telekanaliv...," UNIAN-Polityka no. 0019, 16 June 1994, 5.

49.Mykola Riabchuk, "Krym: ni Honkonhu, ni Bosnii," UNIAN-Polityka no. 0012, 13 June 1994, 17; and Savchenko, "Kryms'ki uroky," 12.

50.See the coverage of the Crimean issue in The Ukrainian Weekly, 26 March 1995 and 2 April 1995.

51.OMRI Daily Digest, 20 April 1995.

52.For a useful introduction to this issue, see Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 1 (1994): 47-68.

53.Ukrainian Republican Party Bulletin III, 21 January 1995; and Ukrainian Weekly, 15 January 1995. It should be noted, however, that Kravchuk's early policy concerning Crimea was inconsistent with his later emphasis on a unitary Ukrainian state, and that he supported the Crimean bid for autonomy in

54.Daniel Elazar, "Federal Democracy in a World Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism," in Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation, ed. Alastair McAuley, (Leicester: Leicester University Press), 2-3.

55.For an early version of this argument, pre-dating the disintegration of the USSR, see Iaroslav Dashkevych, "Maibutnia Ukraina: Federatsiia?" Slovo no. 12 (June 1991): 6.

56.I. Kuras, "Federatsiia chy unitarna derzhava?" Polityka i chas no. 6 (June 1993): 8.

57.Lepingwell, in "The Russian Military," 80-81, 86, notes several examples of support by Russian political leaders for the federalisation of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

58.Audrey Brassloff, "Spain: The State of the Autonomies," in Federalism and Nationalism, ed. Murray Forsyth (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1989), 24-50.

59.Dzhanhirov, "Donets'k i Dnipropetrovs'k," 6-8.

60.Zolotar'ov, "Odesa iak lokomotyv feodalizatsii," 20.

61.Ivo D. Duchacek,The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among, and Across Nations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 117.

62.The issue of territorial-administrative reform in Ukraine has attracted very little attention in the West. However, one recent comment on the situation in Ukraine has briefly noted the possible benefits of the introduction of a federal system in Ukraine. See Gert Weisskirchen, "The Ukraine at the Crossroads," Aussenpolitik no. 4 (1994): 331.

63.For background information on the Donbas and the "politics of coal" in this region see Chapter 6 ("The Donbass Miners and the 1989 Coal Strike") in David Marples, Ukraine Under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1991).

64.Taras Kuzio, "The Multi-Party System in Ukraine on the Eve of Elections: Identity Problems, Conflicts and Solutions," Government and Opposition 29 (Winter 1994): 109-127; and Peter Potichnyj, "Formation of Political Parties in Ukraine," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association of Slavists, Learned Societies conference, Ottawa, 5 June 1993.

65.Nebozhenko, Sotsial'na napruzhenist', 51-52.

66.For a recent description of some elements of Ukraine's party system, and a list of political parties registered by Ukraine's Ministry of Justice, see Ukrains'ka hazeta, 30 March 1995.

67.See, for example, the text of President Kuchma's address to the editors of Ukraine's main newspapers on 12 January 1995, in Ukrinform, Ukraina: khronika podii, 13 January 1995.

68.Information provided by Rostyslav Chomiak, from Kiev, on the Ukes-News list, 9 January 1995.

69.See, for example, the section on Ukraine in "The Media in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union," RFE/RL Research Report 2 (2 July 1993): 5-6. On the great popularity in Ukraine of Russia's Ostankino television broadcasts see Oleksandr Vyshniak, "Bezperechnym liderom sered telekanaliv," UNIAN-Polityka no. 0019, 16 June 1994, 5.

70. Most no. 6, 13-19 February 1995.

71.Ukrinform, Ukraina: Khronika podii, 7 March 1995.

72.I.E. Bekeshkina, Konfliktolohichnyi pidkhid do suchasnoi sytuatsii v Ukraini (Kiev: Abrys, 1994), 35.

73.Bekeshkina, Konfliktolohichnyi pidkhid, 46.

74.In contrast, former president Kravchuk was born and raised in the region of Volhynia, one of the traditional "homelands" of Ukrainian nationalism.

75.For President Kuchma's rather pessimistic evaluation of the accomplishments of the campaign against corruption and organized crime, see the text of his speech in Ukrinform Ukraina: khronika podii, 31 January 1995.

76.See J. Williamson, ed., The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington, DC: Institute for National Economics, 1994), and the commentary by Ivan Koropets'kyi, "Vyhliady na uspikh ekonomichnykh reform v Ukraini," Suchasnist' no. 11 (November 1994): 59-72.

77. For example the chief of the Presidential Informational-Analytic Service, Viktor Nebozhenko, is a sociologist who conducted many of the opinion polls cited in this study. See the interview with Nebozhenko in Sil'ske zhyttia, 23 February 1995.

78. Holos Ukrainy, 19 January 1995.

79. See Nebozhenko, Sotsial'na napruzhenist', 32-33.

80.On the "party of power" see the excellent article by Mykola Riabchuk, "Deshcho pro 'partiiu vlady ta kryzu demokratychnoho rukhu," in Suchasnist' no. 12 (1994): 50-60.

81.Jeremy Lester, "Russian Political Attitudes to Ukrainian Independence," The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 10 (June 1994): 227-28. On this topic see also Roman Solchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," Post-Soviet Affairs 9 (Oct.-Dec. 1993): 358-362.

82.Clarke, "The Saga," 46-49.

83.Solchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," 358-362. For a good general survey of political attitudes in Russia concerning Ukraine, see Lester, "Russian Political Attitudes to Ukrainian Independence," 193-233.

84.A number of articles have recently dealt with this issue. See, for example, Andrei Zagorsky, "Russia, the CIS and the West," International Affairs no. 12 (December 1994): 65-72; and John W.R. Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad'," Survival 36 (Autumn 1994): 70-92.

85.See the observations on "pipeline politics" in J.P. Dorian, I.S. Rossi, and S.T. Indriyanto, "Central Asia's Oil and Gas Pipeline Network: Current and Future Flows," Post-Soviet Geography 35 (September 1994): 423-429.

86.Clarke, "The Saga," pp. 45-46; and "Rusting Fleet," 29-31.

87.Denis J.B. Shaw, "Crimea: Background and Aftermath of Its 1994 Presidential Election," Post-Soviet Geography 35 (April 1994): 222, 226.

88.Charles King, "Eurasia Letter: Moldova with a Russian Face," Foreign Policy no. 97 (Winter 1994-95): 107.

89.Lepingwell, "The Russian Military," 81.

90. OMRI Daily Digest, 26 and 27 April 1995.

91.On Russia's negotiating stance concerning the BSF see Petro Pavliuk, "Resursy kompromisiv vycherpano," Visti z Ukrainy 12-18 January 1995.

92.Pavliuk, "Resursy"; and Viacheslav Savchenko, "Hnit, shcho horyt' z dvokh kintsiv," UNIAN-Polityka no. 0107, 31 August 1994,

93.For the text of Baltin's speech, see Flag Rodiny, 17 November 1994. See also the response in Flot Ukrainy, 17 December 1994.

94. Flag Rodiny, 17 November 1994.

95.See, for example, the report in OMRI Daily Digest no. 82, 26 April 1995; and "Ukraina" Press Agency, 24 April 1995.

96. OMRI Daily Digest no. 77, 19 April 1995.

97."Ukraina" Press Agency, 21 April 1995.

98.OMRI Daily Digest, 27 April 1995, quoting Nezavisimaia gazeta, 26 April 1995.

99.John Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Developments in Ukraine, Project Report no. 645, Operational Research and Analysis, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, August 1993, 93-96.

100. Literaturna Ukraina, 18 July 1990.

101.Military developments in Ukraine prior to mid-November 1991 are described in John Jaworsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Future of the Soviet Armed Forces," revised version of paper delivered at the 3rd Bedford Colloquium on Soviet Military-Political Affairs, 15 August 1991, Bedford, Nova Scotia.

102.Jaworsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism," 19-20.

103.Stephen Foye, "The CIS Armed Forces," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 1 (1 January 1993): 41-44.

104.Author's impressions based on conversations with military personnel in Ukraine in early December 1991.

105.Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine's Young Turks--The Union of Ukrainian Officers," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1993, 23-26.

106. Molod' Ukrainy, 23 July 1992.

107.According to an article published in one of the organs of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence, in 1992 almost 20 percent of Ukraine's state budget was consumed by military-related expenditures. This figure did not include expenditures on conversion. Oleksandr Honcharenkoet al., "Kontseptsiia natsional'noi bezpeky Ukrainy: problemy i perspektyvy rozbudovy," Viis'ko Ukrainy no. 5 (1993): 9.

108.See for example Kievskie vedomosti, 9 April 1994; and Ukrains'ka hazeta, 20 January-2 February 1994.

109. Molod' Ukrainy, 17 May 1994. Ukraine has had very little success breaking into the international arms market. On this topic, see the comment by former Defense Minister Morozov in Visti z Ukrainy, 10-16 March 1994. For general information on conversion in Ukraine, see Ilya Bass and Leslie Dienes, "Defense Industry Legacies and Conversion in the Post-Soviet Realm," Post-Soviet Geography 34 (May 1993): 302-317.

110.Ukrainian Weekly, 22 May 1994. On the state of Ukraine's rocket-space technology sector, seeNarodna armiia, 12 April 1994.

111. Kievskie vedomosti, 12 June 1993.

112.Foye, "The Ukrainian Armed Forces: Prospects and Problems," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 26, 26 June 1992, 56-57; and Molod' Ukrainy, 1 June 1993.

113.Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance, 87-89.

114.Ibid., 91-92.

115.A recent article has noted that Ukraine inherited a disproportionately large proportion of the Soviet Union's military educational institutions, while almost all military research institutions were located in Russia. Narodna armiia, 21 April 1994. Vigorous debates concerning the fate of military educational institutions in Ukraine were still being waged in early 1994. See, for example, Visti z Ukrainy, 24 February-2 March 1994.

116.Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance, 108-110.

117.Ibid., 108. The two main "think-tanks" in Kiev which focus on security issues are the National Institute of Strategic Studies and the International Institute on Global and Regional Security.

118.Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance, 111-112. A strongly-worded attack on Morozov's "politicization" of the UAF and his support of the UOU was recently published in Nezavisimost', 8 April 1994.

119.Jaworsky,The Military-Strategic Significance," 100-101.

120.Ibid., 112-113.

121.On right-wing extremism in Ukraine in general, and the UNA-UNSO in particular, see Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine" in the special issue, entitled "The Politics of Intolerance," of RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 16, 22 April 1994, 42-49.

122.Ibid.; Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance, 102-104; Taras Kuzio, "Ukrainian Paramilitaries," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, 540; andDemokratychna Ukraina, 9 August 1993. On the participation of UNSO members in the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia see Kievskie vedomosti, 18 August 1993; and Nezavisimost', 27 August 1993. In this conflict UNSO supported the Georgian side, since the UNA leadership claimed that Russia was clearly behind the Abkhaz rebels.

123.On attempts by the UNA to gain support among poorly-housed military officers, see Respublika, 4-10 November 1993.

124.Links between representatives of the UOU and the UNSO are noted in Kievskie vedomosti, 15 May 1993; and Vechirnii Kyiv, 11 November 1993 (citing Moskovskie novosti). The head of the L'viv branch of the UOU recently stated that he personally approves of the work of the UNA-UNSO. "Kontakt" Television program (Toronto), 16 April 1994.

125.An interesting interview with Iurii Tyma, one of the UNA-UNSO representatives who was elected to the Ukrainian parliament, was published inKievskie vedomosti, 6 May 1994.

126.Lengthy excerpts from the autobiography of former Defense Minister Morozov, detailing his view of the events leading up to his resignation, were published in the January-March 1994 issues of Ukrains'ka hazeta.

127.Ustina Markus, "Recent Defense Developments in Ukraine," RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 4, 28 January 1994, 26-32. On the adoption of Ukraine's new defense doctrine, see Kievskie vedomosti, 21 October 1993.

128. Uriadovyi kur'ier, 11 January 1994. Regular working meetings between delegations of the Ukrainian and Russian defense ministries have taken place to discuss further technical cooperation. See, for example, the report in UNIAN-Novyny, 27 April 1994, at 21.40. During the conference on "The Military Tradition," former Defense Minister Morozov noted that most representatives of Ukraine's military-industrial complex are strongly in favour of a high level of integration of the economies of Ukraine and Russia.

129.The UOU's Fifth Congress, and changes in official attitudes towards the UOU, are described in Vechirnii Kyiv, 6 January 1994. A plenum of the UOU has sharply criticized many of Radetsky's policies, noting that the Russian language is now used in many of the defense ministry's internal bureaucratic procedures, and that national Ukrainian military traditions are being de-emphasized in the UAF. The plenum also criticized the introduction of "officers' assemblies" in the UAF, arguing that they would serve as an official avenue of pressure by the "reactionary" military leadership on servicemen. See Visti z Ukrainy, 3-9 March 1994. The operation of the officers' assemblies is described in Armiia Ukrainy, 26 February 1994 and 30 March 1994, and they are criticized in Martyrosian's article in Vechirnii Kyiv, 30 April 1994.

130.On the reassignment of General Muliava to other duties see Ukrains'ke slovo, 17 November 1993. See also Kievskie vedomosti, 12 April 1994. In an interview in Molod' Ukrainy, 6 May 1994, Radetsky criticized the hitherto prevailing tendency to criticize all SAF traditions as having no relevance to Ukraine's Armed Forces. However, Ukraine's military press continues to publish articles dealing with themes which were strongly encouraged by Muliava. See, for example, the article on the military-educational preparation of OUN members in 1939-41 in Armiia Ukrainy, 29 March 1994. General descriptions of the work of the SPS's successor can be found in Armiia Ukrainy, 22 March 1994 and 2 April 1994.

131. Pravda Ukrainy, 1 February 1994; Vechirnii Kyiv, 29 March 1994; and Kievskie vedomosti, 24 November 1993. According to a survey whose results were published in Visti z Ukrainy, 19-25 May 1994, the continued practice of "didivshchyna" is the main reason why conscript-age youths are reluctant to serve in the UAF.

132.Oleg Strekal, "No Way to Run an Army," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1994, 34. Defense Minister Radetsky surveyed many of the problems facing the UAF, and called for determined action to weed out phenomena such a sdidivshchyna, in his "open letter" to military servicemen, members of their families, and members of the community at large in Armiia Ukrainy, 9 March 1994.

133. Narodna armiia, 18 March 1994; and Kievskie vedomosti, 30 March 1994. On the difficulties of introducing and implementing effective reforms in the UAF during an economic crisis, see the interview with the chair of the Ukrainian parliament's Commission on Defense and State Security, Valentyn Lemish, in Kyivs'kyi visnyk, 25 January 1994. The activities of the Independent Trade Union of Military Servicemen of Ukraine are described in Kievskie vedomosti, 23 November 1993.

134.Holos Ukrainy, 10 March 1994; Vechirnii Kyiv, 6 January 1994; and the article by Oleksandr Manachyns'kyi in Narodna armiia, 29 April 1994.

135.For statistics on the growth of various forms of corruption and other "pathologies" in the UAF in early 1994 see the article on the work of Ukraine's military procuracy in Holos Ukrainy, 8 April 1994. In May 1994 a number of senior military officials were accused of financial irregularities in connection with the use of military aircraft for commercial transport purposes. UNIAN-Novyny, 13 May 1994, at 22:00.

136. Kievskie vedomosti, 30 March 1994; and Vechirnii Kyiv, 6 January 1994.

137. Kyivs'kyi visnyk, 25 January 1994. On new initiatives to re-train military personnel entering the reserves see Narodna armiia, 29 April 1994.

138. Kievskie vedomosti, 9 February 1994; Ukraina moloda, 6 January 1994; and Uriadovyi kurier, 6 November 1993.

139.For example, according to a "Ukraina" Press Agency report dated 27 April 1995, Minister of Defense Shmarov stated that the most serious problem in the armed forces was social security.

140.See the discussion on this topic in Alexander J. Motyl's "Will Ukraine Survive 1994," The Harriman Institute Forum 7 (January 1994): 3-6.

141.Victor M. Perez-Diaz, The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 40.

142.Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion," Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995): 10-11.

143.Sherman W. Garnett, "The Integrationist Temptation," The Washington Quarterly 18 (Spring 1995): 35-36.

144.President Kuchma stated his concernsre the expansion of NATO in an interview during a state visit to the Czech Republic, summarized in a Reuters dispatch, 25 April 1995. See alsoVseukrainskie vedomosti, 1 April 1995.