McNair Paper Number 45 Chapter 2, October 1995
"DESIGNING AROUND" II: THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
The 1973 Yom Kippur War is another good example of the failure of deterrence theory according to Lebow and Stein. First, Egypt did not make any estimation of the balance of interests. Egyptian leaders were only concerned with their own interests and disregarded Israeli interests. Then, Egyptian leaders talked less about specific interests at stake, interests such as the Sinai, and emphasized instead their strategic interests, interests such as reputation. Still more puzzling, according to Stein, is the observation that the absence of an analysis of the balance of interests did not lead the Egyptian leadership to miscalculate the Israeli response. Egyptian leaders did not expect Israel to back down but to fight and this belief played an important role in their decision to preempt.107
When an analysis of the balance of capability is taken into account, Egyptian behavior is even less consistent with the predictions of deterrence theory according to Lebow and Stein. First, according to Stein, the estimation of "inferior military capability was only a temporary deterrent to the use of force."108 Challengers, according to Stein, "design around" the defender's superiority. The ingenuity of the military mind insures that it is only a matter of time until a strategy that offsets the superiority of the defender is developed. Second, challengers may go to war even if the balance does not favor them if they perceive that the future trend is such that the balance will be worse from their perspective in the future. Thus, not only relative capabilities matter but the negative trend plays an important role in decisions to challenge.109
Finally, Stein argues that the decision to challenge deterrence is influenced by the challenger's perception of the prospects of diplomatic progress. When hopes for a diplomatic settlement fade, challengers resort to the use of force. Insuring deterrence stability requires, according to Lebow and Stein , the use of reassurance strategies as well as demonstrations of resolve. In the absence of the first, the latter are not likely to work and might even lead to war, the outcome deterrence policies intended to prevent in the first place.110
The historical evidence does not support most of Lebow's and Stein's criticisms and the longer term perspective on deterrence adopted in this study sheds a different light on the Yom Kippur War. First, the reason the Egyptian leadership did not engage in an analysis of the balance of interests was the learning that took place as a result of the War of Attrition. The uncertainty the Egyptian leadership had about Israel's will to fight for less than intrinsic interests was removed and, as a result of Israel's behavior during the war, Egyptian decision-makers anticipated correctly a forceful Israeli response.
Second, Stein misses the proper causal chain in the Egyptian decision to challenge. The Egyptian leadership did not decide to go to war when they realized that Egyptian capabilities had reached their peak and that the trend in the future was only going to worsen. Rather, the realization that the trend in the balance was negative from Egypt's perspective, reached in mid-1972 if not earlier, forced the Egyptian leadership to search for a strategy that would offset the Israeli superiority. Thus, the negative assessment of the military trend leads to a search for an alternative strategy and not to a decision to challenge deterrence. When the limited-aims strategy was found, the decision to challenge was made because the balance, as well as the trend in the balance, was no longer relevant to the outcome of the war.
Furthermore, the process which led the Egyptian leadership to the limited-aims strategy suggests that, first, contrary to Stein's interpretation, the discovery of strategies which enable challengers to design around the defender's superiority requires imaginative conceptual leaps in thinking about a problem and are not an event that is bound to occur with the passage of time. Second, successful applications of deterrence policies throughout an enduring rivalry make the process of finding a good strategy even more difficult. Finally, the choice of strategy: limited aims--given the limited goals Egypt pursued after the Six Day War, is indicative of success and not failure.
The next chapter evaluates the predictions made by deterrence theorists as well as critics of deterrence through the framework used in the previous chapters. It considers the reasons for the Egyptian challenge in 1973 and the strategies Egypt considered and finally adopted.
Egypt's Goals and Strategy
Before we discuss Stein's critique let us turn to a brief analysis of Egypt's goals and strategy after the War of attrition. Nasser's strategy was to use attrition warfare to force Israel to make concessions and to create the risk of superpower involvement and global war in order to pressure the United States to demand Israeli concessions. His strategy failed when Egypt suffered from the war more than Israel and when Soviet involvement was necessary to save his regime from another humiliating defeat.111 The Soviets, despite their involvement and probably because of it, had an interest in de-escalation and placed limits on Nasser's ability to escalate the conflict. Thus, instead of increasing the risks of superpower confrontations, Nasser created a situation in which the superpowers had strong incentives to control escalation. Instead of putting pressure on Israel to make concessions, the United States moved closer to Israel's position. Despite the fact that in the Rogers' initiative the American position was closer to the Egyptian position, Nasser's unwillingness to make any significant concessions to Israel or the United States closed the door for any possible gains through diplomacy. Thus, Nasser's strategy led to a dead end.112
Sadat came to power at a time when it became apparent that a new strategy was necessary if Egypt were to regain the Sinai. While the basic elements of Sadat's strategy remained the same as Nasser's, Sadat's approach was quite different. Sadat's main goals were the return of all the Arab territories and the resolution of the Palestinian issue. In case these goals could not be achieved through diplomacy, Sadat kept the war option open in order to have leverage on the West. Sadat's method to achieve his goals, however, was different from Nasser's. While Nasser ruled out a peace agreement with Israel and declared that what was taken by force would have to be returned only by force, Sadat declared his willingness to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel based on a comprehensive agreement according to the Arab interpretation of UN resolution 242. Sadat, then, did not rule out the possibility that a peace agreement could be reached through diplomacy.113
Sadat's first step was to assess the prospect that diplomacy could succeed. He was aware of the fact that a replay of the 1957 scenario would not occur but he hoped that the West might structure a process in which Egypt's position would be given greater weight. To give the Europeans an incentive to pressure Israel directly, or through the United States, Sadat sent the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Riad, to western European capitals to promise that Egypt would be ready to open the canal after an Israeli withdrawal.114 To induce the United States to clarify its position and take a more direct role in pressuring Israel to make concessions, Sadat held the promise of Egyptian realignment between the superpowers.
The main difference in Sadat's strategy, however, was his willingness to discuss the possibility of a peace agreement with Israel. In his February 4, 1971 initiative, Sadat picked up on Dayan's suggestion of an interim agreement and offered to open the canal in return for an Israeli withdrawal. On February 15 Sadat offered to sign a peace treaty with Israel in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal. Whether Sadat was sincere in his peace offers or whether he used them as a ploy to create a rift between Israel and its Western allies is open to debate.115 In his memoirs Sadat said that his actions took Israel by surprise because Israel's long-held position was that noArab leader was willing to consider peace with Israel. This in turn strengthened Israel's standing in the West. Now for the first time the Arabs were able to force the Western powers to reconsider their positions.116 But while Sadat did introduce interesting changes in Egypt's position, these changes were not perceived as sufficient by Israel or the United States government. After a year of negotiations the gap between the parties remained wide.
Both Israel and the United States demanded more significant concessions from Egypt. Israel could not accede to a complete withdrawal from the Sinai without a demilitarization of the area. Israel could not accept a peace treaty that did not include reconciliation, and was dependent on the resolution of the more complicated issues, issues such as those between Israel and the Palestinians. The United States' position was that Egypt would have to move from the Soviet to the American camp and it would have to be more forthcoming in its bargaining with Israel as well.
Sadat realized that American position had moved closer to the Israeli position and that direct pressure on Israel and the United States would be required if the latter were to pressure Israel to make concessions.117 Renewed fighting, Sadat reasoned, would force the Israelis to reassess the relative balance, which in turn would make them more conciliatory at the bargaining table, and it would endanger the new era of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union by introducing the risk that the superpowers would lose control of events. This, in turn, would force the United States to reconsider the Arab position.
Thus, Sadat chose to turn to the military option.118 This option, however, was not viable during 1971 and 1972. The Egyptian political elite did not perceive that Egypt had a viable military option.119 Sadat read the results of the War of Attrition correctly, it was a costly failure from Egypt's perspective, and realized that only an all out offensive against Israel was likely to enable him to attain his political goals. He also realized, however, that a military campaign required, either a direct Soviet involvement on the Arab side, or Soviet military aid to neutralize Israel's capability to strike at Egypt's population centers.120
On his various trips to the Soviet Union, Sadat concluded that his all-out-war strategy would not be a Soviet-Arab war but an Arab war supported by Soviet weapons because the Soviet Union did not want to risk a war with the United States.121 In the absence of direct Soviet participation in the fighting, Egypt needed surface-to-surface missiles or aircraft with a range and payload capable of threatening Israel's population centers. Only with such a capability could Egypt create a balance of terror on the strategic level which would enable it to pursue a land offensive. Sadat also sought Soviet nuclear arms or a Soviet nuclear guarantee against Israel.
The Soviets, however, were concerned that their improved relations with the United States would be jeopardized by an Egyptian-Israeli war and refused to give Egypt the weapons necessary for an offensive campaign.122 In addition to international considerations the Soviet decision might have also been influenced by the realization that Sadat had moved away from Nasser's domestic heritage and flirted with the United States. Therefore, the Soviet Union had little interest in strengthening Sadat's power at the expense of the pro-Soviet groupings headed by Vice President Ali Sabri. Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers, after being refused surface-to-surface missiles and MiG-23s during his visits to Moscow between October 1971 and April 1972, forced the Soviet Union to reconsider its policy regarding military aid to Egypt.123 The Soviets risked losing an important ally in the Middle East and damaging their reputation in the Third World. Renewed aid may have suited their policy vis-a-vis the United States, because their expulsion from Egypt reduced the risks of their direct intervention in the conflict as well as the risk of a superpower confrontation. The Soviets would be able now to support the Arabs without being accused of direct interference with an American ally. Detente would be saved.
The stage was set for an Egyptian offensive but the question remained as to what military strategy had the greater chances of success given Israel's superiority. Sadat's military leaders were skeptical of Egypt's ability to attack Israel in an all-out war. Sadat's innovation was in the adoption of a limited-aims strategy.124 This military option would be part of a military-political strategy in which the military spark would unfreeze the political situation, and would be followed by a diplomatic initiative in which Egypt, after receiving the necessary arms for the military offensive from the Soviet Union, would realign itself with the United States. Thus, Sadat was able to avoid Nasser's mistake and offered the United States a significant concession in order to place it in a position in which it would have to put pressure on Israel. Competing with Israel for alliance with the United States held the promise of renewed independence, regained status, and a leadership position in regional politics. The conceptual breakthrough, however, was the adoption of a limited-aims strategy for political gains.
Stein's Critique
In discussing the balance of interests in the period before the 1973 war, Stein is surprised by two aspects of Egyptian decision-making. First, the Egyptian leadership did not make calculations of relative interests. This is surprising because an assessment of relative interests is a good indicator of relative resolve and the likelihood that the defender will retaliate and fight in response to a challenge. The absence of an assessment of the balance of interests might explain Lebow's finding that challengers frequently resort to force anticipating that the defender will acquiesce rather than retaliate. But in this case, Stein finds that the Egyptian leadership was certain of Israel's response. Stein argues that Egypt correctly read the Israeli threat but this interpretation was not based on the analysis of the balance of interests.125 What is puzzling is the origins of Egypt's prior beliefs that Israel would fight in the absence of an analysis of the balance of interests.
The second aspect of Egypt's behavior that puzzles Stein is that the Egyptian decision-makers discussed their interests at stake not in concrete terms such as territory or political rights, but in symbolic terms. Egypt emphasized the effects of the situation on their strategic interests, their reputation and humiliation, rather than their Sinai. President Sadat, according to Stein, defined the issue as "to be or not to be," Heykal argued that this conflict was the "crisis of our life," and General el-Shazli argued that military action was important to "symbolize our refusal to remain defeated."126 Why did Egypt emphasize strategic rather than specific interests at stake? Is the absence of an analysis of the balance of interests as surprising as Stein suggests?
The discussion of the balance of interests in the last chapter on the War of Attrition reveals that the impact of the 1967 defeat served to reinforce the root causes of Arab animosity towards Israel on two levels. The first was the concrete level which included tangible strategic assets such as the loss of control over the Sinai, the Gulf of Aqaba, the sources of the Jordan River, and the Suez Canal. Egypt and the other confrontation states lost parts of their sovereign territories. On the second level, the military defeat symbolized the defeat of a philosophy of life and whole course of action which was supposed to lead to national renewal, regeneration and dignity. Egypt, which symbolized the forces of progress and renewal lost to Israel which symbolized the forces of oppression, colonialism, and the West. While the Arab states had a long experience of defeat at the hands of the West, the loss in 1967 was different in that it demonstrated the failure of the progressive regimes to lead todifferent outcomes. It served as a painful reminder that the problem may be the result of more fundamental causes inherent in the weakness of Arab society.127
The reason the Egyptian leadership described their own interests in existential terms (and this is where the two levels are connected) is that the tangible losses, important as they were in concrete terms, indicated Egyptian weakness, and cast doubt about Egypt's ability to lead the Arab world as well as the Third World. The concrete territorial losses had an importance that went beyond their tangible value; they were painful reminders of Egyptian weakness and limited its ability to play a leading regional role. The conflict with Israel, which was supposed to enhance the power and influence of Egypt in the Arab world became a burden which weakened Egypt. Egypt became dependent on aid from other Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, for the continuation of the conflict. Thus, Egypt's power and influence vis-a-vis other regional contenders for power declined.128
This analysis explains why Egyptian leaders talked less of specific interests at stake, like the Sinai, and more in terms of humiliation which led to a loss of reputation and an existential crisis. The loss of the Sinai symbolized Egypt's weakness which translated into loss of power and influence in the Arab World. Regaining the Sinai was important for its own sake and, more importantly, for the purpose of regaining power and influence in the Middle East.
The Egyptian leadership thus sought the recovery of the Sinai. Israel's interest was to keep the Sinai until the Egyptian government recognized Israel's right to exist. Israel wanted to negotiate directly with Egypt on the nature of the peace treaty. Israel's claim to the Sinai was only strategic.129 Israel also sought to reduce Egypt's incentives to challenge deterrence and was willing to offer Egypt a partial withdrawal from the canal in return for an Egyptian agreement to reopen the canal and resettle the cities along it. Israel also had an interest in initiating the diplomatic process with its own proposals in order to prevent an American initiative that might have been less favorable from Israel's perspective. We see, then, that the balance of interests was the same in the period before the Yom Kippur War as it was during the War of Attrition. The question was and remained what were the best strategies to achieve this goal?
The second issue raised by Stein was that the Egyptians knew that Israel would fight if challenged. Contrary to Stein's argument, however, Egypt's conclusion that Israel would fight was not reached independent of an analysis of the balance of interests.130 The balance of interests was analyzed before the War of Attrition and remained the same throughout the period. Egypt's belief that Israel would fight was reached as a result of the lessons learned during the War of Attrition. Before the War of Attrition, Egypt was not certain that Israel would be willing to fight a long and costly war for what Israel considered bargaining chips. As a result of the War of Attrition, however, Egyptian leaders believed not only that, in the absence of a peace treaty, Israel had the capability and will to fight for the Sinai, but also that, if Egypt renewed attrition warfare, Israel would respond with a more general war. Thus, the inattention to the balance of interests is not as striking as Stein suggests. The uncertainty about Israel's will to hold onto the Sinai in the absence of a peace treaty was resolved in the War of Attrition. Egypt no longer needed to evaluate the interests at stake in order to ascertain the nature of an Israeli response to an Egyptian challenge.
The Balance of Capability
The analysis of the balance of capabilities before the 1973 war leads to this puzzling observation: the quantitative balance clearly favored the Arab states, yet every military analyst argued that the Arab states would not go to war if they faced certain defeat, as indeed they did given Israeli military superiority.131
If in the Six Day War the Arab states had a military advantage of 1.47:1 in the air, 1.71:1 in tanks and 1.09:1 in manpower, before the 1973 war the ratios improved from the Arab perspective to 2.54:1 in the air, 2.8:1 in tanks and 2.16:1 in manpower. Yet, despite the widening gap in the military balance in terms of force ratios, all the actors in the area, as well as the superpowers involved, doubted Egypt's and Syria's ability to wage a successful war with Israel. Statesmen and analysts alike referred to Egypt as the militarily weaker party.132
This situation was clearly recognized in Egypt where the military and political elite did not believe that Egypt had a military option and opted for a compromise based on a negotiated settlement. In October 1972 Sadat even had to dismiss many of his military high command for refusing to carry out his orders to prepare Egypt's military for an offensive. The Egyptian military high command did not believe that the army was ready for war.133 Did Egypt and Syria go to war knowing they would lose? Did Egypt embark on a suicidal course of action because the value of a lost war was preferable to the status quo? How do the postulates of deterrence theory fare in this case?
The analysis of the military balance poses two challenges to deterrence theory according to Stein. First, contrary to the balance of capability hypothesis, which argues that if the defender is favored by the short-term military balance, deterrence will hold; the military inferiority of Egypt was not a deterrent to the use of force. The Egyptian military planners who were deterred by Israeli military superiority were replaced by other military planners who designed around Israel's superiority. Stein concludes from this that military superiority is not a deterrent to the use of force, but only "an obstacle to be overcome."134
In addition, Stein argues that more important than the military balance in determining deterrence outcomes is the trend in relative capability. The accepted premise of deterrence theorists is that a favorable balance of capability insures stability. Challengers who are in an inferior position will attempt to close the gap and attain superiority before they challenge. Stein argues that expecting deterrence stability in such situations may be imprudent. If highly motivated challengers reach a point where they believe that their capability has reached a peak and may no longer improve, and that in the long run the balance might even worsen from their perspective, they might challenge deterrence even if the present balance is unfavorable.135
Stein argues that "not only assessments of the general balance but also estimates of changing trends in the balance may shape a decision on whether or not to resort to force."136 She argues that the Egyptian decision to challenge in 1973 is similar to the Japanese decision to strike at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Sadat estimated that Egypt had reached the peak of its capacity and that the future trend in the balance was unlikely to improve. Sadat concluded that Egypt would be unable to improve its relative capability to achieve parity or superiority over Israel. Thus, Sadat and his advisers believed that this would be Egypt's best chance for several years. The evaluation of the military trends according to Stein, was more important than the negative assessment of the military balance in the debate about the use of force in 1973. She argues that the Egyptian generals opposed the use of force when they saw the growing gap in relative capability in the autumn of 1972, but when Sadat assessed that Egypt reached the peak of its capability he urged his generals to attack. According to Stein, "a negative assessment of future rather than present capabilities was an essential component in Egyptian calculations. Here Egypt behaved very much as did Japan in 1941."137
Stein's conclusion is that neither military inferiority, nor the absence of a blitzkrieg strategy, was a deterrent to a military challenge. More importantly, the prospect of a worsening balance for the militarily weaker party was a catalyst to a military challenge rather than a deterrent. Finally, leaders design military strategies which compensated for their military weakness.138
Before turning to an evaluation of Stein's analysis, a brief description of the evolution of Egypt's decision-making is in order. Sadat reached the conclusion the diplomatic option was not going to produce results and that he had to resort to the military option in order to force both Israel and the United States to reevaluate their positions. The problem was to determine which military strategy was feasible given the military balance between the parties. Until June 1972, Sadat and his military commanders did not believe they had a viable military option.
The reasons for such bleak assessments within the Egyptian high command are the lessons learned in the 1967 war and the War of Attrition. In the Six Day War, Egypt learned that it could not fight a blitzkrieg type war against Israel. To regain the Sinai in a general war, Egypt would have had to engage the Israeli forces in the Sinai where any general war involved mobile armored warfare. The Israeli army was superior to the Egyptian army in the air and in armored battles.139 Thus, a large-scale, mobile, armored battle, involving tanks, aircraft, paratroopers, and motorized artillery and infantry, was ruled out. The major problem Egypt faced was a weak air force that could not provide the necessary air cover to protect ground operations. Any successful attack was at risk of turning into a major failure because of the Israeli air superiority. The Egyptian high command was skeptical of Egypt's capability to conduct even limited military operations and believed that the military balance was actually worsening from Egypt's perspective.140
The other option available to Egypt attrition warfare, appeared appealing at first glance. The Egyptian army was better suited for defensive warfare and Egyptian soldiers fought well in such wars.141 Static defensive warfare was advantageous from Egypt's perspective because the quantitative edge played an important role in such a war and Israel's advantages in mobile warfare was neutralized. In addition, static defensive wars caused many casualties and Israel was known for its sensitivity to casualties. An attrition strategy, however, was ruled out as a viable option because of the experience gained in the War of Attrition.142 Israel demonstrated that it had the capability to inflict greater pain on Egypt than Egypt was capable of inflicting on Israel even in a static defensive war. Israel was able to use mobility in a static war and use its air force effectively against SAMs and ground forces as well. Furthermore, the War of Attrition exhausted its usefulness because, after the massive Soviet involvement, it was unlikely that Israel would fight another war of attrition under unfavorable conditions. Renewed attrition warfare was likely to invite a massive Israeli reaction and the Egyptian high command was fully aware of that.
Thus, until June 1972, the Egyptian high command lacked a viable military strategy. Egypt was also deterred from challenging deterrence by Israel's threat to the interior, Egypt's major population centers, and its economic and industrial infrastructure, threats to which Egypt did not have a response. Israel's punishing raids on Egypt's interior during the War of Attrition traumatized the Egyptian military command, who did not envision a successful challenge to Israel without insuring first a comparable counter-threat to Israel's population centers. Surface-to-surface missiles, MiG-23s and SCUDs were necessary before any kind of strategy had even the slightest chance of success.143
What eventually enabled Egypt to challenge deterrence and find a successful strategy? Two changes, one in June 1972 and the other in early 1973, enabled Egypt to go to war. First, Egypt's military strategy changed. Egypt designed a limited-aims military strategy that took advantage of its superiority in anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems. On June 6, 1972 during a meeting of the Egyptian high command, Ismail Ali, the Chief of Intelligence, reported that Israeli superiority in the air was still decisive and that Egypt would not be able to attack Israel successfully.144 In that meeting Sadat said he understood the military's concern about going to war before Egypt had the capability to deter an Israeli attack on Egypt's populations centers. But he also made a major conceptual leap by asking a simple question that no one else asked before. He asked, "What are we to do if the political situation would force us to go to war before we reached the ability to neutralize Israel's threat to attack Egypt's interior?"145 This question opened the way to Egypt's reconceptualization of its strategy and led to the adoption of a limited-aims strategy which enabled the Egyptians to overcome Israel's deterrence. This question forced the Egyptian high command to think of a third option as an alternative to the diplomatic option and the all-out-war option, alternatives that were losing strategies from Egypt's perspective.146
Second, after Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet advisers, arms deliveries from the Soviet Union began reaching Egypt in an accelerated fashion.147 By August 1973 Egypt had received a large number of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as SCUD missiles which could strike at Israel's population centers. Thus, Egypt's population centers were no longer held hostage to Israeli air superiority, and Egypt could effect a limited ground attack without the fear that Israeli superiority in the air and in mobile warfare would come into play.
Thus, an overall military-political strategy began to emerge and promised for the first time a chance of success. Egyptian decision-makers were no longer in the "domain of loss." Egypt would deliver an assault across the Suez Canal, capture the Bar Lev line and establish 5 bridgeheads of 10 to 15 kilometers in depth, under the cover of SAMs and antitank missiles.148 Then, Egypt would assume a defensive strategy and inflict massive casualties on Israeli forces which, using offensive strategies, would be trying to dislodge the Egyptians from the captured territory.149 The ultimate goal, however, was not a general military victory but the political repercussions of the limited military challenge. A limited Egyptian victory would force Israel and the United States to reevaluate their positions at the negotiating table.150
We see, then, how Egypt's strategy evolved and what were the determining factors in its decision to challenge deterrence. In light of this analysis, how do Stein's criticisms fare? There are two problems with Stein's interpretation. First, Stein's analysis misses the important variables in the causal chain to deterrence failure in the Yom Kippur War. The decisive factor which enabled Egypt to challenge deterrence was the adoption of a limited-aims strategy. Being able to counter Israel's capability to attack Egypt's interior made the decision tochallenge easier still. That Egypt decided on a limited-aims strategy the consideration that Egypt was the weaker state, and that future trends indicated that in the near future Egypt was going to get weaker still, were irrelevant issues to the decision to challenge.
Sadat's assessment that Egypt's capability had reached its peak was not the cause for the deterrence failure. His negative assessment of the military trend led Sadat to search for, and adopt, the limited-aims strategy which made the overall relative balance of forces irrelevant. Had Sadat continued to plan a general war ,which was perceived by all Egyptian decision-makers as a losing strategy, Egypt would not have gone to war even if it reached the conclusion that the trends in relative capabilities was only going to worsen with time.151 The "all-out offensive" strategy led to no offensive because it relied on a decisive, conventional advantage, and an answer to Israel's nuclear capability. Soviet refusal to supply Egypt with such weapons and guarantees ruled out an all-out offense regardless of the peak Egypt reached, as long as Israel continued to have the above mentioned advantages. For a limited-aims strategy the relative trends in capability, Israel's nuclear option (applicable to vital interests but not to a war in the margins), and the fact that Egypt reached a peak from which its capability was only going to worsen, were irrelevant. The limited-aims strategy was a politico-military strategy, not merely a military one.
Evidence for this conclusion can be seen in another point that challenges Stein's interpretation. The assessment that the trends in relative capability were not going to improve was made as early as June 6, 1972. In the meeting of Sadat with his general command, Shazli discussed the problem of adverse trends in the military balance. Shazli said that Egypt could not wait until its air force would become a realistic match to the Israeli air force and argued that the trend was only going to get worse from Egypt's perspective. Even if Egypt received all the planes it requested from the Soviet Union, argued Shazli, the United States was determined to keep an Israeli superiority over all the Arab confrontation states combined. Israel, according to Shazli, was better at absorbing new airplanes and therefore the military gap was going to remain the same or worsen over time from Egypt's perspective.152 It is at that meeting that Sadat made the great leap in his conceptualization of the problem by finding an alternative strategy to either diplomacy or all-out war.
We should note that despite the negative assessment of the negative trend a challenge to deterrence did not take place at the time. On the contrary, five months later in October 1972, Sadat had to dismiss his top military commanders for refusing to prepare Egypt for attack. In the absence of the concept of a limited-aims strategy, despite the assessment of the negative trend, deterrence held.
That the negative trend in the balance was discussed in other meetings as well can be seen in a meeting of the Egyptian high command on June 20, 1972, organized by the commander-in-chief General Sadeq. At that meeting the director of military intelligence imitated a report by a Soviet journalist in which the journalist asked the Egyptian intelligence commander how Egypt planned to go to war when any time the Soviets supplied Egypt with new weapon systems Israel received newer weapons still. The Soviet journalist observed to the military intelligence field commander that the gap between Israel and Egypt would never close and might even become larger. Does it mean, he asked, that Egypt would never fight?153
We see, then, that the Egyptian political and military command was aware that the trend in military capability was adverse from Egypt's perspective as early as June 1972. It did not lead to an order to challenge deterrence. It lead to the realization that only a limited-aims strategy was a viable strategy which in turn made the problem of relative capability irrelevant. However, even when Egypt decided on a limited-aims strategy it did not simply decide to challenge. Even within the limits of a limited-aims strategy Egypt worried about Israel's capability to inflict great costs on the Egyptian interior and only after the Soviet Union provided Egypt with a counter threat, SCUDs, did Egypt decide that it was in a position to challenge deterrence.154
Further evidence that Sadat's decision to challenge in 1973 was not related directly to the assessment that Egypt's military capability had peaked can be seen in the fact that Sadat seriously weakened Egypt's military capability when he decided in July 1972 to expel Soviet personnel. This decision was opposed by Sadat's military advisers who argued that Soviet personnel played a vital role in Egypt's air defense systems as well as in its electronic warfare fighting ability.155 Thus, the evidence suggests that it is not the case that Sadat's decision to challenge deterrence was made when he assessed that Egypt had reached the peak of its capability but a case in which Sadat reached his decision to challenge deterrence because he found a viable limited-aims strategy in which the overall balance of forces, and their trend, was irrelevant.
In conclusion, Stein's argument that the assessment of future trends played an important role in Egypt's decision to challenge deterrence in 1973 is not supported by a closer analysis of the evidence. The decision to challenge was made after a limited-aims strategy was adopted and this strategy made the issue of relative balance irrelevant. Therefore, the 1973 case is quite different from the 1941 Japanese case. The argument that the challenger's inferiority is only a temporary deterrent because challengers find strategies to design around the defender's superiority will be discussed more fully in the section that evaluates the Yom Kippur War as a deterrence success or failure.
Crisis Bargaining Behavior
This case did not involve a crisis stage in which general deterrence failed first and as a result of the irresolute behavior of the defender an immediate deterrence failure occurred as well. Rather, this is a case in which the challenger preempted. A detailed discussion of the period before the outbreak of the war is, therefore, unnecessary, but a few points are in order. Egypt's preemption is consistent with Fearon's prediction that if the challenger's prior beliefs are that the defender will fight, immediate deterrence is unlikely to hold and challenger's are likely to preempt.156 Immediate deterrence efforts by the defender have no chance of success. At most the challenger might postpone his attack in order to enjoy the benefits of a surprise attack.
One of the reasons Israel was reluctant to mobilize its forces was that the Israeli decision-makers thought that their relationship with Egypt resembled the conditions that characterize a spiral model. The Israeli leaders feared that their defensive actions, mobilization, would make the Egyptian leaders insecure which in turn would trigger an Egyptian attack. Israeli decision-makers should have realized, however, that they operated in a deterrence model and given the warning that Egypt was going to attack, they should have preempted. The Israeli decision was, of course, motivated by their fears that in case they preempted the American administration would stop arms shipments to Israel, arms that might be crucial in a prolonged war.157
While the crisis bargaining period before the Yom Kippur War was practically non-existent, the diplomatic phase was quite long. critics of deterrence argue that deterrence will succeed if defenders send, in addition to signals of resolve, signals of reassurance. If defenders provide challengers with diplomatic opportunities in which concessions and reassurance are offered, challengers are likely to have a high expectation of a favorable diplomatic outcome and are less likely to resort to war. When challengers perceive that their goals cannot be attained by diplomacy they resort to war.158 Israel did offer Nasser the Sinai in return for a peace agreement reached through direct negotiations. Nasser rejected the offer and argued that what was taken by force will be taken back by force.159 What was Sadat's position?
Stein argues that Sadat was willing to accept a peace agreement without a normalization of relations in return for Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. Sadat even considered Israel's offer of an interim agreement along the canal. But the two sides were unable to agree on the terms of an agreement. In 1972 Sadat negotiated with the United States in an attempt to get the Americans to pressure Israel to soften its bargaining position. While the perception in Egypt was that the chances for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict were small, as long as there was movement on the diplomatic front, deterrence, according to Stein, held. By 1973, Stein argues, Egypt lost any hope that a diplomatic solution could be found and decided that only a military action was likely to force the parties to the conflict to reevaluate their positions. The challenger's estimate of alternatives to war played, according to Stein, an important role in the failure of deterrence.160
The problem with Stein's argument is that there is a difference between a situation in which the defender provided the challenger with opportunities to bargain and negotiate and a situation in which the defender had to capitulate to the challenger's demands. In the period leading to the Yom Kippur War, as well as during the War of Attrition, Israel used reassurance and was willing to negotiate.161 What Israel could not accept were terms that required it to relinquish the territories without a peace treaty. Sadat's rejection of diplomacy was not a result of an uncompromising Israeli stand. Sadat was unwilling, and Stein notes this, to make the kind of compromises that were necessary to insure the success of the diplomatic process. While Sadat was more accommodating by far than Nasser was in his approach to the resolution of the conflict, and his acts were more than a ploy to drive a wedge between Israel and the West, his actions fell short of the kind of radical change that was necessary to reach a peace agreement. It was not until 1977 that Sadat was willing to consider the kind of a peace agreement that Israel envisioned.
Sadat's position on the interim agreement, as well as his stand on the general terms for a peace settlement, were not acceptable to Israel. Dayan's interim agreement proposal is a good example which demonstrates Israel's attempt to find solutions that would ultimately lead to the resolution of the conflict and that diplomacy failed because Egypt demanded that its conditions be met without addressing Israeli concerns and interests. In October 1970, Israel offered Egypt an interim agreement in which Israel would withdraw its forces from the canal to the Mitla and Gidi strategic passes.162 The logic of the offer was straightforward. Egypt would be able to reopen the canal and resettle the cities evacuated during the War of Attrition. Egypt would benefit from this arrangement first, by resolving the political problems caused by the displaced population of the canal's cities and second, by collecting the revenues from the canal traffic, revenues which stopped after the closing of the canal as a result of the Six Day War. The reopening of the canal was also perceived in Israel as benefiting the strategic interests of the Soviet Union, Egypt's patron.
Israel would benefit from this arrangement because it would be able to hold onto the Sinai more effectively with a smaller military force. The physical features of the Sinai were such that the two passes created two critical bottlenecks controlling the land access from Egypt to Israel. If the area between the canal and the passes were to be demilitarized, then Israel would have the necessary time to stop the Egyptian forces along the passes, in case of an Egyptian attack, until the Israeli reserves were mobilized and sent to reinforce the front. In addition, the discussion and possible acceptance of the plan held the promise of continued cease-fire and United States political and material support.
Moreover, this arrangement held the promise of reduced military friction between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. This in turn held the promise of a change in the political atmosphere between the two countries which would enable the establishment of new arrangements that would ultimately lead to a final resolution of the conflict.163 It is important to note that the alternative to a limited agreement was a general agreement in which Israel's and Egypt's demands were total. Israel demanded total peace. Egypt demanded that Israel return all Arab territories and address the rights of the Palestinians. Israel viewed the last demand as aiming at the dismantling of the Jewish state in favor a Palestinian state. Therefore, a comprehensive agreement was not politically feasible at the time and required a major change in the form and content of the parties' position.
Egypt's response came on February 4, 1971. Sadat demanded an Israeli withdrawal from the canal under a cease-fire agreement as a preliminary step towards an agreement on a timetable for the implementation of Resolution 242. A few days later Sadat demanded that a partial Israeli withdrawal be carried out to a line east of El-Arish. He also declared that the cease-fire would be limited in nature. While he promised to open the canal within six months he said that he would not allow Israeli shipping until Israel withdrew from all Arab territories and resolved the refugee problem. Thus, Sadat's February 4 initiative demanded that Israel withdraw to the El-Arish line, a major Israeli withdrawal, for a period of six months, and immediately thereafter to the international border. Sadat also demanded that Egyptian forces cross into the Sinai and continued to insist that Egypt preserve the right to renew the fighting if a general agreement was not reached.164
Israel still viewed Sadat's position as an attempt to get all the territories, including the rights of the Palestinian, without agreeing to reach a reconciliation with the state of Israel.165 In response to Nixon's April 1 reply, Sadat agreed to practical steps for the separation of forces in the Siani when the Israelis retreated, but argued that Egyptian forces would follow Israeli forces into the Sinai and that the demilitarization of the Sinai was unacceptable to Egypt. When Egypt signed the "Treaty of Friendship" with the Soviet Union on May 25, the Israelis became convinced that Egypt was trying to use the same strategies it used unsuccessfully in the past in its dealing with Israel. Egyptian goals were to regain the Sinai through superpower pressure on Israel without being willing to make any significant concessions in return in order to transform the conflictual relationship into a conciliatory one.
On June 15, 1971 Israel presented its conditions for an interim agreement in which it demanded that the cease-fire be extended indefinitely, that Egyptian troops not be permitted east of the canal, that effective inspection agreements be arranged, that the interim agreement be severed from other Egyptian demands and that further Israeli withdrawals would only take place in return for a peace settlement. Being sensitive to Egypt's need to demonstrate its sovereignty over territories evacuated by Israel, Dayan was willing to consider symbolic Egyptian presence east of the canal if it were not to exceed 750 soldiers.166 Sadat, however, made the agreement on the interim agreement conditional on Israel's acceptance of Egypt's terms for the final settlement, and was unwilling to say publicly that the PLO might have to accept a small state in the Gaza and the West Bank. Israel was not willing to accept the risks involved. Finally, after another visit to the Soviet Union in October, Sadat rejected the idea of an interim agreement and argued that the issue was not only an Israeli withdrawal from the canal and the Sinai but the rights of the Palestinian people as well. Israel responded positively to Rogers' "proximity talks" idea, but Sadat, after still another visit to the Soviet Union on February 2, 1972, announced that he had terminated his discussions with the Americans.
Sadat's changes of position created in the minds of the Israeli and the American administrations a perception that he was not strong enough to reach a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel. Even Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet advisers was not perceived as a significant concession. Sadat was neither making a complete shift in his alliance policy from the Soviet to the American camp nor was he willing to make a significant concession to the Israelis. In 1972 Sadat still wanted to force the United States to pressure Israel to make concessions instead of making the kind of concessions that were necessary to bring about a change in Israel's perceptions of Egypt's intentions. The United States' position, in the meantime, moved closer to the Israeli position. The United States supported the Israeli demand that the territories would only be exchanged for a full peace and, in the absence of such an arrangement, that the interim agreement would be separate from the more complex Israeli-Palestinian issue.
Egypt demanded that its forces move into the area evacuated by Israel, and that the Israeli withdrawal would be part of a larger timetable for a withdrawal from the rest of the Sinai. Sadat insisted on tying the interim settlement with the general settlement on Arab terms.167 In response to the proximity talks formula suggested by the United States, Sadat rejected the idea of an interim agreement and claimed that the issue was the territories and the rights of the Palestinians. Israel could not accept Egypt's position because it called for an Israeli withdrawal without a peace agreement. The Israelis feared a repeat of 1956 when an Israeli withdrawal did not lead to a peace treaty.
The argument that the absence of a diplomatic alternative is a major cause for deterrence failure does not fare well in this case. Israel was concerned with reducing Egypt's incentives to challenge deterrence and addressing Egypt's concerns. Israel was willing to relinquish the Sinai in return for full peace. In the event that such a comprehensive settlement was not feasible, Israel was willing to negotiate an interim agreement that would create the conditions for further agreements. The diplomatic option failed not because Israel was not willing to negotiate or address Egyptian concerns but because the gap between the parties was too wide. Sadat was more willing than his predecessor to consider a peace treaty but he was not willing or able to agree to the kind of peace Israel envisioned.
Stein's argument that deterrence held when Egyptian leaders saw some prospect of bargaining and that their choice to use force was motivated by the absence of hope for diplomatic progress is problematic for another reason as well. It is difficult to ascertain the motivation behind Egypt's decision not to challenge in the first period, because the period in which the Egyptian leaders saw some prospect of bargaining coincides with the time when they also did not perceive a viable military option. In other words, Sadat may not have challenged deterrence not because he perceived that a diplomatic opportunity existed but because he did not have the capability to challenge deterrence. Sadat's February 4 initiative is a good example that illustrates the point. There is still a great deal of debate about Sadat's intentions at the time. Whether Sadat's initiative was a sincere attempt to reach an accommodation with Israel or was a ploy to gain time and improve Egypt's capability, as well as to drive a wedge between Israel and the West, is an unresolved issue.168 On October 24, 1972, at a meeting of the high command, Sadat told his generals that his February 4 initiative was motivated by two considerations. First, Egypt had to gain time because the cease-fire was supposed to expire during that month and Egypt was not ready to renew the fighting. The Soviets not only told Sadat not to expect any military support if the fighting resumed but they also delayed the delivery of missiles that were intended for the defense of Upper Egypt including the Aswan Dam. This consideration played an important role in the deliberations on the resumption of the fighting.169
Second, the Egyptian proposal that Egyptian forces cross the canal and occupy the territory evacuated by the Israelis was intended to minimize the costs associated with a canal crossing when the cease-fire agreement ended six months later. Thus Egypt used diplomacy to improve its military option in case Israel refused to withdraw from the Sinai.170 This evidence suggests that the availability of bargaining space may have had little to do with deterrence stability. Deterrence held because a military option did not exist and diplomacy was used skillfully to create a military option.
Success or Failure?
Stein's strongest challenge to deterrence theory is that a favorable military superiority does not insure deterrence stability. This is a challenge to the core of the deterrence argument. If Stein's empirical interpretations are correct then her argument indeed poses a major challenge to deterrence theory. According to Stein, "an estimate of inferior military capability was only a temporary deterrent to a use of force."171 Such estimates of weakness, according to Stein, do not insure deterrence stability but spur military planners to design around the defender's superiority. She argues that "given the ingenuity of the military mind and the flexibility of modern multipurpose conventional technology, development of such a strategy was only a matter of time."172
The counter-point to Stein's argument is, first, that the difficulty the Egyptian political and military elite had in conceptualizing the limited-aims strategy indicates that designing around is not an easy task that can be easily reached given enough time. It may require, as Shamir argues, creative leaps in conceptualization which do not occur often.173 Second, a defender who is successful in narrowing the range of available options over time makes the task that much more difficult. An infinite number of strategies simply does not exist. Finally, while attrition warfare and limited-aims strategies indicate the failure of deterrence on one level they indicate deterrence success on another. The fact that the challenger used attrition and limited-aims strategies indicate that he was incapable of executing the more dangerous all-out-war strategy. When a lower-level challenge is used for more limited goals deterrence succeeds.
When el-Badri describes the strategies that were available to the Egyptian high command as either a return to the War of Attrition or the launching of a limited war, he fails to describe the process which led the Egyptian high command to adopt the limited-aims strategy as well as discuss when the option became viable.174 The attrition strategy was not a viable strategy as a result of the lessons the Egyptian high command learned from the War of Attrition. The limited-aims strategy did not exist, conceptually, in the minds of the Egyptian military high command at least until June 1972. Until that date, the only strategy contemplated by the Egyptian high command was an all-out-war strategy which meant, given the balance of capability that prevailed between Egypt and Israel, a no-war strategy.
In a meeting with his high command on December 30, 1970, Sadat said, for example, that Egypt's forces should be ready to renew the fighting when the cease-fire expired on February 7, 1971, even if the Soviet Union did not renew its arms deliveries.175 Sadat nevertheless renewed the cease-fire agreement on February 4 and argued, in a meeting held on March 23, 1971, that he was in the midst of a diplomatic campaign to isolate Israel and could not renew the fighting because that goal would not be achieved if Egypt renewed the fighting.
On January 2, 1972 Sadat held a meeting with his military commanders to evaluate the military balance. All the commanders complained about the fact that Egyptian capabilities did not improve and that the Soviets were slow to comply with the arms agreement signed on October 17, 1971. A major concern that haunted the Egyptian high command was Israel's ability to strike deep inside Egypt and the vulnerability of Egypt's populations centers.176
The meeting on June 6, 1972 of the Egyptian High Command was a turning point in Egypt's conceptualization of its available options. During the meeting, Ismail Ali, the Chief of Intelligence, reported that Israeli superiority in the air was still decisive and that Egypt would not be able to attack Israel successfully.177 In that meeting Sadat said that he understood the military's concern about going to war before Egypt had the capability to deter an Israeli attack on Egypt's populations centers. But he also made the major conceptual leap by asking the simple question that no one else asked before. He asked, "what are we to do if the political situation would force us to go to war before we reached the ability to neutralize Israel's threat to attack Egypt's interior?"178 This question opened the way to Egypt's reconceptualization of its strategy and lead to the adoption of a limited-aims strategy which enabled the Egyptians to overcome Israel's deterrence. This question forced the Egyptian high command to seek an alternative to the all-out-war option.179
Shimon Shamir, in his introduction to Shazli's book, remarked that Sadat's conceptual leap is similar to other innovations in that it poses a question in all its simplicity, a question that no one else asked or considered before. Such questions lead to major reevaluations of conventional thinking and to creative discoveries in politics as well as in science.180 This point sheds an interesting light on Stein's argument that developing a 'designing around' strategy is just a matter of time. First, as Shamir's interpretation suggests, finding strategies which design around a defender's capability is not an easy matter. It requires creative leaps in conceptualizing a problem and that may or may not occur. The fact that the Israelis did not conceive the possibility that the Egyptians would adopt a limited-aims strategy is indicative of the problem. Israel's conception of the options available to Egypt included only a general attack to recapture the whole Sinai or a replay of the War of Attrition. Their force structure was designed to meet these two options but not the limited-aims strategy.
Second, and more importantly, the number of options that are available to a challenger is not infinite and it narrows significantly as the enduring rivalry goes through a few deterrence failures. As this case illustrates, Egyptian planners had no other option left but a limited-aims strategy. All the other options were ruled out as a result of lessons learned in previous deterrence encounters.
Stein's argument that the War of Attrition and the 1973 war illustrate the failure of deterrence because challengers always find ways to design around the superior capability of the defender needs to be reexamined and reinterpreted in a different light. As a result of the lessons learned throughout the period and especially during the 1967 war, the nature of the Egyptian military challenge and its goals changed. Rather than challenging Israel's intrinsic interests for the purpose of building a leadership position in the Arab world, regaining the Sinai became the main goal.181 Attaining it in a general war was no longer perceived as a viable strategy.182 The War of Attrition and the 1973 war were fought for the regaining of the Sinai and were limited in nature; attrition in the first challenge and the capturing of a narrow strip on the East bank of the canal in the latter. Thus, the success of deterrence can be detected in the fact that the challenger sought more limited goals and realized that the range of options available to him to achieve these goals had narrowed down.
The Yom Kippur War, the last Egyptian challenge, is a good case in point. While Lebow and Stein consider the war a major failure of deterrence theory because it demonstrates that highly motivated challengers are willing to go to war when the balance of capability favors the defender, the nature of the war and its conduct are rather indicative of deterrence success. The 1973 Egyptian war plans provide a good example of Israel's credible deterrent threats. First, Egypt's behavior before the 1973 war contrasts sharply with Egypt's behavior in 1967. In 1967, Egypt all but welcomed a confrontation while in 1973 it went to war knowing it would consider the war a success if very limited objectives were achieved. Second, of the three military options available to Egypt--blitzkrieg, a war of attrition, and a limited-aim war, only the last option was perceived to be viable as a result of reputations developed by Israel in the 1967-1970 period. The strategy of blitzkrieg was written off because of the 1967 experience.183 And the strategy of a war of attrition was rejected because Israel demonstrated its willingness to pay a high cost in men and material during the 1969-1970 War of Attrition. Egypt also feared that Israel would escalate the conflict.184
Thus, the use of force does not necessarily reflect deterrence failure but at times it demonstrates deterrence success. The longer term historical perspective shows that the plans to capture a narrow strip of land in the Sinai posed no existential threat to Israel's survival. The real test of deterrence success, to use Rabin's words, is whether deterrence "deflected [the challenger] to a less dangerous [challenge]."185 It did, because Israel's reputation for capability reached mythological proportions, as can be seen in the fact that both Syria and Egypt would not exploit their initial successes.186 After the Yom Kippur War, which almost ended in another disaster, Sadat was willing to make the necessary concessions he was unwilling to make only two years earlier, beginning a process that eventually led to the signing of a peace treaty.187 Stability on the Egyptian-Israeli axis exists to this day.188