McNair Paper Number 44, Chapter 9, October 1995

Historian Barbara Tuchman once observed, "One needs to step outside a phenomenon in order to see its shape, . . . to be able to look back and say, 'There was the turning point.'"(Note 61) From its vantage point, the INSS study group believes that the 1991 Expanded IMET amendment provides International Military Education and Training with its first turning point. This legislation both reaffirmed and challenged the successful 1976 program. In particular, it reaffirmed the program's two original aims. The United States first wanted to help countries utilize their resources more effectively, improving military doctrine, technical and tactical competence, and defense management skills in order to increase national self-reliance in security matters. Second, the United States used the medium of military education to advance understanding of U.S. culture, institutions and values, especially as they relate to human rights. These two objectives remain relevant, useful and worthy of funding support, and the rightness of the program's focus--military officers--continues to be upheld.

In addition, Congress in 1991 recognized that the changing international security environment poses an expanding set of non-traditional requirements for this military program, such as assisting armed forces to adjust to new democratic norms and exploring the challenging demands associated with coalition peace operations. But Congress went beyond professional military education and competency training and gave the IMET program a political-military task--to help educate several categories of civilian officials in how to oversee, manage and work with national military establishments. The U.S. legislators also challenged the foreign aid community to find ways to adapt to the evolving U.S. domestic security context. In the future, IMET will operate with fewer resources, be subject to closer interest group and Congressional scrutiny, and respond to greater international requirements for U.S. security assistance training. The INSS team found today's IMET program, and foreign military education and training in general, in a state of transition from the old methods of Cold War vintage toward a new approach that is still taking shape. Congressional action in 1991, the recognition by unified commanders that low-visibility defense instruction has exceptional value in promoting both democracy and military cooperation, plus emotional criticism of the U.S. Army School of the Americas by media and religious activists have thrust IMET into the policy limelight. While progress has been made in adjusting to current circumstances, International Military Education and Training has had to become many things to different constituencies and, consequently, its center of gravity has been lost. In an effort to help chart the best course for the future, the study group went beyond an examination of IMET's effectiveness as a policy instrument and looked at two other aspects of the program: foreign military education and training today, and contemporary pressures on the IMET system.

The Nature of Foreign Military Education and Training Today

Misleading terminology. The considerable success that the United States has enjoyed with its foreign military education and training programs relies on three different funding sources: the modest grant appropriation in the security assistance budget (IMET);(Note 62) Foreign Military Sales for training, which regularly funds over 50 percent of international students; and a small counterdrug grant initiative funded by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. Lacking a term that consolidates the different categories of foreign military education and training, the practice today is to misleadingly refer to all three collectively as IMET.

The investment. DOD has long viewed foreign military education and training as a valuable investment in future bilateral and multilateral defense and diplomatic relations. Experience has shown that most visiting junior and middle-grade officers will move into national decision-making hierarchies. Thus far, the investment has paid substantial dividends in such areas as access to military and political leaders, resource management, procurement, doctrine development, and training practices.

There also is a second, less visible, near-term investment. It is derived from DOD's efforts to improve human rights awareness among foreign military and civilian students. The immediate objective is to positively influence personal behavior after graduates return home, possibly saving lives in the extreme. This investment is akin to an accident prevention program that relies heavily on awareness and a willingness to follow guidelines. Success with such a program is very difficult to measure accurately in quantifiable ways. It is defined largely after the fact in terms of what has not occurred, e.g., no accidents, military coups, or violations of human rights. Observers are hard pressed to determine how many incidents were avoided as a result of this educational experience, but clearly, as critics attest, the United States is held accountable for the failures.(Note 63)

Education in three parts. The Defense Department's traditional approach to foreign military education and training is poorly understood, even within DOD. The method combines three elements: English language training (as required); a course of instruction in the service, joint or defense education system conducted in the United States (ideally more than 8 weeks long); and DOD's voluntary Informational Program (IP).

Whether visiting military and civilian students understand the United States, admire it, and want to identify with its values and overseas objectives, or cooperate militarily with it, may hinge directly on the quality of experience they have while undergoing training in this nation. Integrating all three elements shapes the experience, creating a positive environment that affects the knowledge and attitudes about the United States and its Armed Forces these visitors carry back home. English language training and the Informational Program are the unseen and underappreciated variables in the IMET experience. INSS's research, however, finds them to be the most influential elements, constituting the core of DOD's approach to human rights awareness.

Unavoidable tradeoffs have been made in the quality of this experience, diminishing the DOD program's full impact. The use of Mobile Training Teams to teach short courses outside the United States often are the only and best option to provide the technical instruction that a country needs. A few courses in the United States are so brief that students cannot participate in an IP. DOD's Spanish-language schools are examples of a compromise, as are the main components of today's E-IMET program.

Emergence of a separate E-IMET experience. Responding to Expanded IMET legislation, the immediate Defense response was to adapt it to the original IMET experience and gradually introduce new courses. Initially, it was assumed that routine procedures could be followed to satisfy E-IMET's guidelines. Civilian defense officials, for example, would simply join military counterparts in established country IMET programs. However, finding sufficiently qualified civilian students has proven more complicated than expected and highly disruptive in many newly democratic countries with a limited number of candidates. Recently, Congress expanded civilian participation to include legislative and nongovernmental personnel involved in defense matters, with a corresponding growth annually in the percentage of the IMET appropriation "fenced" for this purpose ($5 million in FY 95). The expansion of IMET to training civilians, which is a "strongly encouraged" but not mandated requirement (officer education can use E-IMET funds for specific courses), does have a negative impact. It still eliminates, for example, a significant amount of the professional military education sought by foreign governments and limits the restoration of programs, especially in Africa, that were gutted by earlier reductions in funding and shifts in policy interest to Central and Eastern European programs. The E-IMET initiative also further reduces funding support for English language training and the Informational Program at a time when these two important components are most needed.

With a better appreciation today for the problems associated with civilian governance in new democracies and a clearer understanding of their political-military requirements, the Defense Department is beginning to increase the number of short, tailored courses conducted overseas. The use of mobile education teams (MET) is sensitive to foreign cultures and institutions, focuses on helping governments educate their small pools of civilian officials, provides confidence-building opportunities at senior levels in both civilian and military sectors that are impossible to achieve outside the participating countries, improves the image of the U.S. mission, and minimizes negative aspects of E-IMET (e.g., civilian officials gone for extended periods, inadequate English language proficiency). The emerging MET formula suggests that rather than trying to further modify, and possibly distort, the original model for IMET-funded education, Expanded IMET can provide its own unique professional experience--one that concentrates on affecting change in the near-term as well as investing in the future, is less dependent on English language proficiency and travel to the United States, and brings a sample of Americana to the participants.

A second and more troubling dimension of the E-IMET experience is the introduction of a trend toward shifting more funds from traditional IMET programs into expanded IMET initiative courses and training. The sources of the trend are statements explaining congressional intent in appropriation committee reports in 1992 (House) and 1993 (Senate). It is not yet clear whether or not new Republican leaders in these committees share the intent of the Democrats. The trend, however, continues. Each year since its inception in FY 1991, an additional $1 million has been obligated for E-IMET ($5 million in FY 1995), based on report language. There is no indication of an upper limit for this annual occurrence. When combined with the directive to "shift more funds from traditional IMET programs," the future organization of foreign military education and training is in question. How will PME offerings be balanced with education in the "softer" aspects of military science--resource management, civilian control and human rights? The Military Departments manage the traditional programs; DSAA manages the E-IMET initiative and oversees the entire security assistance training opportunity. The trend, if it continues, is to progressively pull military instruction away from professional education.

Democracy and human rights. The INSS research team found that, with the exception of DOD's three Latin American schools, there is generally little consideration for a supplemental democracy and human rights curriculum in mainstream professional military education designed for a U.S. student population. Opposition to incorporating these topics into standard command and staff and war college courses, beyond instruction on leadership, discipline and military law, seems to stem from a negative predisposition of U.S. faculty and students who do not see the relevance of these subjects to U.S. officers and the traditional "battlefield." The strong workhorses in foreign military education on issues of democracy and human rights continue to be the Informational Program, which recently has been strengthened internally and made uniform across the services, and English language training, which now incorporates the two themes in its instructional material as well as in courses taught at Lackland AFB. The Latin American program presents a different situation. The U.S. Army School of the Americas actually incorporated democracy and human rights in its curriculum in 1990 before passage of the E-IMET amendment; the smaller Air Force and Navy programs followed suit. All these programs have continued to refine their instructions.

Post-graduation contact program. There is a promising fourth element of foreign military education and training--a program to reinforce the U.S. experience by maintaining contact with graduates. Today, the program is ad hoc and highly personalized. Each military school has its own approach, and the degree of effectiveness varies. Some attempts have been made to share current professional literature. The Naval War College, which may have the most successful program, has been able to hold periodic, small group reunions of Command Course graduates in various foreign countries. A large part of the difficulty in postgraduation contact is maintaining current locator data. Embassies are irregular in keeping information on students trained under the IMET or FMS programs--recordkeeping too often depends on individual motivation. The INSS team found no record of embassy initiatives to keep in contact with officer-graduates in a manner similar to that accomplished for other foreign education programs, such as the Fulbright program. DSAA does not have complete or adequate historical records on IMET graduates other than an annual report on positions of prominence (undefined) attained by former students.(Note 64) There are no data on officers educated with FMS funding. Also incomplete is information on the accomplishments of graduates, which might suggest "subjective ties" to the United States attributable to foreign military education. The INSS study group found general agreement that the advent of E-IMET programs, particularly for civilians, offered a promising opportunity to institute a common program designed to maintain contact with foreign students throughout their careers. DSAA recently started work to develop a computer database to track students trained in the United States.

Contemporary Pressures on the IMET System

Internal trends. While the level of foreign interest in U.S. professional military education and, to a lesser degree, technical training is at an all time high, in practice fewer military students from more countries are funded with progressively less money. This situation, extending from FY 1986 forward, underscores several findings about foreign military education and training:

English language training (ELT). The INSS research team found repeated evidence that ELT programs overseas are limited and often ineffective in their preparation of students for U.S. military schools. Problems are related to insufficient funding in support of a policy requiring English language education, and they take several forms. In some countries, the United States has provided language labs and training materials under IMET, but governments have decided to "save" decreasing IMET funds by underutilizing their ELT capability. In recently established U.S. programs in Central and Eastern Europe, where governments are investing heavily in ELT, the problem is one of rapidly growing student populations and insufficient resources. Central and Eastern Europe need additional funding to expand their ELT programs, train more English language instructors, and increase training materials. The FY 1996 IMET request includes funds to develop these programs.

Spanish-speaking countries in the Hemisphere present a different problem. These governments need to revitalize languishing ELT programs and make greater use of the Defense Language Institute, but there is no incentive to do so. Many Latin American officials continue to depend heavily on Spanish-speaking schools like the U.S. Army School of the Americas instead of participating in English-language programs. This is the only region for which the U.S. Government deviates from one of IMET's basic principles--professional military development is accomplished by training alongside U.S. military and civilian personnel. Many officers from across the Americas view these programs with suspicion and characterize them as a second-class education because top U.S. officers do not attend them. The INSS study group believes that the continuing importance and utility of Spanish-language courses for middle-level and senior officers in this era of interoperability should be reexamined. The maximum benefit of the foreign military education and training experience, furthermore, can only be realized with language proficiency. Regional governments are beginning to agree. Argentina and Guatemala now demand proficiency in English for officers to progress in rank. Guatemala has recently introduced a language standard for promotion to general officer.

Program management. The worth of international military education and training as a diplomatic and defense policy instrument is generally underappreciated across the U.S. Government, and its effectiveness is underestimated. IMET's management history is in large measure responsible for this view. Unfortunately, this inappropriate situation will continue unless there is both a more useful, flexible, and reliable vision to guide the contemporary program and a more responsible and responsive overall management system.

In Washington, IMET is important twice a year--when the government submits its budget to Congress and when the Department of State allocates the program's appropriation. Otherwise, there is no constituency for, little interest in, or understanding of this "military" program in the department that, by law, owns it. For example, there have been no guidelines for embassies in selecting military and civilian students and screening them for past human rights abuse. Overseas, IMET has traditionally been a minor foreign and security policy tool managed in embassies by junior military or foreign service officers or foreign nationals. State's senior leadership and ambassadors still view the program as "pocket change" to be used to show immediate interest in foreign military and U.S. goodwill. Such a gesture--the offer of orientation tours for senior officers--was made recently to the Bosnian Federation. Ambassadors need to be educated about the deeper value of the IMET program beyond language training and orientation tours. They need to understand what is expected of them in terms of recruiting, reporting, and follow-up. In sum, more active participation by ambassadors is necessary if country IMET and E-IMET programs are to fulfill their potential.

State's ambivalence toward IMET is reflected in the Department's propensity to use this grant program in short-range "carrot and stick" diplomacy. The Defense educational experience has not been viewed in the same light as equivalent civilian programs run by USIA and USAID; their programs are not curtailed, suspended or conditioned to signal U.S. displeasure with the government. IMET is treated as the expendable program. Research revealed that DOD often is not consulted in advance when a country program is suspended or terminated. Unified Commands have little confidence in State's willingness to engage Congress heartily to increase funding levels for IMET or to defend individual country programs when scrutinized.

Nor has the Office of the Secretary of Defense shown serious policy interest in a program that it manages--until last year. As the collapse of foreign aid begins to eliminate options, IMET has assumed new importance. The program traditionally has been a relatively small, low-cost and low-risk appropriation with sound annual Congressional support--a "bonsai" program in DOD's security assistance forest. The Department's policy interest and involvement with State in allocating IMET funds, beyond DSAA's input, have been minimal. Similarly, when Congressional committees have asked about specific country IMET programs, OSD and Joint Staff officials, other than DSAA's staff officers, have usually kept a low profile. Comments from Unified Commanders in support of these programs most often are passed to State to bolster its arguments in defense of this assistance. OSD has often played no role.

Policy makers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including DSAA, have taken little interest in the academic dimension of the foreign military education and training experience--what the United States is teaching foreign officers and how it is being taught. The educational process has remained decentralized, without any sense of shared responsibility among OSD, Joint Staff, and military departments. DSAA and the Joint Staff today provide only administrative manuals and regulations to guide training program management. The Agency, however, has taken a more all-inclusive role in overseeing the Expanded IMET program.

The 1991 legislation focuses on four classic areas of interest for the Office of the Secretary of Defense: the military's role in a democratic society, defense resource management, military justice systems, and education of civilians to oversee and work with the military institution. DSAA is moving forward in response to congressional directives, but it does so without guidance on how senior officials in OSD view their responsibilities for educating their civilian counterparts in these four areas. The Secretary's staff has not addressed several issues: